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Abstract: ANTECEDENTES DE LA CUESTIÓN Y OBJETIVOS PROPUESTOS El 
objetivo fundamental de la misma es analizar en profundidad el 
componente familiar de la migración internacional y su impacto sobre la 
naturaleza y composición de los flujos así como sobre la ulterior 
integración de los inmigrantes en las sociedades de acogida. En 
concreto, la tesis pretende: 1) Determinar la importancia numérica y la 
secuencia temporal de la inmigración de tipo familiar – generada tanto 
por la reagrupación familiar como por la importación de cónyuges. 2) 
Examinar qué factores hacen que los inmigrantes aceleren o difieran en 
el tiempo la reagrupación de sus familiares más cercanos (cónyuge e 
hijos) en el país de destino 3) Analizar cuáles son las características 
individuales y las condiciones contextuales que hacen más probable que 
un(a) inmigrante soltero(a) elija como esposa(o) a un nativo, a otro 
inmigrante o a un co–nacional que aún reside en el país de origen y que 
es “importado” al país de destino a raíz del matrimonio. 4) Investigar si el 
tipo de familia y la secuencia migratoria dentro de la misma tienen algún 
impacto sobre la estructura del hogar (nuclear vs. extenso) y la 
participación laboral de las mujeres inmigrantes en el mercado de 
trabajo receptor. METODOLOGÍA El caso de estudio elegido es el de la 
migración a Alemania durante el período 1960-2000. La metodología 
utilizada para el desarrollo de los capítulos de contenido empírico es el 
análisis estadístico por medio de modelos de regresión logística y de 
modelos de análisis dinámico comprendidos dentro de lo que se conoce, 
genéricamente, como técnicas de análisis de historia de acontecimientos 
o, por su nombre en inglés, “event history analysis”. En concreto, se 
aplican tanto modelos de riesgo acelerado (“Accelarated Failure Time” 
Models) como modelos de tasa de transición (“Transition Rate Models”). 
APORTACIONES Los resultados de la tesis ponen en cuestión la 
descripción más habitual del proceso migratorio hacia Alemania que se 
inició con los programas de reclutamiento de trabajadores extranjeros a 
mediados de los años 50 y principios de los 60. En contra de lo que la 
mayoría de estudios del área mantienen, la tesis demuestra que el 
proceso de reagrupación familiar, especialmente la reagrupación de las 
esposas, comenzó mucho antes de que el gobierno alemán decretase el 
cese de los programas de reclutamiento a finales de 1973. Es decir, que 
el cierre de fronteras a la inmigración laboral en 1973 no fue el 
detonante de la reagrupación familiar y el establecimiento permanente 
en Alemania, pues este proceso había comenzado desde el momento 
mismo en que se inició la contratación de trabajadores extranjeros. 
Además, la medida que más aceleró el proceso de reagrupación de los 
hijos no fue el cierre de fronteras a la inmigración laboral asociada con el 
establecimiento permanente de los inmigrantes en Alemania, sino las 
reformas acometidas en el sistema de ayudas por hijos llevada a cabo 
en 1975. En relación con lo anterior, la tesis identifica el flujo de 
“esposas importadas” como el fenómeno característico de la emigración 
adulta hacia Alemania desde los antiguos países de reclutamiento desde 
finales de los años setenta y, sobre todo, a partir de los ochenta. La 
importancia de este tipo de nueva inmigración vinculada a las decisiones 
matrimoniales de, especialmente, los hijos de los originales 
“trabajadores invitados” queda puesta de manifiesto no sólo por su 
magnitud dentro de los flujos actuales de inmigración, sino también por 
las implicaciones que la misma pueda tener de cara al proceso global de 
integración de los inmigrantes en Alemania. Las parejas en que uno de 
los cónyuges fue importado por el otro son más proclives que el resto a 
vivir en hogares extensos; además las esposas importadas revelan una 
vinculación más débil con el mercado de trabajo alemán que otras 
mujeres inmigrantes, lo que se relaciona en gran medida con su 
concentración en trabajos a tiempo parcial peor retribuidos que el resto. 
Por último, la tesis demuestra que el efecto de las medidas restrictivas 
adoptadas a mediados de los setenta no fue tanto el de acelerar la 
reagrupación familiar sino el de alterar la selección de los nuevos 
inmigrantes que llegaron desde entonces y, sobre todo, dificultar 
enormemente su integración laboral, en especial la de las mujeres en 
edad adulta. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Immigration policies ultimately result in the selection of 
households rather than individuals. However, receiving countries 
rarely explicitly adopt a household approach when designing and 
implementing their immigration policies. The formation and 
settlement of immigrant families and the consequent development 
of “permanent” immigrant communities in their territories is 
usually presented by politicians as an unforeseen and unwanted 
outcome of their original decisions to admit foreign workers as a 
remedy for temporary labor shortages. Politicians often argue that 
their country has to accept further immigration because of 
international commitments to the protection of fundamental 
human rights which includes, among others, the right to family 
life. In fact, family-linked migration has effectively become the 
major source of new immigration to developed countries and, thus, 
also one of the fundamental sticking points of the debate about 
how liberal democracies should manage increasing ethnic 
diversity in their territories.  
This dissertation is precisely devoted to the study of the family 
dimension in international migration and how it relates to the 
integration of immigrants in their host societies. In particular, it 
focuses on the analysis of two main aspects of international 
migration: 
1) The structure of family-induced chain migration in its 
twofold form of family reunification and family formation through 
the importation of spouses. 
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2) The relation between different patterns of family-linked 
migration, the structure of immigrant households at destination 
and the post-migration labor behavior of immigrant women.  
The study of these issues requires taking the household as unit 
of analysis. In addition, especial attention must be paid to the role 
of women within immigrant households and to the interactions 
between the wife and the husband. Finally, gender differences in 
the impact that the family life cycle impose on the migration of 
men and women has to be taken in account as well.  Accordingly, 
in the two next sections, I will briefly review the previous studies 
on these topics within the field of international migration. Then, I 
formulate the main research questions that this dissertation aims at 
answering, present the case study, the data and the method utilized 
in the empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude with the dissertation 
outline. 
 
 
1.1. Families and women in migration theory 
 
Immigrant communities are the result of immigration flows 
that that are caused by many different factors. International 
differentials in wages and employment conditions, capital 
constraints that make it difficult for families in developing 
countries to protect themselves against a variety of market 
failures, structural requirements of the demand for labor in 
industrial and service economies, the penetration of capitalist 
modes of production and labor relations into developing countries 
and, in general, globalization, have been some of the causes cited 
for explaining the initiation of immigration flows from less 
developed to developed countries. 
Traditionally, the dominant approach in studying international 
migration was founded on neoclassical economics, which 
conceives migration to be a consequence of the disequilibria in the 
international market caused by geographical differences in the 
supply of and demand for labor and the resulting wage 
differentials across countries. At the individual level, such 
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employment and wage differentials lead people to make a cost-
benefit calculus by comparing present income and expected 
earnings at destination over a certain time horizon; if expected 
earnings are higher than present income after discounting the costs 
of migration, individual rational actors will migrate (Sjaastadt, 
1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970). 
Although economic motivations play a key role in shaping 
individual migration decisions, the standard individual cost-benefit 
approach - still prevailing in many economic accounts of 
migration- offers an excessively atomistic view of the migration 
process that largely overlooks the wider socio-economic context in 
which individuals make their decisions, as has been highlighted by 
the macro-structural approach since the late seventies (Piore, 
1979). In order to avoid both the atomistic view prevailing in 
micro-economic models of migration and the risks of an over-
socialized view implicit in the studies inspired by economic 
dependency theories and the world system approach, authors from 
a variety of disciplines including anthropologists (Wood, 1981; 
Pessar, 1982), economists (Mincer, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 
1982; Stark, 1984; Stark and Bloom, 1985), and sociologists 
(Findley, 1987; Massey et al., 1987) insisted that families rather 
than isolated individuals are the principal agents of migration 
decision-making. In their article “The New Economics of Labor 
Migration” (1985), Oded Stark and David E. Bloom put it as 
bluntly as follows: 
 
“Just as it is clear that neither a brick nor a bottle of wine can decide 
to move between markets, so should it be equally clear that a migrant 
is not necessarily the decision-making entity accountable for his or 
her migration. Migration decisions are often made jointly by the 
migrant and some group of non-migrants.” (174) 
 
Consequently, they argued, important issues related to 
migration would be better addressed by focusing on more 
intermediate units of analysis such as the household. A central 
tenet in the “New Economics of Migration” - which is not new 
anymore - is that families develop economic strategies not only to 
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maximize earnings but also to minimize risk: the household buys 
insurance by placing different household’s members in different 
markets whose outcomes are not positively correlated. If this is the 
case, individuals would engage in international migration even in 
the absence of wage differentials, which challenges the principal 
assumption of the neoclassical approach. Neoclassical economics 
assumes that people move abroad permanently to maximize life-
time earnings and, thus, remittances are viewed as anomalous 
behavior. On the other hand, the New Economics of Labor 
Migration assumes that migrants are target-earners who only leave 
temporarily in order to overcome market deficiencies in their 
home countries. Within this framework, remittances appear 
therefore as the logical mechanism to assure the redistribution of 
the gains derived from the household’s migration strategy (Stark 
and Lucas, 1985; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Galor and Stark, 1990; 
Durand et al., 1996). Not only is the issue of migrants’ remitting 
behavior better addressed by the New Economics of Labor 
Migration, but the new approach appeared also better equipped for 
explaining other migration-related phenomena such as the non-
migration of part of the household and the eventual return of the 
member(s) who left. All these topics received the attention of 
migration scholars in the early eighties in relation to the 
unexpected developments of migration flows in Europe and the 
political reactions of many receiving countries to those 
developments. 
However, one of the most important issues related to 
contemporary international migration that the New Economics of 
Labor Migration could not account for in a satisfactory way was 
the maintenance of the migratory flow even when the original 
causes for its initiation have lessened or disappeared. Network 
analysis and the idea of “cumulative causation”, applied to the 
field of migration studies by Douglas Massey in 1987, came to fill 
this void. Due to the development of social networks that 
progressively reduce the costs of international movement and alter 
individual motivations, argued Massey, household strategies for 
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survival and community structures evolve in ways that lead to 
more migration. 
Although migrants’ networks are not restricted to those of kin, 
the centrality of family ties in easing and promoting international 
migration is well-established. Households that have relatives 
living in destination areas, or that have members with experience 
in those areas, are more likely to send migrants than those who do 
not (Massey, 1987; Massey and España, 1987; Massey, 1990; 
Massey and Espinosa, 1997). The causal mechanism commonly 
argued to account for the correlation of migration risks across 
members of a social group is a social capital effect: family ties 
across borders function as a channel for information transmission 
that lowers the costs of migration to create further links in the 
migration chain. 
The role of networks, however, and of family networks in 
particular has hardly been studied outside the Mexican-US 
immigration experience. Several reviewers of the subject have 
remarked that the immigration literature in Europe, in contrast to 
North America, yields little in the way of quantitative analysis 
documenting the effect of network ties in promoting and 
sustaining international movements (King, 1993; Massey et al., 
1998). Moreover, attempts to distinguish the supposed family-
based network effect and competing hypothesis are still rare even 
in the US literature. As Spittel (1999) and Palloni et al. (2001) 
have noted recently the migration of several members of the 
household might be the result of joint decision making and 
household’s strategies of risk diversification, that is, the sequential 
migration of relatives is linked to the purpose of family 
reunification and settlement rather to a social capital effect (see 
Spittel, 1999 and Palloni, Massey et al., 2001). But the process of 
family reunification as such remains a topic largely overlooked in 
the specialized literature of migration. Boyd (1989), in her 
assessment of the immigration literature in the late eighties, stated 
that the three major areas of research for the next decade would 
be: 1) to specify further the process of chain migration in relation 
to immigration law, 2) to more deeply analyze the structure of 
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family induced chain migration and, 3) the nature of sponsorship 
and its effects. However, there has been little progress in this 
direction. 
There are several reasons why such a relevant research line 
has not been fully developed so far. The lack of adequate 
statistical information has consistently been found to be a major 
obstacle. Official statistics on reasons to migrate or even 
admission category are quite limited, and survey data on the 
household structure and the sequence of migration within the 
household are far less frequent (Kofman, 1999, 2004; Coleman, 
2004). It is not clear, however, whether this is a cause or a 
consequence of the lack of attention paid to this issue (Zlotnik, 
1995: 230). Family-linked migration has traditionally been seen as 
a secondary form of migration subordinate to and divorced from 
labor markets, usually equated with permanent settlement. In part 
because of the legal distinctions made by the host country’s 
regulations, and in part because it mostly involves women and 
minors, family-related migration is often labeled as “non-
economic”. Actually, women have also been widely assumed to 
migrate first and foremost for “family reasons”. Terms like 
“trailing spouse” or “tied mover”, which are commonly applied 
describe the women’s experience of migration, largely respond to 
this view. But such characterizations are facile if not inaccurate, as 
I demonstrate in this dissertation. 
Since the mid-eighties, a growing body of literature has 
challenged the neglect of women in migration studies. Under the 
influence of feminist scholarship, various studies have criticized 
the view of the household as a migratory unit governed by the 
principles of reciprocity, solidarity, consensus and altruism, which 
had prevailed up to that point in migration research. In their rush 
to rescue immigrant women from invisibility, they focused on 
“women only”. Moreover, trying to discredit the aforementioned 
idea that women migrate mainly for family reasons, a myriad of 
monographs and case studies have reproduced women’s histories 
of migration; preferably, those of unmarried or divorced women 
who had migrated independently of men. Unfortunately, these 
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studies often focus on migration patterns that still remain a 
minority within overall female migration and, consequently, they 
unintentionally enhanced the traditional exclusion of women from 
the mainstream study of immigration and also retarded our 
understanding of how gender as a contextualizes immigration for 
all immigrants, not only for women (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1999; 
Pessar, 1999). In fact, the actual “engendering” of international 
migration studies has occurred much more recently and, largely, 
thanks to the joint analyses of men’s and women’s migration 
experiences and the insertion of such experiences within the 
(family) life-cycle. 
 
 
1.2. Migration from a life-course approach 
 
Migration commonly entails changes in parallel careers. 
Migration is often connected to changes of status in the labor force 
or changes of marital status.  But there are also effects in the 
opposite direction: changes in family or occupational careers can 
trigger (or inhibit) migration. This complexity of effects calls for a 
theory and examination of migration from a whole life-span 
perspective. In fact, over the last two decades a growing number 
of studies have tried to integrate migration within the wider 
context of a life-span and disentangle the connection between 
migration and other crucial events in individuals’ lives. 
Sandefur and Scott demonstrated as early as 1981 that the 
decline in migration propensity with advancing age predicted by 
the human capital model of migration tends to disappear when 
differences in the family life-cycle are taken into account. Since 
then, two facts have been repeatedly asserted in this regard. First, 
that international migration is closely associated with other life 
course transitions related to the family cycle (Harbison 1981; 
Chant and Radcliff 1992; Massey et al. 1987). Second, that such 
association exists not only for women, as had been traditionally 
stated, but also for men. This is true even though the direction in 
which reciprocal influences operate may vary by gender (Parrado, 
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2003). In other words, it can be said that the consideration of the 
linkages between family-life cycle and migration allows for an 
appropriate introduction of the idea of “household strategies” and 
“gender” into immigration studies. 
Marriage and child-bearing embody different household 
demands for men and women over the family-life cycle, which are 
likely to considerably affect their respective motivations, 
propensity and timing to migrate, as well as migrants’ labor 
behavior at destination. Evidence for Mexican migration to the US 
suggests, for instance, that men more often migrate in response to 
the economic necessities of a growing family: young children and 
a larger number of children seem to increase men’s odds of 
migrating (Massey et al., 1987; Espinosa and Massey, 1997). In 
contrast, the rate of movement among women remains quite low 
throughout the early years of having a family (Brettell 1986; 
Kanaiaupuni 1995, 1998; Hoodar 1992). In particular children of 
pre-school age appear the biggest deterrent to women’s migration, 
whereas older children and extended family members enhance 
females’ mobility (Escobar et al. 1987; Casillas Moreno 1985; 
Young 1978; Stier and Tienda 1992; Kanaiaupuni 1995). 
While the effect of children on male or female migration is 
fairly well understood in the Mexican-US case, the evidence 
concerning the different impact of marriage on men’s and 
women’s propensity to migrate, and the timing of their migration, 
remains controversial. Stark (1988) suggested a couple of decades 
ago that “marriage, migration and related phenomena such as 
marital stability, fertility and investment in human capital may be 
better explained by studying marriage and migration jointly”. 
However, empirical studies aimed at disentangling the reciprocal 
influences between marriage and migration, are still limited and 
inconclusive. While Kanaiaupuni (1995) found a significantly 
higher likelihood of migration among cohabitating women and no 
effect on men’s propensity to migrate, Donato and Kanaiaupuni 
(2000) concluded that marriage reduced women’s odds of 
migration. In the case of men, Massey et al. (1987) stated that 
never-married men were never the most likely to migrate, whereas 
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newly married husbands and fathers of older children appeared the 
least likely to migrate to the US. However, Kanaiaupuni (1995) 
concluded that marriage displayed no effect on men’s propensity 
to migrate. A recent study by Parrado (2004) helps greater 
understand the complex link between men’s international 
migration and marriage in Western Mexico. As the author shows, 
international migration has both positive and negative effects on 
men's marriage and, thus, the net association will vary according 
to the particular migration experiences. The likelihood of marriage 
is lower for Mexican men while they are residing in the US, but 
upon returning to their home communities they are in a better 
position to form a union. The main motor behind the positive 
association between migration experience and marriage for men is 
the effect of labor migration on men's transition into adult 
economic roles. By facilitating access to home ownership, land 
acquisition, and business formation, a period of migration to the 
U.S. provides Mexican men with the necessary capital and 
financial resources to start a family.  
Trying to take research on these lines a bit further, Cerruti and 
Massey (2001) studied the relationship between the timing of 
marriage and migration, the stage in the family-life cycle and its 
relationship to post-migration labor force behavior, for both men 
and women. Although their results tended to support the 
conventional wisdom that among women the decision to move 
stems more from family than from work considerations, the 
authors admitted that this fact does not exclude the possibility that 
participation in the workforce may ensue after migration. 
Furthermore, in the case of women, it is possible to note 
significant differences across generations: for women whose 
mothers were also immigrants, migration appears in many cases to 
be part of a broader labor market strategy and they remain more 
likely to migrate and participate in the labor force even after 
getting married. 
All these studies, although very innovative, limit their analyses 
to the Mexican-US immigration experience. In Europe, the 
connection between migration, family formation -both nuptiality 
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and fertility- and changes in female labor force participation has 
been extensively examined in the context of internal migration 
(Courgeau, 1985; Mulder and Wagner, 1993; Boyle, Halfacree and 
Smith, 1999; Boyle, Cooke et al., 2001). Yet, the scarcity of 
similar studies for immigrants of foreign origin living in European 
countries remains astonishing, with the exception of the 
Netherlands, where fertility and marriage patterns of both Turkish 
and Moroccan women has been closely studied (Schoorl, 1990; 
Hooghiemstra and Manting, 1997; Hooghiemstra, 2001; Lievens, 
1998, 1999; Reiners, 1998). 
 
 
1.3. The research questions and their relevance 
 
Bearing in mind the current state of migration research, as has 
been shown in previous sections, what this dissertation aims to do 
is to clarify the link between the family-life cycle of individuals, 
the timing of their migration and their post-migration behavior in 
several areas of their socio-economic life such as their marital 
choices, structure of the households and labor behavior, which are 
relevant for the general process of integration of immigrants in 
their host societies.  
I will analyze this triple linkage (family-migration-integration) 
in the specific case of postwar immigrants in Germany. By doing 
this, some evidence about the European experience could be added 
to the academic discussion on these issues, which has been very 
US-biased to date. 
Family ties in migration are, therefore, the focus of this 
research. I first analyze the importance of family ties in generating 
chain migration through two main channels: 1) the reunification of 
spouses and children left behind by migrants who were already 
married at the date of migration and, 2) the “importation” of 
spouses –actual or intended- by migrants who were still single at 
migration, that is the so-called ‘family-forming migration’ or 
‘marriage migration’. Secondly, I examine whether and how 
different patterns in the process of family reunification and/or 
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formation affect the post-migration behavior of immigrants with 
regard to their living arrangements and labor performance. 
The distinction between family reunification and family-
forming migration is a very basic but important one. Because both 
types of family-linked immigration are commonly seen as 
“unwanted chain migration”, politicians, journalists, statisticians 
and researchers tend to include them within the same general 
category of “family reunification”, which has favored the blurring 
the proper understanding of the family component in European 
immigration inflows during the last decades (Kofman, 1999; 
2004). Family reunification can only be accomplished by adult 
first generation immigrants who were already married at the time 
of their arrival to the host country and, therefore it is likely to die 
out relatively soon after the flow started. On the other hand, 
family-forming migration or the importation of prospective 
spouses from the sending countries can be prolonged much longer 
in time, depending on whether the middle, second and further 
immigrant generations decide to bring their partners from their 
parents’ home country or to marry someone else at destination. In 
fact, spouse migration has begun to replace family re-union of 
existing spouses and of other dependants as a major migration 
stream in many receiving European countries. However, in most 
countries no numbers can be put upon this phenomenon, which 
feeds stereotypes and distorts the political debate around the issue. 
Beyond the fact that it encourages the growth of ethnic 
minorities and, therefore represents a clear threat for the 
restrictionist admission policies currently in vogue within the 
European context, family-linked migration and, especially, the 
importation of (new) spouses is also seen by the receiving 
countries as a serious threat to the integration process as a whole. 
Family reunification is generally interpreted as the logical 
consequence of the failure of labor importing countries in 
enforcing the rotation principle underlying most programs of 
temporary recruitment. In contrast, family-forming migration or 
importation of spouses from other countries tends to be conceived 
as an indicator that integration is failing in that youths of 
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immigrant origin show a preference for marrying within their own 
group. 
In order to shed some light on the issues raised in the previous 
paragraphs, the first part of this dissertation is aimed at answering 
the following research questions:  
Which is the numerical significance of the two main forms of 
family-linked migration? Do they affect different genders and 
ethnic groups symmetrically? Do they co-exist or rather, does one 
precede the other? 
When and why does labor migration turn into family 
reunification? How is the process of family reunification 
organized: in a staggered way or all at once? Are there variations 
by ethnic origin? Do some groups tend to bring their relatives to 
the immigration country faster than others? If so, why? Do these 
variations in the pattern of family reunification reflect differences 
in the migration strategy, the household structure and the socio-
economic conditions in the sending area or in the context of 
reception? Do some immigration policies trigger (or delay) the 
process of family reunification?  
Has the practice of importing spouses evolved as a way of 
circumventing increasing restrictions to entry in Western 
European countries or does it rather reflect the survival of 
traditional forms of marriage among immigrant communities? 
Who are the immigrants who “import” their spouses, and why do 
they not marry natives or other immigrants within their own 
national group? Is it to do with family pressures and 
traditionalism? Or is it rather a mechanism developed by single 
immigrants to cope with sex imbalances within their own 
immigrant community? Does the propensity to import partners, 
mix-marry or marry within their own community vary across 
generations? Why? 
In the second part of the dissertation, I try to deepen our 
knowledge of the connections between family ties and 
immigrants’ integration. Towards this aim, I have chosen two 
spheres of socio-economic life relevant for measuring integration 
and upon which family ties may have important effects: living 
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arrangements and labor participation. A long debate exists about 
whether the availability of a dense network of family support in 
the country of destination favors or hampers the integration of 
immigrants in their host societies. Some argue that family 
(reunification) actually facilitates integration and serves to 
promote economic and social cohesion; while others, on the 
contrary, argue that individuals who receive aid upon arrival 
become dependent upon their kin for support and are, 
consequently, less aggressive in confronting new social situations. 
With regard to living arrangements, the main question is 
whether the type of partner who immigrants marry influences the 
structure of the new households resulting from different types of 
immigrants’ unions. Nuclear families are the dominant 
arrangement at present time in Western societies. Accordingly, 
extended households are seen as potentially more problematic for 
integration as they involve more traditional forms of family 
relationships. The main question leading this analysis is whether 
immigrants who import their partner from their (parents’) country 
of origin are also more likely to live in extended households. If so, 
this would confirm the dominant view that the importation of 
spouses is strongly associated with arranged marriages and, thus, 
diminished freedom of choice for individual immigrants in family 
decisions. 
Secondly, I will also analyze the impact that different patterns 
of family formation have on the labor behavior of immigrant 
women during their stay abroad. Participation in the labor force is 
commonly seen as a motive for migration but also, especially in 
the case of women coming from less developed countries, as an 
integration marker. It seems, therefore recommendable to analyze 
whether family reasons for migration exclude labor participation, 
as has been widely assumed in the past, or not. And more 
generally, how do differences in the sequence and pattern of 
marriage, migration and child-bearing affect the labor behavior of 
immigrant women? In this part of the dissertation, therefore, I will 
try to answer the following questions: 
14 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
Are wives who are reunited with their husbands less likely to 
work than their non-reunited counterparts? If so, is it due to a 
more family-oriented orientation in their migration project, or 
rather to differences in their socio-demographic characteristics 
such as educational skills that render their employability more 
difficult and less profitable? Does the context of reception make 
any difference in this regard? 
Are imported brides the most reluctant to participate in the 
paid labor force? If so, is “traditionalism” the main reason for 
this? Or, on the other hand, is it differences in the family-life cycle 
the main factor that accounts for their behavior? 
How are the labor decisions of immigrant wives related to 
their husbands’ characteristics? Do immigrant women work 
exclusively to finance the human capital investment of their 
husbands? Or to complement household income when their 
husbands are unemployed? 
 
 
1.4. The German case 
 
A large proportion of the current immigrant population in 
Germany originated in the massive recruitment of foreign labor 
begun in the late fifties. The ultimate goal of the recruitment 
scheme was to satisfy the increasing demand for labor, which 
could not be filled with native workers, in the cheapest and 
quickest way. Although other European countries like France or 
Switzerland also implemented measures of this type at some point 
after the II World War, nowhere did it reach either the magnitude 
or level of administrative organization as it did in the German 
case. Germany, unlike their neighbors, lacked past colonies to rely 
on as a source of cheap labor, which lead to an active involvement 
of the state in the recruitment system as the best strategy to cope 
with labor shortages and facilitate economic growth. The guiding 
principles established in the bilateral treaties that established the 
process of the selection and hiring of foreign workers were 
“temporariness” and “rotation”. Both these principles aimed at 
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avoiding the permanent settlement of foreigners in the territory of 
the Federal Republic. Yet, neither rotation nor temporariness was 
strictly enforced by the German authorities as it became clear that 
such principles were not in the interest of either immigrant 
workers or their employers. On the contrary, foreign workers 
progressively prolonged their stay and strengthened their legal 
status. This development, however, took place for the most part 
against the will of the German authorities and public opinion. 
The admission of foreign workers to Germany had been 
systematically justified and accepted, from its very beginning, on 
the basis of economic considerations. Accordingly, when growth 
rates declined and unemployment started to rise in the early 
seventies, labor migration was called to a halt. The recruitment 
freeze was intended to prevent the number of foreigners in 
Germany from rising. It did not. According to conventional 
accounts of postwar migration, migrant workers feared that they 
could not return to Germany if they went home and, instead, 
decided to stay and bring their families, who had been left behind, 
to Germany (Martin, 1998; Werner, 2000). The halt on 
recruitment is usually seen, therefore, as the triggering event for 
family reunification and the consequential transition from a guest-
worker system to an immigration system. Such transition is 
traditionally characterized by a growing number of wives and 
children in foreign entries and parallel increases in the foreigners’ 
dependency ratio (number of foreigners to number of foreign 
workers), which grew from 1.7 in 1973 to 2.3 in 1980. In words of 
Constant and Massey (2002): 
 
“The first guest workers were generally young men unaccompanied 
by wives or children. […] The situation changed dramatically in late 
1973. […] In November of that year Germany suspended guest-
worker recruitment. Authorities expected the migrant population to 
dwindle slowly as visas expired and the guests rotated out. They 
were surprised to discover, however, that neither employer nor 
guestworkers behaved according to plan (Mark and Miller, 1980). 
Employers wished to avoid the costs of recruitment and retraining, 
and thus sought to extend the visas of the foreign workers they 
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already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not want to give up their 
good jobs and steady income, so they stayed put. Rather than leaving 
they sought to sponsor the entry of their wives and children. After 
dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign population of Germany rose and 
its composition shifted increasingly from workers to dependents. 
Since 1974 most immigrants to Germany have come through family 
reunification.” (6)  
 
These transformations forced the German authorities to 
redesign progressively their policy towards aliens and start 
considering the need to integrate those who, despite official 
attempts to promote their return, decided to stay with their 
families. While 1973 certainly constitutes a critical turning point 
in government immigration policy, it is questionable whether it 
was also the crucial turning point for the migrant’s decisions to 
bring their families and settle permanently in Germany. The effect 
of this policy change on migration patterns, and those on women 
in particular, was probably more complex than generally assumed; 
it rarely occurs that migrants adjust their plans and behavior in 
accordance with the policy statements of the authorities of the host 
country. However, the absence of studies that systematically 
analyze the changes in sex and age composition of inflows, in 
reasons for migration and in the labor market behavior of 
immigrant women, among others, has to date hampered a more 
detailed account of the historical development of the immigration 
process to Germany. This dissertation aims to offer a more 
comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned issues, which help 
our understanding of when and why temporary labor migration 
turns into permanent immigration. 
The exceptionality of the German case should not be 
considered an obstacle in achieving this goal, but rather an 
opportunity. What is unusual in the German case is the active 
involvement of the state bureaucracy in the entire recruitment 
process, along with a lingering reluctance towards migrants’ 
permanent settlement and promotion of their integration (Soysal, 
1994). These features make Germany the ideal case study to 
critically test the current feasibility of immigration policies that 
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ignore the family dimension of individuals’ migration. In fact, the 
alien’s right to reunify the family is said to have revolutionized the 
underlying conception of German immigration policy, based to 
that point on the “gastarbeiter” scheme (Marzal, 2006). Therefore, 
it can be said that the German case and its experience with the 
recruitment of foreign labor offers a great opportunity to analyze 
the impact of state regulations on the features of immigration, its 
volume and composition, and on the migrants’ behavioral patterns 
during their stay abroad. In particular, it provides a great 
opportunity to analyze the impact of state policies on migrants’ 
patterns of family formation and/or reunification and how they 
relate to the economic strategies of immigrant families. 
 
 
1.5. A Quantitative approach. Data and categories of analysis 
 
Family-linked migration is not homogeneous but encompasses 
several different forms, with fluid and interacting categories, 
making it difficult to construct a simple and unambiguous 
typology. The different types of movements that occur in relation 
with family aspects of migrants’ life are not necessarily reflected 
in statistical data, which remain very crude and do not allow for 
the tracing of the (re)composition of family groups across space 
and time. In fact, the distinction between migration for the purpose 
of family reunification and family-forming migration has 
remained largely overlooked in the specialized European 
migration literature due, basically, to data limitations (Kofman, 
1999, 2004; Coleman, 2004). Moreover, within the European 
context official statistical classifications often reflect state 
regulations concerning different types of entry permits rather than 
self-reported reasons for migration or actual family links among 
newcomers and current-residents. As a result, in order to analyze 
all the aforementioned issues, we are usually reliant on small-scale 
ethnographies and autobiographical narratives of migrant families’ 
and women’s histories (for Germany see Goodman, 1984, 1987; 
Yuecel, 1987; Inowlocki and Lutz 2000; Erel 2002; Erel and 
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Kofman 2002; Treichel and Schwelling, 2003). This type of 
studies, even though they provide us with rich detailed 
information on the every-day life of immigrants that are 
tremendously helpful in formulating hypotheses and articulating 
detailed explanations of aggregate patterns, often make the 
drawing of conclusions about changes over time or across 
generations or groups of origin very difficult. Therefore, they 
suffer from an inherent limited capacity for generalization, which 
can only be overcome by utilizing larger sample sizes and 
appropriate specialized techniques of statistical analyses. 
In order to deal with these issues in the most appropriate 
manner, the empirical analyses carried out in this dissertation are 
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a wide-
ranging representative longitudinal study of private households 
living in Germany since 1984. Unlike other large-scale surveys of 
this type, GSOEP offers the advantage of including a special sub-
sample made of households whose head was a national of one of 
the five largest recruitment countries that sent foreign labor to 
Germany between 1960 and 1973 (i.e. Turkey, the former 
Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Greece). Three major features make 
GSOEP particularly fitted for the aim of this dissertation: 1) it 
includes information on all household members, which permits the 
reconstruction of the family migration pattern; 2) it includes 
retrospective information on family and work biographies since 
the age of 16, which allows us to analyze how events in each of 
these two parallel careers relate to each other; 3) it is longitudinal, 
which means that the same private households have been surveyed 
annually since 1984 and, therefore, it is possible to follow the 
same individual and his (changing) family circumstances during 
his entire stay in the host country. 
In sum, the structure and range of information contained in 
GSOEP permits us to take “women within households” as the unit 
of analysis and examine issues such as marriage, child-bearing and 
decisions about participation in the labor force within a dynamic 
framework. Moreover, differences between different generations 
of immigrants’ and distinct national origin groups can also be 
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analyzed. The central variables that structure the empirical 
analysis carried out in this dissertation are, therefore, age at 
migration and marital status at migration. By separating out 
individuals who were single at their time of arrival in Germany 
from those who had married before migrating, I am able to 
distinguish the process of family reunification -which only affects 
those individuals who already had a family at origin before 
migrating- and the process of family formation -which affects 
those individuals who were still unmarried at the time of arrival 
and got married during their stay in Germany, regardless of their 
generation. By taking into account the age at arrival, on the other 
hand, I am able to separate first, middle and second generations, 
and examine how behavioral patterns in different fields of the 
individuals’ socio-economic life have changed over time. 
The inherently dynamic dimension of migration and of the 
integration process into the host societies will be taken into 
account not only by comparing the behavior of different 
generations, but also by applying statistical techniques of event 
history analysis. Although the application of these techniques has 
been relatively common in the study of Mexican migration to the 
US, in Europe the few migration studies that have utilized event 
history analysis are almost exclusively concerned with internal 
migration and housing relocation (Courgeau, 1990; Wagner and 
Mulder, 1993). In this dissertation, the application of dynamic 
models will enable us to disentangle the overlapping effects of 
assimilation, cohort and period effects. In addition, its application 
is also key to understand the role of the halt on recruitment and 
other restrictive measures approved in the mid-seventies on the 
pace of family-linked migration. 
 
 
1.6. Structure of the dissertation and chapters’ outline 
 
This dissertation comprises three main parts. The first 
describes ‘the case-study’ and the dataset that I will employ in the 
following empirical analyses. In the second part, I will analyze the 
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family dimension involved in immigration to Germany, in its 
twofold modality of family-reunification and family-formation. 
Finally, in the third part, I examine the employment cycles of 
female immigrants in Germany and how they relate to women’s 
migration and family careers as well as to changes in the context 
of reception. 
Part One is divided into two separate chapters: 
Chapter 2 describes the process of international migration to 
Germany between 1955 and 2000. For the sake of brevity and 
consistency with the issues dealt with in the following chapters, 
three aspects are paid particular attention: 1) the recruitment 
experience, 2) the presence of immigrant women in immigrant 
inflows from different sending countries and its variations 
throughout the entire process and, 3) the policy measures dealing 
with family reunification and marriage migration over a period of 
almost fifty years. Apart from providing a general overview of the 
whole immigration process, which will be examined later in the 
dissertation, the aim of this chapter is to challenge the dominant 
periodization of the process made by most conventional accounts, 
according to which temporary labor migration of single, young 
men was followed by a family reunification and settlement period, 
dominated by wives and children of established guest-workers. 
 Chapter 3 presents the dataset that will be utilized in the 
statistical analyses carried out in the following chapters, which is 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2002). Here, I deal with 
technical issues such as the selection of my sample, identification 
of the second generation and reconstruction of families and their 
migration and labor biographies over time, and I assess the 
advantages and limitations of GSOEP dataset to the study of 
international migration. In the final part of the chapter I carry out a 
preliminary description of the sample paying attention to central 
variables for my analysis such as gender, period of arrival and 
marital status at migration. This description provides the basis for 
the subsequent analysis of family reunification and family 
formation processes among immigrants in Germany. 
Part Two is divided into two chapters: 
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Chapter 4 examines the process of family reunification 
undertaken by those (male) immigrants who had already 
constituted their own (nuclear) family before migrating to 
Germany. First of all, I compare the picture of the process of 
family reunification drawn from the information available in the 
German official statistics, on the one hand, and the individual data 
of GSOEP, on the other. Next, I utilize GSOEP to separate out 
spouse’s and children’s reunification and then analyze the factors 
that delay or accelerate the occurrence of each of these related 
processes. One of the key questions to be answered by these 
analyses is the extent to which family reunification was the 
response of immigrants to the recruitment stop in 1973 or, rather, 
an ongoing process that reflected variegated family migration 
strategies. 
Chapter 5 turns the focus on those immigrants who were 
unmarried at migration and examines their marital choices while 
living in Germany and how these marital choices are associated 
with the formation of nuclear vs. extended households after 
marriage. The analysis of marital choices made by single 
immigrants allows me to explore the importance of family-
forming migration and the factors underlying this particular type 
of endogamous partner choice among immigrants. The 
comparison between “importers”, on the one hand, and immigrant 
men and women who either mix-marry or marry other co-national 
immigrants already in Germany, on the other, provides a great 
opportunity to understand better the forces driving this type of 
new immigration to Europe. In addition, towards the end of the 
chapter I also explore the connection between marital choices and 
the structure of newly formed immigrant households (nuclear vs. 
extended), which can be taken as a relevant marker of immigrants’ 
integration. 
Part Three is divided into two chapters: 
Chapter 6 analyzes entries into the German labor force of first 
generation immigrant women. The main goal in this chapter is to 
test the idea that adult women migrated to Germany mainly for 
family reasons and, therefore became economically dependent of 
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their husbands. Accordingly, I examine the importance of the 
effect that being a “reunited wife” might have had, on the one 
hand, and changes in the immigration policy and in the macro-
economic conditions in the German labor market, on the other, 
taking into account differences in women’s participation in the 
labor market. 
Chapter 7 extends the analysis in the previous chapter by 
examining also the determinants of women’s exits from the labor 
force and their subsequent re-entry. In order to investigate whether 
exits were voluntary or not, I separate exits to inactivity from exits 
to unemployment and compare the factors explaining each type of 
transition out of employment. 
The dissertation ends with a concluding chapter, Chapter 8, 
where the main findings and implications of the study are 
presented and discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. THE GERMAN CASE 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In May 2004, the number of foreigners in Germany amounted 
to 6,717,115, which represented approximately 9% of its total 
population (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2005). About a 
quarter of these seven million foreigners are second-generation 
immigrants, that is, people born in Germany to immigrant 
parents.1 These figures clearly indicate that, despite the official 
discourse, Germany has become an immigration country. In fact, 
Germany is the country with the largest proportion of foreigners 
within the EU and one of the most influential states in the design 
of the incipient immigration and asylum policy at EU level.  
In this chapter, I will describe the process of migration to 
Germany that has generated such a large immigrant population 
over the last fifty years, focusing on the changes in the 
immigration policy and how it affected the demographic profile of 
the immigrant population and the family dimension of the process. 
 
 
                                               
1 The reason why most second-generation immigrants remain 
foreigners despite being born in Germany has to do with the German 
notion of citizenship, which represents the paramount paradigm of 
restrictive naturalization policies based on the “ius sanguinis” or descent, 
instead of the “ius solis” or birth right (Brubaker, 1992). 
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2.2. A brief historical account of postwar migration to 
Germany 
 
During the Nazi regime, the German industrial capacity 
expanded tremendously and the consequent labor demand was 
easily satisfied with prisoners of war and forced labor, amounting 
to almost 8 million in 1944 (Mehrländer and Schultze, 1992:7). 
Although the war severely damaged the transports’ network, it did 
not dramatically affect German industrial capacity. In fact, the 
main economic problem at the end of the conflict was not the 
reconstruction of factories and industrial machinery but rather 
capital and labor shortages. While capital needs were more or less 
resolved through the Marshall Plan and the currency reform in 
1948, labor shortages appeared more difficult to solve.2 They 
emerged first in agriculture, a sector often rejected by the 
“Vertriebene” population who were mostly of urban origin and 
relatively well educated.3 As early as 1953, farmers in the 
Southwestern regions had articulated demands for importing 
foreign workers in order to satisfy their demand for labor (Herbert, 
1990: 204). But the unemployment rate was still high in many 
other regions of the country and the German government initially 
rejected their demands. The Ministries of Economy and Nutrition, 
however, had overtly supported the idea of recruitment, arguing 
that labor shortages may generate serious inflationary pressures. 
Barely two years later, the Government modified its initial 
position about the issue and signed a bilateral recruitment 
agreement with Italy (22 December 1955). 
During the first few years of implementation of the agreement, 
the number of Italian workers who entered Germany annually 
                                               
2 The Federal Republic of Germany received 1,390.6 million of 
dollars between April 3, 1948 to June 30, 1952, according to the 
Statistics and Reports division of the Agency for International 
Development in 1975. 
3 Vertriebene population is expellees from the former German 
territories in the east, annexed by Poland or the Soviet Union after 1945. 
In 1960, they made up 25% of the total population in Germany. 
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stayed at rather low levels. This satisfied the demands of the trade 
unions, who were still quite reluctant accept to the idea of foreign 
labor as the right strategy to cope with labor shortages. Besides, 
the unions did not feel so threatened because most of these 
recruited workers were effectively employed in agriculture. 
However, conditions in the German labor market gradually 
improved and labor shortages expanded beyond the agricultural 
sector. In 1960, the number of job vacancies surpassed the number 
of unemployed people for the first time since 1945, which 
intensified the fear of recession, especially if labor shortages 
continued growing.  
The labor supply from Italy was clearly insufficient, despite 
the fact that the number of Italian workers tripled between 1959 
and 1960 (from 50,000 to 144,200, approximately). In response, 
two new bilateral recruitment agreements, following the Italian 
model, were signed with Greece and Spain in 1960. This was, 
however, a short-lived solution. In 1961, the stream of refugees 
from East Germany, which had alleviated the labor needs of the 
German economy up to that moment, was abruptly stopped by the 
construction of the Berlin Wall. Pressures to find countries willing 
to send their citizens to work in Germany increased and, in 
October, a fourth recruitment agreement was signed with Turkey. 
Other three minor agreements followed with Morocco (1963), 
Portugal (1964) and Tunisia (1965). Although a sudden recession 
interrupted recruitment in 1966, the rapid economic upsurge 
permitted the reactivation of the hiring of foreign workers with 
renewed enthusiasm. In fact, the German government signed one 
more agreement with Yugoslavia in 1968 and, over the next five 
years, the annual average surplus of foreign immigrants was 
387,000 (Münz and Ulrich, 1997). 
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Figure 2.1. Total inflows, outflows and net migration, 1962-1978 (only 
five largest nationalities) 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. Several years. Own 
elaboration. 
 
 
In 1973, the number of foreign workers peaked at 2,595,000. 
Such an impressive growth was accompanied by other important 
transformations in the composition of the foreign population. Up 
until 1970, most foreigners (workers or not) came from Italy 
and Yugoslavia, but after 1972 the major source was Turkey. 
In addition, the length of stay of foreign workers was increasing, 
in spite of the non-permanency assumption, which indicated that 
the capacity of foreign labor to function as an effective economic 
buffer was reducing.4 
Aware of these transformations, the government started to 
modify its view on the advantages of recruitment, which had been 
presented as the most efficient way of dealing with labor shortages 
up to that moment. When the oil crisis exploded in late 1973, the 
government indefinitely prohibited further recruitment and 
                                               
4 The rate of return to the country of origin dropped from 30% prior 
to the crisis in 1966 to 16% in 1972.  
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adopted complementary restrictive measures in order to reduce the 
number of foreign residents. However, the foreign population 
continued to grow from approximately 4 million in 1974 to 
4,453,300 in 1980. This implies that at least 450,000 new entries 
took place in the six years following the halt on recruitment.5 
Moreover, political instability in Turkey, which culminated in the 
military coup of September 1980, substantially increased the 
number of Turkish citizens seeking asylum in Germany. The 
German authorities responded with additional restrictions on 
asylum which, along with the deep recession in the early eighties 
and the Voluntary Repatriation Program implemented in 1984, 
was finally successful in curbing the growth of the foreign 
population: in eight years the number of foreigners augmented by 
barely 40,000 individuals (from 4,453,300 in 1980 to 4,489,100 in 
1988). 
However, the so-called asylum crisis was just about to begin. 
Since the late eighties, thousands of asylum seekers and ethnic 
Germans had sought to be admitted into Germany. First, the civil 
war in Sri Lanka and the persecution of the Tamil minority 
provoked a considerable growth in the number of asylum seekers 
in 1986 (almost 100,000 applications). Just a few years later, the 
demise of communism and ethnic cleansing in the former 
Yugoslavia paved the way for a new rise in the number of 
applications, which doubled from 103,100 in 1988 to 193,100 in 
1990 and to 438,200 in 1992. The CSU/CDU-FDP coalition in 
office at that time claimed that the only lasting solution lay in the 
reform of the article 16 of the Basic Law and its open-ended 
clause “persons persecuted for political reasons shall enjoy the 
right of asylum”. The SPD and the Green Party initially opposed 
the reform but a final agreement was reached in November of 
                                               
5 This was a time of high foreigner turnover: some left Germany 
forever but others replaced them and stayed more or less permanently. 
However, it is not possible to identify whether the proportion of these 
years’ growth in the foreign resident population was actually due to new 
entries because the German official figures registered entries instead of 
individuals. 
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1992. The reform consisted of introducing an amendment that 
allowed people who entered Germany through a “safe country” to 
be turned back without a hearing application. By including Poland 
and Hungary in the list of “safe countries”, the reform was clearly 
effective in its goals: the number of applications fell to 322,600 in 
1993, 127,200 in 1994 and hovered around the same figure in 
1995 and 1996, with a further reduction to 104,000 in 1997. Not 
only the inflows of asylum seekers shrank, but also the proportion 
they represented of the total stock of foreigners from 28% in 1993 
to only 16.3% in 1999.6 
The other group responsible for the large increase in total 
immigration to Germany in the last decade was “ethnic Germans” 
or “Aussiedler”, that is, people whose German parents or 
grandparents lived in the German Reich in December 1937. Under 
article 116 of the German Basic Law and German Naturalization 
Law, they and their children remained German citizens even 
though many became Polish or Soviet citizens when some German 
territories were occupied after World War II. Although millions of 
ethnic Germans had moved west after the war, an estimated 4 
million remained in 1950 (Mehrländer and Schultze, 1992). In 
1988 the number of ethnic Germans resettling in Germany rose 
sharply to 200,000 and it approached 400,000 in 1989 and 1990. 
Many came initially from Poland, but within a few years Romania 
and, above all, newly independent states of the USSR became the 
                                               
6 According to the official statistics published by the Federal 
Government's Commissioner for Foreigners in 2000, refugees living in 
Germany were classified as follows: 185,500 were entitled to asylum, 
44,000 were Convention refugees, an estimated 130,000 were relatives of 
recognized refugees and 9,500 were quota refugees; 120,000 were Jewish 
migrants from the states of the ex-Soviet Union, other 120,000 were 
foreigners with a residency permit for exceptional purposes under the 
Aliens Act, 13,500 were homeless foreigners, 255,000 were de facto 
refugees, 264,000 were asylum seekers and about 50,000 were refugees 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina with a temporary suspension of deportation 
(roughly 46,000) or with a residency permit for exceptional purposes 
(roughly 6,300). 
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largest sending areas. The total number of ethnic Germans 
resettled in Germany since 1989 amounted to approximately to 2.3 
million of persons (Dietz, 1999: 1). Note, however, that these 2.3 
million “Aussiedler” are immigrants but not foreigners; they are 
German nationals and, thus, excluded from official figures that 
relate to foreign population. 
This description of postwar immigration to Germany clearly 
suggests that the current immigrant population in the country is 
made up of people who arrived during different periods and from 
different countries of origin. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Year of Immigration of 1995 Stock First Generation 
Immigrants 
 
Source: Mikrozensus, 1995 (Fertig and Schmidt, 2001: 47). 
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Figure 2.2 shows that approximately 65% of the total stock of 
the first generation residing in Germany in 1995 had arrived prior 
to 1985. They do not belong, therefore, to the massive wave of 
asylum seekers who arrived in the nineties, but are linked 
somehow to the previous recruitment experience. This is the 
immigrant population who will constitute the focus of analysis in 
this dissertation, along with in some cases their descendants born 
in Germany. Accordingly, in the next section I will examine in 
detail the recruitment system, the changes it experienced over time 
and the consequences of these changes for the demographic profile 
of the foreign population who arrived between 1955 and 1985. 
 
 
2.3. The guestworkers’ experience and the recruitment system 
 
The conclusion of the recruitment agreement with Italy in 
1955 was not viewed as a fundamental decision in the definition of 
a national strategy for development. On the contrary, it was 
presented as a temporary solution for a sector and region-specific 
problem. But geographical disparities in the needs for labor 
progressively disappeared and full employment was reached in 
1960. At that time, many defended the recruitment of foreign 
workers as the most convenient approach in solving the increasing 
labor shortages that threatened German economic recovery.  
Two additional bilateral treaties for recruitment were signed 
with Spain and Greece in 1960, after the Italian model. These 
three agreements established first the practical details for 
organizing the recruitment process and also distributed tasks and 
responsibilities between the labor authorities of the sending and 
receiving country. Next, the agreement regulated the legal and 
working conditions of recruited workers in Germany. Finally, it 
introduced a clause that allowed the possibility of family 
reunification as long as the worker could prove the availability of 
adequate housing. 
A recruitment office was set up in one or several cities of the 
sending country. The “Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und 
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Arbeitslosenversicherung” collected requests for foreign workers 
from German employers and sent them to their colleagues in the 
sending areas, after having checked that national preference in 
employment had been respected. Job offers had to include 
requirements about skills, characteristics of the post and its 
intended duration. In addition, job offers also had to specify wage 
and working conditions, which could not be worse than those than 
those of a German worker with equivalent qualification within the 
same firm. The contract model included in the Annex of the 
Spanish-German agreement, signed on the 29th of March 1960, 
established: 
 
“En lo referente a retribución, condiciones de trabajo y protección 
laboral, el trabajador español tiene derecho a un trato que no podrá 
ser, en ningún caso, menos favorable que el de un trabajador alemán 
–de la misma empresa- cuyo grado de cualificación sea equiparable.” 
(BOE, 5 de Mayo 1960, Num. 108, 5967) 
 
This type of clause was one of main requirements that the 
German trade-unions imposed as a necessary condition for 
supporting the governmental decision of recruiting foreign labor. 
Priority for German workers and equal wages for natives and 
foreigners assured that German workers would benefit the most 
from recruitment: there would be no displacement effect or 
downward pressures. Moreover, recruitment of foreigners might 
be a cheap strategy for obtaining a reduction in the working hours 
of German employees. Recruitment also benefited employers 
since they were supplied with unskilled flexible labor, which had 
become scarcer and scarcer among natives. 
In this manner, the German government was able to equally 
satisfy workers and employers and, simultaneously, avoid the 
inflationary pressures that would be a consequence of firms 
competing for scarce labor. In addition, the government was also 
aware of the strong political symbolism of recruitment, which was 
presented as a way of enhancing ties between Europeans at a time 
when the EEC was a promising project (Herbert, 1990). Sending 
countries were alleged to benefit from recruitment because 
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emigration relieved pressures in local labor markets, remittances 
would help families left behind and work experience abroad would 
provide foreign workers with new skills, which would contribute 
to the economic development of their own countries. 
Bearing in mind the advantages that recruitment had for each 
of the actors involved in the process, it is not surprising that very 
few voices opposed the idea of hiring foreign workers during the 
initial period. 
Once the list of job offers was sent to the recruitment offices, 
the employment authorities of the sending country pre-selected 
potential candidates that matched the requests made by the 
German employers. Then, the representatives of the 
“Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und 
Arbeitslosenversicherung” in the sending countries screened for 
health and skills (including a criminal record screen), and issued 
work contracts along with a work permit valid for one year for 
each of the recruited workers (Martin, 1994: 200, Werner, 2000; 
Bendix, 1990). Finally, collective transport to Germany was 
arranged and after a long trip, workers were sent to their 
respective firms and began work one or two days after arrival. 
Some employers also paid for housing at destination and the cost 
of the return trip. However, this was optional and German trade 
unions rarely monitored this closely because poor housing for 
foreigners did not affect native workers in any way (Bendix, 
1990). 
It is important to highlight the fact that the process of 
recruitment was highly selective. In addition to the self-selection 
inherent in labor migration, the German authorities further 
selected from the pool of those available the most suitable 
candidates to meet German employers’ demands. Health tests 
carried out by the German authorities at the recruitment offices 
have been repeatedly described as particularly strict and 
humiliating. A prospective worker could be rejected for having a 
bad tooth (Goodman, 1984; Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000). 
In 1961, the construction of the Berlin Wall made labor 
shortages even more severe. The number of unemployed people in 
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Germany was only 94,856, against 572,758 vacant jobs. The 
number of workers supplied by Italy, Greece and Spain remained 
totally inadequate to meet the number of annual requests made by 
German employers who, in response, started to personally recruit 
workers from Turkey. In October of that year, the German and 
Turkish governments intervened to regulate recruitment, which 
had already informally begun (Ansay, 1991). The signing of a 
bilateral agreement with Turkey in 1961 transformed both the 
magnitude and, progressively, the conception and implementation 
of the recruitment process itself. First of all, the availability of 
thousands of Turks wanting to work in Germany made the 
recruitment system even more selective, because selectivity is the 
more intense the larger the pool of applicants. As Philip Martin 
put it “[…] With ten Turks wanting to work in Germany for each one 
needed, the Germans could be selective, and they were” (1994: 200).7 
As in the case of the other sending countries, the government of 
Ankara also had its own reasons for wanting to sign such an 
agreement. However, it seems that the Turkish officials did not 
impose themselves during the negotiations and its input into the 
final text was minimal. The agreement clearly reflected German 
preferences. First of all, the Turkish agreement contained a 
rotation stipulation limiting the period of residence to a maximum 
of two years. This provision was not included in the agreements 
previously signed with Italy, Greece and Spain, which only 
established that foreign workers would be issued a residence and 
work permit for one year. This permit could be renewed at a later 
date by the German authorities if the work contract had been 
                                               
7 Ermes and Mattes (2003) stated that “[…] for the recruitment of 
assembly workers doing delicate work in the electronics industry and 
some branches of metal processing there were special vision tests. […] 
The job candidates also had to prove agility of their hands and fingers. 
[…] And many Turkish female employees of Siemens attended courses 
organized by the company in Istanbul, which served the purpose of 
testing the suitability of the job candidates prior to the official tests by 
the official agency.” (171) 
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extended and if there was no apparent harm for the German 
national interest. 
Secondly, the medical examinations carried out by the German 
authorities at the Istanbul Recruitment Office were conducted to 
ensure for securing the best candidate for the employers, but also 
on “epidemic-hygienic grounds” (seuchen-hygienische Gründe), a 
term which was also utilized in the agreement signed with 
Morocco in 1964 (Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000). Moreover, the 
medical and skills tests in the recruitment offices set up in Spain, 
for instance, were carried out by Spanish officials of the Instituto 
Español de Emigración, whereas in Turkey these tests were 
carried out by Germans.8 
Finally, the possibility of family reunion which, although 
officially discouraged, appeared in the agreements with the other 
countries was conspicuously absent from the Turkish one.9 As 
Bendix (1990) has remarked, the most effective manner of 
discouraging -without banning- family reunion was by introducing 
the requirement of “adequate housing”. Trade-unions exerted a 
strict surveillance on employers to secure that wage conditions 
were fulfilled but housing, as it was a “foreigners’ specific” issue, 
was usually neglected (Herbert, 1990).  
                                               
8 See more on the recruitment of Spanish workers in Babiano and 
Fernández Asperilla (2002). 
9 In the German-Spanish Agreement, article 17 established: 
“1) Los trabajadores españoles que deseen que sus familias se reúnan 
con ellos en la República Federal de Alemania y presenten un certificado 
oficial acreditando que disponen de vivienda suficiente al efecto, podrán 
solicitar de la Policía de Extranjeros competente el necesario permiso de 
residencia. La Policía de extranjeros examinará benevolentemente 
(cursive is mine) la solicitud y la resolverá lo antes posible. La Comisión 
Alemana comunicará al Instituto los nombres de los familiares a los que 
se conceda el permiso de residencia. 
2) La ayuda para la reagrupación familiar, bien facilitando vivienda, 
bien participando en los gastos de traslado de las familias, serán objeto 
de regulación en los correspondientes contratos de trabajo o en acuerdos 
posteriores concertados entre el empresario y el trabajador.” 
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The particularities of the German-Turkish agreement clearly 
reveal greater a bigger effort on behalf the German officials to 
prevent extended stays and immigration of the Turkish 
population.10 German officials were increasingly aware of the 
risks involved in the massive recruitment of foreign workers. They 
wanted to limit the possibility of permanent settlement and 
guarantee that foreign labor would fulfill its intended buffer 
function in case of recession; and the rotation system was viewed 
as the best instrument to meet this objective. Yet, on the other 
hand, in the context of the incipient economic boom, the German 
demand for labor kept growing and the recruitment agencies 
abroad found it more and more difficult to meet it. The pressures 
of the Federation of German Employers’ Associations 
(“Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände”) to 
speed up the workers’ selection process multiplied. Employers 
repeatedly voiced their satisfaction with Turkish workers, stressed 
the disadvantages of the rotation principle and, as a result, asked 
for a revision of the German-Turkish agreement that would 
suppress the rotation clause (Erylmaz, 2002). These demands were 
actively supported by the Ministry of Economy and the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry in Germany, but opposed by the Ministry of 
Interior. 
                                               
10 Eryilmaz (2002) interprets these particularities as proving that the 
Turkish agreement was a second class agreement, similar to agreements 
with Morocco (1964) and Tunisia (1965), due to the Muslim factor. He 
says “… German bureaucrats were quite reserved towards the Turkish 
proposal to send workers to Germany because in their eyes Muslim 
Turkey was comparable only with Arabic countries, although Turkey had 
a secular state.” Oswald et al. (2003), in contrast, states that “rather than 
a negative or racist view of the Turks, the motive behind this act of 
discrimination –i.e. the explicit rotation mechanism of the agreement 
with Turkey- was the intensified attempt to erect barriers against 
immigration at a time when the extension of migration seemed 
unstoppable.” (p. 23, foot note 11) These authors note the inclusion of a 
similar clause in the agreement with Portugal (concluded in 1964) as 
supporting their view. 
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Employers asked to increase not only the number of male 
recruits but also female. Some sectors of the German economy 
traditionally considered “female” such as the textile and food 
processing industries, were also experiencing acute labor 
shortages in the early sixties; but the German authorities refused to 
solve them by promoting the labor participation of (married) 
German women because of “family policy considerations”. In fact, 
in 1961, the Federal Employment Service (“Bundesansalt für 
Arbeit”) stated in its annual report: 
 
“[…] There is a large demand for foreign female employees in the 
German economy, half of which could not be met through successful 
placements that actually take place.” (Erfahrungsbericht 
Bundesansalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslossenversicherung, 
1961, p. 14; cited in Erdem and Mattes, 2003: 169) 
 
The influence of the Catholic Church on family policy and 
gender ideologies in countries like Italy made it particularly 
difficult at that time to recruit the number of women required by 
German firms. In addition, German employers usually requested 
mostly single childless literate young women, who were in short 
supply in the sending countries.11 
As a result, the waiting period for filling “female” vacancies 
extended and German employers had no choice but to accept the 
option they had initially discarded: the recruitment of Turkish 
women.12 It had initially begun in an informal way; employers 
                                               
11 Italy, the oldest and largest supplier of foreign immigration to 
Germany until 1971, had consistently sent to Germany a very low 
proportion of women. In 1962, only 11.6% of total Italian entries were 
women. The corresponding percentage of Turkish total entries was 
14.6%, 30% of Spanish entries, and 34.2% of Greek entries. Although 
Yugoslavia had not yet signed its Recruitment Agreement, the flow from 
this country was already substantial at that time and the proportion of 
women was approximately 24.5%. 
12 Erdem and Mattes (2003) cited correspondence between the food 
processing firm “Gifhorn” and officials from the Ministry of Labor on 
the 27th of July and 10th of August 1964 where these type of difficulties, 
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with Turkish male workers in their firms asked them about their 
female relatives in Turkey willing to work in Germany. The 
employers then asked for them formally by name, following the 
traditional visa procedure instead of the system of anonymous 
recruitment. Increasingly aware of the demand for female labor, 
the German authorities adopted several measures aimed at 
promoting Turkish labor migration in those years. First of all, they 
established an open contingent for processing the applications of 
female (suitable) Turkish emigrants: Turkish job centers 
forwarded applications to the German recruitment agencies 
directly, without waiting for older applications to be processed. 
Secondly, age and education restrictions by which illiterate men or 
men over 35 were automatically excluded from the recruitment 
process, did not apply to women (Erdem and Mattes, 2003). 
Finally, in 1964, the Federal Employment Service launched an 
initiative to recruit married couples in Turkey; the recruitment 
offices offered “preferential treatment”, which meant 
inapplicability of the “queuing principle” (Reihenprinzip), for 
Turkish men willing to emigrate if they brought their working 
wives with them. Such an initiative was in overt contradiction to 
the official position concerning family reunification, which was 
not even considered in the Turkish agreement. 
Although family reunification was discouraged in the official 
discourse on recruitment, the idea that the separation of families 
was unacceptable was an argument frequently raised by catholic 
associations, activists for the defense of migrants’ rights, home 
countries’ officials and even by the German employers. Many 
German employers did actually favor “de facto” family 
reunification by requesting a work visa for wives and other female 
adult relatives of their foreign workers, as I mentioned above. By 
doing this, they not only obtained the female labor they needed 
but, at the same time, they guaranteed that their experienced and 
                                                                                                
relating to the excessive delays in filling “female” vacancies through the 
recruitment offices placed in Spain or Greece, were discussed (169 and 
footnote 11). 
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trained male foreign workers would remain, which implied 
savings on the cost of recruiting and training new workers 
(Werner, 2000).13 
The standard recruitment process was anonymous and, 
therefore, did not allow employers to request a specific worker but 
only a worker who fulfilled the job requirements. This is the 
reason why they often utilized the traditional visa system for 
female recruitment, in which the employer stated his interest in 
hiring a specific foreign worker and ordered her visa from the 
German consulate at her country of origin. The consulate, after 
obtaining the approval of the German authorities, issued the visa 
and the worker traveled to Germany where she was awarded the 
residence and work permit, usually also valid for only one year but 
renewable if the work contract got extended.14 The “visa 
procedure” offered clear advantages not only for employers but 
also for those migrants who wished to join their spouses abroad. 
First of all, workers who were personally requested by employers 
jumped the queue. Secondly, the “visa procedure” also guaranteed 
that spouses of workers already in Germany would be sent to the 
same place in Germany where their partners lived, which could 
                                               
13 Employers had to pay a 300 DM (approximately a third of a 
monthly salary) fee for each recruited worker, apart from providing him 
or her with housing. Werner (2000) also added that by employing wives 
of their male guestworkers already employed, employers often saved the 
health insurance on the wives. 
14 The bilateral agreements explicitly recognized this possibility of 
“nominative recruitment” and established that the same procedure would 
be applied also in these cases, although the labor authorities could 
examine the possibilities for making the procedure simpler and quicker. 
The German-Spanish Agreement, for instance, established in article 8: 
“El procedimiento fijado en este Acuerdo para la contratación y 
colocación de trabajadores se aplicará también en los casos en los que los 
empresarios alemanes, en sus ofertas de empleo, soliciten 
nominativamente determinados trabajadores españoles en virtud de 
relaciones personales. El Instituto y la Comisión alemana examinarán 
hasta qué punto puede, en este caso, simplificarse y acelerarse el 
procedimiento.” 
The German case / 39 
 
not be relied upon by anonymous recruitment. In the Turkish case, 
for instance, Paine (1979) confirmed that workers who were asked 
for by name or applied for recruitment jointly with their spouses 
were given priority for acceptance until the reform of the 
recruitment system in 1972. From that date, priority for workers 
who were asked for by name was eliminated but the system 
maintained preferential treatment for applicants with a close 
family member already abroad.15 
Therefore, the possibility that a substantial number of spouses 
and other adult relatives would join their partners in Germany by 
these means (without being counted as entries under “family 
reunification”) should be considered. A considerable number of 
women who were defined as “labor” in official statistics because 
of their admission category (recruitment, either personal or 
anonymous), certainly had relatives already established in 
Germany at the time of their arrival. Thus, they reunified their 
family (or at least their husbands) at the same time they migrated 
as workers. On the other hand, other women admitted to entry as 
tourists or even as relatives (i.e. non-labor categories) might not 
strictly be “dependants”, since they could end up working in 
Germany.16 
As early as 1962, 22% of annual foreign entries and 16% of 
annual labor entries were women. Unfortunately, official statistics 
                                               
15 In addition, the reform of 1972 also gave preference to applicants 
from less developed regions in Turkey, which had clear implications in 
the profile for more recent Turkish immigrants to Germany. 
16 Some figures suggest that the volume of migrants who entered as 
tourists was substantial. For instance, the Spanish Catholic Commission 
of Emigration estimated that approximately 35% of the 444.119 
Spaniards who entered Germany between 1960 and 1971 entered as 
tourists and, therefore, without a signed work contract at origin 
(Asperilla and Babiano, 2002). Among Turkish migrants, the survey 
carried out by the Turkish State Planning Organization in February 1971 
found that roughly 20% of all migrant workers had not been officially 
recruited (See Paine, 1979, Appendix 3 for detailed description of the 
survey). 
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are too raw to allow us to ascertain how many of these women 
migrated only for the purpose of family reunification, how many 
for work purposes and how many for both. But what is quite 
evident is that there were already a substantial proportion of 
women entering Germany even in the initial phases of recruitment, 
and that not all of them were admitted exclusively on economic 
grounds.17 
The previous description has sought to highlight two aspects 
of the process of migration to Germany which are fundamental to 
the argument of this dissertation, but generally overlooked in 
conventional accounts. First of all, legal categories of admission 
do reflect the immigration policy of the receiving states rather than 
individuals’ reasons for migration and/or their post-migration 
labor behavior. This caveat especially applies to married women, 
whose migration generally occurred after their husbands.18 
Secondly, in the first years of recruitment, economic and foreign 
policy considerations were given preference over fears about 
immigration. Measures for facilitating the recruitment of Turkish 
women probably constitute an ideal example of this tendency. In 
fact, in 1964 the German government gave in the employers’ 
pressures and eliminated from the Turkish agreement the clause 
limiting the stay of Turkish workers to two years and included 
some provisions for family reunification.19 
                                               
17 Note the six percentage points’ differential between the percentage 
of women in total foreign entries (22%) and in total labor entries (16%). 
18 Obviously, I do not ignore the existence of a substantial number of 
women who migrated single and, therefore, independently of men. My 
interest here restricts me to highlight the fact that in couples where the 
husband had migrated first to Germany, wives were very likely to have 
utilized the visa procedure in order to join their husbands and obtain, in 
addition, a work contract and a work permit in Germany. 
19 Legally, Turkish workers started to receive equal treatment with 
immigrant workers coming from European Union countries when child 
benefits were revised on June 1, 1963. An agreement on social security 
reached between Germany and Turkey on April 30, 1964 also established 
legal rights guaranteeing Turkish workers equal treatment with German 
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That same year the one-millionth guestworker, a Portuguese 
man called Armando Rodriguez, arrived in Germany. Foreigners 
amounted to 4.4% of the total work force and the first signs of 
prolonged settlement started to appear. The President of the 
Federal Institute for Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und 
Arbeitlossenversicherung) estimated that 10 per cent of the foreign 
workers would stay permanently in Germany. He went even 
further and stated that it was time to realize that the employment 
of foreigners was not merely an economic question and that the 
separation of families was unacceptable (cited in Oswald et al., 
2003: 24, footnote 14). Two years later, he updated his estimate to 
15%. The Director of the Liaison Office in Istanbul, Theodor 
Marquard, stated publicly: 
 
“[…] Most of them will begin a new life in Germany; they will 
sprout roots and visit their home countries only as guests.” (cited in 
Eryilmaz, 2003: 1) 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that permanent settlement was 
perhaps underestimated by the German authorities but never 
ignored, not even at the beginning of recruitment. With increasing 
awareness about the risk of permanent settlement, voices against 
recruitment began to grow. The main arguments for opposing 
recruitment were that the utilization of cheap foreign labor may 
delay the rationalization of production in German industries, and 
that the costs of foreign labor would increase as guestworkers 
prolonged their period of stay. However, the Social-liberal 
coalition in office at the time, leaded by Willy Brandt, rejected 
these and other related arguments and continued supporting 
recruitment as the optimal strategy for assuring economic growth. 
Moreover, the sudden recession of 1966/67 and the reaction of 
foreign workers in the face of it were interpreted as a proof of the 
                                                                                                
workers in other important respects. The revision of the Recruitment 
Agreement in September 1964 was, therefore, one more step in this 
direction. 
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virtues of the system and resulted in enhanced support for it. Not 
only did a high number of guestworkers return home but there was 
a virtual end to new recruitments. Net migration substantially 
reduced from 303,000 in 1965 to 97,000 in 1966; moreover, the 
migration balance became negative in 1967 (- 198,000).20 
In the face of these figures and the extraordinarily quick 
recovery of the German economy (the growth rate was above 8% 
in 1968), the government reactivated recruitment with renewed 
enthusiasm and decided to sign one more recruitment agreement 
with Yugoslavia (1968), which symbolized the beginning of the 
golden age of recruitment. Between 1968 and 1973, foreign 
workers in Germany increased from 1,089,000 to 2,595,000; the 
total foreign population increased from 2 to 4 million residents. 
The foreign population not only grew but profoundly transformed 
itself during these years. In 1972, Turks replaced Italians as the 
largest group both in terms of inflows and stocks, and the number 
of Spaniards and Greeks reduced substantially in favor of the 
Yugoslavs. The presence of women steadily increased until it 
represented 38% of total foreign entries that year. However, the 
proportion of males to females still varied greatly across countries 
of origin. According to official statistics, women represented 37% 
and 41% within the Turkish and Italian communities, respectively; 
77% among Greeks (excluding Berlin), 47% of Yugoslavs and 
52% of Spaniards.21 Finally, children represented 20% of the total 
Italian population in Germany in 1972, 19% of the Greeks, 17% of 
the Spaniards, 15% of the Turks and only 8% of the Yugoslav 
                                               
20 The same trend can be observed if one focuses on labor entries 
instead of total entries, although some remarkable differences by gender 
and nationality appear. Women showed a lower propensity to return to 
their home countries than men during the recession, which intensified 
feminization of the foreign population (Booth, 1992; Paine, 1979; 
Heckman, 1985). 
21 Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, Wirstschaft und Statistik and 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Nürnberg. Cited in Pained (1979), Appendix 2. 
These divergences across nationalities were even larger when sex ratio is 
calculated only for the working instead of the total population. 
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community (Paine, 1979). These children were both children born 
in Germany to foreign parents, and children born abroad and 
brought to Germany by their parents. 
These figures clearly indicate a progressive demographic 
“normalization” of the foreign population in Germany. Such a 
“normalization” process naturally derives from flows 
consolidation, but it can also be triggered by certain measures in 
the immigration policy of the host country such as the reform 
introduced in the Work Permit Ordinance of March 1971. The new 
regulation established that foreign workers who had been 
employed in Germany for five years had the right to apply for an 
unrestricted work permit valid for another five years. The reform 
substantially enhanced the legal status of foreign workers in 
Germany, and seriously undermined the discretional powers of the 
German immigration authorities who were prevented from forcing 
foreigners to return by denying them their permits renewal. 
According to Herbert’s estimations, just a year after the Ordinance 
was approved about 40% of total foreign workers in Germany 
already enjoyed this new privileged legal status (1990: 232).22 
Increasingly aware of the consequences of this measure, the 
government started to modify its position with regard to the 
incalculable advantages of foreign labor. In 1972, the Minister of 
Labor, Mr. Arendt, publicly embraced each of the arguments that 
the economist Föhl had put forward as early as 1964: 
 
“The regional mobility of foreign workers lessens with increasing 
length of stay and the associated fact that such workers are often 
joined by family members and dependents. In addition, a continued 
influx of foreign workers may mean that certain labor-saving 
                                               
22 This 40% was made of approximately 400,000 non-EC workers 
and about 500,000 Italians. Note that, according to official data, in 1972 
approximately 30% of the foreign workers had been living in Germany 
for seven years or longer (Bundesansalt für Arbeit, 
Repräsentativevuntersuchung’72 über die Beschäftigung ausländicher 
Arbeitnehmer im Bundesgebiet und ihre Familien- und 
Levensverhältnisse, 1973: 33). 
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investments are not being made. The upshot of this is that the growth 
rate for labor productivity is sinking. Increasing numbers of foreign 
nationals and longer periods of stay are, at the same time, leading to 
increased private and public expenditures for measures of absorption 
and occupational structuring. Somewhere a point will be reached 
where the drawbacks outweigh the advantages of growth.” (cited in 
Herbert, 1990: 233) 
 
In the summer of 1973, a series of wildcat strikes at the Ford 
factory of Cologne made clear the extent to which foreign workers 
were no longer the flexible and compliant workforce that the 
German government and employers wanted. O’Brien (1992) 
described the Cologne’s events as follows:  
 
“[…] Employers realized with dismay that a united and hostile 
foreign work force could potentially lame the entire economy by 
disrupting production in key sectors. The strikes equally frightened 
German unions. For the foreigners embraced radical forms of 
struggle long eschewed by the unions. In the most dramatic of 
strikes, in the Ford factory of Cologne, Turkish workers took control 
of the plant, severed relations with IG Metal and negotiated 
independently. Germans had long characterized foreigners as 
quiescent and obedient; they now were the “dynamite”, “the time 
bomb” of social conflict and disorder (118).” 
 
With prolonged length of stay, foreigners had inevitably 
strengthened their legal status and organized themselves to 
promote their rights and improve their living conditions in the host 
country. They were highly concentrated in a few sectors and firms, 
their level of union membership had increased considerably, and 
they did not move from one city to another as easily and rapidly as 
before. Therefore, they were less and less suitable to perform the 
buffer function they were originally thought for.  
In addition, the unemployment rate among Germans had 
slightly increased and the government knew that public tolerance 
towards recruitment and foreigners in general heavily depended on 
its capacity to avoid competition between foreigners and natives in 
the labor market. In this context, the need to halt recruitment 
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became evident. Yet, such a controversial decision needed to be 
made at the right time. In July, the government had already raised 
the recruitment fee from 300DM to 1000DM. However, the 
measure proved to be totally insufficient. In November, just a 
month after the OPEC declared the oil embargo on the US and 
increased prices by 70% to North America's allies in Europe, a 
total halt on recruitment was imposed. 
 
 
2.4. The halt on recruitment and the measures against family 
reunification 
 
The government presented the ban on recruitment as a mere 
technical decision aimed at solving a purely economic problem. 
The decree of the Ministry of Labor stated that the hiring of 
foreign workers had to be halted because of the unanticipated rise 
in unemployment. In this manner, the cost-benefit rationale which 
had been consistently utilized for defending recruitment against 
their critics since its inception in the late fifties was now employed 
to suspend it. On occasions, the labor and economic authorities 
responsible for the measure argued that the ban on recruitment 
was equivalent to the measures taken to fight the recession in the 
mid-sixties. Yet, this kind of argument was soon shown to be false 
since recruitment was not resumed as the German economy 
showed the first signs of recovery in 1976. On the contrary, further 
restrictive measures, which suggested the initiation of a totally 
new phase in the process of postwar migration to Germany, were 
approved.  
The halt on recruitment, contrary to what is generally argued, 
did actually accomplish its official objective: to stop labor 
immigration to Germany. Labor entries dropped abruptly in 1974 
and net labor migration turned negative (-140,107), until the 
reactivation of migration from Italy in 1978.23 However, the ban 
                                               
23 Remind here that Italian workers were never subject to the 
restrictions on recruitment because of its EEC membership. 
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on recruitment was unable to prevent relatives of the already-
established foreign workers from applying for admission through 
family reunification provisions. The government realized that 
specific measures had to be passed to achieve this goal and 
initiated what some authors have called “the war on the alien 
family” (O’Brien, 1988). On the 13th of November 1974, barely a 
year after the ban on recruitment was imposed, the Ministry of 
Labor approved a decree which meant that the Federal Institute of 
Labor had to deny work permits to all non-ECC citizens who 
already resided in Germany but who were applying for a permit 
for the first time (Federal Ministry of interior, 2000: 156 ff.). Only 
two exceptions were made to this prohibition. The first was for 
youths who had entered Germany before the 30th of November 
1974. The second exception was for people seeking employment 
in sectors where there was still a special demand for labor such as 
cleaning services or food processing industries, which took longer 
to feel the symptoms of the recession.24 This measure, commonly 
known as “Stichtagsregelung” or “key date regulations”, 
hampered the labor opportunities of, especially, spouses and 
working age children who had recently arrived either as tourists or 
through the official channels for family reunification. The black 
economy was the only option for them to earn a wage in 
Germany.25 Probably key date regulations were aimed at reducing 
family-linked entries by discouraging the migration of those 
relatives who intended to work in Germany but, clearly, its 
primary objective was to protect German workers from further 
foreign competition in a time of recession. 
                                               
24 In November 1975, this second exception was further restricted to 
people who had entered the country before November 1974. 
25 Note here that the upper age limit for reuniting children in 
Germany was 20 until 1978, when the limit was lowered to 17 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit, 1977). This implied that many of the 
foreigners’ offspring between, let’s say, 15 and 20 years old, who had 
joined their parents in Germany and had not a work permit on November 
1974, were subjected to the restriction. 
The German case / 47 
 
The ban on access to the labor market for new arrivals was 
accompanied by other complementary measures also aimed at 
limiting the rate of family reunification. In 1974, for instance, 
another governmental decree prohibited foreigners settling in 
“overburdened” residential areas (i.e. where the percentage of 
foreigners was more than 12% of the total resident population). 
Such a restriction on foreigners’ freedom of residential choice was 
declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
1976. Other legal judgements led also the government to approve 
in June 1977 a partial lifting of the key date regulations for youths 
that had arrived in Germany prior to 31st December 1976. 
However, the “Stichtagsregelung” did not totally disappear until 
April, 1979. Despite its relatively long duration, these tough 
restrictions are often overlooked by the specialized literature on 
immigration to Germany.26 
The other legislative measure that strongly affected the 
immigration dynamics after the halt on recruitment was the reform 
of the children’s allowances or “Kindergeld” in January 1975. In 
1970, the government paid a monthly amount of 25DM for the 
second child, 60DM for the third and the fourth, and 70DM for the 
fifth and each additional child, regardless of the place where the 
child lived. In principle, the entitlement to social benefits depends 
on territoriality, that is, only people who resided within the 
territory of the state that provides the benefit can receive that 
benefit. However, EEC workers living in other EEC countries 
different to that of their nationality, were eligible to receive the 
same amount of money per child as German parents even if their 
children lived in their countries of origin. Owing to special 
bilateral agreements, this option existed also for Greek, Yugoslav, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Turkish workers in Germany. The reform 
                                               
26 Of the many sources consulted, only four mentioned the key date 
regulations as an important measure in explaining German immigration 
policy and immigrants’ performance in the seventies (Dohse, 1981; 
Goodman, 1984; O’Brien, 1988; Erdem and Mattes, 2002). Magnificent 
works like those by Herbert (1990) or Martin (1994; 1999) omitted any 
reference to this aspect of German immigration policy. 
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raised the rates substantially: 50DM for the first child, 70DM for 
the second and 120DM for the third and each additional child. 
However, the eligibility criteria was also modified and established 
that the new rates would only apply to children living in Germany, 
while the old lower rates would still apply to children of (non-
Italian) foreign workers who lived, separated from their parents, in 
their home countries (Korte, 1985: 37).27 
Although the modification of the child allowance was 
integrated into a more general income tax reform, there are some 
indications that suggest that the reform of this aspect of the 
legislation was also prompted by the anti-immigration climate at 
the time. Martin (1999) argued that the measure was actually the 
response of German politicians to newspaper stories of Turkish 
parents getting allowances for between six to ten real and fictitious 
children in Turkey. It seems, therefore, that the intended goal of 
the reform was probably to save money and, simultaneously, to 
calm the fears of German voters concerning the alleged abuses 
from the German welfare state by foreigners at a time of economic 
crisis. Yet, its actual effects are likely to have been quite different 
from what the German government intended. If one considers the 
average size of a Turkish family in 1975, the financial 
implications of the child allowance reform for foreigners living in 
Germany and their plans concerning the reunification of their 
families are evident. For a Turkish man with four children, all 
residing in Turkey, the reform would imply a loss of more than 
200 DM in his monthly income, a substantial loss that he could 
avoid, however, by bringing his children to Germany.  
 
 
                                               
27 For them, the only update the reform established was 10DM for 
the first child. 
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Table 2.1. Annual entries of foreigners by sex and age, 1968-1982 
(thousands) 
 Total Male Female % 
Female 
Younger 
than 18 
% Younger 
than 18 over 
total entries 
% Female  
of entries  
< 18 
1968 589.6 389.2 200.4 33.99 89.2 0.15  
1969 909.6 620.8 288.8 31.75 123.6 0.14  
1970 976.2 668.3 307.9 31.54 153.6 0.16  
1971 870.7 578.7 292 33.54 174.3 0.20  
1972 787.1 497.3 289.8 36.82 181 0.23 0.41 
1973 869.1 554.7 314.4 36.18 200.6 0.23  
1974 538.6 299.4 239.2 44.41 193.6 0.36 0.44 
1975 366.9 198.1 168.8 46.01 133.8 0.36 0.45 
1976 387.8 214.8 173 44.61 134.9 0.35 0.45 
1977 422.8 238 184.8 43.71 142.4 0.34 0.45 
1978 456.1 266.4 189.7 41.59 148.7 0.33 0.43 
1979 545.2 337.6 207.6 38.08 173 0.32  
1980 631.4 403.1 228.3 36.16 185.1 0.29  
1981 501.1 301 200.1 39.93 127 0.25  
1982 321.7 185.1 136.6 42.46 72.5 0.23  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, several years. Own 
elaboration. 
 
 
Most accounts of foreign immigration to Germany since 1973 
commonly argue that the reason why family reunification 
increased after the border closed is that migrant families feared the 
permanent separation of family members residing in the Federal 
Republic (Goodman, 1984: 61). It is assumed that until 1973 male 
foreign workers had the chance of going back and forth, which 
made migration-related separation relatively bearable for some 
families. Men went to Germany to work for a year or two and 
returned to their countries of origin, which meant that families’ 
separation was not prolonged for too. But the halt on recruitment 
made this family strategy unfeasible: foreign workers in Germany 
now feared that if they returned to their home countries, they 
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would have no further chance to work in Germany. Consequently, 
many decided to stay and bring their families to Germany instead. 
Doubtless, some workers behaved in the manner explained 
above. In fact, for the most recently arrived at least, it would have 
been rational to react in this way since they had a weaker legal 
status and, therefore, also more difficulties to retain their jobs if 
they left Germany. Turks and Yugoslavs would probably be 
overrepresented in this group as they were the most recently 
established flows (in September 1973, 66% of Turks and 60% of 
Yugoslavs had resided in Germany less than 4 years). Yet, for 
foreigners who had been residing in Germany 4 years or mores 
(approximately 58.4 % in 1973, many of whom would have 
already obtained an unrestricted work permit or even a permanent 
residence permit), why would they decide to bring their relatives 
to Germany precisely in response to the halt on recruitment?  
 
 
Table 2.2. Length of residence of foreign residents in the FRG, 1973 
 % of Total Turkey Yugoslavia Italy Greece Spain 
Less than 
1 year 12.2 18.42 11.27 9.95 5.31 10.70 
1 to 2 11.5 15.21 10.13 9.79 9.49 10.24 
2 to 3 13.5 16.62 14.64 11.29 13.18 12.37 
3 to 4 15.2 16.54 24.15 11.53 16.43 13.11 
4 to 6 18.5 17.58 25.62 21.22 20.07 16.95 
6 to 8 6.4 5.06 5.45 8.41 7.49 7.06 
8 to 10 6.6 6.39 2.58 8.05 11.02 11.05 
10 and 
more 16.2 4.17 6.15 19.77 17.01 18.52 
Source: Jahrbuch, 1974. 
 
 
My argument here is quite straightforward. The halt on 
recruitment cannot be put forward as the main reason underlying 
the phenomenon of family reunification as a whole. The abrupt 
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halt on recruitment may have speeded up the decision of some 
foreign workers to settle in Germany, especially those who had 
recently arrived. However, it cannot be used to explain the family 
reunification of those foreign workers who had already resided in 
Germany five, seven or ten years by the time the halt came. In 
addition, for those who had most recently arrived, measures such 
as the reform of the “Kindergeld” are believed to have been more 
crucial in shaping their decision about family reunification than 
fear to permanent separation.  
A survey carried out by the Job Placement Office in 
Nuremberg in 1972 found in a sample of 14,000 foreign workers 
that the percentage of foreign married men who lived in Germany 
with their wives was 71% of Italian workers, 81% of Greeks, 63% 
of Spaniards, 46% of Turks and 55% of Yugoslavs. These 
percentages clearly indicate that a substantial fraction of married 
male migrants in Germany had reunified at least with their wives 
before the halt was imposed in 1973.28 
On the other hand, the previous percentages also suggest that 
wives of Turkish and Yugoslav nationality were over-represented 
in the flow of reunited spouses who joined their husbands in 
Germany after the mid-seventies. As a result, it is likely that they 
were also the most strongly affected by the “Stichtagsregelung”, 
which banned the access to the German labor market to adult 
relatives who entered Germany after 1975. Several studies carried 
out when the restrictions were still in force also supported this 
hypothesis. Brandt (1977), in a study commissioned by the 
German government to analyze the effects of the restrictive 
measures approved since the halt on recruitment, concluded that 
the “Stichtagsregelung” seriously harmed the labor integration of 
adult foreign women who had arrived recently in Germany. The 
study stated that the Stichtagsregelung had been strictly enforced 
to the extent that even women who had entered Germany earlier 
this legal restriction was approved had been denied their work 
                                               
28 Bundesansalt für Arbeit: Repraesentativ-Untersuchung 72. 
Nuremberg, 1973, p. 19-20. 
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permits.29 In 1980, the Repräsentativuntersuchung’80 also offered 
some interesting data on this issue of the impact that the “key date 
regulations” had on the labor performance of female immigrants, 
which are reproduced in Table 2.3. 
 
 
Table 2.3. Labor force participation of immigrant women by origin and 
year of arrival, 1980 
 Turkey Yugoslavia Italy 
1977-79 9.5 12.5 51.4 
1975-76 29.2 40 51.4 
1974 51.2 80 66.7 
1973 59.5 79.2 48.3 
1971-72 71.1 79.1 55 
1966-70 82 88.4 55.7 
1961-65 59.3  66.1 
Source: Mehrländer et al., Situation der ausländichen Arbeitnehmer und 
iher Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 340. 
 
 
Table 2.3 shows the percentage of women who had taken 
employment in Germany at some point in 1980. It differentiates by 
period of arrival and country of origin. By 1980, the participation 
rate of Turk and Yugoslavian women who had arrived to Germany 
in 1975 or 1976 was approximately half of that of their co-
nationals who arrived in 1974. In fact, the abrupt decline in the 
rate of labor participation occurred among women who arrived in 
                                               
29 See Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, 
Situationsanalyse nichterwerbstätiger Ehefrauen ausländischer 
Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1977, cited in Erdem 
and Mattes (2003: footnote 38 and 40). Dohse (1981) also defended the 
idea that these restrictions were strictly enforced during the time they 
were in force. However, other authors like Korte (1985) maintained that 
these measures either remained ineffective or had to be repealed for legal 
reasons. 
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1975 and later, when the “Stichtagsregelung” was already in force. 
In addition, the differences between Turks and Yugoslavians, on 
the one hand, and Italians, on the other, appear quite surprising. I 
have already noted that the flow of Italian female labor to 
Germany had been traditionally low. Yet, the labor participation 
rate of Italian women who arrived in Germany in 1974 was 
approximately 12 percentage points higher than that of Italian 
women who arrived between 1966 and 1972, and almost 20 points 
higher than that of women who arrived in 1973. In my opinion, the 
privileged legal status of Italians which derived from their EEC 
membership and obliged to apply them exactly the same labor 
conditions as to German workers, help to explain these 
differences. Although Italian migrants had enjoyed a legally 
privileged status since 1968, its effect on women’s labor behavior 
did not become visible until the mid-seventies, when the 
restrictions imposed on foreign workers of other nationalities 
further strengthened their comparative advantage. 
It is virtually impossible to determine whether the 
“Stichtagsregelung” did reduce the magnitude of potential adult 
female flows, as it intended, or not. There is no way to know if, in 
absence of this restriction, the number of wives joining their 
husband in Germany between 1975 and 1978 would have been 
larger than it was. However, it is evident that it hampered the 
chances of a successful incorporation into the labor market for 
those who actually migrated. Besides, there is also the possibility 
that the restriction would have altered the selection mechanisms 
underlying the migration of wives to Germany. Aware of the new 
legal restrictions imposed for acquiring a first work permit in 
Germany, only two types of wives would persist in their intention 
to migrate: those without a primary interest in working and those 
willing to work abroad at any cost, even in the black economy 
without a work permit. 
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2.5. Policy towards the guestworkers who stayed. The tension 
between integration and return 
 
During the second half of the seventies, judges and courts, at 
both the regional and national level, turned into the institution in 
charge of protecting foreigners’ rights against the increasingly 
restrictive stance of the German immigration authorities. A 
substantial number of judgments reversed administrative decisions 
that denied work permits and authorizations for entry and joining 
foreign relatives established in German cities. The “key date” 
regulations, partially lifted in 1977, were definitely suppressed in 
April 1979, once the economy seemed to have been brought under 
control. 
Proposals for developing a comprehensive policy regarding 
the social and economic status of ofreign residents began to gain 
ground. In November 1978, Heinz Künh was appointed the first 
Federal Government Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign 
Workers and their Families. In March 1980, the Federal 
Government adopted the preliminary guidelines for the further 
development of an integration policy for foreign workers and their 
families, with a focus on the measures aimed at the integration of 
the second and following generations. In this spirit, a new 
amendment to the Work Permit Ordinance established in June of 
that year the legal right to a work permit for foreigners undergoing 
vocational training, for children having completed German 
schooling or vocational training, and for people having taken a 10-
months vocational preparatory course. Moreover, this right was 
independent of any waiting periods and even irrespective of the 
priority placement and employment of Germans and other EEC 
nationals.30 
However, the legal changes were less far-reaching than they 
appeared from official statements. The political discourse 
concerning immigration became overtly ambivalent and further 
                                               
30 Fifth Ordinance Amending the Work Permit Ordinance of 30 May 
1980, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 638. 
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restrictions on foreigners’ rights continued to be passed, especially 
when the economic upsurge revealed became uneven and short-
lived.  
The halt on recruitment had eliminated the possibility of 
independent new labor immigration; the “key date” regulations 
eliminated as well the possibility of legal work for those who 
entered under the family reunification provisions. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that people willing to migrate for economic reasons 
turned to asylum as a more rapid route into the German labor 
market during the second half of the seventies. In fact, the number 
of asylum-seekers increased from approximately 10,000 in 1975 to 
more than 50,000 in 1979 and more than 100,000 in 1980 (Münz 
and Ulrich, 1997). This situation led the German government to 
adopt an emergency program to restrict the number of asylum 
seekers in 1980, almost at the same time as it approved the 
aforementioned Fifth Ordinance on Work Permits. The package of 
urgent actions included the imposition of compulsory visas for 
citizens coming from the main countries of origin of asylum 
seekers (Turkey included) and measures aimed at speeding up the 
asylum procedure. In addition, it established a waiting period of 
one year during which asylum seekers were forbidden to work. In 
1981 the number of applications reduced to approximately half of 
that of the previous year, which was interpreted by the German 
government as indicating that delaying the authorization to enter 
the labor market for asylum seekers had effectively lowered the 
number of “bogus” asylum seekers. However, it is fair to remind 
also here that the significant rise in the number of asylum 
applications since 1979 was strongly related to the economic and 
political instability that culminated in the military coup in Turkey 
in September 1980.31 
                                               
31 In fact, although after the legislative reform the number of new 
work permits granted reduced by almost 10 times, from more than 
29,000 in 1980 to 3,580 in 1981,  the number of asylum applicants fell at 
a much slower rate, from more than 100,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1981, 
37,500 in 1982 and 20,000 in 1983 (Booth, 1992, Table 12a, p. 169; 
Münz and Ulrich, 1997). 
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By early 1981, Schmidt’s cabinet faced the worst scenario: the 
economic growth fell and the unemployment rate rose, but 
inflation did not abate. In this context, the previous ambivalence 
towards foreigners and integration was overtly substituted for a 
new stricter foreigners’ policy. The ban on work permits for 
asylum seekers was extended from one to two years; the waiting-
periods regulating the access of spouses and children of foreign 
workers to the German labor market -four and two years 
respectively- were passed into law;32 and the Federal Government 
urged the Länder to adopt urgent measures to control the 
subsequent immigration of dependants, (see more below). 
However, all these restrictions on immigration were not enough to 
avoid the Schmidt's collapse in the fall of 1982, as the FDP 
withdrew to join a coalition led by Helmut Kohl, the leader of the 
CDU/CSU. 
Although Kohl had won the elections partially on the grounds 
that it would “do something” about immigration (Martin, 1994: 
203), most of the actions implemented by his cabinet in this field 
relied upon the restrictive measures that had already been 
proposed and discussed during the previous SPD legislature.33 
This was clearly the case of the Act to Promote Foreign Workers’ 
Return, approved on the 28th November, 1983. The law 
established that Yugoslavians, Turks, Spaniards, Portuguese, 
Moroccans, Tunisians and Koreans returning to their country of 
origin in the following eleven months (i.e. until November, 1984) 
could under certain conditions receive a departure bonus of DM 
10,500 and an additional DM 1,500 per child. Additionally, the 
                                               
32 See Waiting Periods Act, 3 August 1981, Federal Law Gazzete I, 
p. 802. By virtue of the Association Agreement with Turkey, the waiting 
period for Turkish nationals was reduced to three years (Association 
Council Decision 1/80). Since 15 December 2000, the waiting period for 
obtaining a first work permit for spouses of foreigners residing in 
Germany is one year (First Ordinance amending the Work Permit 
Ordinance). 
33 See the Policy Statement by the Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
before the German Bundestag on the 13th October, 1982. 
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returning family would be reimbursed the employees’ 
contributions to social security upon their arrival back home, they 
would have early access to privileged saving deposits without 
forfeiting tax reductions and could receive repatriation counseling. 
However, the number of foreigners who ultimately left during the 
eleven months when the program was implemented was small: 
545,068 foreigners left Germany in 1984, which means 
approximately 120,155 more than the previous year. Moreover, 
some authors like Philip Martin (1994) argue that most of the 
foreigners who returned home would have left in any event, so 
Germany merely bunched normal returns during the nine-months 
program (204).34 
Since 1985 the rate of growth of the foreign population began 
to substantially increase again. In fact, it did not stop until the 
historic year of 1992, when foreign entries amounted to 1,200,000 
people and net migration was about 600,000. Most of these new 
entrances were citizens from the former communist countries 
applying for refugee status. 
 
 
2.6. The battle against chain migration: restricting the right to 
choose a spouse 
 
As I mentioned before, entries due to family reunification 
became the primary concern for the German immigration 
authorities immediately after the halt on recruitment in 1973. 
However, prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the 
German legislation regulating the reunification of spouses and 
children of the guest workers. Some of the bilateral Recruitment 
Agreements included a clause regarding the possibility of family 
reunification. This clause established the requirement of sufficient 
                                               
34 Unfortunately, none of the studies about return migration from 
Germany has specifically analyzed the effect of the program on the 
magnitude of out-migration from Germany and, thus, it is difficult to 
know exactly who left. 
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housing and said that the Aliens Police would “kindly” examine 
the application for a residency permit for relatives willing to join 
workers in Germany.35 Apart from this, the Aliens Act 
(Ausländergesetz) passed in 1965 contained no provisions 
regarding the entry into the Federal Republic of spouses or 
children of foreigners lawfully living in the Federal territory. The 
only relevant provision of applicability to these situations was the 
one contained in paragraph 2.1, which established that a residency 
permit “may be issued when the presence of the alien does not 
interfere with the concerns of the Federal Republic of Germany”. 
However, the Conference of State Ministers of Interior which 
gathered shortly after the introduction of the law, established in 
the “Principles of Alien Policy” that the permission to join a 
worker from a recruiting state was to be made dependent on one 
year of domestic residency by the worker. 
As I have shown in the previous pages, the only measure 
initially adopted to discourage the reunification of families after 
the halt on recruitment was the “Stichtagsregelung”, which aimed 
at curbing the family influx by banning their access to the labor 
market for an open-ended period of time. However, no further 
restrictions were imposed on the entry of spouses and children of 
the original guest workers, the so-called first-generation aliens. 
                                               
35 In the bilateral Spain-Germany agreement, article 17 established: 
(1) Los trabajadores españoles que deseen que sus familias se reúnan 
con ellos en la República Federal de Alemania y presenten un certificado 
oficial acreditando quo disponen de vivienda suficiente al efecto podrán 
solicitar de la Policía de Extranjeros competente el necesario permiso de 
residencia. La Policía de Extranjeros examinará benévolamente la 
solicitud y la resolverá lo antes posible. La Comisión alemana 
comunicará al Instituto los nombres de lo familiares a los que se conceda 
el permiso de residencia. 
(2) La ayuda para la reagrupación familiar, bien facilitando vivienda, 
bien participando en los gastos de traslado de las familias será objeto de 
regulación en los correspondientes contratos de trabajo o en acuerdos 
posteriores concertados entre el empresario y el trabajador. (BOE, num. 
108, de 5 de Mayo de 1960, p. 5968) 
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The number of foreign residents initially fell a little, from 
4,127,000 in 1974 to 3,950,000 in 1976, it stabilized between 1976 
and 1978, but began to rise again in 1979. In 1981, the number of 
foreign residents amounted to 4,630,000, which led the Federal 
Government to devise a new plan for fighting against further 
family-related entries that had remained as the only possible way 
of entering the Federal Republic of Germany, apart from asylum.  
In October, the minister of Interior of Baden-Württemberg 
approved an Aliens Decree by which the permission for foreign 
spouses to join alien residents in Germany was made dependent on 
the observance of a three year waiting period beginning from the 
date of the marriage itself. Bavaria followed this initiative. On the 
2nd December of 1981, the Federal Government, in line with the 
Baden-Württemberg initiative, asked the Länder to pass 
immediate regulations for the social control of families joining 
aliens from non-EC states (with the exception of those entitled to 
seek asylum and quotas of refugees). The general guideline given 
for such regulations were “exclude by way of federally uniform 
state resolutions the following group of persons from entry in 
order to join aliens: a) young aliens of age 16 and 17; b) alien 
children, when only one parent resides in the territory of the FRG 
(exceptions for half-orphans and children of divorced or single 
persons); c)… ; d) spouses of aliens who entered the FRG as 
children of aliens or who were born here, when they have not lived 
here at least eight years without interruption, have not reached the 
age of 18 and the marriage has not been in existence for one 
year.” 
It is important to note that the focus of the new restrictions put 
forward by the Federal Government were adolescents and spouses 
of the recruited workers’ offspring, instead of spouses and minor 
children of the recruited workers themselves. In fact, the Federal 
Minister, in his statement submitted to the proceedings on the 
matter before the Constitutional Court some years later, argued 
that: 
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“[…] A focal point in this decision was the entry of spouses to join 
aliens who entered the Federal territory as children of alien guest 
workers or who were born here” but the recommendation did not 
extend to cases dealing with “the entry of the spouse of an alien who 
entered the Federal territory as a recruited guest worker for the 
purpose of employment. […] Measures limiting entry in this area 
were also not considered by the Federal Government.” (Sections IV. 
1. a) and IV. aa) of the cited judgment)36 
 
The foregoing statements clearly reveal that the German 
authorities, as early as 1981, were aware of the fact that family 
formation by the middle and second generations were the true 
sticking point of the German immigration policy concerning 
family chain migration, while potential migration due to family 
reunification was virtually over by that time. This makes eve more 
striking the fact that no systematic study on the issue of 
importation of spouses has been conducted over the last two 
decades. 
The Federal Government gave responsibility to the Federal 
Minister of Interior to urge the ministers of Interior of the Länder 
about the need for prompt action with regard to the 
aforementioned recommendations. The Länder approved 
regulations to implement the Federal Government 
recommendations during the course of 1982. Most of them chose 
not to require a marriage period for entry to join first-generation 
aliens. On the other hand, with regard to the entry of relatives to 
join second-generation aliens, most states introduced the 
requirement of a one-year marriage and eight-year residency of the 
spouse living in Germany. However, some important differences 
still subsisted, and a federally uniform regulation on this area did 
not emerge. In Hesse, a minimum residency of five years was 
                                               
36 Note that even though the Resolution included children of aliens 
when only one parent lived in the FRG, this measure was easy to 
circumvent by bringing the spouse and the children at the same since no 
restriction was imposed on the reunification of the spouses of first-
generation aliens. 
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demanded, whereas Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria required 
three years of previous marriage for second-generation spouses, 
instead of only one. 
In 1983, foreigners affected by the new restrictions, mainly 
nationals from Turkey and Yugoslavia, began to legally challenge 
the decisions that administrative authorities made on the basis of 
the aforementioned decree. Several of them reached the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which made a 
key judgment on the issue, on the 17th May 1987 (BVerfGE 76, 1; 
2 BvR 1226/83 et al.). This judgment, apart from its 
transcendental importance from a judicial standpoint, constitutes 
an extremely valuable document where the political views 
concerning the issue of family reunification by foreigners residing 
in Germany made evident. The Federal Minister of Interior at the 
time, Friedrich Zimmermann, but also the Interior Minister of 
Baden-Württemberg, of Schleswig-Holstein, the cities of Freiburg, 
im Breisgau and Sindelfingen, and the President of the Federal 
Administrative Court submitted “opinions” to the proceedings. 
Besides, both the Federal and the Länder Governments were 
requested by the Court to submit information about: a) the 
development of spousal entries, b) the goal of the restrictions and, 
c) the reasons why they believed that such restrictions were the 
most suitable measures in order to attain the intended goal. 
Accordingly, it is likely that in no other document was the position 
of the German authorities concerning the issue of family-linked 
entries dealt with more thoroughly. In the following lines, I will 
summarize the arguments offered by the cited authorities. 
1) General reasons to justify the restrictions 
1.a) The parties involved generally justified the restrictive 
measures under consideration as a necessary means to “overcome 
the considerable and, in part, practically irresolvable economic 
and social problems that resulted from the uncontrolled 
immigration of aliens into the Federal Republic of Germany”. In 
their opinion, the economic and social risks that Germans and 
aliens themselves would run from massive immigration can only 
be reduced by restricting family entries, which “has to be 
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considered as the main cause of the continuing strong growth of 
aliens since the recruiting stop in 1973”. In fact, the restrictions 
were said to be based on estimations of potential entries of 
500,000 non-EC children, 250,000 non-EC spouses and 600,000 
future spouses of children and young persons who would marry 
between 1982 and 2000, plus family entries of EC-aliens and 
asylum seekers.37 
1.b) In the Federal Minister’s words, “the Federal Government 
has acknowledged that the FRG had a special responsibility 
towards workers recruited up to 1973, but it does not see itself 
obliged to permit immigration of family members for endless 
generations. The number of alien family members seeking entry 
can be constantly renewed by way of marriage and birth. The 
Federal Government does not consider itself constitutionally 
obliged to accept long-term immigration for family reasons of the 
children and grandchildren of recruited workers at the expense of 
the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Section V, 1 of 
the judgment).38 
2) Foreseen effectiveness of the restrictions in achieving the 
goal of avoiding massive and uncontrolled immigration derived 
from family entries. 
The Federal Minister drew a clear distinction between the goal 
that the requirement of eight years of residence was aimed at, and 
                                               
37 The estimations cited by the Interior Minister of Baden-
Württemberg were 430,000 non-EC children, 215,000 non-EC spouses 
and 300,000 future spouses. The Interior Minister of Schleswig-Holstein 
estimated that in 1981 there were approximately 80,000-100,000 spouses 
in the countries of origin and that about 300,000 more would appear 
during the course of the decade. 
38 The Interior Minister of Baden-Württemberg confirmed this point 
when he said “ […] With regard to the measures enacted, it was assumed 
that spousal entry to join first-generation aliens living here continues in 
principle to be permissible considering that they had been recruited to 
work here and that such measures should be limited to battling specious 
marriages. Such an obligation was not considered to be called for with 
regard to second-generation aliens.” (Section V, 2) 
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the intentionality underlying the introduction of the one-year 
waiting period since marriage. The requirement of uninterrupted 
residency of at least eight years is based upon the consideration 
that “the lengthy presence of the alien spouse seeking to be joined 
guarantees that he has firm roots in the Federal territory – 
particularly, through the creation of economic and social 
existence39- such that he is able to facilitate the integration of the 
spouse joining him.” 40 
With regard to the marriage-length requirement “the decisive 
factor was that prior to the restriction on familial entry, the 
number of cases increased in which aliens married not out of a 
serious desire to set up a marital relationship but rather solely in 
                                               
39 The Federal Minister pointed out that the goal aimed might not be 
secured by the possession of an unlimited residency permit because 
children of guest workers are able to obtain such a permit even when 
they have lived in the FRG for less than five years and, thus, the minimal 
required integration cannot be secured. 
40 The Interior Minister of the State of Schleswig-Holstein argued in 
his opinion submitted to the proceedings that “Spouses of second or 
subsequent-generation aliens living here have sought to enter the Federal 
Republic of Germany at an age in which, on the one hand, the desire for 
employment is self-evident and, on the other, the ability and willingness 
to integrate, however, is considerably lower as compared with that of 
school-age children. The expectations entertained with respect to 
employment have not, or only inadequately, been able to be fulfilled due 
to unemployment problems in the workforce. Unlimited spousal entry 
would thus increase even further the already high unemployment figures 
among aliens and impede adequate integration within the alien 
population who have lived here for some time and who are prepared to 
remain here. It must also be taken into consideration that a second- or 
subsequent-generation alien who has lived here less than eight years is 
normally not so rooted in the economic and social life of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and so removed from life in his native country that 
it cannot be expected of him that he return to his native country when he 
chooses to marry an alien who is not in possession of residency status in 
the Federal territory.” 
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order to make it possible for the spouse living abroad to enter the 
Federal territory and acquire access to the German workforce. 
This was supposed to be made more difficult through the 
imposition of a waiting period.” 
In the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, the Aliens 
Decree extended the one-year waiting period recommended by the 
Federal Ministry to three years. In justifying such a tough 
measure, the Interior Ministry of Baden-Württemberg mentioned 
not only the goal of preventing the so-called specious marriages 
but also -he said – “prompting affected persons (partners) to 
consider whether they might not wish to establish or continue the 
marital relationship in the native country. In so doing, account was 
made for the fact that a second-generation alien, living in the 
Federal territory, who fulfills all requirements for spousal entry 
except for the marriage-length requirement, is normally able to be 
naturalized without difficulty and can then seek entry for his 
spouse. For humanitarian reasons, it was decided not to impose a 
total prohibition on spousal entry to join second-generation 
aliens.” Moreover, the Director of the Bavarian State Chancellery 
added “[…] It was decided not to make an absolute prohibition on 
spousal entry for second-generation aliens in exchange for 
relaxing naturalization requirements, since such a relaxation was 
not considered to be desirable. The main objective of the three-
year marriage requirement […] was to prompt the affected young 
families to consider moving permanently to their native countries. 
With a significantly shorter waiting period, it is not possible to 
assure the attainment of the objective.” Even more transparent was 
the reasoning of the High Administrative Court of Baden-
Württemberg when it argued “[…] it is to be expected that equal 
application of the regulation would prompt a considerable number 
of aliens living in the Federal Republic of Germany and willing to 
marry either to forego marriage with a partner of non-German 
nationality or to return to their native countries in order to avoid 
lengthy separation from their spouses.” Later, the Court added 
“The affected parties who solely fail to fulfill the marriage-length 
requirement would likely decide to accept a temporary separation 
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with its possible high risks for the existence of the marriage. This 
does not, however, indicate that the regulation is unconstitutional. 
Even those second-generation aliens who have resided in the 
Federal Republic for more that eight years, possess an unlimited 
residency permit and are able to provide for the common support 
of the family from their own income can be expected to return to 
their native countries in order to conduct a marriage with the 
partner of choice without the threat of deportation or interruption. 
Aliens in this group were originally granted residency solely for 
the purpose of being raised in the care of their parents. This 
purpose was fulfilled once they reached majority age or left their 
parents' home.” 
In sum, the main declared objectives of the waiting period and 
the eight years of previous residency were: first, to avoid specious 
marriages celebrated only or primarily to get legal admission to 
the German territory; and secondly, to secure a sufficient degree of 
integration on the part of the spouse seeking to be joined, which 
eases the integration of the newcomer. However, the authorities of 
those states that imposed a three years waiting period -instead of 
one- admitted a further goal: compelling young aliens to choose 
between marrying people of German nationality or, alternatively, 
if they chose to marry partners who still resided in their country of 
origin, to return and start or continue there their marital 
relationship. In fact, in these cases the goal of encouraging return 
migration seemed to prevail over the one of guaranteeing the 
required level of integration on the part of the alien seeking to be 
joined by his/her foreign spouse since the possibility of relaxing 
the naturalization requirements was explicitly deemed undesirable. 
 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the most conventional 
periodization of the postwar migration process to Germany is 
organized on the basis of the changes in the official immigration 
policy announced by the German government, instead of the 
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actual development of the immigrant population. As a result, the 
capacity of the German state to define immigrants’ lives and 
decisions has been magnified, and immigrants’ behavior has been 
commonly assumed to have responded almost mechanically to the 
policy switches. In line with some recent studies like the one by 
Oswald et al. (2003), the historical account carried out in this 
chapter along with the statistical figures and graphs presented 
clearly suggest that female migration was substantial long before 
the halt on recruitment was passed and that the largest fraction of 
the post-halt new immigration was due to the entry of minors 
rather than wives. The German government itself was aware of the 
fact that the process of family reunification had been largely 
completed shortly after the halt was decreed. In fact, the 
population targeted by the new restrictions approved in 1981 was 
not spouses and children of original guestworkers but the spouses 
of the guestworkers’ offspring. Therefore, it seems evident that the 
importation of spouses rather than family reunification in strict 
terms has been the main source of family-linked migration to 
Germany in the most recent decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP, hereafter) is a 
long-term project aimed at collecting representative micro-data on 
individuals and households in Germany. Its main goal consists of 
analyzing changes in the individuals’ living conditions by 
focusing on a wide range of socio-economic and political 
variables. The original sample was drawn in 1983. Since then, the 
dataset has grown every year with new samples, new questions 
and topical modules and further methodological advancements. 
One of the main advantages of GSOEP dataset comparing the 
most standard surveys is that it collects information on every 
member of the selected households, either through personally 
interviews or indirectly. This kind of information permits to 
examine individual behavior within its family context, as well as 
the reciprocal influences among family members and how they 
affect the individuals’ life chances. 
In this chapter, I will describe the content, structure and 
organization of GSOEP dataset, with special attention to those 
aspects that are relevant for the study of immigrants from a family 
and dynamic perspective. After explaining the procedure to select 
the sample that I will utilize in the empirical analyses of the 
following chapters, I will describe its main characteristics. Next, I 
discuss the main methodological issues to deal with in the 
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empirical analyses of this dissertation, many of which are related 
to the peculiarities of GSOEP dataset.1 
 
 
3.2. Target population and samples in GSOEP 
 
In the original design, the target population of GSOEP was the 
residential population of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1983, including West Berlin. Two main groups were 
distinguished: 1) “residents in the Federal Republic of Germany”, 
which made up the so-called “German Sample” or also Sample A, 
in GSOEP’s terminology and, 2) “foreigners in the Federal 
Republic of Germany”, which constitutes the “Foreign Sample” or 
Sample B. The “Foreign Sample” included persons living in 
private households with a household head of Turkish, Yugoslav, 
Italian, Greek or Spanish nationality. Compared to Sample A, the 
population of Sample B is over-sampled (sampling probabilities 
were 0.0002 and 0.0008, respectively), in order to allow for stand-
alone analyses of this population which was expected to be 
affected by additional drop-outs, due to return migration. In fact, 
Sample B consisted of five autonomous samples for each of the 
five largest foreign groups living in Germany in 1983. 
Apart from these two original samples, GSOEP has developed 
five more new samples since its inception. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1990, a new sample that covered the population 
living in private households where the household head was a GDR 
citizen, added up 2,179 new individuals to GSOEP (“East German 
Sample” or Sample C). In 1994/95, a special sample of 522 
households in which at least one member had moved from abroad 
to West Germany after 1984 was initiated (“Immigrants Sample” 
                                               
1 Part of this chapter is based on the documentation published by 
Haisken-Denew and Fick (2003) in Desktop Companion to the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Study. However, here the emphasis will be put 
not only on the general traits of the dataset but also on how these traits 
may potentially empower or limit the statistical analysis of immigration-
related issues under research in this dissertation. 
Data and methods / 69 
 
or Sample D). In 1998, another sample, “Refreshment Sample” or 
Sample E, which covered 1,067 new private households in 
Germany was selected independently of the ongoing panel 
(Samples A trough D), in order to update original Sample A. In 
2000, one more sample called “Innovation Sample” or Sample F 
was selected independently of the ongoing panel (Samples A to 
E); it added up 6,052 new households to the existing survey. 
Although Sample B was the sample specifically designed for 
the study of the foreign immigrant population living in Germany 
in 1983, the other five subsequent samples also included some 
individuals of foreign and/or immigrant background. In order to 
maximize the size of my final sample and to slightly update 
Sample B with immigrants arrived in Germany after 1983, I 
decided to merge individuals in Sample B with all the individuals 
in the other five samples, as long as they report either to have been 
born in Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece or Spain, or 
to have parents who were born in one of the five selected countries 
(see more below, section 3.5.1). 
 
 
3.3. Structure of the dataset 
 
3.3.1. Individual and household information 
 
GSOEP dataset contains information referred not only to 
individuals but also to households. Within each selected 
household, individuals are personally interviewed face-to-face as 
they reach the age of 16. However, information about non-adult 
members living in the selected households is also collected 
through questions answered by the head of the households and 
other adult members. Household questionnaires include mainly 
questions about the physical characteristics of the place where the 
household-unit lives (i.e. number of rooms in dwelling) and the 
costs associated to it (i.e. monthly cost for hot water or support by 
public loans). This information will not be used in the analyses 
carried out in this dissertation, with the only exception of the 
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annually collected information on the type of kin relationship that 
links each member of the household to the head of the household 
(variable “$stell”).  
The core information utilized in this dissertation is the 
information collected at the individual level, that is, the 
information collected annually through face-to-face interviews 
with each of the adult household’s members since the date the 
household was selected as part of the survey. This information 
includes apart from basic socio-demographic characteristics of the 
interviewed individuals, marital, reproductive and labor 
biographical histories, which is central for the analyses in the 
following chapters. 
 
 
3.3.2. Cross-sectional and longitudinal data. The development of 
the longitudinal sample: follow-up rules and attrition 
 
GSOEP was purposely designed for detecting patterns of 
change and stability in the socio-economic behavior of individuals 
and their living conditions. To capture this dynamic component of 
individuals’ life, GSOEP questionnaires include questions that 
collect information referred to a specific point in time, periodical 
information, calendar-type information and biographical 
retrospective information. Information referred to a specific point 
in time is generally contained in the so-called cross-sectional files, 
which consist of the information collected through each of the 
annual interviews. As of 2004, there were twenty cross-sectional 
files available (Waves A to S, in GSOEP terminology). Cross-
sectional files contain a set of questions about a specific module 
topic apart from basic personal information. Each of these twenty 
waves can be utilized as an independent survey to carry out cross-
sectional analyses referred to the year of the wave (1984-2002). 
However, the main advantage of using GSOEP for the study of 
immigration derives from its panel design, which permits 
longitudinal research. In panel studies, a group of people provides 
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information on their lives as they unfold over time through 
repeated rounds of surveys.  
Unlike cross-sectional samples, the longitudinal population in 
GSOEP is not stable. While there is a core group of individuals 
who have been interviewed each year without interruption since 
GSOEP started in 1983, other individuals either left or entered the 
survey at some point in the meantime between 1984 and 2005. 
This implies that the size of the longitudinal sample in GSOEP 
shrinks or expands over time depending on these entrances and 
exits (i.e. unbalanced panel). 
A crucial issue when dealing with panel survey designs is the 
criterion determining which individuals are to be followed over 
time, the so-called follow-up rule. In GSOEP, the basic sampling 
units are households (not individuals). Accordingly, it was 
necessary to decide whether only the household head was to be 
followed or, by the contrary, the rest of the household’s members 
will be followed as well. In order to assure the data continue being 
representative of the target population over time, GSOEP has 
followed all the household’s members, even if they move-out from 
the originally selected household and constitute a new independent 
household. In addition, young children who moved from a foreign 
country into a selected household while the panel was in progress 
were also followed. There are, therefore, several mechanisms by 
which the GSOEP original sample has grown over time. First of 
all, GSOEP interviews every person of age 16 or older who 
belongs to one of the households originally selected to be 
surveyed. This implies that the next generation is automatically 
incorporated into the original sample as they reach the age of 16 
and stay within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
even if they move-out from their parents’ household and constitute 
a new one. Secondly, persons who entered one of the selected 
households while the panel was in progress are also incorporated 
to the GSOEP core sample.2 Moreover, if an old household splits-
                                               
2 These individuals are followed even if they leave the households 
since 1989, but not prior to this date. 
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off, the new resulting households and their members are still kept 
within the sample although under a new household identifier. 
Finally, new persons enter the sample every year as a result of 
births occurred within the originally (or subsequently) selected 
households. 
All the aforementioned mechanisms have resulted in the 
enlargement of the sample’s size over time. However, such a 
growth has not been large enough to completely offset the 
continuous reduction in the number of interviewed people due to 
permanent drop-outs.3 Permanent drop-outs may be due to survey 
related causes (i.e. the household declined to reply or the contact 
failed) or to demographic causes as deaths or migration abroad. 
This latest cause (move abroad) is likely to particularly affect the 
development of the sample of foreign immigrants in GSOEP. 
Permanent drop-outs are a serious problem for panel datasets 
because they may result in a biased sample. Longitudinal survey 
samples are designed to be representative of the target population 
at the particular time-point when they are selected. However, over 
time the sample ages and its initial size reduces as a result of an 
increasing rate of non-responses. This phenomenon can present a 
serious problem for panel surveys if the sample loses its 
representativeness over time causing estimates to be biased. 
Successive drop-outs over the life of the panel may result in biased 
survey estimates if households (or individuals) that abandon the 
sample are not a random group within the entire original sample. 
There are several techniques capable of minimizing the 
destroying effect of attrition; one of the most common consists of 
sampling successively new households or individuals, the so-
called “refreshment samples”, that counterbalance the panel’s 
continuous drain. However, this technique is not problem-free 
                                               
3 GSOEP considers a drop-out as permanent when there are two 
consecutive drop-outs and none member of the household could be 
contacted and/or there was a final refusal. Temporary drop-outs (i.e. the 
household filed to be contacted one year but was contacted the next one) 
are filled by means of a short questionnaire aimed at collecting the 
missed information concerning the previous year. 
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because new panel recruits may substantially differ from the ones 
originally selected and lost. As I said before, GSOEP followed this 
strategy to update the core “German Sample” or “Sample A” in 
1998 (“refreshment Sample” of “Sample E”), but it did not the 
same with respect to the sample of foreign households contained 
in Sample B.4 This decision progressively rendered the original 
Sample B less and less representative of the current foreign 
population residing in Germany, which has experienced big 
transformations since the mid-eighties especially since the asylum 
crisis and the arrival of substantial numbers of ethnic Germans in 
the early nineties. Aware of this situation, GSOEP launched a new 
sample of immigrants who had entered Germany after 1984 in 
1994/95, the so-called “Immigrant Sample” or “Sample D”. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the rate of sample’s reduction over 
time in Sample A and Sample B. About 45% of persons originally 
interviewed by GSOEP in Sample A were still re-interviewed in 
2004, whereas the corresponding percentage for Sample B is 40%. 
On the other hand, losses due to “move abroad” (grey at the top of 
the figure) are clearly more in Sample B than in Sample A.5 
 
 
                                               
4 The reason given in GSOEP documentation for such a decision 
with regard to Sample B is that “[…] at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
immigration of migrant workers or their family members constituted the 
bulk of all immigration.” (Desktop 2001) However, this is not 
completely correct. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters of 
this dissertation, immigration from the original recruitment countries, 
especially from Turkey, has continued through the reunification of 
children and the importation of spouses by middle and second-generation 
immigrants after the early eighties. 
5 The pattern of attrition over time of the 5,139 individuals selected 
as belonging to my final sample is quite similar to the general attrition 
pattern showed in Figure 3.2 for Sample B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Number of losses due to panel attrition, Sample A (Waves 1 to 21) 
Source: Kroh and Spiess (2004), p. 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.2. Number of losses due to panel attrition, Sample B (Waves 1 to 21) 
 
 Source: Kroh and Spiess (2004), p. 22. 
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3.4. Survey and retrospective panel data and the 
reconstruction of entire life histories 
 
As I have said above, panel data measure the same sample of 
respondents at different points in time. Panel information, also 
called longitudinal, can be collected prospectively or 
retrospectively. GSOEP cont ains both types of panel data: 
1) Prospective or survey panel data, which are made of the 
responses given by the same individuals to questions asked to 
them every year since they entered the survey. Some longitudinal 
files are constructed by GSOEP personnel and, therefore, are also 
readily available to GSOEP’s users along with raw cross-sectional 
data for each wave of the panel. This is the case for occupational, 
marital and reproductive longitudinal information for the period 
elapsed between each individual’s first and last interview. This 
survey panel data are collected through monthly calendar-type 
questions asking about, for instance, employment status as of 
January through December of the previous year. Figure 5 
reproduces the monthly calendar-type question included in the 
personal questionnaire of 1984. 
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Figure 3.3. Example of occupational calendar-type question in the 
survey questionnaire (1984) 
AP361. And now please think about the entire year, in other words about 1983: We 
have made a sort of calendar. On the left, we have written things that could have happened
last year. Please go through the entire list and put a cross by each month, in which for 
example, you were employed or unemployed, etc. Please make sure you answer for each 
month. 
 1983 
 J F M A M J J A S O N D 
[AP3601-12] Full-time 
employment __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3613-24] Part-time or 
occasionally employed __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3625-36] Vocational 
training __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3637-48] Registered 
unemployed __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3649-60] Retired __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3661-72] 
School/college __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3673-84] 
Military/Civilian service __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3685-96] 
Housewife/house-husband __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
[AP3697-108] Other, fill 
in here __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, Questionnaire Wave A, 1984. 
1AP36 is the resulting code for Wave One (A) in Personal Files (P) and 
question number 36 (36). 
 
 
With the information provided by the respondents to this type 
of calendar questions, GSOEP constructs monthly spell-type files.6 
                                               
6 In other cases, however, researchers have to build themselves their 
own longitudinal file linking the responses given by the same individuals 
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Compared to typical panel data, which are organized in a person-
year or person-month structure, spell data have an observation per 
person per spell (instead of per year/month). The “spell” is the 
period of time elapsed between the start date and the end date of 
the episode. In contrast to survey panel data, the retrospective 
biographical information on occupational, marital and 
reproductive trajectories in GSOEP is collected on a yearly basis, 
as it can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
                                                                                                
to the same question in different waves of the survey. GSOEP identifies 
each individual with a unique personal identifier (i.e. variable “persnr”), 
which allows the user to follow the trajectory of one person over the 
entire period of time the individual has remained in the survey. The 
personal information contained in different waves has to be linked 
according to this unique personal identifier. The Stata command for 
carrying out this action of linking individuals’ information across waves 
is “merge”. This command joins corresponding observations from the 
dataset currently in memory (called the master dataset) with those from 
the Stata-format dataset stored as filename (called the using dataset) into 
single observations. “merge” can perform both one-to-one and match 
merges. In either case, the variable _merge, which is automatically 
generated by Stated, indicates: 1) cases only in the master dataset, 2) 
cases only in the using dataset and 3) cases in both datasets, which are 
the one properly linked. 
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Figure 3.4. Example of occupational calendar-type question in the 
retrospective questionnaire 
We would now like to ask you for some information about your personal history starting at 
age 15.  Please fill out the table below as follows: 1) In the large boxes at the top, please fill in 
the years in which you turned 15, 20, 25, etc., up to your current age. 2) Please make an X in the 
appropriate box for each age. Please indicate when you were attending school, in vocational 
training, working, etc, for each year of your life since age 15. The most important thing is to 
make sure that at least one box is marked for each age. If more than one of the options applies to 
you at a particular age, then please mark all those that apply 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, English Version Supplementary. 
Biography- Questionnaire. 
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Merging yearly and monthly spell-type information 
 
Although the content of monthly and yearly biographical files 
in GSOEP is very similar or even identical in some occasions, to 
merge these two types of information is not always 
straightforward and it has methodological implications that need 
to be bore in mind. In fact, most authors who have analyzed life-
course transitions using the GSOEP dataset have limited their 
analyses to the monthly panel data starting in 1983.7 
However, to limit the analysis of immigrants’ labor or marital 
transitions to the period starting in 1983 would entail serious 
limitations, especially for the first generation (i.e. individuals who 
immigrated at age 16 or older) because most of them arrived in 
Germany, married and started to work prior to 1983. 
Consequently, I decided to merge the retrospective yearly 
information in GSOEP with the monthly survey panel data, by 
transforming each person-year observation in the retrospective 
biographical files into 12 different month-person year 
observations, and assumed that the event of interest (i.e. 
reunification, entrance into the labor force, exit from the labor 
force) occurred in January of the corresponding month. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 For an exception see Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rohwer (1999). In this 
article, they analyzed the employment careers of German women by 
merging yearly and monthly spell information available in GSOEP. 
However, they did not specify at which month they assumed the 
transition to occur and did not discuss either the methodological 
implications of that decision. In order to control for the differences in the 
time units of the two different parts of the survey and to increase the 
robustness of the estimates, they added to the models a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the data come from the yearly scheme or from the 
monthly one, which performs a strictly controlling function (p. 138). 
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Overlapping states 
 
Overlapping states, that is, the simultaneous occupancy of 
different states within the same life-course dimension over the 
same period of time may result from two different causes. First, a 
person may truly occupy several different states simultaneously 
within a particular life dimension when these two states are not 
mutually exclusive (single and married): a woman may be 
working part-time and defined herself as a housewife for many 
years in her life, for instance. In these cases, the researcher would 
have to decide which of these two states deserves to be considered 
as “principal”, according to the research goals.  
In other cases, however, overlapping states do not reflect a 
true concurrence of positions but they are rather the result of 
insufficient information about the precise moment at which 
individuals change from one state (part-time worker) to another 
(housewife). This happens when a woman A, for instance, worked 
part-time since January to March, 1983 and left her work at the 
end of March to become a housewife in April, 1983. Although 
woman A has never worked part-time and being a housewife 
simultaneously, the yearly structure of the retrospective dataset 
would make it appears as if. In these cases, the lack of more 
precise information would force the researcher to choose only one 
of these two labor force states as the principal or dominant one for 
the entire year of 1983. As a result, shorter spells tend to be 
underrepresented in the final clean (without overlapping spells) 
dataset. 
Retrospective data in the employment biography files in 
GSOEP (PBIOSPE file) contain both types of overlapping spells 
(i.e. true overlapping and overlapping derived from imprecise 
information about the exact moment at which the transition from 
one state to another state took place).  
The decision rules followed to decide which state should be 
given primary over the rest, have been the following: 
1) Unemployment 
2) Part-time employment/ short work hours 
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3) Full-time employment 
4) Maternity 
5) School, training, apprenticeship 
6) Housewife 
7) Retired/pensioner 
8) Other 
Note that this decision rule implies that short spells of 
unemployment will be given priority over short spells of 
employment. 
 
 
3.5. Selection and description of the immigrant sample 
 
3.5.1. Migration-related information in GSOEP and definition of 
the immigrant sample 
 
The first issue I had to deal with to define my own sample 
within GSOEP has to do with the distinction between foreigners, 
immigrants and people of foreign/immigrant origin. Foreigners are 
persons born in another country than the one where they reside, 
who have not been naturalized. Immigrants are individuals who 
come to a country where they were not born in order to settle there 
temporarily or permanently. Comparing to the two previous ones, 
the term “people of immigrant origin” is a more inclusive one, 
which includes not only individuals who effectively immigrated at 
some point but also their descendants, regardless of they are 
immigrants or foreigners themselves or not. 
In GSOEP, Sample B was selected according to the nationality 
of the head of the household, whereas Sample D was selected 
according to the immigrant status of at least one of the members of 
the household. Individuals in the other samples were selected 
according to different criteria but they all have information on 
migration-related issues, which is collected through four different 
variables: 
- The variable “born in Germany” (“germborn”), which 
indicates whether the individual’s place of birth was Germany or a 
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foreign country, without specifying the name of the foreign 
country. All individuals who were born abroad but immigrated to 
Germany prior 1949 are coded as “born in Germany”. 
- The variable “country of origin” (“corigin”), which indicates 
the specific country where the individual was born. 
- The variable “nationality’ (“pnation”), which indicates the 
nationality of each surveyed individual at the time of the survey. 
There are also some complementary variables that collect 
information on second nationality and date of naturalization. 
However, these variables are not available since the very first 
wave of GSOEP, which implies that the information is missed for 
individuals who did not stay in the survey until the year the 
question was formulated for the first time. 
- The variable “year of immigration” (“immiyear”), which 
records the year of first immigration to Germany of each surveyed 
individual, as long as the immigration occurred in 1949 or later. 
Individuals who immigrated earlier than 1949 have no information 
on the year of immigration and are assumed to be born in 
Germany. 
Any definition of foreign and/or immigrant populations in 
GSOEP have to be derived from the information contained in 
these four variables. If the main research interest is on the 
migration event itself, the sample should include only those people 
with valid information about the year of immigration. On the 
contrary, if migration is seen as having far-reaching consequences 
that would also affect the immigrants’ offspring, regardless of 
whether they have migrated themselves or not, a more extensive 
definition of the target population including both foreigners and 
people of immigrant origin must be utilized. 
The possibility of defining the immigrant population in such 
an extensive manner is commonly hampered by data limitations. 
In GSOEP, first and middle generation immigrants are easy to 
identify because they are all foreign-born and, thus, they have 
complete information on their date of immigration and country of 
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birth.8 On the contrary, in GSOEP the foreign origin of the second 
and subsequent generations becomes progressively blurred 
because they are coded “Germany” in the variable “country of 
origin” and, in addition, their nationality is not recorded until they 
reach the age of 16. There are two possibilities to identify their 
“immigrant origin”: 
1) By the sample they belong to. As I noted before, Sample B 
and Sample D were designed explicitly to select households 
including individuals of foreign and immigrant origin, 
respectively. Therefore, most individuals in these two samples are 
of foreign or immigrant origin by definition, even if they were 
born in Germany. Accordingly, the second generation would be 
more easily identified if I would restrict my potential sample 
either to individuals coded as being part of Sample B, which only 
includes households with a foreign head, or Sample B plus 
individuals of immigrant origin included in Sample D.9 Yet, as I 
have explained above, I decided to select the final sample for the 
empirical analyses in this dissertation from the six ongoing 
samples in GSOEP, in order to reduce the impact of attrition over 
time and to improve the sample’s representativeness with regard to 
immigrants who have entered Germany after 1984. 
2) By linking them to their mothers if they are also in GSOEP 
and to attribute them the country of origin of their parents. This is 
a hard task in terms of data managing and it is not problem-free, 
especially in cases of children born to mixed couples where only 
the father has a foreign origin. However, this is the procedure I 
                                               
8 By first generation I mean foreign-born individuals who 
immigrated at adult age (16 or older). By middle generation I mean 
foreign-born individuals who immigrated younger than 16. 
9 Note that households Sample D include, at least, one immigrant 
member individual. The rest of household’s members may be: 
immigrants, individuals of immigrant origin in a looser sense (depending 
on their kin relationship to the immigrant member of the household), or 
German citizens living in a household that includes one or more 
immigrants. 
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have utilized it to identify the “country of origin” of the second 
generation immigrants included in my sample. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Individuals contacted by GSOEP as of 2002, by sample and 
place of birth (frequencies and percentage) 
 A B C D E F Total 
Missing & not 
applicable 
789 
5 
380 
5 
208 
3 
49 
3 
86 
3 
573 
4 
2085 
5 
Born in 
Germany 
14,494 
92 
2,608 
39 
7,016 
96 
798 
42 
2,216 
89 
12,321 
86 
39,453 
81 
Immigrant 
since 1949 
422 
3 
3,758 
56 
104 
1 
1,051 
55 
191 
8 
1,404 
10 
6,930 
14 
Total 15,705 100 
6,746 
100 
7,328 
100 
1,898 
100 
2,493 
100 
14,298 
100 
48,468 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction. 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the number of individuals contacted by 
GSOEP, by sample and place of birth. Although Sample B 
effectively contains the largest immigrants’ sample (3,758), the 
number of immigrants in Sample D (1,051) and Sample F (1,404) 
is not negligible. To select my final sample I have first selected 
only those foreign-born immigrants who came to Germany from 
on of the following countries: Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain and the 
former Yugoslavia.10 Next, I added to them their second 
                                               
10 Individuals for whom the variable “country of origin” was coded 
as Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina have been merged into the more 
general category “former Yugoslavia”. Of the total number of 
immigrants interviewed before 1990 and who reported as country of 
origin “Ex-Yugoslavia”, “Croatia” or “Bosnia-Herzegovina” (597 in 
total), 70 (12%) reported Croatia and 30 (5%) Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Within the group of individuals interviewed for the first time after 1989, 
the proportion from Croatia remained approximately stable but those 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina increased to 17% of total. As I have no 
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generation, that is, individuals born in Germany to immigrant 
mothers from one of these five countries. The resultant sample 
size is 7,008 persons of immigrant origin, of whom approximately 
44% lack information on their date of immigration because they 
were born in Germany (see Table 3.2). Most of them are children 
born to immigrant women, and just a few are native German 
citizens who are included in a foreign household as a result of 
their marriage to an immigrant partner. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Individuals of immigrant origin contacted by GSOEP as of 
2002, by sample and place of birth 
 A B C D E F Total 
Immigrant 
since 1949 
34 
17.99 
3,522 
57.46 
1 
25.00 
114 
65.52 
38 
70.37 
239 
52.18 
3,948 
56.34 
Born in 
Germany 
155 
82.01 
2,607 
42.54 
3 
75.00 
60 
34.48 
16 
29.63 
219 
47.82 
3,060 
43.66 
Total 189 100 
6,129 
100 
4 
100 
174 
100 
54 
100 
458 
100 
7,008 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction. 
 
 
Of these 7,008 individuals, 1,869 have been never personally 
interviewed by GSOEP either because they are still younger than 
16 (797) or because they lived in households that left the survey 
before they reached the age of 16 (843). Therefore, the core of my 
final sample will be constituted by 5,139 individuals of immigrant 
origin (first, middle and second generation) have completed at 
least one interview by GSOEP. Table 3.3 shows their distribution 
across the six samples. 
 
                                                                                                
possibility of determining the actual ethnic origin of individuals coded to 
be from the “former Yugoslavia”, I have considered better to keep for all 
of them under the most general label “former Yugoslavia”. 
Data and methods / 87 
 
Table 3.3. Individuals of immigrant origin from the five selected with at 
least one interview in GSOEP 
 A B C D E F Total 
Immigrant 
since 1949 
34 
24.11 
3,414 
75.38 
1 
25.00 
100 
88.50 
37 
86.05 
226 
73.14 
3,812 
74.18 
Born in 
Germany 
107 
75.89 
1,115 
24.62 
3 
75.00 
13 
11.50 
6 
13.95 
83 
26.86 
1,327 
25.82 
Total 141 100 
4,529 
100 
4 
100 
113 
100 
43 
100 
309 
100 
5,139 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves A to S (2002). Own construction. 
 
 
3.5.2. Reconstruction of the immigrant families 
 
One of the major advantages of GSOEP dataset, as I said 
before, is that it contains information that permits to link each 
individual to his/her spouse (or cohabiting partner), and to link 
each couple to their children. Spouses (or cohabiting partners) can 
be linked one to each other by utilizing the variable “partnr$$”, 
which contains for each interviewed individual the unique 
personal identifier of his/her spouse (or cohabiting partner) since 
1984.  
It is also possible to link each couple to their children, 
regardless of their age and of whether they still live in their 
parents’ household or not, by utilizing the variable “kidpnr[n]” 
included in the biographical file which documents the birth 
biography for each woman ever surveyed by GSOEP (BIOBIRTH 
file). This variable contains a unique personal identifier for each 
child identified in GSOEP, which permits to link each child to her 
mother who, in turn, had previously been linked to her spouse.11 
                                               
11 This procedure to reconstruct nuclear families indirectly assumes 
that the current husband (or partner) of a mother is the father of her 
children. However, this is not a major problem for the population and 
type of analyses carried out in this dissertation. 
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As I have already pointed out, children born in Germany in 
households that GSOEP classified as “foreign” or “immigrant” are 
considered children of immigrant origin, and they are attributed 
their mother’s country of origin. To use the mother’s country of 
birth to determine children’s origin does not imply major problems 
in my sample because most “pure” immigrant couples (i.e. couples 
where the two spouses are immigrants) are made of partners of the 
same nationality or from the same country of origin. On the other 
hand, children born to mixed couples where the foreign parent is 
the mother do not constitute a problem, since they would be 
classified as children of immigrant origin in any case. The only 
difficulty may appear with children born to mixed couples where 
the foreign parent is the father. These children can be identified in 
GSOEP as far as they are included as members of households that 
GSOEP has previously defined as “foreign” or “immigrant”, as it 
is the case if it belongs to Sample B or to Sample D. Children born 
to German mothers and foreign fathers are more difficult to 
identify if they belong to Sample A or Sample F. However, some 
chances to detect them as children of immigrant origin still remain 
as far as their fathers remained in GSOEP until 2001, when birth 
biography –up to then only available for women- was also 
collected from men in the GSOEP sample. 
 
 
3.5.3. Description of the entire sample12 
 
Generation and country of origin 
 
As of 2002, the selected sample of individuals of immigrant 
origin was made mostly of descendents of the original 
                                               
12 The description carried out in this section is based not only on 
those individuals with at least one interview in GSOEP but it includes 
also those individuals contacted but never interviewed in order to provide 
a more complete description of the entire population of immigrant origin 
that includes the second generation (most of which has not been 
interviewed yet because their members are younger than 16). 
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guestworkers, since middle and second generations represented 
about 60% of the total. By middle generation I mean children born 
abroad who immigrated at ages between 6 and 16. By second 
generation I mean children born in Germany to immigrant parents 
and children born abroad who immigrated younger than 6. 
As Table 3.4 shows, citizens of Turkish origin are the most 
numerous in GSOEP, followed by Italians, people from the former 
Yugoslavia, Greeks and Spaniards in this order. However, their 
relative size over the total sample varies by generation. 
Immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are over-represented 
within the first generation, which is partially due to the re-
activation of immigration coming from that area during the 
Balkans War. Immigrants from Turkey are over-represented 
within the middle generation and Italians within the second one, 
which might be due to higher fertility rates among Italian and 
Turkish first-generation women comparing to their counterparts 
from other origins. The relative size of Spanish and Greek groups, 
on the contrary, has remained more or less stable over 
generations.13 
                                               
13 According to the 1995 Mikrozensus, the population born in 
Germany to foreign immigrant parents from one of the five selected 
countries was distributed as follows: 46% of Turkish origin, 22% from 
the former Yugoslavia and 32% from the remaining European 
recruitment countries (mainly Italy, Greece and Spain). The 
corresponding percentages utilized the selected sample in GSOEP as of 
2002 are 45%, 16% and 39%. Taking into account that these 
Mikrozensus figures refer to 1995 and GSOEP to 2002, and that 
Mikrozensus classified as immigrants only those people who still held 
their original foreign citizenship in 1995, the similarity of proportions in 
both sources is remarkable. However, the comparison of the distribution 
by country of origin of the immigrant population registered in 1995 
Mikrozensus and GSOEP as 2002 shows larger differences. While in 
1995 Mikrozensus Turks represented 41% of the total immigrants from 
the five selected countries, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia 
amounted to 28% and immigrants from the remaining recruitment 
countries 28%, the corresponding percentages in GSOEP as of 2002 are 
40.8%, 20% and 40%. This indicates that GSOEP maybe over-represent 
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Table 3.4. First, middle and second generations, by country of origin 
Generation Turkey Former Yug. Greece Italy Spain Total 
First 985 
35.90 
606 
22.08 
356 
12.97 
500 
18.22 
297 
10.82 
2,744 
100 
Middle 627 
52.08 
170 
14.12 
124 
10.30 
180 
14.95 
103 
8.55 
1,204 
100 
Second 1,225 
42.55 
427 
14.83 
307 
10.66 
622 
21.60 
298 
10.35 
2,879 
100 
Total 2,837 
41.56 
1,203 
17.62 
787 
11.53 
1,302 
19.07 
698 
10.22 
6,827 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration. 
Note: total sample size is 6,827 instead of 7,008 because information 
about the parents’ country of origin was missed for 181 individuals of 
second generation. 
 
 
Age and gender 
 
Both first and middle generations are slightly male-biased (see 
Table 3.5. However, females outnumber males in the second 
generation, as it is the rule in non-migrant populations. Within the 
second generation, individuals are 19.6 years old on average. 
More than of the second-generation was already of working age as 
of 2002; 30% were still in school and about 17% were of pre-
school age. 
 
 
                                                                                                
the immigrant population from the older recruitment countries (Italy, 
Spain and Greece) comparing to those from the former Yugoslavia. 
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Table 3.5. Sex and age, by generation (average) 
 Sex Average Age 
Generation Male Female Total Male Female 
First 1,457 
53.10 
1,289 
46.90 
2,746 
100 
56.8 
(12.5) 
53.8 
(13.5) 
Middle 662 
54.98 
542 
45.02 
1,202 
100 
35.4 
(7.4) 
32.2 
(7.4) 
Second 1,515 
49.51 
1,545 
50.49 
3,060 
100 
21.2 
(12.5) 
22.5 
(13.6) 
Total 3,634 
51.86 
3,374 
48.14 
7,008 
100 
38.1 
(20.0) 
36.5 
(19.1) 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Period of arrival, sex and marital status at migration 
 
As I exposed in Chapter 2, migration to Germany during the 
period of recruitment (1955-1973) has been traditionally 
characterized as being male-dominated. In fact, most accounts of 
postwar migration to Germany affirm that the typical recruited 
migrant was a young single man who, in case of being married, 
left his spouse and children behind. According to this dominant 
view, flows into Germany prior to 1974 are expected to be 
strongly male-biased; on the contrary, female immigrants are 
expected to be much more numerous in foreign inflows since 
1974. 
GSOEP data confirm these expectations: while men clearly 
outnumbered women in the total inflows to Germany between 
1955 and 1973, women dominated the post-halt inflows. 
According to the percentages reported in Table 3.6, men 
represented 58% of total pre-halt inflows but only 46% of total 
post-halt inflows. On the contrary, women increased their 
respective proportion from 42% to 54% after the halt on 
recruitment. Nevertheless, the proportion of female entries during 
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the recruitment period is still larger than it would be expected 
(approximately 42% of total). 
 
 
Table 3.6. Sex of first and middle generation immigrants, by period of 
arrival 
 Period of Arrival 
Sex Pre-halt Post-halt Total 
Male 1,446 58.33 
673 
45.81 
2,119 
53.67 
Female 1,033 41.67 
796 
54.19 
1,829 
46.33 
Total 2,479 
100 
1,469 
100 
3,948 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Of the total number of foreign-born immigrant women in my 
sample (1,829), approximately half were younger than 16 at their 
arrival in Germany (i.e. middle generation) and, therefore, mostly 
single. Of the other half, who were adult first generation women, 
2/3 were married at arrival (see Table 3.7). According to the most 
common accounts of the postwar migration process to Germany, 
these immigrant women who were already married at the time of 
their arrival in Germany would be expected to be “reunited wives” 
who joined their husbands after they decided to stay permanently 
in Germany. However, contrary all expectations, Table 3.7 
indicates that the distribution of the immigrant population by 
marital status at migration hardly changed across the two periods: 
among male immigrants, the proportion of married and single men 
was approximately the same over the recruitment period and the 
post-halt period; and among women, the proportion of immigrants 
single at arrival reduced a little in the post-halt period compared to 
the pre-halt one (from 34.6% to 31.4%). These percentages do not 
support, therefore, the idea that most immigrant women who 
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entered Germany during the recruitment period were single 
women, neither with the idea that single women were replaced by 
reunited wives after the halt on recruitment. 
 
 
Table 3.7. Marital status at migration of first generation immigrants, by 
sex and period of arrival 
 Male Female 
Marital 
status at 
migration 
Pre-halt Post-halt Total Pre-halt Post-halt Total 
Single 566 
52.46 
194 
52.72 
760 
52.5 
256 
34.59 
167 
31.39 
423 
33.25 
Married 513 
47.54 
174 
47.28 
687 
47.5 
484 
65.41 
365 
68.61 
849 
66.75 
Total 1,079 
100 
368 
100 
1,447 
100 
740 
100 
532 
100 
1,272 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration. 
 
 
As I said before, one of the main advantages of GSOEP is it 
collects information for all the members of the household, which 
allows us to know who migrated first and who follows whom in 
migration within the family. This information is needed in order to 
distinguish different types of family-linked migration such as 
spouses’ reunification and importation of spouses. By combining 
the information on date of marriage and date of migration of each 
spouse within a couple, I have constructed a typology that 
classifies first generation immigrants –who were adult at arrival- 
according to their family status at the time of migration. 
Let’s say marrD  denotes the date of marriage, migH denotes the 
date of the husband’s migration and migW denotes the date of the 
wife’s migration 
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I have defined a woman to be a “first-mover” if she was 
married at the time of her arrival in Germany and had preceded 
her husband in migration; that is, if marrD < migW < migH  
I have defined a woman to be a “reunited wife” if she was 
married to her husband before he migrated to Germany and she 
took more than one year to migrate herself and join her husband in 
Germany; that is, if marrD < migH < migW  
I have defined a woman to be an “imported bride” if she 
marries a man who migrated to Germany prior to the date of 
marriage and she migrates herself after the date of her marriage; 
that is, if migH < marrD £ migW  
Finally, migration of women who were married at the time of 
their arrival in Germany and migrated the same year as their 
husband did is called “joint couple migration”; that is, if 
marrD < migH = migW  
Note the same classification is applicable to men who were 
married at arrival by changing W by H in the above expressions. 
In Table 3.8 I have classified first-generation immigrants who 
were married at the time they arrived in Germany, according to the 
previous typology. The percentages reported confirm wide 
differences between men’s and women’s types of migration. 
Migrant husbands often migrated solo (42.46%) and hardly ever 
after their wives (6%). In contrast, for migrant wives to follow 
their husband some time after he left was not uncommon. 
However, the table bluntly illustrates a considerable diversity in 
migration strategies within the couple. Joint couple migration, for 
instance, appears a migration pattern much more common than 
expected; being imported by the other partner who already resides 
in Germany is particularly frequent for women, even more than 
typical reunification. 
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Table 3.8. Type of family migration of immigrants married at arrival, by 
sex 
 Male Female 
First-mover within 
the couple 
262 
42.46 
39 
5.01 
Reunited spouse 37 
6.00 
253 
32.52 
Imported spouse 104 
16.86 
288 
37.02 
Joint Couple 
Migration 
191 
30.96 
182 
23.39 
Spouse’s Missed 
Info 
23 
3.73 
16 
2.06 
Total 617 
100 
778 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All samples. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table 3.9 focuses only on women and distinguishes type of 
family migration by period of arrival. The intention here is to 
explore a little further the change occurred in the composition of 
immigration inflows to Germany after 1973. The relative 
proportion of reunited wives over the total female adult 
immigration during the recruitment period was substantially 
higher than the corresponding percentage over the post-halt period 
(39% versus 24%). This suggests that family or, at least, spouses’ 
reunification was already substantial prior to the halt imposed, and 
that reunification of spouses did not appear to have augmented 
after 1973 as it is generally assumed. The reason behind these 
unexpected results relates to the huge increase experienced by the 
inflow of imported wives during the post-halt period (54% of total 
female adult inflows). In addition, almost 30% of married women 
who migrated to Germany during the recruitment period migrated 
jointly with their husbands (i.e. the same year as him), which 
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implies that a substantial fraction of original male guestworkers 
did not migrate solo but with their spouses to Germany. 
 
 
Table 3.9. Type of family migration of women married at arrival, by 
period of arrival 
 Pre-halt Post-halt 
First-mover 28 
6.41 
11 
3.23 
Reunited Wife 170 
38.90 
83 
24.34 
Imported bride 104 
23.80 
184 
53.96 
Couple migration 128 
29.29 
54 
15.84 
Partner info missed 7 
1.60 
9 
2.64 
Total 437 
100 
341 
100 
Source: GSOEP, Waves 1984-2002. All Samples. Own elaboration. 
 
 
The preliminary description carried out up to now suggests 
that: 
1) Single women entered Germany approximately in the same 
proportion before and after the halt on recruitment, which implies 
that the vast majority of women recruited during the sixties and 
early seventies were already married by the time they arrived in 
Germany. 
2) Family reunification, in particular the reunification of wives 
who had initially remained at the country of origin took place 
much earlier than the halt on recruitment was imposed. In fact, 
approximately 2/3 of the total number of women who can be 
considered strictly as “reunited wives” entered Germany prior to 
that year. Moreover, a substantial part of these women migrated 
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the same year as their husbands and, consequently, can be 
considered to participate in joint couple migration rather than 
family reunification as such. 
3) The bulk of female adult immigration to Germany during 
the post-halt period has been due to the practice of importing 
spouses from the country of origin by a considerable number of 
middle and second-generation single immigrants, that is, to family 
formation rather than family reunification. 
These preliminary conclusions are enough to justify a 
profound revision of the most common accounts of the postwar 
immigration process to Germany and the dominant interpretation 
of the halt on recruitment as a measure that encouraged family 
reunification. In particular, the dominant view according to which 
the typical migrant in the sixties was a young, single, male migrant 
that became replaced by dependant wives with their children since 
the mid-seventies onwards, appears seriously challenged on the 
basis of the previous statistical description. 
 
 
3.6. Methods 
 
The empirical analyses carried out in the following chapters of 
this dissertation are based on multivariate regression techniques, 
which predict values of one variable (i.e. dependent variable) on 
the basis of two or more other variables (i.e. independent variables 
or covariates). Depending on the nature of the phenomenon under 
study and the specific definition of the dependent variable, I will 
utilize either static or dynamic models. The main difference 
between these two types of regression models has to do with the 
inclusion (or not) of a time dimension in the analysis of the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates. 
Among the former, I will use logistic regression models for the 
analysis of joint couple migration in Chapter 4, the type of partner 
chosen by single immigrants and the type of households 
constituted by them after marriage in Chapter 5. On the other 
hand, I will apply techniques of event history analysis to study the 
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duration of the process of wives’ and children’s reunification in 
Chapter 4, as well as the employment cycles of immigrant women 
after their arrival in Germany. 
In the next two sections, I will deal with the main 
characteristics of logistic regression models and various models 
utilized in event history analysis. 
 
 
3.6.1. Logistic regression models 
 
It is not uncommon that a dependent or response variable is 
binary in nature, that is, that it can have only two possible values. 
For example, patients either do or do not recover from an injury; 
job applicants either succeed or fail at an employment test, 
subscribers to a journal either do or do not renew a subscription, 
coupons may or may not be returned, couples may or may not 
migrate together, etc. In all of these cases, one may be interested 
in estimating a model that describes the relationship between one 
or more continuous independent variable(s) to the binary 
dependent variable. 
Of course, one could use standard multiple regression 
procedures to compute standard regression coefficients for 
categorical dependent variables. However, it is important to note 
that in doing so we would violate some of the basic assumptions 
of the “ordinary least squares” (OLS) regression models. 
Categorical dependent variables are not normally distributed, as it 
is required in OLS. In fact, if we would use standard multiple 
regression procedures to predict the categorical outcomes, we 
would obtain values of Y greater than 1 and smaller than 0, which 
are obviously not valid. Logistic regression models, in contrast, do 
accomplish exactly this: they are designed to predict values for the 
dependent variable that will never be less than 0, or greater than 1, 
regardless of the values of the independent variables. 
This is the most obvious advantage of using logistic instead of 
standard regression models to predict a categorical outcome. 
However, logistic models also allows the researcher to overcome 
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other restrictive assumptions of the OLS models such as the 
linearity in the relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables, the normal distribution of the error terms, 
the homocedasticity, etc. All these properties make logistic 
regressions the most adequate models to deal with phenomenon 
that can be expressed as a categorical outcome. 
The most popular logistic regression model is the binary logit 
regression model, which follows the general form: 
)]}...(exp[1/{1)1( 110 nn XbXbbYP +++-+==  
Where Y is the dependent binary variable that takes value 1 
when the outcome occurs (i.e. the couple migrates together), and 0 
otherwise (i.e. the couple does not migrate together but one spouse 
precedes the other in migration), and X are the independent 
variables or covariates utilized to predict the value of Y. 
Logistic regression coefficients are estimated by maximum 
likelihood method, after transforming the dependent variable into 
a logit variable, which is the natural log of the probability of 
occurrence of the outcome divided by the probability of not 
occurrence.14 This implies that the parameter estimates provided 
by logistic regression models, unlike in standard linear regression, 
are not readily interpretable as the effect that a change in the 
independent variable has on the value of the dependent variable 
itself. On the contrary, they compute the effect that a change in the 
independent variable has on the log odds of the dependent. The 
most common way of interpreting a logit is to convert it to an odds 
ratio using the exp() function. Note that an odds ratio above 1 
                                               
14 Instead of finding the best fitting line by minimizing the squared 
residuals, Maximum Likelihood (ML) method of estimation consists of 
finding the smallest possible deviance between the observed and 
predicted values by means of derivative calculus. With ML, the computer 
uses different "iterations" in which it tries different solutions until it gets 
the smallest possible deviance or best fit.  Once it has found the best 
solution, it provides a final value for the deviance, which is usually 
referred to as "negative two log likelihood" (shown as "-2 Log 
Likelihood").  The deviance statistic can be thought of as a chi-square 
value. 
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refers to the odds that Y = 1 in binary logit regression. The closer 
the odds ratio is to 1, the more the covariates are independent of 
the dependent variable, with 1 representing full statistical 
independence. For instance, if the logit b1= 2.303, then the 
corresponding odds ratio (the exponential function, eb) is 10; in 
this case, we may say that when the independent variable increases 
one unit, the odds that Y = 1 increases by a factor of 10, when 
other variables are controlled. 
It is also possible to calculate the expected probability that Y = 
1 for a given value of X, by applying the following formula: 
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Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary 
logistic regression models that allow the simultaneous comparison 
of more than one contrast. In other words, multinomial regression 
models are logistic regression in which the dependent variable is 
not binary but it can takes three or more values. In these cases, the 
main issue to bear in mind is that the estimated odds ratios do not 
express anymore the ratio between the probabilities of occurrence 
and not occurrence of the (binary) outcome. On the contrary, they 
must be interpreted as the ratio between the probability that the 
outcome takes value 1 divided by the probability that the outcome 
takes the value of the category of reference, which can be 
arbitrarily selected by the researcher. In fact, for the sake of 
simplicity, multinomial logistic regressions can be read as two or 
more simultaneous binary logistic regressions. 
In this dissertation, I will apply binary logit regression to 
analyze the propensity of migrant couples to migrate together or 
separately (Chapter 4), as well as the propensity to form nuclear or 
extended households among immigrants who marry someone 
during their stay in Germany (Chapter 5). As can be seen, the 
dependent variable in these two cases is dichotomical: to migrate 
together or not, to live in extended households or not. Marital 
choices, in contrast, will be examined by means of multinomial 
logit regression models that allows for three possible outcomes in 
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the dependent variable: a native partner, a co-national immigrant 
and an imported spouse. 
 
 
3.6.2. Event history analysis 
 
Introductory notions 
 
As Yamaguchi stated, “event history analysis is concerned 
with the patterns and correlates of the occurrences of events” 
(1991: 1). By “event”, we mean a qualitative change from one 
state (j) to another state (k), which occurs at a particular point in 
time.15 However, event history analysis does not exclusively 
focuses on the type of change occurred, but also on when it occurs. 
This is precisely its principal characteristic: it permits to 
incorporate time into the analysis, which substantially enhances 
the possibility of establishing casual relationships between some 
variables and the occurrence of a particular event.  
The incorporation of time into the analysis is possible thanks 
to the capability of event history techniques to deal with both 
censored observations and time-varying covariates. Censoring 
exists when incomplete information is available about the duration 
of the risk period because of a limited observation period. Time-
varying covariates are explanatory variables whose value changes 
over time (i.e. number of children). 
Event history analysis is particularly well-prepared to deal 
with right censoring, especially when the reason explaining 
censoring is independent of the event of interest. Left censoring is 
generally much less manageable than right censoring. Fully left 
censoring generates sample selection bias since the data missing 
from the sample are not missed at random but their absence 
                                               
15 Event history analysis can study also changes from one state (j) to 
more than one new state (k, l, m…). However, the logic underlying these 
two variations of the problem is the same. Therefore, the description here 
will limit to the former case (change between two states). 
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depends on the timing of entry into the risk period. An example 
based on GSOEP dataset may help. As I said before, GSOEP was 
launched in 1983. Therefore, its original target population was 
people residing in Germany at that time. This clearly implies a 
strong selection bias with regard to the immigrant sample in 
GSOEP: those immigrants who have a higher propensity to remain 
in Germany are also more likely to be observed when the panel 
starts, whereas short-term stayers are missed out. Unfortunately, 
this type of problem is difficult to fix. However, in the next 
empirical analysis, I will always discuss the potential role played 
by this data limitation in my results. In addition, I will always try 
to complement the GSOEP information for the period before its 
inception with the available official statistics, in order to check the 
extent and direction of the bias. 
Event history analysis techniques have been utilized to 
examine propensity to marriage (Blossfeld, 1995), the propensity 
of transitions between different labor force states (Bernardi, 1999), 
job mobility (Sorensen and Tuma, 1981), strikes’ duration 
(Kennan, 1985), and many other events of interest for social 
scientists. In the field of international migration, event history 
analysis has been profusely utilized in recent times by US scholars 
to study the propensity to migrate and to return (Massey, 1987; 
Parrado, 2003). However, the scarcity of longitudinal datasets that 
collects information on international migrant populations has 
consistently hampered the application of these techniques in the 
field of immigration out of the Mexican-US experience. 
There multiple types of processes that can be studied by means 
of event history analysis techniques. However, each of them 
requires a specific type model depending on whether the event is 
repeatable or it can occur only once; on whether there are only one 
or multiple destination states; and on whether the process is 
continuous or discrete. There are processes that entail only one 
potential transition between two states and, therefore, one only 
episode –episode is the duration until the event occurs. However, 
in some occasions there more than one destination state to which 
the transition from the origin state may occur. In these cases, the 
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research interest may be on assessing the relative propensity to 
change from the origin state (j) to each of the two (or more) 
possible destination states (k, l, m, etc.). In addition, some events 
or transitions can occur only once (i.e. first marriage); however, 
other events can occur several times along the individuals’ life-
course (i.e. marriage, in general). Finally, there are events that can 
occur at any point in time since the moment the risk period starts 
(i.e. continuous process); others, in contrast, only take place at 
specific points in time (discrete-time process). 
In order to successfully apply techniques of event history 
analysis, the researcher must define the process under study 
according to each of the previous dimensions. Each type of 
process requires a different type of analysis and data preparation; 
therefore, the researcher must think of the most effective way of 
framing her research question, taking into account the type of data 
she has available. 
Among the migration-related phenomena under study in this 
dissertation, the process of family reunification appears 
particularly well-fitted to the application of event history analysis. 
Family reunification may be thought as a particular type of 
migration, which has to meet two conditions:  
1) There must be two individuals linked by a kin relationship 
(marital or parental, for instance) prior to the migration of both of 
them (if the kin relationship is established ex-novo in the country 
of destination, it is obvious that there is no re-unification) 
2) One of these two individuals precedes the other in 
migration 
The reunification event occurs when the relative who 
originally stayed behind joins his (her) relative abroad.16 The 
                                               
16 In order to distinguish “family reunification” from potential 
successive arrivals to the host country on behalf the joining relative, only 
fist migration is considered as “family reunification”. In addition, family 
reunification implies some sort of permanency and settlement in the host 
country; therefore, it would be desirable to require some minimum period 
of stay abroad after first arrival to consider that family reunification has 
actually occurred. As I will explain in Chapter 4, all the individuals 
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origin state in this process is “residence in the country of origin”, 
the destination state is “arrival/settlement in the host country”; the 
episode or duration of the process in this case would be the time 
elapsed between the date of migration of the spouse (or parent) 
who migrated in the first place, and the date of migration of the 
joining relative. Family reunification is, therefore, a process with a 
single episode and two states (i.e. non-reunified and reunified). 
The key statistical concept of event history analysis to analyze 
this type of processes (and more complex ones) is the transition 
(or hazard) rate. Formally: 
tt
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T is the duration before the occurrence of an event, i.e. the 
time from the origin state j (non-employed) to the destination state 
k (employed). The transition rate r(t)jk expresses the instantaneous 
likelihood (risk) that the event occurs at time t, given that the 
event did not occur before time t. The transition rate incorporates, 
thus, two pieces of information: the quality of change (from j to k) 
and its timing (or the duration before it occurred.  
Formally, it cannot be interpreted as a probability since its 
values can be greater than one. However, if the time interval (t’, t) 
is small, then )()( tttr jk -¢ can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that the event occurs in the time 
interval (t’, t) (Blossfeld and Rowher, 2002: 37; Bernardi, 2006).  
The size of the time interval (t’, t) has much to do with the 
discussion concerning the difference between continuous time and 
discrete time. Although time is always continuous by definition, 
some times it cannot be measured as such because the unit of time 
utilized in the data collection is not precise enough. For instance, 
we may have information on the year of immigration of a sample 
of individuals, as it is the case in GSOEP, but lack information on 
                                                                                                
included in my sample for the study of spouses and children’s 
reunification resided in Germany at least two years after joining their 
relatives there.  
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the exact month and day of arrival. The importance of this type of 
data limitation depends on the kind of process under study, as well 
as on the number of ties in the sample. Events are tied when two 
or more subjects experience the event within the same time 
interval. Theoretically, two subjects never experience the event 
exactly at the same time. However, ties can occur in the data 
because events are measured at discrete time points (note the 
larger the unit of time utilized to measure the process under study, 
the more likely to have tied events). 
The main problem derived from the presence of multiple ties 
relates to the possibility (or not) of establishing causal 
relationships between the events. As Blossfeld has put it “there is 
always a time order of events in this relationship” (Blossfeld, 
1998: 236), there is always a time ordering between causes and 
effects. It takes some finite amount of time for the cause to cause 
the effect. The time interval may be very short or very long, but 
can never be zero or infinity. In other words, there can never be 
simultaneity of cause and its effect. Yet, apparent simultaneity is 
often the case in social sciences applications where basic 
observation intervals are relatively crude such as, for example, 
yearly data to examine the effect of getting married on women’s 
labor force participation. It is not difficult to imagine a woman 
who migrates and marries during the same year. In fact, this is a 
relatively common situation, as I will show later on. If we only 
have such information and do not know the exact month at which 
each woman migrates and marries, it turns virtually impossible to 
establish the direction of causality: does a woman migrate in order 
to marry a man who lives in the immigration country, or did she 
marry in order to make possible migration to that country? 
Although the answer to this question depends on many other 
circumstances and factors, to know the exact time ordering 
between migration and marriage would help us in formulating and 
testing hypothesis about. 
Most of the statistical models utilized in event history analysis 
assume continuous time. If the discrete time interval is small, 
however, a discrete time model can be used as an approximation 
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of a continuous time model. Moreover, in many cases discrete-
time transition models can be considered an approximation to 
proportional hazard rate models with continuous time, and the 
obtained results with both models are substantially identical.17 
In the empirical analyses included in the following chapters I 
will make use of both continuous and discrete-time models. In 
Chapter 4 I apply an accelerated failure time model to investigate 
the “time until wife’s (or children’s) reunification”. In Chapter 6 
and 7 I apply discrete-time logit rate model to study the entries 
and exits of immigrant women from the labor force. Below I have 
described the main characteristics of each of these two models. 
 
Logit model for discrete-time data 
 
This model is the most appropriate when events can only occur at 
regular, discrete points in time, but it has also been frequently 
employed when ties arise from grouping continuous-time data into 
intervals (Allison, 1995).18 This model is generally written as: 
                                               
17 In general, the approximation can be considered to be Clogg and 
Eliason (1987) show that rate models can be used as an approximation 
for logit models if the conditional probabilities of the occurrence of the 
event within each time interval are reasonably small; they exactly said 
0.1 or smaller. Hence, logit models can be used as an approximation for 
rate models under a similar condition. However, as Yamaguchi (1991) 
states, “it may be too conservative to require the conditional probabilities 
to be consistently smaller than, say, 0.1 at all discrete time points and for 
all combinations of covariate values. In fact, we still get very similar 
results for continuous and discrete-time models for datasets where 
conditional probabilities exceed 0.1 at many discrete time points. 
However, we can reasonably expect that the approximation will not be 
adequate if the aggregate frequency data include a high proportion of 
situations where conditional probabilities become much larger than 0.1.” 
(42) 
18 This model is very similar to the continuous-time models that 
estimate the transition rate assuming a piecewise exponential 
distribution. The main difference is that the piecewise exponential model 
assumes that you know the exact time of the event within a given 
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itkkititit xxthPP bb +++=- ...)()1/log( 11  
Where itP  is the conditional probability that individual i has 
an event at time t, given that an event has not already occurred to 
that individual. The model says that itP is related to the covariates 
by a logistic regression as the one written above. In this model, it 
is possible to divide the time scale into intervals and assume that 
the hazard is constant within each interval but can vary across 
intervals. Formally, h(t) consists of a series of dummy variables 
nddd ,..., 21  where 1d =1 in the time interval 1, 210 =- dtt  in the 
interval 21 tt - , etc. The choice of intervals is arbitrary but it has 
the advantage that the researcher has not to assume any specific 
form for h(t). In fact, the coefficients estimated for each of the 
dummy variables that identify the time intervals do allow the 
researcher to reconstruct how the effect of time on the occurrence 
of the event changes over the process. 
I will utilize this type of model for estimating the probability 
of entering and exiting the German labor force for immigrant 
women in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
 
Accelerated failure time models 
 
Accelerated failure time models, also known as accelerated 
time models or ln(time) models, which can be written as: 
jxjj xt eb +=)ln( 19 
                                                                                                
interval. By contrast, the discrete-time procedures presume that you 
known only that an event occurred within a given interval. This 
difference aside, the two approaches have the same advantages and 
disadvantages. 
19 An alternative notation utilized by authors like Bernardi (2006) 
is *ln( )T X zb= + . 
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Where )ln( jt is the logarithm of the episode duration;20 xb  
are the estimated coefficients for covariates X , which are allowed 
to be time-varying; and e  is an error term.  
The word “accelerated” is used in describing these models 
because, rather than assuming that failure time jt  is exponential, a 
Weibull form or some other distribution is instead assumed for  
jxjj tx )exp( bt -=  
In Chapter 4 I have assumed a Weibull distribution because it 
seems reasonable to assume that the hazard of, say, joining the 
husband in Germany increases as the time since the spouses’ 
separation started increases. 
The expression )exp( xjx b- is called the acceleration 
parameter. If the acceleration parameter is equal to 1, time 
passes at its normal rate; if it is larger than 1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject (time is accelerated), and 
so failure is expected to occur sooner. Finally, if the 
parameter is smaller than 1, then time passes more slowly for 
the subject (time is decelerated), and so the failure would be 
expected to occur later. 
Note that a positive xb  in accelerated failure time models 
indicates the corresponding covariate prolongs the duration of the 
episode, that is, the ln(time to failure). In the case of the spouses’ 
reunification, a positive coefficient must be taken as an indication 
that the corresponding covariate increases the time until the wife 
joins her husband in Germany. 
It must be noted that the Accelerated Failure Time metric 
gives a more prominent role to analysis time. In fact, by means of 
the previous specification jxjj xt eb +=)ln( , one basically is 
asserting an interest in what happens to }|){ln( jj xtE  for 
                                               
20 As for the log transformation of T, its main purpose is to ensure 
that predicted values of T are positive. 
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different values of jx .21 In addition, As Cleves et al. (2002) state, 
there is a second sense in which these models are “accelerated”. 
The effect of a change in one of the X  covariates increases with t. 
In other words, for larger t , we expect a longer delay in failure 
due to a one-unit increase in any of the covariates. 
 
                                               
21 With such an interest usually comes a desire to predict time to 
failure (i.e. time until reunification occurs). However, to construct such 
predictions is a “truly miserable calculation” for which Stata has no 
automated way to calculate. Therefore, it is not uncommon that the 
interpretation of the coefficients in these type of models mainly consists 
of saying whether the covariates delay or accelerate the occurrence of the 
event under study. For indications about how to calculate predictions of 
the time to failure in these models see Cleves et. al (2002: 193-194). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. THE PROCESS OF FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION. THE TIMING OF WIVES’ 
AND CHILDREN’S MIGRATION 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The issue of family reunification attracted considerable 
attention in the immigration debate during the eighties in the US, 
as the number of annual admissions granted on the basis of family 
reunification was considered excessive by many. Since the 
Immigration Act (1965) phased out the national origins quota 
system – established in 1921- and substituted a new system based 
primarily on family reunification and needed skills, the concerns 
about the multiplicative effect that family networks may have on 
the number of foreign residents and their (labor) quality had 
steadily grown. Academic research aimed at quantifying the so-
called “immigration multiplier”, which started with the pioneering 
work of Jasso & Rosenszweig (1986), concluded “that the 
magnitudes of the actual multipliers associated with family-
reunification provisions are substantially lower than the potential 
multipliers and lower, as well, than previously supposed” (309). In 
addition, the share of new immigrants admitted under the 
provisions of family reunification -whether they were immediate 
relatives of US citizens or were family-sponsored immigrants- 
decreased in the early nineties, from about 70% of total entries to 
50%. This helped  calm public concerns about a potentially 
uncontrolled growth of immigration due to family networks, and 
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the debate about quantity became a debate about quality: 
regardless of numbers, what were the characteristics of the 
sponsored immigrants and what would be their impact on the 
overall process of assimilation? 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Percent of total US immigration by category of admission, 
1986-2003 
 
Source: Batalova, 2005. 
 
 
However, the re-formulation of the question did not provide an 
answer. If researches are unsure about the rate at which 
immigrants sponsor their relatives’ migration, they are even less 
confident about who bring their families in and why. Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1989), in their study of the sponsors’ characteristics, 
concluded that foreign immigrants are more likely to sponsor other 
immigrants than naturalized immigrants, that women are more 
likely to sponsor their spouses’ migration from origin than men, 
and that the sponsorship of parents appears particularly large 
among immigrants from Asia residing in the US. In addition, they 
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stated, immigrants who sponsor their relatives tend to submit their 
applications as soon as they are permitted to do so under the law.  
When it comes to the issue of the impact of admission policies 
on the labor quality of immigrants and their performance in the 
host labor markets, George Borjas was one of the first academics 
to analyze the impact that family composition and the migrant’s 
position in the family migration chain have on immigrants’ 
productivity in the US labor market. Departing from his earlier 
thesis that selectivity in migration depends on the relative return of 
skills between the country of origin and the country of destination, 
he found that people who migrate as part of a family unit are more 
skilled and have higher earnings than people who migrate on their 
own. In particular, in his work with Bronars, entitled “Immigration 
and the Family” (1991), he concluded that the skills and earnings 
of married immigrants are higher than those of single immigrants 
and that the skills and earnings of earlier links in the family-
migration chain are lower than those of subsequent links. More 
recently, several studies that compare the earnings and 
occupational performance of male immigrants on the basis of their 
admission category into the US, have suggested that kinship-based 
immigrants often experience lower earnings at entry but higher 
earnings growth, which would permit them to catch up with 
employment-based immigrants after twelve to eighteen years in 
the US (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1995; Duleep and Regets, 1996). It 
is important to note, however, that women have not been included 
in these studies, despite the fact that they make up the largest share 
of immigrants admitted for the reason of family reunification. 
In Europe, the scarcity of empirical studies devoted to the 
analysis of the family reunification process and its impact on the 
general process of integration of immigrants in their receiving 
societies is even greater (see King, 1993 and Massey et al., 1998, 
for reviews). However, the reason underlying this gap in the 
European literature is not that family-linked inflows are of a 
smaller size in Europe than in the US. As Figure 4.2 shows, 
immigrants admitted for the purpose of family reunification 
represented a substantial proportion of the total in most Western 
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European countries in 2001. In France, for example, this category 
accounted for more than 70% of total entries that year (the same as 
in the US), more than 60% in Sweden and more than 50% in 
Denmark and Norway. In Switzerland, UK and Portugal, entries 
for the purpose of family reunion represented about 40% of total 
entries. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Distribution of immigrants by major purpose of migration in 
selected countries, 2001 
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Source: OECD (2003). 
 
 
Official figures, however, are not available on a yearly basis 
and present various limitations for cross-national comparisons. 
Among these limitations, one that should be particularly 
highlighted, as I mentioned in the Introduction, is that many 
countries do not distinguish between entries for the purpose of 
family formation and for the purpose of family reunification. A 
quick look at Figure 4.3, drawn from Dutch statistical data, is one 
of the few exceptions in this regard, and serves to prove the 
importance of such a differentiation. According to the Dutch 
Statistics, “family reunion migration” refers to the reunion of 
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families who already existed before one or more members 
migrated to the Netherlands. Family members of labor migrants, 
for instance, who immigrated in the same year are also considered 
family reunion immigrants. On the other hand, “family formation 
immigration” relates to immigrants who settled in the Netherlands 
to marry or cohabit (Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2004). Figure 4.3 
illustrates that while entries due to family reunification stabilized 
in the second half of the nineties (about 20,000 every year) and 
declined steadily since then (less than 14,000 in 2003), entries for 
the purpose of family formation has been growing since the late 
nineties and outnumbered entries for family reunification in 2002. 
In 2003, one in four immigrants entered the Netherlands to marry. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Annual entries of foreign immigrants to the Netherlands, by 
reason for migration (thousand) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Family formation Family reunification Work Asylum  
Source: Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2004. 
 
 
Official statistics not only fail to distinguish between these two 
types of family-linked migration but also often provide no 
information on the type of relationship between the sponsor and 
the newcomer(s). Family formation figures - by definition- include 
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only “spouses”, while family reunification figures generally merge 
spouses, children, parents and other relatives, which prevents us 
from knowing whether spouses and children are brought to the 
country of immigration at the same time or in a staggered way 
(some countries like Denmark and the UK distinguish at least 
spouses/cohabitants from other relatives). 
Yet, such poor collection of immigration statistics in most 
European countries - along with the consequential absence of 
empirical-based research on family reunification - have not 
prevented certain beliefs becoming firmly established. First among 
those beliefs is the widely accepted idea that family reunification 
and permanent settlement are two sides of the same coin. In 
accordance with this belief, the postwar immigration experience in 
Western Europe has been traditionally portrayed as a two-stage 
process in which a first wave of temporary male workers was 
followed by the arrival of wives and children and the permanent 
settlement of immigrant populations in the host countries. 
Secondly, the assumption that the process of immigration 
proceeded in the described way along with the fact that the 
economic performance of immigrants in most Western countries 
notably worsened from the late seventies, has favored the 
identification between family reunification and integration 
problems. At the same time, it has also favored the neglect of 
other concurrent potential causes such as rising unemployment 
and economic restructuring in the host economies. 
It is important to note that this view is not restricted to the 
seventies’, but continues today, as can be seen by reading the 
document recently published by the Kirkhope Commission (2004). 
This document was aimed at reviewing the immigration situation 
in the UK and proposing a potential plan of action for an incoming 
Conservative Government and stated: 
 
“[…] Family reunion immigration is the biggest source of low 
skilled workers that depress GDP per capita, which is a significant, 
even if not the sole, contributor to our quality of life. As previously 
noted, the overall positive fiscal contribution of the immigrant 
community comes from the high-income, high-skilled workers. 
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Immigrants from all over the world who come in on work permits do 
pay their way. Immigrants who come in through family reunion are 
usually subsidized by the UK taxpayer.” (22) 
 
In line with this view, the Commission proposed to establish a 
requirement of minimum income, British citizenship and age 
limits for sponsoring spouses.1 Moreover – and even in the middle 
of the riots in France in November 2005 - the Minister of 
Employment Gérard Larcher and the UMP president of the 
National Assembly Bernard Accoyer suggested that large, 
polygamous, African families were one of the main causes of three 
weeks of rioting in the poorer suburbs and public housing estates 
in French towns and cities. Just a week later, M. de Villepin 
announced plans to restrict the re-unification of immigrant 
families and tougher enforcement of existing French laws against 
polygamy (see El País, November 30th 2005). 
The relevance of carefully studying the determinants and 
timing of the family reunification process among immigrants 
seems, therefore, warranted. In the remainder of this Chapter, I 
will deal thoroughly with the family reunification process led 
originally by guestworkers in Germany. First, I will identify the 
major assumptions in the literature with regard to the size and pace 
of this process in Germany. Then, I propose to examine each of 
them in the light of data provided by both official statistics and 
survey information contained in the GSOEP. After summarizing 
the main theoretical arguments that have been developed so far on 
the issue of family reunification, I will study the timing of the 
reunification of spouses and children by male immigrants and its 
determinants by means of both static and dynamic statistical 
analyses based on GSOEP data. 
 
 
                                               
1 Note here also that family reunion and family formation are, again, 
confused. 
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4.2. Family reunification in Germany according to official 
statistics and surveys 
 
The dominant view that postwar immigration to Western 
Europe can be described as a two-stage process with a first wave 
of male single workers followed later on by spouses and children, 
is largely based on the German experience. It is commonly stated 
in the literature that the recruitment stop, which was intended to 
prevent the number of foreigners in Germany from rising, 
unexpectedly caused an increase in the number of foreign 
residents living in Western countries. The explanation usually 
offered is that - after the halt was imposed - migrant workers 
feared that if they went home, they would not be allowed to return 
to Germany; accordingly, instead of returning to their countries of 
origin, many decide to stay and brought their families to Germany, 
which led to a substantial growth in the foreign population, from 4 
million in 1973 to 4.5 in 1980 (Martin, 1998: 13).  
Some quotations from authors in the field help illustrate these 
facts. According to Mehrländer (1993): 
 
“the ban on recruitment of foreign labor has been in effect since 
1973, but since the late 70’s an increasing number of family 
members have to come to join the foreign workers already in the 
Federal Republic.” (191) 
 
Massey and Constant (2002), in their study of return migration 
among immigrants in Germany, also stated that: 
 
“The first guestworkers were generally young men unaccompanied 
by wives or children. As the postwar boom went on, however, the 
temporary shortages proved not temporary but chronic, leading 
employers to demand more guestworkers and extend the work 
permits of those already present. The migrants, meanwhile, found 
that once their initial economic goals had been met, new needs arose, 
leading to new trips of longer duration (Piore, 1979). Although some 
of the migrants may indeed have “rotated”, they usually returned 
home only for short visits before coming back to jobs in Germany. 
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The situation changed dramatically in late 1973. The Arab Oil 
Boycott organized in the wake of the Yom Kippur War sent the 
European economy into a deep recession, and in November of that 
year Germany suspended guestworker recruitment. Authorities 
expected the migrant population to dwindle slowly as visas expired 
and the guests rotated out. They were surprised, however, that 
neither employers nor guestworkers behaved according to plan 
(Martin and Miller, 1980). Employers wanted to avoid the costs of 
recruitment and retraining, and thus sought to extend the visas of the 
foreign workers they already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not 
want to give up their good jobs and steady income, so they stayed 
put. Rather than leaving, they sought to sponsor the entry of their 
wives and their children. After dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign 
population of Germany rose and its composition shifted increasingly 
from workers to dependents.” (6) 
 
Statements of this type, although quite common in the 
literature, are only partially correct and have led to a misleading 
view of the migration process to Germany with regard to its 
female and family component, as I will try to prove in the 
following pages. Entries of dependants effectively increased after 
the halt, but only in relative terms. As Booth (1992) pointed out in 
her demographic description of the migration process to Germany, 
dependants have formed an increasing proportion of immigrants 
over time, especially after the halt; however, fluctuations in this 
proportion were more the result of changes in the volume of labor 
migration than of dependant migration itself. Such a distinction 
between relative and absolute figures becomes crucial in proving 
that neither an increasing number of family members have come 
to join the foreign workers already in the Federal Republic since 
the late seventies, nor that migrants were primarily young single 
men who did not bring their families until 1973. In the following 
pages I will demonstrate that family reunification, on the contrary, 
started from the very moment that married men migrated to 
Germany. 
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4.2.1. Numerical importance and time sequence according to the 
official statistics 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the historical development of non-labor 
entries into Germany between 1960 and 1981. Since information 
on the reasons to migrate or admission category is not available in 
German official statistics, the annual difference between total and 
labor immigration is taken to proxy “annual family entries” (i.e. 
non-labor migrants). This measure, however, has one important 
limitation: it reflects the border control policy of the receiving 
country rather than the true reasons for migration of the migrants 
finally admitted. “Non-labor entries” are likely to include the entry 
of relatives of already-established migrants whose main purpose 
of migration was economic but who decided to apply for family 
reunification and once admitted start looking for employment, 
because they had little chance of being admitted as workers. This 
situation would be particularly probable in periods of economic 
recession and restrictive admission policies at destination. 
Alternatively, in periods of economic growth and labor shortages, 
“labor entries” would surely include also relatives of other 
immigrants already established who applied for a job in the 
destination country - not necessarily because they wished to work, 
but maybe because in this manner they would be able to join their 
relatives abroad sooner than following the family-reunification 
procedure. 
Figure 4.4 clearly shows that the absolute number of 
foreigners annually admitted to Germany under any category other 
than labor (i.e. “non-labor entries”, taken here to be an 
approximation of family-linked immigration) started to increase 
not after the ban on labor migration in 1973/74 but much earlier, 
in 1968, once the recession of late 1966 was over. Since that time, 
non-labor entries grew without interruption until 1973, when the 
number of non-labor entries –along with labor entries as well- 
experienced an abrupt fall, instead of a huge increase as 
conventional accounts have traditionally argued. In fact, non-labor 
migration from recruitment countries peaked just before the halt, 
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and it never resumed its pre-halt levels with the exception of the 
Turkish second peak in 1980. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Non-labor entries to Germany by country of origin, 1962-
1981(absolute and percentage) 
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Source: Booth, 1992 (Table13) and Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Own elaboration. 
Note: This data does not distinguish between first and subsequent 
arrivals since they are based on cases instead of persons. Therefore, they 
offer an inflated indicator of real migration, not least because of the 
practice prior to 1974 by some foreigners of de-registering on leaving for 
vacation in order to draw on their contribution to the national insurance 
fund. In addition, remigration to the homeland is known to be 
underestimated because those with no pension rights had no advantage in 
de-registering.  
 
 
Moreover, the decline in family entries since 1973 might have 
been even larger than suggested by Figure 4.4, due to the 
aforementioned undercounting of relatives of former immigrants 
who gained admission prior to 1973 on the basis of either 
anonymous recruitment or the traditional visa system, (which 
probably benefited relatives of guest-workers already established 
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more than anybody else.) Actually, it is a well known fact that the 
German government did not enforce rotation strictly, and many 
German employers favored “de facto” reunification of wives (and 
other adult relatives) of the guestworker by providing them with a 
visa for work in Germany. Under this procedure, the German 
employer stated that a specific migrant worker was willing to 
work for him and ordered his visa from the corresponding German 
consulate abroad. The consulate then had to obtain the approval of 
the German authorities. The local immigration authorities checked 
that the legal conditions allowed the residence and work permit to 
be issued. If approved, the consulate granted the visa, and the 
foreign worker entered the country for the purpose of working and 
then obtained the necessary permit, usually valid for one year. By 
bringing wives, employers not only obtained the additional human 
resources they needed but also ensured that the experienced and 
trained migrants remained, consequently saving the cost of 
recruiting and training new foreign workers (Werner, 2000; 
Martin, 1982, 1998). 
Although we do not know how many relatives did actually 
gain admission into Germany through this second procedure, it is 
clear that their inclusion within the category of “labor entries” 
contributes to the underestimation of the annual number of family 
entries during the pre-halt period. In their analysis of Turkish 
female labor migration between 1960 and 1990, Erdem and Mattes 
(2003) noted that the Federal Employment Service of Germany 
had acknowledged, as early as 1961, that approximately half of the 
demand for foreign female employees at the time could not be met 
through successful placements taking place that year (169, note 
10). In this context, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that a 
considerable number of wives might have seized the chance to 
join their husbands in Germany by getting a visa for work that had 
been requested by their husbands’ own employers (or other 
employers in the area where their husbands worked). However, the 
magnitude of the under-estimation of family-linked entries derived 
from this is difficult to assess. Eryilmaz argued that approximately 
200,000 out of the 850,000 - a quarter of the Turkish labor entries 
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to Germany between 1961 and 1973- took place through the visa 
procedure, instead of by anonymous recruitment (2002: 3). Booth 
(1992), on the other hand, also noticed this problem in the official 
figures of non-labor entries. However, she considered this under-
estimation not to be great (134). Regardless of its actual size, the 
resulting underestimation in the annual number of family-linked 
entries is expected to be larger during the pre-halt period since no 
special effort was made by the German authorities to restrict the 
number of visas granted for work through their embassies abroad 
until 1969. Furthermore, such under-estimation is also likely to 
have affected mainly spouses and other adult relatives, but not 
children. 
This decline in non-labor entries immediately after the ban on 
recruitment, although rarely mentioned in the literature, is not as 
surprising as it may appear at first sight. As Jennissen (2004) has 
recently shown, family-linked migration or dependant migration, 
as it is also called, is not totally unresponsive to changes in 
economic conditions at destination. In his analysis, the Dutch rate 
of unemployment appeared to be an important determinant of 
Moroccan family migration to Netherlands over the period 1985-
1999; the higher the unemployment rates in the Netherlands, the 
lesser the number of family members who came over to join 
former Moroccan migrants.2 
In the case of Germany, the economic slump in 1966 and 1967 
had already proved that family immigrants were not irresponsive 
to economic conditions at destination (Booth, 1992). The drop in 
family entries from the five largest recruitment countries between 
1973 and 1976 is probably the result of who concurrent effects: 1) 
                                               
2 The difference in the GDP per capita between Morocco and the 
Netherlands also display a negative effect on annual family migration 
from Morocco, although the effect does not reach the level of statistical 
significance. In his work, Jennissen (2004) also suggested that the effect 
of economic conditions at both sending and receiving countries may 
differ for the two main different types of family migration -family 
reunification and family formation migration. However, he left the 
analysis of this question for future research. 
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the discouraging effect that increasing unemployment rates in 
Germany had on prospective family migrants still in the origin 
countries by 1973; 2) the increase in return migration among 
foreign guest-workers, which logically reduces the number of 
relatives coming to Germany during that period, and also the 
economic and political changes that took place in some source 
countries, which put an end to the migration of many Greek and 
Spanish workers in Germany. Finally, the potential effect of the 
halt on recruitment itself should not be overlooked either, 
especially when one takes into account the fact that a substantial 
number of relatives entered into Germany as workers themselves. 
The development of Italian non-labor entries perfectly 
illustrates the extent to which dependants were also responsive to 
the changing economic context in Germany. Due to their ECC 
membership, entry limitations like the ban on recruitment and 
other discriminatory clauses commonly applied to foreign workers 
did not apply to Italians from 1968, when the free movement of 
labor came into full effect. In spite of such privileges, however, 
the number of entries of Italian dependants plummeted between 
1973 and 1975 (from 43,015 to 20,882), which in the case of the 
Italians can only be explained as a response of potential family 
migrants to the recession in Germany, since they were not subject 
to the newly imposed stringent borders’ controls. 
Within this overall pattern of decline in family entries after the 
halt on recruitment, specific developments by country of origin 
deserves comment, especially as regards the length of time during 
which the process of family reunification seems to have been at 
work. By calculating the number of years that elapsed between the 
signature of the bilateral recruitment agreement and the year at 
which the number of family entries peaked, one can obtain a rough 
approximation of the length of the process. While Greek and 
Spanish family inflows peaked ten and twelve years after the 
signature of their respective bilateral agreements with Germany, 
non-labor inflows from the former Yugoslavia took only five years 
to reach their peak level. In contrast, non-labor entries from Italy 
and Turkey displayed a lengthier pattern. Italian family entries 
The process of family reunification / 125 
 
peaked in 1973; therefore, the overall process of family 
reunification can be said to have prolonged by approximately 
thirteen or fourteen years. Turkish non-labor entries peaked twice, 
in 1974 and in 1980, which implies between thirteen and nineteen 
years depending on which peak we consider; in any case, it is the 
lengthiest process of the five national groups under attention here. 
However, the more prolonged nature of the family 
reunification process among Italian and Turkish immigrants in 
Germany may reflect different causes. Italians have enjoyed the 
privilege of free movement since 1968, which allowed them -both 
workers and their families- to plan their trip on a temporary basis. 
Free movement made it particularly easy for Italian workers to 
visit their families in Italy and, consequently, their families had 
fewer incentives to move to Germany, at least in the very first 
moment.3 In addition, free movement privileges implied also that 
Italian labor migration to Germany did not stop in 1973 but rather 
it re-activated as soon as the German economy showed the first 
signs of slight recovery. Thus, non-labor entries from Italy 
registered after the mid-seventies do not exclusively include 
relatives of immigrants who had immigrated prior to the halt on 
recruitment, but also relatives of new labor entries that occurred 
after 1973. 
If the possibility of traveling between Germany and Italy 
without facing the risk of being refused re-admission is argued to 
have delayed the urgency of family reunification among Italians, 
the absence of such a possibility for Turks and other national 
groups should have accelerated their process of family 
reunification. In fact, this seems to have been the case for 
immigrants originating in the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned 
before, but not for Turkish immigrants. The bilateral agreement 
                                               
3 Several demographic indicators support this hypothesis: the large 
excess of adult males (54% in 1974, 51% in 1978 and 50% in 1981), the 
high proportion (23%) who had been in Germany less than 4 years in 
1981, and the continuing young age structure of the adult Italian 
population despite it being the first country in signing a recruitment 
agreement (Booth, 1992: 145). 
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for recruitment with Turkey had been signed under the strictest 
conditions, in particular regarding the possibility of family reunion 
for foreign workers. This clause, which despite having been 
included in the agreements previously signed with Italy, Spain and 
Greece, was omitted in the verbal statement that made public the 
treaty with Turkey in October 1961. Even though the German-
Turkey agreement was revised in September 1964, Turkish 
dependant entries still did not really start until 1968 (Eryilmaz, 
2002).4 Several factors may have played a role in delaying the 
process of Turkish families’ reunification in Germany. First, the 
larger size of Turkish households and their extended structure 
must have increased the number of potential candidates for 
reunification compared with the other four countries.5 If Turkish 
workers had, on average, more children and brought them to 
Germany in a staggered way, the lengthier process of Turkish 
family reunification suggested by Figure 4.4 becomes more 
logical. Secondly, unlike primary labor migration from other 
recruitment countries like Spain, Turkish primary migration had 
not been exhausted by the time the halt was imposed. On the 
contrary, asylum was often utilized as an alternative entry-door by 
prospective emigrants from Turkey after 1974, which resulted in 
further family entries during the rest of the decade.6 Finally, an 
                                               
4 It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which this delay in the 
initiation of Turkish non-labor entries may partially reflect the tightening 
of the procedure for granting a visa for work, which is known to have 
been extensively utilized by Turkish women, in 1967. 
5 The average household size in Turkey in 1970 was 5.8 persons and 
5.0 in 1980, while the Italian corresponding figure for 1980 was 3.2 
persons (Demographic Yearbooks 1973, 1987, 1995). The total fertility 
rate in Turkey in 1971 was 5.9 children, although it reduced to 2.5 in 
2004 (Engender Health's program in Turkey, 2002). 
6 Statistics of asylum applications clearly show that Turks made 
extensive use of the category of ‘asylum seeker’ as an alternative means 
of gaining admission into the German labor market. Aware of this 
situation, the German authorities imposed compulsory visas for Turkish 
citizens in 1980 and, in addition, prohibited asylum seekers from 
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uncertain but perhaps substantial share of Turkish non-labor 
entries after 1974 would correspond to what I have called the 
importation of spouses, which is not “family reunification” in the 
sense I have defined it previously. 
Although the statistics drawn on to date do not permit a 
precise depiction of the historical development of the family 
reunification process in Germany, it seems to me that they do 
provide us with enough reasons to question some of the most 
entrenched ideas on this topic such as the belief that family 
reunification intensified as a result of the halt on labor migration 
imposed in 1973. On the other hand, the discussion of the figures 
presented so far in this section suggests that family and economic 
reasons were not necessarily mutually exclusive in shaping the 
migration decisions of many foreigners to move to Germany. 
Moreover, it seems clear from the previous description that non-
labor entries were also responsive to the worsening of the German 
economy in the mid-seventies. Even though the rate and speed of 
the process of family reunification seemed to vary across 
nationalities as a result of a variety of factors (e.g. differences in 
the historical pattern of the overall migration process, prevailing 
family structure in the home countries, differences in the legal 
conditions that regulate admission and residence of foreigners of 
distinct origin, etc., non-labor entries from all five countries 
considered in this study reduced substantially the year following 
the halt on recruitment. In my opinion, these findings strongly 
suggest that a more thorough analysis should be undertaken which 
draws on alternative sources, as the German Socio Economic 
Panel. This would permit a more complete test of the question at 
stake. 
 
                                                                                                
working in Germany during their first year of residence. In 1981 this 
waiting period was extended to 2 years. These two combined measures 
proved highly efficient in reducing the number of newly issued work 
permits to Turkish people from 29,219 in 1979 to 3,580 in 1981. 
However, the relatives of those who had been already admitted retained 
the possibility to join them. 
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4.2.2 Magnitude, timing and characteristics of family reunification 
according to individual survey data collected in GSOEP 
 
When studying family reunification, at least three different but 
related questions may be posed: 1) how many new immigrants are 
directly brought by an immigrant during his stay in the host 
country (immigrant sponsorship rate)?, 2) how many are the total 
number of new immigrants directly or indirectly sponsored by one 
original immigrant (immigration multiplier)?, 3) and what are the 
characteristics of the sponsoring and sponsored populations (i.e. 
who does bring his/her relatives in and whom they bring)? 
Most of the political debate on this issue has revolved around 
the first question concerning the proportion of total immigration in 
the receiving countries which is due to family reunification. This 
is particularly true in the case of Europe, where increasing border 
controls and a restrictionist approach in dealing with immigration 
issues since the mid-seventies (and earlier in the case of the UK) 
have favored a negative view on family reunification. Yet, 
empirical research aimed at establishing the true scale of family-
linked immigration flows in Europe has so far not been 
undertaken. As Jasso & Rosenzweig (1989) pointed out when they 
researched this aspect of family reunification in the US, the 
computation of immigrant sponsorship rates and, therefore, of 
immigration multipliers requires a prospective linkage design in 
which an immigrant cohort is linked to those future immigrants it 
sponsors. None of the statistical sources available to date in the 
EU countries, either register-based or survey, has such as 
prospective linkage design. Retrospective designs in which a 
cohort of immigrants is retrospectively linked to its sponsors can 
provide a picture of the population of sponsors at a given point in 
time; but it cannot alone be used to compute sponsorship rates 
since information on the appropriate denominator (the population 
“at risk” of sponsorship) is unavailable. 
In the GSOEP case, the predominantly retrospective nature of 
the data used prevents not only estimations of the immigration 
multiplier and sponsorship rates, but also a proper comparison 
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between migrants who were joined by their relatives and those 
who were not, due to the cumulative effect and selective impact of 
return migration. 
As I said in Chapter 3, the GSOEP’s data of inception was 
1983 and its first results published in 1984. By that time, most 
married foreigners in Germany had already been joined by their 
spouses. In fact, only 5 % (56) of the total number of married male 
migrants included in the original sample still had their spouse in 
their country of origin in 1984; the rest had already brought them 
to Germany. Furthermore, about half of these 56 men ended up 
bringing their spouses at some point during the observation period 
(1984-2000). Thus, the sub-sample of men who never brought 
their partner to Germany before returning home are too few and 
unrepresentative of the whole population of those who returned 
before bringing their spouses to Germany. Furthermore, GSOEP 
does not provide information on the spouses who never came to 
Germany but only those who came and were interviewed at least 
once. 
With regard to the reunification of children with their parents, 
GSOEP provides information on every child in every household 
surveyed. Yet, adult children who left the parents’ household 
before their parents entered the survey are not separately identified 
as a part of the family and, as a result, their reunification process 
cannot be reconstructed.7 This drawback in the dataset implies that 
the earlier the parents migrated and the older a child at migration, 
                                               
7 To take one example: Antonio and Maria are a Spanish couple who 
were interviewed by GSOEP in 1984. They and their only son, Daniel, 
had migrated to Germany ten years previously, in 1974. At that time, 
Daniel was 15. Four years after arriving in Germany, in 1979, Daniel 
married Lucia and moved out from his parents’ place. This implies that 
when Antonio and Maria were interviewed for the first time, Daniel did 
not live with them anymore and, thus, he was never interviewed by 
GSOEP. We know that Maria had had a son in 1959 because this 
information is recorded in Maria’s retrospective questionnaires. Yet, it is 
impossible to ascertain whether he was ever taken to Germany and, if so, 
when it took place. 
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the more likely that this child would have been missed in GSOEP. 
The potential bias derived from these missing cases is further 
discussed in Section 4.5. 
Despite the limitations mentioned in the foregoing section, 
GSOEP data allows us to: 1) separate wives’ reunification from 
the importation of brides; 2) separate wives’ and children’s 
reunification; 3) calculate the time it took for the first-mover 
within each foreign household to bring different members of 
his/her family to Germany. Before analyzing each of these aspects, 
I have chosen to compare the aggregated picture of family-linked 
migration to Germany provided by the official statistics on foreign 
non-labor entries represented in Figure 4.4 (see previous section) 
and the picture derived from data in GSOEP. 
As can be seen, the overall trend provided by the two sources 
is quite similar with only one exception: according to GSOEP 
data, entries of foreigners who had at least one close relative 
(spouse or parent) in Germany before their own arrival peaked in 
1970 and slowed down in 1971 (green line). On the other hand, 
aggregate data from the Official German Statistics suggests a 
smoother increase between 1968 and 1973. This divergence might 
be due to the entry of adult relatives of guest-workers between 
1968 and 1970 (included) under the category of “labor migration”, 
either as “anonymous recruitment” or as admitted with visa for 
work. As explained above, these individuals are not counted as 
family immigrants even if they have close family ties with other 
foreign residents in Germany. On the other hand, the GSOEP 
estimates of family-linked migration are based precisely on the 
kinship relationship between newcomers and other foreigners 
established in Germany prior to their arrival. It is important to bear 
in mind this distinction when interpreting the results of this 
chapter. 
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Figure 4.5. Family-linked migration in German Official Statistics and in 
GSOEP 
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Sources: GSOEP, 1984-2002 and Booth (1992). 
Notes: 1. Family-linked migration calculated with GSOEP data includes 
those immigrants who, at the year of their arrival, had at least one spouse 
or parent in Germany, regardless of the fact that they effectively utilized 
such a family tie with another foreign resident in Germany as a mean to 
obtain the permission to entry and stay or not. Remind here that figures 
in official statistics, represented in Figure 4.4, count exclusively those 
foreigners who obtained admission to Germany under a non-labor 
reason. 
2. See note in Figure 3.2 for official statistics of foreign non-labor 
entries. 
 
 
In Figure 4.5 I have drawn a distinction between family-linked 
migration of spouses and children of previous immigrants in 
Germany, using GSOEP data. The number of reunited wives who 
entered Germany annually peaked in 1970 and steadily decreased 
until 1972 - the two small peaks in 1979/80 and 1993 respectively 
relate to the reunification of spouses of asylum seekers who fled 
Turkey in the months prior to the coup d’Etat, and who fled the 
war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992/93. Thus, figures in GSOEP 
also support the idea that the halt on recruitment did not intensify 
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the reunification of wives but their migration roughly followed the 
pattern of male adult immigration. In fact, the annual entries of 
reunited wives virtually ceased to exist in 1981; this year the 
entries of imported wives outnumbered the number of reunited 
wives.8 Finally, entries of children peaked systematically one or 
two years after the inflows of reunited wives did, which suggests 
that the reunification of children was a lengthier process than the 
reunification of wives, and was responsible for the largest 
proportion of foreign entries between 1973 and 1981. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Type of kinship relationship in family-linked migration to by 
year of arrival, 1960-2000 
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In Figure 4.7 I explore whether GSOEP data supports the well 
established idea that the halt in recruitment accelerated the process 
of family reunification by male guest-workers who, instead of 
                                               
8 It is important to note that it was specifically in December 1981 
when the Ministry of Interior approved the Decree aimed at curbing the 
entrance of this type of spouses (see Chapter 2).   
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returning to their homelands and risking their chances of later 
returning to Germany, preferred to settle more permanently with 
their families there and feel assured that they would not lose their 
jobs. The graph clearly illustrates the importance of distinguishing 
- within the process of family reunification - between spouses and 
children. While between 60% and 75% (depending on whether 
wives who migrated to Germany the same year as their husbands 
are considered reunited wives or not, see transparent and yellow 
areas respectively), of pre-halt male immigrants had brought their 
wives to Germany in 1973, the corresponding percentage for 
children is less than 40%. These cumulated percentages indicate, 
first, that the reunification of children effectively took place 
slower than the reunification of wives and, secondly, that the 
majority of foreign men who were in Germany by 1973 had 
already brought their wives from the country of origin when the 
halt on recruitment was imposed. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Stock of reunited children and wives whose husband (father) 
migrated to Germany before the halt on recruitment, by year of arrival 
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134 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
Finally, differences by country of origin coincide only 
partially with the picture drawn by official statistics in Figure 4.4. 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 represent the stock of wives and children 
reunified by male immigrants in Germany over time. The graph 
for wives is restricted to those whose husbands had migrated 
before the halt on recruitment in order to test the plausibility of the 
hypothesis that the halt precipitated the family reunification of 
those who feared losing their possibility of working in Germany 
forever if they returned to their countries in the new context of 
restrictive immigration policy. On the other hand, Figure 4.9 
shows all immigrant children who arrived between 1960 and 2000. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Stock of reunited wives whose husbands had migrated before 
1974 by country of origin 
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The official figures for non-labor entries suggested that 
Yugoslavs and Greeks were the groups that reunified faster, 
whereas Turks appeared to be the slowest. However, we were not 
able to distinguish to what extent such appearances might be 
masking differences in the time taken for reunifying spouses and 
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children, respectively. When we separate both processes with 
GSOEP data, the picture provided by the aggregate data changes 
in significant ways. First of all, Greeks (pink line) followed by 
Spaniards (yellow line) are those who reunified with their wives 
faster; on the other hand, Yugoslavs (green line) were relatively 
slow in bringing their wives to Germany, according to GSOEP 
data. While approximately 80% of Greeks and Spaniards had their 
wife already in Germany as early as 1970, at the same date the 
percentage of reunified wives with Yugoslav and Turkish men in 
Germany were, respectively, 45% and 25%. When the halt was 
imposed in 1973, 40% of Turkish reunited wives and about 30% 
of Yugoslav ones were still in their countries of origin. 
Children, effectively, took longer to be reunified, among other 
reasons because their numbers were potentially greater. A similar 
pattern to the one described for the reunification of wives was 
reproduced here: a larger fraction of the Spaniard children had 
been already been brought to Germany in 1973 (75%), while the 
proportion of Turkish and Yugoslav children by then was between 
20% and 30%. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Stock of reunified children by country of origin, 1960-1996 
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The following sections are aimed at disentangling the factors 
that explain the relative speed at which male immigrants from 
different countries brought their spouses and children to Germany, 
after briefly reviewing the existing literature and evidence on this 
issue with a particular focus on the German experience. 
 
 
4.3. Theoretical ideas on the process of family reunification  
 
The lack of adequate datasets that contain information about 
the immigrants’ relatives and their date of immigration has, to 
date, severely hampered the empirical research of the reunification 
process. In addition, the predominance of the neoclassical 
economic paradigm in the study of the migration decisions 
(Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976) has favored a strong individualist 
bias that, in turn, has contributed to obscure the family dimension 
of the migration process. 
Some economists like Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) made 
an effort to shift the focus from the individual to the family as the 
appropriate unit of analysis for migration studies. However, 
empirical applications of their theoretical reasoning have largely 
been restricted to the phenomenon of internal migration, where 
family reunification is barely an issue. Long-distance internal 
migration generally involves less family separation than 
international migration. The so-called ‘commuter marriages’ - i.e. 
married couples who set up separate households in different cities 
because of the geographical locations of their respective jobs 
(Gerstel and Gross 1982) – have been presented as being most 
similar to migration-related spouses separation (Gupta, 2003). 
However, commuter marriages are in principle more individualist 
since they are a work solution compromise that allows both 
spouses to pursue their careers while maintaining their  marital 
relationship, whereas migration-related separation is assumed to 
occur mainly in families where the male bread-winner model 
applies (i.e. specialized gender roles, in which women expect to 
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benefit from their husbands’ financial support and men expect 
their wives to have their households and basic needs cared for). 
In less developed countries, labor migration of the head of the 
household is often seen as necessary for the economic survival of 
the entire family. Accordingly, families are expected to experience 
some residential separation for at least a period of time. However, 
we do not know much about either how long separation lasts or 
about the reasons that lead immigrants to end family separation 
after a period of separation. Gupta (2003) has recently examined 
the incidence and duration of spouses’ separation among Mexican 
immigrants in the US. However, she framed the study within the 
context of circular or repeated migration, focused on visits to the 
family in the country of origin that interrupt spouses separation 
and, therefore, excluded from the analysis couples who were 
separated for all twelve months in the year. Gupta’s findings 
indicate that wives’ probability of migrating together with their 
husband increases as they get older and that more educated 
women are also more likely to migrate with their husbands than 
being left behind. Couples where both spouses have a green card 
are much more likely to migrate together and avoiding migration-
related separation. Finally, the likelihood of separation increases 
with the number of pre-school children, while school-age children 
neither promotes nor deters couple migration. The sex of the 
children does not appear to make any difference either. For 
couples who have experienced at least one spell of separation, 
separation tends to be longer the older the wife is at the time of the 
husband’s migration, and shorter the more educated the husband 
is. Children, especially school-aged ones, make separations longer. 
Return migration, as a means of definitively ending migration-
related separation, has received more attention in the literature. In 
fact, return migration is often presented as the reverse of family 
reunification: immigrants who decide to stay permanently are the 
ones who end up bringing their relatives to the host country. This 
idea, which is widespread, has led to the question “who 
reunifies?” being replaced by the question “who does (not) return 
to the home country after migration?  
138 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
It must be noted, though, that by establishing such a 
symmetrical relationship between return migration and family 
reunification, we are assuming indirectly that migration – both 
emigration and re-migration to the country of origin – is a one shot 
move: immigrants stay or return, but nothing else happens in 
between. Yet, if repeat migration is common practice - as some 
recent pieces of research have suggested not only for Mexicans in 
the US -see Massey and Constant (2003) for repeated migration of 
guest-workers in Germany-, the reunification of the family (or at 
least part of it) and return migration do not need to be mutually 
exclusive events but may rather occur at different stages of the 
migration process and, therefore, should be analyzed separately.9 
Unfortunately, we know very little about how these two 
processes -family reunification and return migration- relate to each 
other. In a recent piece of research, Khoo (2003) writes “… the 
relation between family sponsorship and permanent settlement (or 
return migration) is not a simple one for empirical analysis. While 
it can be hypothesized that immigrants who want to sponsor or 
have sponsored their close relatives (such as parents and siblings) 
are more likely to want to settle permanently, it is also possible 
that those who decide to settle permanently are also more likely to 
want to sponsor their relatives to join them.” (180) This author 
concluded, with data for a recent cohort of immigrants in 
Australia, that there exists a strong association between 
immigrants’ permanent settlement and family sponsorship 
decisions. In fact, she found that immigrants who have sponsored 
their close relatives, particularly parents and siblings, are much 
more likely to settle permanently than migrants who have not. 
                                               
9 It is possible to think, for instance, of a male immigrant who arrives 
first to the country of migration, goes back to his home country after a 
year abroad, stay there for several months and then migrates again with 
his oldest son; later on, he brings his wife and their youngest child, and 
then stays for several more years until they finally return to their country 
of origin for good. 
 
The process of family reunification / 139 
 
Moreover, this relationship appeared to be stronger for skilled and 
business immigrants than for all migrants.  
However, there are no empirical studies that allow us to 
establish that such a strong connection between permanent 
settlement and family reunification also holds for relatives other 
than siblings and parents, in particular for the spouse and children, 
who are the close relatives most commonly reunified. In spite of 
this lack of evidence, the belief that immigrant men do not bring 
their wives and children until they decide to stay put on a more 
permanent basis in the country of immigration is a widely 
accepted one. It seems fairly reasonable to hypothesize that 
parents do not want to take their young children abroad unless 
they have decided to settle permanently in the country of 
immigration. But beyond these kind of general statements, the 
preferences of immigrants for reunifying their spouse and older 
children are not so easy to identify in advance.  
Constant and Massey (2002), in their paper on the return 
migration of immigrants in Germany, stated that the relationship 
between the presence of a spouse in the origin (or host) country 
and immigrants’ decision to return to their homeland (or settle at 
destination) depends basically on the individuals’ initial reasons 
for migration. If migrants are income maximizing individuals who 
move in response to the higher wages in the receiving nation and 
will stay abroad as long as there is no reduction in the bi-national 
wage difference, as the Neoclassical Economic of Migration 
(Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976) assumes, they are expected to be 
more willing to endure relatively long separations until proper 
arrangements can be made for family reunification. On the other 
hand, if migrants are target earners who return home as soon as 
they manage to remit or save the amount of money they were 
looking for, according to the view of the New Economics of Labor 
Migration (Stark, 1991), having a spouse and children at origin 
encourages them to work longer hours abroad. However, bringing 
the spouse and children of working age to the immigration country 
might increase the chances of meeting the household’s savings 
target faster and, thus, of shortening their stay abroad. It is clear 
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that these incentives for reunifying the spouse as soon as possible 
are conditional on leaving non-adult children at origin, since they 
would detract from the mother’s work effort in the host country 
and would therefore reduce the likelihood of return. 
In accordance with the foregoing rationale, only the 
reunification of children under 16 (working age) appears to be a 
reliable indicator of intentions of permanent settlement. On the 
other hand, the reunification of the spouse and/or adult children 
may reflect the desire to reconstitute the family abroad for the 
purpose of permanent settlement, but it may also reflect the desire 
to make as much money as possible in the shortest time, in order 
to return home sooner. It is possible, though, that couples who 
plan migration as a means of making money fast are more likely to 
reunify abroad faster and to leave children at the home country, 
especially pre-school age children, than couples planning to move 
permanently to another country. 
There is a major problem for testing empirically the 
hypotheses formulated above with regard to the likelihood of 
family reunification abroad and the speed at which reunification 
occurs: the original reasons for migration are not directly 
observable and, in addition, they can vary both across individuals 
and over time. In an attempt to avoid this problem, I have 
followed the following analytical strategy: 1) separating the 
reunification of spouses from the reunification of children, 2) 
distinguishing immediate versus delayed reunification of the 
spouse, 3) analyzing the factors that accelerate or delay the 
process of partner’s reunification within the group of couples that 
did not migrate the same year and, 4) studying the extent to which 
reunited wives take their children abroad with them or delay their 
reunification. The empirical analysis of wife’s reunification and its 
variants is carried out in Section 4.4 and the reunification of 
children in 4.5. 
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4.4. The reunification of the wife, immediate or delayed? 
 
4.4.1. Construction of the dependent variable(s) and method of 
analysis 
 
Due to the various limitations in the dataset, I decided to focus 
on immigrants who actually brought their spouses to Germany, 
and analyze why some of them did it much faster than others. In 
other words, I have changed the question from “who does bring 
his wife to Germany?” to “when do they bring their wives?”. The 
length of time that elapses before the wife joins her husband 
abroad may be very informative about immigrants’ initial 
intentions, their reasons to migrate and the choices they make with 
regard to a wide range of socio-economic issues during their lives 
in Germany. In the case of Germany, Dustman and Schmidt 
(2000) affirmed that “it is typical in labour migration that the 
husband arrives earlier, and the female partner follows after a 
stable job is found by the initial migrant. […] If the husband 
arrives earlier, budgetary considerations may be less binding, and 
the female partner may abstain from labour force participation.” 
(18) Although this hypothesis will be dealt with at length in 
Chapter 6, what I would like to illustrate with the previous quote is 
that the timing of spouses’ migration has already been assumed to 
have had some effects on the post-migration behavior of 
immigrants. 
I have identified 434 reunited wives in GSOEP, that is, 434 
women who migrated later than their husbands but had married 
before the husband migrated, according to the definition of 
reunification I made in Chapter 3.10 
                                               
10 It is worth noting that “imported brides” (i.e. women who married 
and joined men in Germany who had migrated at least two years prior to 
marriage) are not considered “reunited wives” and, thus, are excluded 
from the analysis in this chapter. On the other hand, married women who 
preceded their husbands in migration are also excluded. They are only 33 
cases in GSOEP, which clearly reveals the extent to which the 
phenomenon of couples’ reunification was a female-dominated 
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On average, reunited wives in my sample took less than 4 
years to join their husband in Germany. Figure 16 shows that a 
surprising 42.4 % of reunited wives in GSOEP arrived in Germany 
the same year as their husbands, and an additional 13.7 % arrived 
the following year to their husbands’. Overall, more than ¾ of the 
reunited wives who were still in Germany in 1984 took less than 5 
years to join their husbands. By highlighting the expression “still 
in Germany in 1984”, I simply intended to highlight the risk that 
these figures partially reflect a selection bias effect. Effectively, 
there is the possibility that wives who reunified quicker also 
stayed longer and, therefore, are over-represented in GSOEP data. 
However, this reasoning is rather counterintuitive. If immigrant 
men are assumed to delay the reunification of their families until 
they consolidate their economic position and are able to make 
adequate living arrangements, why should one expect women who 
reunify later to return earlier and, thus, to be under-represented in 
GSOEP? The large proportion of women who migrated the same 
year as their husbands is partially due to the inclusion in the 
sample of some couples from Turkey and, especially, from the 
former Yugoslavia, who have probably obtained admission as 
asylum seekers during the 1980’s and 1990’s, since the regulation 
of family reunification applicable to asylum seekers did not 
impose waiting periods. In fact, 90% of reunited wives whose 
husbands arrived after 1973 migrated the same year as them. 
However, if one restricts the sample to wives of immigrant men 
who had migrated to Germany prior to the halt on recruitment (red 
bars in Figure 4.10), the proportion of women who joined their 
husbands the same year that they migrated or the following one is 
much higher than expected (34% and 15.3% respectively). 
 
 
                                                                                                
phenomenon, and justifies focusing on couples where it was the wife 
who followed her husband and not the other way around. 
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Figure 4.10. Years elapsed until the wife’s reunification in GSOEP 
0
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All Women whose husbands migrated prior to 1974  
Source: GSOEP, own elaboration. 
 
 
These percentages suggest a faster than expected process of 
wives’ reunification and challenge the well-established ideas that 
most wives only joined their husbands when they had more or less 
consolidated their economic position in Germany; and that many 
immigrant men who had not brought their families to Germany in 
1973 decided to do so when the halt on recruitment was imposed. 
It seems rather that the majority of reunited wives tended to join 
their husbands sooner rather than later.  
One may argue that in cases where the husband and the wife 
migrate the same year, that it is not so much “reunification” as 
“joint couple migration”. However, the question about how long 
should separate partners’ migration in order to consider that the 
wife (husband) has been reunified by her husband (his wife) is an 
empirical one. When should we classify a woman as a reunited 
wife? A reunited wife is a woman who follows her husband three 
months after he left? Six months later? Sixteen months later?  
In addition, in GSOEP, due to the annually structured data for 
a substantial part of the observation period (1960-2000), in 
couples where both partners migrated the same year it is 
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impossible to determine which partner migrated first (the husband 
or the wife). In order to determine whether women who migrated 
the same year as their husband should be considered to have 
migrated (a few months) earlier than him or not, I carried out a 
systematic means comparison between the 39 women who 
preceded their husbands in migration and those women who 
migrated the same year as their husbands. The former group of 
women (who preceded their husbands) was found to be 
significantly more educated, with more work experience and to 
have fewer children than women who migrated the same year as 
their husbands. Therefore, I assumed that women who migrated 
the same year as their husbands had not preceded them. Next, I 
repeated the same procedure by comparing women who migrated 
the same year as their husbands and those who migrated the 
following year to him, and I found that there were no significant 
differences between these two groups. However, they were 
significantly different in many socio-economic characteristics 
from women who followed their husbands two or more years later. 
Accordingly, I have distinguished two groups of women: 1) 
women who joined their husbands immediately after they left 
(from 0 days to several months) and, 2) women who delayed the 
date of joining their husbands in Germany at least two years from 
the date their husband left.  
In the empirical analysis that follows, I have decided to 
examine first which factors increase the likelihood of joint couple 
migration versus delaying the wife’s migration; secondly, the 
factors that lengthen (or shorten) the period of time that spouses 
live separated from each other until the wife joins her husband in 
Germany and, finally, the factors that lengthen (or shorten) the 
number of years until each child in my sample join their parents in 
Germany.11 
                                               
11 Most of the time, children joined not only their father but also their 
mothers in Germany since in most cases children did not migrate to 
Germany until the mother had done so as well (see Table 4.6). 
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For the analysis of joint couple migration, I utilize a standard 
binary logistic regression model, which follows the general form: 
/{1)1( ==YP ( )[ ]nn XbXbb +++-+ ...exp1 110 } 
Where Y is the dependent binary variable that takes value 1 if 
the couple migrates together (i.e. during the same year), and 0 if 
the wife takes more than one year to join her husband abroad. 
For the analysis of the reunification of the wife (in those 
couples that did not migrate together) and of the children, I utilize 
a parametric accelerated failure time model that permits us to 
examine the effect of time-varying covariates over the duration of 
the process,12 and which can be written as: 
jxjj xt eb +=)ln( 13 
Where )ln( jt is the logarithm of the episode duration,14 xb  
are the estimated coefficients for covariates X , which are allowed 
to be time-varying; and e  is an error term.  
Note that a positive ß in accelerated failure time models 
indicates the corresponding covariate prolongs the duration of the 
episode (i.e. a positive coefficient must be taken as an indication 
that the corresponding covariate increases the number of years 
elapsed until the wife joins her husband in Germany). I have 
assumed that T follows a Weibull distribution. 
 
 
                                               
12 Time duration models are generally chosen not only because they 
allow us to analyze the effect of time-varying covariates but also because 
they can deal with the problem of censoring. In my samples, however, 
there are no censored data since in GSOEP I only have information for 
those wives and children that have effectively reunified their husbands 
and fathers in Germany. 
13 An alternative notation utilized by authors like Bernardi (2006) 
is *ln( )T X zb= + . 
14 As for the log transformation of T, its main purpose is to ensure 
that the predicted values of T are positive. 
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4.4.2. Sample’s Description 
 
Table 4.1 shows the average characteristics of women in my 
sample, distinguishing women who joined their husbands 
immediately and women who did not. The mean values of 
independent variables are measured at the time of husband’s 
migration, and not at the time when the wife migrated herself. Had 
women’s characteristics been measured at the time they migrated, 
I would have included the same information twice, both in the 
dependent and independent variables since the dependent variable 
is defined as a function of the moment the woman migrated (See 
Appendix A for a more detailed discussion). 
 
 
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the reunited wives at the time of their 
husbands' migration 
Variable Delayed Reunification Immediate Reunification 
Wife’s age 28.4 
(6.1) 
28.8 
(7.6) 
Husband’s age 31.3 
(0.4) 
31.6 
(0.5) 
Wife’s age at marriage 19.9 
(0.3) 
21.2 
(0.3) 
Years of marriage 8.5 
(0.4) 
7.6 
(0.4) 
Wife’s Education 7.7 
(0.1) 
8.4 
(0.1) 
Husband’s education 8.7 
(0.1) 
9.5 
(0.1) 
Pre-marital  work 
experience (years) 
1.3 
(0.2) 
2.4 
(0.2) 
Years of experience 3.6 
(0.5) 
5.3 
(0.4) 
Number of minor kids 2.2 
(1.4) 
1.4 
(0.8) 
% childless at husband’s 
migration 19.3 32.3 
% Turks 50 % 29 % 
N 226 181 
Note: values are measured the year of the husband’s migration. 
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According to the descriptives in Table 4.1, the age of women 
at the moment their husbands migrated hardly differ across groups 
(it hovers between 28 and 29 years old). Something similar 
happens with the husband’s own age at migration (around 31 years 
old). In contrast, what seems to be a more informative indicator is 
wife’s age at marriage: women who reunified later had married at 
a younger age, which confirms the selective nature of women who 
marry older than usual. 
As a result, the most notable difference appears in “years of 
marriage” at the moment the husband migrated: women who 
followed their husbands immediately, had been married on 
average 7.7 years. In contrast, women who took more than 5 years 
to reunify with their husbands in Germany had been married about 
9 years at the moment their husbands left. 
Wives who migrated sooner were also slightly more educated 
than the rest. In addition, their husbands’ education level was also 
higher. It is important to note, though, that there are no 
educational differences between couples that reunified after 3, 4 or 
8 years but only between those couples who reunified immediately 
and the rest. Something similar occurs with regard to pre-
migration work experience. Women who reunified immediately 
had, on average, 2 more years of work experience than the others, 
despite the fact that their age does not differ significantly. 
The number of children, especially younger children, is 
expected to be a major driving force in wives’ migration decision. 
The proportion of childless women is noticeably higher among 
those wives who reunified immediately (29%), which does not 
seem to be due to differences in the age profile of these two 
groups of women. 
Finally, there are also differences by country of origin. Turkish 
women are underrepresented in the group of immediate 
reunification, whereas Greeks are significantly overrepresented. 
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4.4.3. Hypotheses and predicted effects of explanatory variables 
 
Wife’s age and years since marriage 
 
Age is usually taken as a proxy for other age-related life cycle 
events like marriage, fertility, work experience, etc. Yet, as far as 
one is capable of specifying these other life events, age may 
become irrelevant or even redundant. This is particularly likely in 
cases where the dependent variable is time itself (i.e. time until 
wife’s migration) or, at least, where it incorporates a temporal 
dimension (i.e. immediate/delayed migration) and the research 
design is not a dynamic one.  
Propensity to migrate decreases with age, as aging implies an 
increase in the psychological costs of moving and a reduction in 
the potential benefits of migration. In principle, the same 
reasoning would apply to prospective reunited wives. Older 
women probably have a stronger attachment to their country, their 
city, their family and so on. Consequently, they may prefer, at 
least initially, to stay behind. Later on, if the husband prolongs his 
stay abroad and partners’ separation time increases, migration for 
the purpose of family reunification could turn into a more 
attractive option.  
Following to the previous reasoning, I expect older women to 
be less likely to follow their husbands immediately after they left. 
However, it is necessary to separate the effect of wife’s age 
from the potential effect that “previous time of married life” may 
have on the wife’s decision to migrate. In principle, women in 
newly married couples are expected to be more reluctant to accept 
separation immediately after the wedding; therefore, immediate 
wife’s migration for reunification is more likely the shorter the 
duration of marriage at the time when the husband migrates.  
Besides, newly married couples would be freer to move as they 
generally have no children. However, “children effects” will be 
controlled for separately. 
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Educational level 
 
Education has been systematically found to influence 
positively the propensity to migrate. Therefore, education is 
expected to increase the probability of immediate reunification. 
Not only the wife’s own education level but also her husband’s 
education is likely to show such a positive effect. In the case of 
women, education is associated with a series of traits that favor 
migration: lower fertility, better job chances at destination, older 
age at marriage, etc. The same applies to their husbands; if higher 
education helps immigrant men in getting more stable and better 
paid jobs at destination, the potential costs associated with wife’s 
reunification could be easier to afford. 
 
Previous work experience 
 
The effect of this variable is unclear. On the one hand, women 
who have worked a substantial number of years before their 
husbands migrate are likely to be willing to migrate as soon as 
possible, to get a better paid job in the destination country. 
However, to have a job at origin might also function as a strong 
incentive to stay. In fact, according to the New Economics of 
Labor Migration, one of the major reasons driving international 
migration is to diversify the sources of household income to 
manage risk in the absence of well-functioning insurance and 
credit markets in sending nations (Stark, 1991; Massey et al., 
1998). Women who are able to gain a wage at origin may prefer to 
stay and assure or complement household income with remittances 
sent by their husbands abroad. In the following empirical analysis 
I will try to find out which of these two effects dominates. 
 
Number of children and their ages 
 
Children are expected to be a major constraint on women’s 
decision to migrate. I would expect a much higher proportion of 
childless wives to follow the husband immediately for several 
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reasons. First of all, in absence of children, mutual dependence 
between partners is likely to be higher and wives are probably less 
disposed to accept separation.  
Besides, the costs associated with wife’s migration are likely 
to be much lower in childless couples, no matter what their 
intentions are regarding permanent settlement or return. These 
women do not need to accept the psychological costs of separation 
from their children, nor the higher economic costs involved in 
moving two, three or more people to the destination country. 
On the other hand, in couples who have children at the time 
the husband leaves, the mother’s decision to migrate is taken 
simultaneously with the one about leaving the children at origin 
with other relatives or taking them with her to Germany. Leaving 
children behind involves higher psychological costs but lower 
economic costs, as having no children in Germany would increase 
the mother’s chances of working there and obtaining an additional 
income for the household. And viceversa. 
Psychological and economic costs are likely to move in 
different directions depending on children’s age. In order to 
capture these potential differences, I have included a set of dummy 
variables that distinguish women who had at least one child below 
4 (infant); with no infant child but at least one preschool kid 
(preschool); with neither infant nor preschool children but at least 
one kid of school age (school); women with only adult children 
(older than 16). Emotional costs associated with leaving a child 
behind are expected to be higher the younger the child is; 
however, it could be easier to find a close relative willing to look 
after them. Thus, the effect of children’s age on migratory 
decision is not easy to predict. 
Finally, the intensity of the delaying effect that the number of 
children may have on wives’ migration could also vary depending 
on the children ages. However, these kind of interactive effects are 
difficult to capture in static designs. 
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Country of Origin 
 
According to the description in Section 4.2.1, Yugoslav 
women are expected to be the most likely to follow their husbands 
shortly after his departure, since Figure 4.4 suggested that the 
process of family reunification was particularly fast for this 
national group. On the other hand, Turks seem to take longer to 
reunify. 
Legal privileges granted to Italians with regard to entry and 
work permits are expected to have some influence on the way 
couples planned the migration of each household’s member. 
However, it is difficult to anticipate the direction (positive or 
negative) of that influence on the speed of partners’ reunification. 
On the one hand, Italian wives did not need to get a job to obtain 
permission to enter in Germany. This fact is expected to have 
favored immediate couple reunification. However, on the other 
hand legal privileges also favored Italian families organizing 
migration to Germany on a more temporary basis and, 
consequently, Italian wives perhaps experienced a lesser need for 
joining their husbands in Germany as soon as possible, as the 
husband was able to visit the family at origin more often. 
 
Year of husband’s migration 
 
Finally, it might be important to take into account the 
historical context at the time the husband migrated. A woman 
whose husband migrated at a time when, for instance, female labor 
demand was on the rise might have had stronger incentives to 
follow him immediately. She would be able to get a job there as 
well, which would improve the couple’s living conditions and 
reduce the wife’s initial isolation. Besides, during periods of 
economic growth immigration policy usually becomes more 
flexible and it is easier to get a (nominated) visa for work that 
would allow de facto reunification of immigrant couples.  
Historical accounts of immigration to Germany illustrate the 
increasing demand for female labor in the textile and other 
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industries, which began in the mid-sixties and developed after the 
recession in 1967. I have divided the observation period into three 
sub-periods, before 1968, between 1968 and the halt on 
recruitment in 1973, and after the halt. Following the previous 
reasoning, I expect immediate spouses’ reunification to be more 
common after 1968 than earlier. However, it is more difficult to 
predict how couples in which the husband had entered Germany 
after 1973, organized their reunification. After the halt on 
recruitment, very few adult men were able to get admission into 
Germany as foreign labor was not required anymore. In fact, post-
halt entries of foreign adults occurred mainly through the asylum 
door, which was the only one available for those people that 
lacked family ties with already established foreign residents in 
Germany. Asylum legislation immediately eased family 
reunification and, until the 1980 reform, allowed asylum seekers 
to work legally in Germany immediately after arrival. In addition, 
in 1981 Greece became an EEC member, which undoubtedly 
offered a more stable context for Greek citizens’ movement 
despite the fact that free movement did not fully apply until 
1987.15 
 
 
4.4.4. Joint Couple Migration versus Delayed Reunification 
 
Table 4.2 shows the logit estimates of practicing immediate 
couple reunification versus a delayed one. Six nested models are 
estimated and results are reported successively in order to show in 
detail the effect of adding each new variable on the effects of the 
other variables, as well as the overall fit of the model. It is 
important to remember that the analysis is carried out at the time 
of the husband’s migration and, therefore, time-varying variables 
                                               
15 A similar transition period was imposed on the accession of Spain 
and Portugal in 1986, which delayed the fully application of freedom of 
movement until 1992. 
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such as “wife’s age” or “duration of marriage” take their values at 
that specific point in time. 
Estimates in Table 4.2 indicate that Italian and Greek couples 
are much more likely to migrate together than Turkish ones 
(reference category). Although partners from the former 
Yugoslavia also show a higher likelihood of joint migration 
compared to Turks (see Model 1), this difference disappears once 
variances in partners’ level of education are controlled for in 
Model 2. In contrast, the results for Italians and Greeks remain 
more or less stable across different model specifications. The 
higher propensity of Italian couples to migrate together is in line 
with expectations, because of their legal privileges as EU 
members. However, the strong inclination for Greek immigrants to 
migrate with their partners appears a little odd. 
The younger the wife is at the time the husband makes the 
decision to migrate, the more likely it is for her to migrate jointly 
with him. Similarly, the shorter the period the couple has been 
married when the husband decides to migrate, the more likely it is 
for the couple to migrate together (see the negative sign of the 
coefficient for the variable “years since marriage” in Model 1). 
Although the effect of these two variables varies depending on the 
number of controls added to the model, they remain significant at 
least at the 10% level in the final model specification (see Models 
5 and 6). 
In line with the findings obtained for migrants to other 
destinations, the more years of education that the partners have at 
the time the husband decides to migrate, the more likely it is for 
the couple to migrate together (see the positive significant 
coefficients of “W’s” and “H’s years of education” in Model 2). In 
addition, spouses also appear more likely to migrate jointly if the 
wife had some work experience at the time the husband migrates 
than if she had none (reference category). However, the stronger 
the attachment to the local labor market, the less likely for the wife 
to migrate at the same time as her husband (see the negative sign 
of the coefficient of the variable “W’s years of work experience”); 
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although this effect does not reach the level of statistical 
significance. 
As expected, joint couple migration is less likely to happen the 
larger the number of non-adult children the couple has (see the 
negative sign of the coefficient in Models 4 to 6). However, only 
having children of school age strongly increases the odds of 
migrating together for the couple compared to childless couples 
(reference category). These two results together can be read as a 
clear indication that household economic needs play a crucial role 
in shaping family migration decisions: couples with more children, 
especially if they are of school age, are much more likely to 
migrate together than childless couples. The strategy consists 
probably in the two spouses working abroad in order to save as 
much money as possible in the shortest period of time. The reason 
for the variance depending on the children’s age is not clear in 
advance. It might be that children of school age are easier to take 
abroad because they are less time-demanding than younger 
children and, therefore, do not restrain the mother’s work in the 
paid labor force. However, it might also be that parents are more 
willing to temporarily leave their children behind with other 
relatives if they are of older age. The analysis of the determinants 
of the process of children’s reunification should offer some clues 
on this (see below). 
Finally, in Model 5 I have added a set of dummy variables 
indicating the time at which the husband migrated to Germany. 
Clearly, the likelihood of joint couple migration increased during 
the peak years of recruitment (1968-1973) compared to the 
previous period (1960-1967). However, the most noticeable result 
is the extremely high probability of joint migration among couples 
that migrated after the halt on recruitment (see B = 3.65 in Model 
5). This result is probably related to the fact that most male adult 
foreigners who entered Germany after 1973 were admitted on the 
basis of asylum and, thus, enjoyed special conditions with regard 
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Table 4.2. Logit estimates of joint couple migration (ref. delayed 
reunification) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 H’s mig 
< 1974 
(ref. Turkey)       
Former Yugoslavia 0.78** 
0.27 
0.45 
0.28 
0.35 
0.29 
0.07 
0.30 
-0.02 
0.33 
-0.02 
0.34 
Greece 1.26** 
0.34 
1.34** 
0.35 
1.18** 
0.38 
1.01** 
0.40 
1.26** 
0.44 
1.31** 
0.45 
Italy 0.70** 
0.34 
0.84** 
0.35 
0.74** 
0.35 
0.85** 
0.37 
0.90** 
0.41 
1.02** 
0.42 
Spain 0.02 
0.40 
-0.02 
0.42 
-0.20 
0.43 
-0.26 
0.45 
0.21 
0.49 
0.24 
0.49 
W’s Age 0.06* 
0.03 
0.05* 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.07** 
0.04 
0.08** 
0.04 
H’s age 0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.04 
Years since Marriage -0.08** 
0.03 
-0.07* 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.04 
-0.07* 
0.04 
-0.08* 
0.04 
W’s Years of Education  0.22** 
0.09 
0.21** 
0.09 
0.21** 
0.09 
0.14 
0.10 
0.15 
0.11 
H’s Years of Education  0.17** 
0.07 
0.16** 
0.07 
0.18** 
0.07 
0.14* 
0.07 
0.15** 
0.08 
W’s Ever worked (ref. 
never worked) 
  0.63** 
0.27 
0.62** 
0.28 
0.74** 
0.30 
0.75** 
0.30 
W’s Years of work 
Experience 
  -0.04 
0.03 
-0.06* 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.03 
No. of children< 17    -
0.33** 
0.14 
-
0.36** 
0.15 
-0.38** 
0.15 
(ref. no children < 17)       
Youngest kid < 6    -0.17 
0.39 
-0.00 
0.42 
0.02 
0.43 
(ref. no children < 17)       
Youngest kid 6-16    1.20** 
0.49 
1.23** 
0.52 
1.26** 
0.53 
(ref. H’s mig. 1960-67)        
H’s migration 1968-70     0.89** 
0.32 
0.93** 
0.33 
H’s migration 1971-73     0.88** 
0.37 
0.92** 
0.37 
H’s migration 1974-97     3.65** 
0.79 
 
Constant -1.53** 
0.73 
-4.56** 
1.05 
-4.63** 
1.05 
-3.94** 
1.12 
-4.68** 
1.24 
-4.96** 
1.27 
Log-likelihood 
N 
-263 
407 
-252 
407 
-249 
407 
-233 
407 
-213 
407 
-202 
353 
Source: GSOEP, Unweighted data. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 
5%. 
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to their family reunification.16 In order to eliminate the potential 
distortion that migrant couples of this kind (i.e. “refugees”) might 
make to the overall analysis, in Model 6 I restricted the sample to 
couples where the husband’s first migration to Germany occurred 
prior to 1974 (i.e. “original male guestworkers”). As can be seen 
in the last column of Table 4.2, results remain mainly unchanged. 
 
 
4.4.5. The duration of spouses’ separation 
 
Table 4.3 shows the effect that several factors have in 
accelerating (or delaying) the process of spouses’ reunification in 
Germany, among those migrant couples where the husband 
preceded his wife in migration and he migrated to Germany prior 
to 1974. It is worth noting here that a negative coefficient in 
Accelerated Failure Time models implies a shorter duration of the 
episode until the event occurs, that is, a faster process of 
reunification. 
By origin, Greek couples tend to reunify faster than Turkish 
ones (reference category). In fact, although the size of the “Greek” 
coefficient reduces as additional controls are added to the 
specification, it remains strongly significant (see Models 1 to 7). 
On the other hand, the tendency among Spanish wives to reunify 
with their husbands faster than Turkish ones does not become 
significant until all the control variables are added in Model 7. 
Neither Yugoslav nor Italian wives reveal significant differences 
in their pace of reunification with their husbands abroad, 
compared to Turkish ones. 
More educated wives tend to join their husbands quicker. In 
contrast, the husband’s education, which was found to 
substantially increase the likelihood of joint couple migration, 
does not appear to shorten significantly the spouses’ time of 
separation in cases where the wife initially stayed behind (see 
                                               
16 In fact, only two couples out of all of the couples where the two 
partners entered Germany after 1973, did not migrate together. 
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coefficient “W’s” and “H’s” years of education” in Model 1). In 
difference to what I found for the joint couple migration decision, 
wives who had worked at the time their husband left for Germany 
do not appear to reunify with them quicker than wives who had 
never worked (see non-significant coefficient for “W’s has ever 
worked” in Models 1 to 7). On the contrary, a stronger attachment 
to the local labor market appears to significantly delay the wife’s 
migration to Germany in order to join her husband (see positive 
coefficient in Models 1 to 7 for the variable “years of work 
experience at the time of husband migration”). 
However, the effect of wife’s labor experience on her pace of 
reunification with her husband appears to vary depending on when 
it was acquired. In Model 2 I have included a time-varying 
variable that indicates whether the woman worked or not the 
previous year. The large and negative coefficient obtained clearly 
suggests that working in the country of origin strongly increases 
the likelihood of joining the husband abroad in the following year, 
regardless of the total number of years of work experience the 
woman had at the time the husband had migrated himself. 
Although the size of the coefficient (B = -1.12 in Model 2) 
reduces substantially when additional controls are added to the 
model, it remains strongly significant and one of the largest effects 
(see B= -0.41 in Model 7). 
The rationale underlying the effect of “work previous year” is 
not immediately evident. There is the possibility that women who 
are planning to migrate and join their partner abroad, decide to 
work in order to save money for the trip to be able to cover any 
unforeseen expenses that may result from migration. This is 
especially likely if the couple also wish to take their children with 
them abroad. However, alternatively, it may also occur that 
women decided to work while they are still at origin in order to 
meet the greater economic needs of the family during specific 
periods. Provided that they are already working in the origin 
country, couples might consider it better for the wife to migrate 
and work abroad since, this way, she will be able to obtain higher 
wages and make a greater contribution to the family budget. 
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The effect of the number and ages of children, added in Model 
3, does not become apparent until additional controls are added 
over the following specifications of the model.  As expected, more 
children extend the duration of the period of spouses’ separation 
as expected (the positive coefficient in Model 3 becomes 
significant in Model 5, once macro-economic conditions at 
destination are controlled for).  
On the other hand, having at least one child of pre-school age 
initially appeared to accelerate the migration of the mother (see 
negative significant coefficient B= -0.71 in Model 3); however, 
when additional controls were added this effect vanishes (see 
Model 5). 
Model 4 confirms again the importance of period effects. 
Wives whose husbands migrated in the period 1968-70 and 1971-
73 joined their husbands abroad quicker than wives whose 
husbands had migrated during the period 1960-67 (reference 
category). In order to investigate whether these “period effects” 
may reflect the higher demand for female labor in the late sixties 
and early seventies, in Model 5 I have added the annual rate of 
female unemployment in Germany as a proxy variable for female 
labor demand. First of all, the positive coefficient of the variable 
“rate of female unemployment in Germany” indicates that, in line 
with my prediction, worsening economic conditions in the host 
labor market tended to delay the wife’s migration to Germany. 
Secondly, the importance of the period in which the husband had 
migrated, far from disappearing becomes larger and stronger. 
Moreover, after adding the variable “female unemployment rate in 
Germany”, the time it takes the wife to join her husband in 
Germany substantially reduces not only among those whose 
husbands migrated after 1967 compared to those whose husbands 
migrated earlier, but also among those whose husbands migrated 
between 1970-73 and those whose husbands migrated between 
1968-70. These results suggest that more recent cohorts of male 
immigrants tended to bring their wives to Germany in a shorter 
time than the first immigrant men; this reduction of the spouses’ 
separation period seems to be an effect derived from the 
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development of wider and stronger support networks at destination 
that probably lowered the cost of wives’ migration. 
In contrast, better economic conditions in the country of origin 
measured through the variable “GDP country of origin” tended to 
delay the moment of the wife’s migration, although the effect is 
only marginally significant (at 10% level, see Model 6). Note also 
that controlling for differences in the macro-economic conditions 
in the country of origin modifies the coefficients of “country of 
origin”: it substantially increases the accelerating effect of being 
Greek and Spanish compared to Turks. 
Finally, in Model 7, I have added to time-varying dummy 
variables –“halt” and “kindergeld”- that take value 1 in years 1974 
and 1975, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The results obtained in 
Model 7 suggest that there was no accelerating effect on the 
process of spouses’ reunification in 1974 (i.e. the first year after 
the halt on recruitment was imposed), since the coefficient for 
“halt” variable is negative but non-significant. On the other hand, 
the effect of “kindergeld” is strongly significant and negative. This 
result suggests that the reduction in the amount of money that 
immigrant families may expect to receive if they kept their 
children in the country of origin, instead of bringing them to 
Germany, effectively led some families that had remained 
separated up to that moment to ultimately reunify in Germany. 
However, this interpretation must be confirmed by analyzing 
whether the “kindergeld” reform also displayed an accelerating 
effect on the pace of children’s reunification or not (see below). 
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Table 4.3. Estimates of the time that elapses until the reunification of the 
wife (Accelerated Failure Time Model, Weibull link) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(ref. Turkey)        
Former Yug. 0.20 
0.20 
0.24 
0.18 
0.17 
0.15 
0.20 
0.15 
0.06 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.06 
Greece -0.84** 
0.19 
-0.69** 
0.18 
-0.46** 
0.17 
-0.65** 
0.19 
-0.28** 
0.08 
-0.39** 
0.10 
-0.39** 
0.10 
Italy -0.06 
0.25 
0.06 
0.25 
0.00 
0.18 
-0.07 
0.18 
0.05 
0.10 
-0.18 
0.17 
-0.18 
0.17 
Spain -0.26 
0.27 
-0.10 
0.22 
-0.03 
0.18 
-0.22 
0.19 
-0.08 
0.11 
-0.26* 
0.14 
-0.25* 
0.14 
W’s age -0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
H’s age -0.02 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.02* 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
Years since 
Marriage 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
W’s Years of 
Education 
-0.13** 
0.06 
-0.09* 
0.05 
-0.09** 
0.04 
-0.06 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
H’s Years of 
Education 
0.03 
0.06 
-0.03 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.04 
-0.07* 
0.04 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.02 
(ref. never 
worked) 
       
W’s has ever 
worked 
 -0.05 
0.17 
-0.06 
0.14 
-0.02 
0.15 
0.01 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
W’s Years of  
work Experience 
 0.08** 
0.02 
0.07** 
0.01 
0.06** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
(ref. was not)        
W’s worked the 
previous year 
 -1.12** 
0.20 
-1.10** 
0.18 
-1.09** 
0.19 
-0.43** 
0.09 
-0.42** 
0.09 
-0.41** 
0.09 
No. of children      
< 17 
  0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04** 
0.02 
0.04** 
0.02 
0.04** 
0.02 
(ref. no child      
< 17) 
       
Youngest child      
< 6 
  -0.71** 
0.21 
-0.61** 
0.21 
-0.12 
0.13 
-0.13 
0.13 
-0.12 
0.13 
(ref. no child         
< 17) 
       
Youngest child 
6-16 
  -0.23 
0.16 
-0.12 
0.17 
0.07 
0.10 
0.06 
0.11 
0.06 
0.11 
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(ref. H’s mig. 
1960-67) 
       
Rate of female 
unemployment 
    0.18** 
0.01 
0.18** 
0.01 
0.18** 
0.01 
GDP Country of 
Origin 
     0.00* 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
(ref. year≠ 1974)        
Halt        -0.04 
0.06 
(ref. year≠ 1975)        
Kindergeld       -0.22** 
0.10 
Constant 4.19** 
0.72 
4.49** 
0.66 
5.44** 
0.60 
5.32** 
0.64 
2.50** 
0.37 
2.41** 
0.37 
2.36** 
0.37 
ln_p 0.65** 
0.06 
0.75** 
0.05 
0.89** 
0.06 
0.90** 
0.06 
1.48** 
0.05 
1.48** 
0.05 
1.51** 
0.05 
P 1.92 
0.11 
2.10 
0.10 
2.42 
0.14 
2.46 
0.14 
4.37 
0.21 
4.40 
0.21 
4.51 
0.22 
N 
Log likelihood 
179 
-462 
179 
-432 
179 
-412 
179 
-403 
179 
-275 
179 
-274 
179 
-270 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
 
 
4.5. The timing of children’s reunification 
 
In the previous section I showed that children have a negative 
effect on the probability of couple joint migration to Germany. In 
addition, some evidence supporting the idea that such a negative 
effect is conditional on children’s ages was also provided:  
What remained unanswered was: why? Is it easier for migrant 
parents to leave school age children at origin because of lower 
emotional costs of separation, compared to infants and pre-school 
children? On the other hand, do children of school age display a 
positive effect on their parents’ joint migration because they are 
taken at the same time to Germany as well and put into school, 
which permits their mothers to work outside the home and earn a 
wage? In this section, I intend to respond to these and other related 
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questions by examining the timing at which children are taken to 
Germany. 
 
 
4.5.1. The sample: size, composition by origin and potential bias 
 
This section’s analysis is based on the sub-sample of children 
born to first generation immigrant couples who were married 
before the husband left for Germany for the first time. Wives in 
this sample had 942 children before they migrated to Germany,17 
of which I have been able to reconstruct the migration biography 
of 534 born to 261 reunited wives in my sample.18 Therefore: 
- I have complete information about the migration biography 
for only 57% of the children born to these immigrant couples. The 
reasons why the remaining 408 children are missing in GSOEP are 
primarily twofold: first, GSOEP only collects information on 
children who were living at their parents’ household by the time 
the household was surveyed (i.e. 1983 in most cases); second, an 
unknown number of children were never brought to Germany by 
their parents but rather remained in their home country. In other 
words, I do not know how many of these children never migrated 
to Germany or how many did migrate but were not included in 
GSOEP because they had left their parents’ household earlier than 
1983. 
- As a result of these “missing children”, the process of 
children reunification is completely missed for 76 of 342 
immigrant couples, where the mother migrated with or after the 
father, which represents 22% of my total sample of reunited 
couples with children. 
                                               
17 Note that children born to reunited wives in Germany cannot be 
reunified. Note also that 18.5% of wives in these couples were childless 
at the time they migrated. 
18 18% (162) of these children were born to immigrant women in the 
time that elapsed between their husbands’ and their own migration to 
Germany, that is, they were born after their father had migrated to 
Germany. 
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These two facts imply that my sample of reunited children 
may be biased in two directions: children who still lived with their 
parents in 1984, that is to say younger children, and children from 
those countries whose migration stream to Germany prolonged 
until more recent times, are likely to be over-represented. In fact, 
Table 4.4 shows that in the sub-sample of reunited children 
available, children from Turkey are over-represented while 
Spanish children are under-represented. Only in the case of Italian 
children does the percentage in both samples coincide. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain whether the under-
representation of Spanish children is due to the fact that Spaniards 
were less likely to bring their children to Germany; or to the fact 
that Spaniards migrants had older children who had formed their 
own households when they (their parents) entered the survey; or to 
the fact that Spanish migration died out earlier than migration 
from other countries and, therefore, more children of Spaniards 
migrants had already returned to their home country by the time of 
GSOEP’s inception. In any case, the over-representation of Turks 
might have had some consequences for the following empirical 
analysis, which will be drawn upon when relevant. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Potential bias in child-mother’s sample compared to total 
mothers’ sample 
Mother’s Country 
of Origin 
% in Whole 
Sample of 
Children 
% in Whole 
Sample of 
Reunited 
Children 
Percentage 
Points 
Differential 
Turkey 47.0 57.1 + 10.1 
Former Yugoslavia 19.6 16.7 - 2.9 
Greece 12.3 10.3 - 2.0 
Italy 12.0 12.0 0 
Spain 9.1 4.0 - 5.1 
N 942 534  
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. Own elaboration. 
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I restricted the analysis to those children with complete 
information for all the independent variables included in the 
analyses and who were below 17 years old at the time of 
reunification, since German family reunification provisions only 
allowed the reunification of children below this age (migration of 
adult children is likely to have been a more independent decision, 
less influenced by the characteristics of their parents). As a result, 
the final working sample for the empirical analyses reduces from 
534 to 489 children. 
Children can also be sent to Germany earlier than their mother 
if they are of working age or, at least, of school age and there are 
other relatives at destination willing to look after them. Table 4.5 
classifies the 489 children in the sample according to whether they 
migrated jointly with, later or earlier than their mother.19 
 
 
Table 4.5. Type of child’s migration (earlier, joint, later than mother) 
Type Turk Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish Total 
Joint 55.8 75.6 49.1 75.4 89.5 62.0 
Later 38.1 20.7 45.2 19.3 10.5 32.7 
Earlier 6.1 3.7 5.7 5.3 0.00 5.3 
Total 278 82 53 57 19 489 
Source: GSOEP data. Own elaboration. 
 
 
                                               
19 I have also run a logistic regression model that examines the 
determinants of joint mother-child migration (versus “child migrates 
later”). A multinomial logistic model with triple outcome (joint, later and 
earlier than the mother) showed that the probability of a child to be sent 
to Germany earlier than her mother increases with Turkish origin, 
mother’s work experience and the number of siblings. If any brother or 
sister migrates at the same time, the probability of anticipated child’s 
migration decreases. 
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According to Table 4.5, approximately 60% of the children in 
the sample were taken with their mothers to Germany, while one 
third were brought later on. Only 5% preceded their mothers in 
migration to Germany (this percentage increased to 8.5% if 
children older than 16 at migration are included). Similarly to 
what I found in the case of the reunification of spouses, it is a 
remarkable fact that the greater number of children migrated 
simultaneously with their mothers. Moreover, more than half of 
married male immigrants took their wife and at least one child 
with them the same year they migrated themselves, which offers 
grounds to believe that joint family migration to Germany was 
more frequent than commonly thought. Important differences by 
country of origin emerge, though. While virtually all Spanish 
children in the sample were brought to Germany with their 
mothers (90%), this was the case only for half 50% of Greek 
children and 56% of Turks. Italian and Yugoslav children occupy 
an intermediate position between Greeks and Spaniards: 2/3 
migrated jointly with the mother and 1/5 later on. 
In the previous section, I attributed the divergence between 
dependants’ entry at the aggregated level and the actual behavior 
revealed by the analysis at the individual level to the different 
timing in spouses and children’s reunification in Germany. In 
particular, I hypothesized that the more prolonged pattern of 
dependants’ entry among Greek immigrants was due to the 
delayed reunification of children, rather than delayed partners’ 
reunification. On the other hand, the more compressed pattern 
family reunification among Yugoslav immigrants did not imply a 
higher propensity to reunify with the partner immediately but 
probably to a higher propensity to practice total family 
reunification (wife’s and children’s) at once. The next multivariate 
regression analysis will allow us to ascertain whether percentages 
in Table 4.5 reflect actual differences in the pattern of father-
mother-child(ren) reunification across national groups or 
differences on other dimensions. 
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4.5.2. Hypothesis and explanatory variables 
 
I have considered four major sets of factors that may affect the 
timing of children’s reunification: 1) the child’s characteristics 
(country of origin, age, sex) 2) structure of the households and its 
socio-economic characteristics (parents’ age, parents’ level of 
education, number of siblings and their ages), 3) the migration 
timing of other members of the household, 4) context of reception 
in the country of destination (unemployment level and legal 
measures restricting or easing reunification of foreign families). 
 
Child’s characteristics 
 
Results obtained in the previous section indicated that mothers 
were less likely to migrate jointly with their husbands if they had 
children of pre-school age, which may be interpreted as a sign that 
separation from younger children entails higher emotional costs 
for their mothers but also as an indication that taking pre-school 
age children abroad is more costly than taking children that can be 
enrolled in school at destination. Thus, I expect the time elapsed 
since the father migrates until the child is brought to the 
immigration country to increase during the first years of birth and 
reduce after. In other words, I expect a bell-shaped effect of 
child’s age on the time until his/her reunification. 
With regard to potential gender differences in the timing of 
children’s reunification, it is difficult to anticipate the direction of 
the effect, if it exists. In patriarchal cultures with a rigid division 
of gender roles, it might be preferred that daughters stay behind, 
so as not to be “contaminated” with the “modern” customs of life 
abroad. However, the same desire of maintain stricter 
“surveillance” over them might lead their parents to bring them to 
Germany in the first place. Thus, the effect of gender remains 
unclear in advance. 
Finally, I will also examine differences across countries of 
origin, which are expected to reflect variations in family migration 
strategies rather than intrinsic differences between the children 
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themselves. In the previous section, I found that Greek and Italian 
mothers were the most likely to migrate with their husbands but, at 
the same time, official statistics suggested that, at the aggregated 
level, Italians (and Turks) had the most prolonged process of 
family reunification over time. Taking into account the fact that 
Italian immigrant couples faced fewer difficulties in returning 
periodically or having their children visit to Germany, one could 
expect Italian children to be reunified in Germany at a slower pace 
to the rest. Greek families, even though they did not enjoy the 
same privileges as Italians, are often presented as having the most 
temporary migration among the five recruitment countries, which 
would delay children’s reunification also. However, all these 
“country” effects are likely to be strongly dependent on variations 
in the mother’s pattern of reunification. 
 
Structure of the household and its socio-economic characteristics 
 
Previous research has suggested that couples where the two 
partners migrate together tend to be more educated than those 
involved in staggered couple migration (Houdagneau-Sotelo, 
1994; Gupta, 2002). More precisely, more educated wives were 
found to be significantly more likely to migrate with their 
husbands, as my analysis in the previous section also showed. 
Although the reasons underlying such association are not 
completely clear yet,20 I also expect that mother’s education will 
reduce the time that elapses until children’s reunification. On the 
one hand, it seems reasonable to expect, for instance, that more 
educated women will be more reluctant to rely on their relatives 
for solving their “own” family “problems” and, therefore, would 
                                               
20 Gupta (2002) suggests that more educated women maybe establish 
a more equalitarian relationship with their husbands and are, therefore, 
more likely to insist on migrating with their husbands or succeed in 
convincing them not to migrate at all. Houdagneu-Sotelo (1994), in 
contrast, found that couples that migrated together in her sample were 
totally dependent on the wife’s family network abroad in their migration 
decision. 
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prefer to take their children with them to Germany, instead of 
leaving them behind with a relative. On the other hand, higher 
education often implies less fear in facing unknown places and 
settings, which may encourage mothers to take their children with 
them at once instead of waiting until they become familiar with 
the context of destination. 
However, more education usually also entails stronger job 
commitment, which might function as a discouraging factor for 
taking children to the immigration country immediately, especially 
those of young age, if women wish to maximize their marketable 
time there. In order to separate these two potential opposite 
effects, I have included mother’s education along with the 
mother’s years of work experience at her date of migration, which 
is assumed to be a good predictor of her work intentions upon 
arrival.  
Mother’s age is also included as a control variable that may 
interfere with the net effect of both education and pre-migration 
work experience since it captures other potential effects of the 
family-life cycle on women’s behavior.  
On the other hand, the speed of the children’s reunification 
process and family size are expected to be negatively related. 
Taking children abroad is a costly enterprise. Thus, the larger the 
number of siblings each child has to compete with for a trip ticket, 
the longer will be the time needed until he/she is the chosen one. It 
is possible, however, that not all the siblings compete on an equal 
level in the race for migration. Being the youngest or the eldest 
may affect the chances of being taking to Germany sooner or later, 
since it is a well-established fact that the order within the siblings 
affects differently the set of expectations and type of relationship 
that parents have with their children. Or more generally, siblings 
of pre-school age are likely to be taken to the immigration country 
later than their older brothers and sisters. In fact, the analysis in 
the previous section on wife’s reunification, suggested that women 
who had only school age children were much more likely to 
migrate with their husband than women who either had no 
children, or had at least one of preschool age. In line with those 
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results, I will analyze whether having no sibling of pre-school age 
does increase or reduce the time that elapses until one’s 
reunification. In principle, siblings of pre-school age are likely to 
delay the own process of reunification since parents are likely 
either to delay mother’s migration or older siblings’ migration in 
order not to leave young children with more distant relatives. 
 
Migration of other members of the households 
 
In order to find out whether family reunification among 
guestworkers took place all at once or in a staggered way, it is 
necessary to take into account the timing of migration of each 
household member and to analyze whether and how it influences 
the migration of the remaining members. However, the number of 
possible combinations grows as does the size of the family, which 
implies a high degree of difficulty for making predictions. 
Since minors cannot work in the destination country, it is not 
likely for them to precede their mother’s migration, especially if 
they are of a young age. On the contrary, the mother’s migration is 
expected to speed up the children’s reunification in the 
immigration country. This accelerating effect can be understood 
either as a “period effect” (i.e. children will be more likely to be 
reunified during the entire period of time after their mother 
migrated), or as a “year effect” (i.e. children will be more likely to 
be taken to Germany the same year as their mother migrates). 
Previous analysis has shown that only a tiny fraction of children in 
the sample joined their fathers in Germany before their mother 
migrated, which implies that the introduction of the 
aforementioned “period-effect” variable would barely improve our 
understanding of the underlying process, since we already know 
from the descriptive tables (see above) that about 95% of the 
children from the sample did actually migrate with or after their 
mother. It seems more appropriate then to examine the “year-
effect” of mother’s migration, especially because it will permit us 
to examine the more general issue of when and why family 
reunification takes place. 
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One of the most unexpected findings in the previous section 
was the large proportion of wives who migrated to Germany the 
same year as their husband did: what I have called “joint couple 
migration”. This pattern of parents’ migration is likely to influence 
also the subsequent pattern of children’s reunification. In families 
where the mother initially remained in the country of origin when 
the father left, the reunification of children is likely to be delayed 
longer than in those cases where both parents had left at once. 
Note that while in the former case – parents’ staggered migration -
, the mother would be available to look after the children during 
the father’s absence, while in the case of joint parents’ migration 
she would not. Thus, children would have to stay with some other 
relatives (e.g. grandparents, older siblings, etc.), which may imply 
additional costs -such as estrangement- that would increase as 
separation prolongs. Thus, I expect “joint parents’ migration” to 
shorten the time that elapses until children are brought to 
Germany. 
Along the same lines, it is also important to investigate the 
effect that the migration of other siblings has on the own 
propensity to migrate. This effect, however, is likely to vary 
depending on whether the sibling’s migration takes place at the 
same time as mother’s migration or not. If the mother has already 
migrated, then it is expected that more than one child would have 
been taken at once to Germany since there is already a person at 
destination who can taker care of the children or, alternatively, a 
two-earners household that will be able to support (economically) 
more than one child at once. Yet, if the mother takes one sibling 
with her the first time she migrates to Germany, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the rest of sibling would have to wait 
some more time until their reunification is arranged since it is 
expensive and difficult for a first-time migrating mother to take 
more than one child at once. Thus, I would expect a sibling’s 
migration to increase other siblings’ chances of being taken to 
Germany, conditional on the fact that the second sibling’s 
migration takes place once the mother has already migrated. 
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One of the most unexpected findings in the previous section 
was the large proportion of, what I have called, “joint couple 
migration” (i.e. wives who migrated to Germany the same year as 
their husband did). It seems reasonable to expect that joint parents’ 
migration also implies a faster reunification of children, compared 
to children in families where the reunification of the mother and 
the father in Germany was delayed for several years. This is 
because in these cases the mother would be available to look after 
the children during the father’s absence, whereas in the case of 
joint parents’ migration she would not. If the mother has left, the 
children would have to stay with some other relatives (e.g. 
grandparents, older siblings, etc.), which may imply additional 
costs such as estrangement that would increase as separation 
prolongs. Thus, I expect for joint parents’ migration to shorten the 
time elapsed until children are brought to Germany. 
 
Context of Reception 
 
One of main aims of this dissertation is to challenge the 
widespread view that foreign workers who originally migrated on 
a temporary basis made up their minds to stay because of the ban 
on further labor migration imposed by the German authorities in 
late 1973 (23rd November), and decided to settle permanently in 
Germany and bring their families. On the contrary, it is my belief 
that by the time the halt on recruitment was imposed, the large 
majority of guestworkers had already made their decisions with 
regard to family reunification. In fact, I have already demonstrated 
in the foregoing section that many of them had already brought 
their spouses to Germany prior to 1973 and, for those who had 
not, the halt on recruitment had only a slight accelerating effect on 
the decision to bring them. However, it remains to be seen whether 
migrants’ decision about taking their children to Germany, which 
in principle implies a stronger intention of settling for a longer 
time or even permanently, was also little affected by the policy 
change and its implications or, on the contrary, had a more 
significant impact on this case. Following what I argued in chapter 
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2, I would rather expect for the change in the regulations of the 
family allowances, which was passed in January of 1975, to have 
had a much stronger effect on the migrants’ decision to bring their 
children to Germany. In contrast to the halt on recruitment, the 
reform of the family allowances was a policy measure with 
immediate and specific consequences for the immigrant families 
still separated, which clearly encouraged the reunification of 
children by those parents who had not yet carried it out. 
In any case, the effect of these two policy measures should be 
measured net of the effect of variations in the macro-economic 
conditions in Germany. Both measures were taken during a period 
of rising unemployment and declining growth of the German 
economy, which was expected to slow down the process of 
immigrants’ permanent establishment there. Accordingly, in the 
following estimations I will include three time-varying covariates 
aimed at measuring the impact that changing conditions in the 
context of reception had on the timing of children’s reunification: 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 in year 1974 and 0 otherwise, 
to capture the potential effect of the halt on recruitment; a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 in year 1975 and 0 otherwise, to 
measure the effect of the “kindergeld” reform; finally, the annual 
level of unemployment in Germany. 
 
 
4.5.3. Results and discussion 
 
In Table 4.6, I present the estimates of seven nested models 
where the effects of several factors hypothesized to affect the 
duration of child-father migration-related separation are examined. 
It is worth noting that a negative coefficient in accelerated failure 
time models must be interpreted as indicating that this covariate 
accelerates the occurrence of the event of interest or, alternatively, 
reduces the time elapsed until the event occurs. 
According to my expectations, the reunification of children is 
delayed when they are of young age and increases as they get 
older (see in Model 1 the estimates of “Child’s age” and “Child’s 
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age square”, which indicate the relation between child’s age and 
time until his reunification follows a bell-shaped form). Mother’s 
age displays the same kind of effect on the pace of children’s 
reunification, quite probably because children do not migrate until 
their mother does it herself (see “M’s age” and “M’s age square” 
in Model 2). In other words, the mother is likely to wait until her 
children are of a certain age to migrate herself and take them with 
her to the immigration country. Although daughters appear to join 
their parents at the immigration country quicker than sons (see the 
negative sign of “sex” variable in Models 1, 2 and 3), the effect is 
only marginally significant and vanishes when additional controls 
related to the pattern of migration of other household’s members 
are controlled for in Model 4. 
On the other hand, the tendency of the more educated to have 
their family reunified at destination quicker than those with lower 
educational levels is confirmed here again (see the negative sign 
of the variable “M’s years of education” in Model 2, which 
remains robust after including all the available controls in Model 
7). In contrast, the effect of the father’s education does not affect 
in a significant way the time that elapses before the children are 
reunified in Germany, although the sign is the expected one in all 
specifications. Finally, having a mother strongly attached to the 
paid labor force in her country of origin does not appear to delay 
her children’s migration, as I had hypothesized (although the sign 
is also positive, this variable never reaches the level of statistical 
significance). Therefore, these results do not support the idea that 
those mothers who are more work-oriented would prefer to leave 
their children behind, for some time at least, in order to maximize 
their market time and their wages in Germany, which is a little 
unexpected. 
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Table 4.6. Estimates of the time that elapses until the reunification of 
children (Accelerated Failure Time Model, Weibull link) 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(ref. Turkey)        
Former Yug. 0.14* 
0.08 
0.11 
0.08 
0.11 
0.08 
0.04 
0.07 
0.04 
0.07 
0.09 
0.06 
-0.06 
0.05 
Greece -0.63** 
0.09 
-0.64** 
0.10 
-0.66** 
0.11 
-0.68** 
0.10 
-0.62** 
0.10 
-0.55** 
0.08 
-0.23** 
0.07 
Italy -0.16* 
0.08 
-0.13 
0.08 
-0.13 
0.09 
-0.17** 
0.09 
-0.18** 
0.08 
-0.18** 
0.07 
-0.09 
0.06 
Spain -0.25* 
0.13 
-0.39** 
0.13 
-0.41** 
0.13 
-0.28** 
0.13 
-0.22* 
0.13 
-0.20** 
0.10 
-0.09 
0.08 
Sex (ref. man) -0.10* 
0.05 
-0.10* 
0.05 
-0.10* 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.05 
-0.07 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.03 
Child’s age 0.07** 
0.02 
0.05** 
0.02 
0.05** 
0.02 
0.04* 
0.02 
0.05** 
0.02 
0.03* 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
Child’s age sq. -0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
M’s age  0.10** 
0.03 
0.10** 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04** 
0.02 
M’s age sq.  -0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
M’s years of 
education 
 -0.06** 
0.02 
-0.07** 
0.03 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.04* 
0.02 
-0.03 
0.02 
-0.07** 
0.02 
F’s years of 
education 
 -0.03 
0.02 
-0.03 
0.02 
-0.03** 
0.02 
-0.03* 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
M’s years of 
work exp. 
 0.003 
0.004 
0.002 
0.004 
0.007* 
0.004 
0.005 
0.004 
0.002 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
(ref. no child)        
Children   0.00 
0.02 
0.06** 
0.02 
0.05** 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.02 
(ref. no sibling)        
Youngest 
sibling< 6 
  -0.10 
0.13 
0.25** 
0.13 
0.24** 
0.12 
0.26** 
0.10 
0.22** 
0.08 
 Youngest 
sibling>= 6 
  -0.07 
0.12 
0.16 
0.12 
0.14 
0.12 
0.17* 
0.10 
0.04 
0.08 
(ref. other)        
Eldest    0.06 
0.07 
-0.04 
0.07 
-0.04 
0.07 
-0.01 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.05 
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(ref. other)        
Youngest    0.03 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.11 
0.07 
0.12** 
0.06 
0.10** 
0.05 
(year≠ M’s mig)        
M’s migration    -0.70** 
0.07 
-1.04** 
0.08 
-0.75** 
0.07 
-0.55** 
0.06 
(year≠ S’s mig)        
Sibling’s 
migration 
   -0.56** 
0.07 
-0.92** 
0.08 
-0.70** 
0.07 
-0.57** 
0.06 
M’s mig* Sib’s 
mig 
    0.69** 
0.11 
0.43** 
0.09 
0.22** 
0.07 
(ref. no joint 
mig. of parents) 
       
Parents’ Joint 
Mig 
     -0.35** 
0.07 
-0.26** 
0.06 
M’s mig* F’s 
mig 
     -1.25** 
0.11 
-1.19** 
0.09 
(ref. year other 
than 1974) 
       
Halt        -0.08 
0.06 
(ref. year other 
than 1975) 
       
Kindergeld        -0.38** 
0.07 
Rate of female 
unemployment 
      0.11** 
0.01 
Constant 2.60** 
0.10 
1.23* 
0.64 
1.23* 
0.67 
1.99** 
0.66 
2.07** 
0.66 
2.21** 
0.54 
1.85** 
0.43 
ln_p 0.64** 
0.04 
0.72** 
0.04 
0.73** 
0.04 
0.74** 
0.04 
0.75** 
0.04 
0.96** 
0.04 
1.16** 
0.04 
P 
 
1.90** 
0.07 
2.06** 
0.07 
2.06** 
0.08 
2.10** 
0.08 
2.11** 
0.08 
2.61** 
0.09 
3.21** 
0.11 
N 
Log likelihood 
426 
-1066 
426 
-1030 
426 
-1029 
426 
-778 
426 
-758 
426 
-656 
426 
-568 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Model 3 adds to the previous specifications a set of covariates 
aimed at measuring the effect that variations in the composition of 
the household might have on the way in which families organize 
the reunification of their children in the country of immigration: 
number of siblings, their ages and whether the child is the eldest or 
the youngest sibling in the family. Quite surprisingly, none of 
these variables have a significant effect on the timing of children’s 
migration and some of them even present the opposite sign to the 
one predicted (see Model 3). The picture, however, becomes much 
clearer as one includes in the model the effect that the migration of 
other relatives has on children’s own migration in Models 4 to 6. 
Model 4 examines whether children are likely to be taken with 
their mother or siblings when these relatives migrate to Germany 
themselves. The variable “M’s migration” takes value 1 the year 
the mother migrated to Germany and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the 
variable “S’s migration” takes value 1 when one (or more) 
sibling(s) migrate to Germany and 0 otherwise. Therefore, what 
the large and negative coefficients of these two covariates in 
Model 4 indicate is that children were frequently taken with their 
mother or some of their siblings to Germany. However, these 
results must not be interpreted as an indication of a strong 
tendency for family joint migration yet. In fact, results in Model 6 
rather suggest the opposite since the interaction term between the 
variables that indicates the date of mother’ and sibling’s migration 
(M’s migration and S’s migration, respectively) appears strongly 
significant, large in size and with positive sign. Moreover, after 
adding the interaction term to the model, the two main effects of 
the variable “year of mother’s migration” and “year’s of sibling’s 
migration” become substantially larger in size. Put simply, 
children are likely to migrate either with their mother or with some 
of their sibling(s). Yet, if the mother decides to take another 
sibling with her, the rest of the children in the family are likely to 
see their own migration to Germany delayed. 
On the other hand, after taking into consideration the timing of 
other relatives’ migration, the effect of the set covariates 
accounting for variations in the size and structure of the household 
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such as the total number of siblings and their ages, turn significant 
in the direction expected. First of all, having more siblings delay 
one’s own migration (see positive sign of variable “number of 
siblings” in Models 4 and 5) and, secondly, if there is at least one 
child of pre-school age in the household, the reunification of their 
siblings is also likely to be delayed (see the positive significant 
coefficient of the variable “youngest sibling <6 in Models 5 to 7). 
Finally, my expectation that children in households where the 
mother and the father migrated together are likely to be brought to 
Germany earlier than those whose parents’ migration followed a 
staggered pattern, is also confirmed as the negative sign of the 
variable “parents’ joint migration” in Model 6 indicates. This 
latest effect, however, may mean either that parents who migrated 
together tended to take their children with them all at once, or that 
parents who migrated together took a shorter time to bring their 
children to Germany, or maybe even both things at the same time. 
The introduction of the interaction between the variables that 
indicates the date of each parent’s migration, which is strongly 
significant and very large in size, indicates that both facts 
accelerate the timing of children reunification, but the latter 
especially. That is: 1) children whose parents migrated together to 
Germany were much more likely to be brought there the same year 
as their parents and 2) children whose parents migrated together 
waited a shorter time until being reunified than children whose 
mother migrated some years later than their father. The former of 
these two effects, which is the largest by far, is quite unexpected 
since it entails the existence of a number relatively large of 
immigrant couples that not only migrated together to Germany but 
took at least one child with them. In order to determine the 
numerical importance of this pattern of family joint migration in 
my sample, I examined the data more carefully and found that 
couples who migrated with at least one child to Germany represent 
about 18% of the total sample of the families where at least the 
two spouses and any children reunified in Germany. Families 
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whose parents and at least two children migrated all at once 
represent about 10% of the whole sample.21 
In the last specification included in Table 4.6, I have added 
three covariates aimed at capturing the effect that changing 
conditions in the German economy and the immigration 
legislation might have on explaining differences in the pattern of 
children’s reunification followed by immigrant families in 
Germany. As I stated earlier, one of the main aims of this chapter 
and the whole dissertation is to test empirically the widespread 
idea of the supposed accelerating effect that the halt on 
recruitment had on the guestworkers’ decision to stay permanently 
in Germany and send for their families left behind. In order to 
achieve this goal, I have added to Model 6 a time-varying 
covariate which indicates if the year is the year the halt was 
imposed or not (i.e. the variable “halt” takes value 1 when 
year=1974 and 0 otherwise). Note that I have decided to measure 
the impact of the halt one moth after it was imposed (23 
November of 1973) and for a span of one year. In addition, I have 
also included another dummy time-varying covariate for year 
1975, in order to capture the potential accelerating effect that the 
reform in family allowances introduced in January of that year 
might have had on the timing of children’s reunification by their 
parents in Germany. Finally, the annual rate of unemployment, 
which rose substantially over these years, is also included.  
In line with my argument and according to the results shown 
in Table 4.6, the halt apparently had no significant effect on the 
pace at which immigrant families brought their children to 
Germany (although the sign is negative, the coefficient is still far 
from reaching the significance level). On the contrary, the reform 
                                               
21 By country of origin, 33% of these couples were Turk, 20% 
Italian, 20% Greek, 20% from the former Yugoslavia and 5% from 
Spain, which practically matches the distribution by origin of the sub-
sample of women who migrated jointly with their husbands. In addition, 
it is important to say that approximately 80% of mothers who followed 
this migration family pattern (i.e. couple+at least one child at once) had 2 
or more children by the time they migrated. 
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of family allowances clearly enhanced the children’s likelihood of 
being taking to Germany by their parents (see the negative sign of 
the variable “kindergeld” in Model 7). Finally, unemployment at 
the country of destination appears to have delayed the process of 
children’s reunification which, along with the previous finding, 
reinforces the idea that immigrant families were very responsive to 
their current economic situation and prospects in the host country 
when they organized the order and timing of their members’ 
reunification. 
Given the importance of the result concerning the lack of 
effect of the halt on recruitment on the pattern and timing of 
family reunification, I have tried to operationalize this variable in 
several other ways: 1) making the variable “halt” to take value 1 in 
1973, instead of 1974; 2) tuning the variable “halt” into a period-
effect variable, which takes value in all the years following the 
halt on recruitment (1974-2000) and 0 in all the years that 
preceded the measure (1960-1973); 3) turning the variable “halt” 
into a period effect that takes value 1 in the four years following 
the halt and 0 in the remaining years. The results for all these 
alternative estimations are included in Appendix C, where it is 
shown that the results remained unchanged. 
Finally, it is desirable to examine whether differences in the 
pattern of children’s reunification by country of origin still emerge 
after having controlled for all the aforementioned factors or, 
better, to examine how the different patterns initially observed 
between origin groups modify as additional controls are added. At 
first, children from all the countries considered here (except those 
from the former Yugoslavia) appeared to have been brought to 
Germany quicker than their Turkish counterparts. Furthermore, 
these differences did not seem to be attributable to differences in 
the size and composition of the families by country of origin, or 
even to differences in the timing of the parents’ migration (see 
Models 4 to 6); Italian, Spanish and, above all, Greek children 
systematically appeared to be taken to Germany earlier than their 
Turkish counterparts. However, this picture changed substantially 
after controlling for the variation in the German macro-economic 
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situation and the immigration legislation in Model 7. After adding 
these controls, only Greek children remained the ones being 
reunified quickest, even in the size of the coefficient reduced 
substantially. In contrast, differences between Turks and the other 
national groups became non-significant. The Greek 
“exceptionalism” reappears here again, as it did in the analysis of 
the reunification of spouses.22 
 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
In this article I have examined the family reunification of a 
sample of original male guestworkers in Germany, distinguishing 
between the process of wife’s and children’s reunification. With 
regard to the wife’s migration, one of the most striking findings is 
that approximately half of the immigrant couples in the sample 
had migrated together (i.e. in the same year) to Germany. Joint 
couple migration appeared to be common among educated 
couples, where: the wife had some work experience at the time; 
less children; if they had no pre-school children and during the 
peak years of recruitment (1968-1973). When the couple did not 
migrate together, the wife’s reunification tended to happen quicker 
if the wife had worked the year before, if she had few children, if 
female unemployment in Germany was low, and if the husband 
had migrated more recently (i.e. in 1968-1970, or above all in 
1970-1973). By country of origin, joint couple migration was 
much more likely among Greek and Italian immigrants than in the 
rest of the groups considered in this article, especially compared to 
Turks. Moreover, Greek husbands also tended to bring their wives 
quicker than other male immigrants in the sample, in the case that 
they had not migrated together. 
The process of children’s reunification in Germany appears to 
be strongly conditioned by the characteristics of the mother and 
                                               
22 In Appendix D, I run the same model only for families of Turkish 
origin. 
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the timing of her own migration. Children born to more educated 
mothers join their parents abroad quicker. In addition, the 
migration of the mother, especially if it occurred simultaneously 
with the fathers, greatly accelerates the migration of her children. 
On the other hand, the migration of other siblings in the family 
also accelerated one’s own migration, unless the sibling migrated 
along with the mother. In this case, own migration delays. 
Moreover, children with pre-school age siblings tend to take 
longer before they join their parents abroad, perhaps because 
mothers in this situation also delay their own migration. Greek 
children tended also to join their parents abroad earlier than 
children of other origins. 
The halt on recruitment, contrary to what most conventional 
accounts would have suggested, does not appear to have 
accelerated the pace of family reunification, neither the wives’ nor 
the children’s, among those immigrant families who still lived 
apart when the measure was imposed in 1973. According to the 
results obtained, the reform of the children allowances approved in 
January of 1975, in contrast, did trigger the process of family 
reunification. Of course, there is also the possibility that the 
potential accelerating effect of the halt on recruitment on the 
process of family reunification was not immediate but it took at 
least one year for it to manifest itself fully. In this case, the 
acceleration of the process of reunification observed in 1975 
would be due to the cumulated effect of the two measures, the halt 
and the children’s allowances reform. 
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Appendix A. The changing effect of independent variables 
depending on the time at which the analysis is carried out 
 
 
Logit estimates of joint couple migration (ref. delayed reunification) 
 At wife’s migration At husband’s migration 
(ref. Turkey)   
Former Yugoslavia -0.13 
0.35 
-0.02 
0.34 
Greece 1.32*** 
0.46 
1.31*** 
0.45 
Italy 0.96** 
0.44 
1.02** 
0.42 
Spain 0.41 
0.52 
0.24 
0.49 
W’s Age 0.07** 
0.04 
0.08** 
0.04 
H’s age 0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
Years since Marriage -0.04 
0.04 
-0.08* 
0.04 
W’s Years of Education 0.15 
0.11 
0.15 
0.11 
H’s Years of Education 0.15** 
0.08 
0.15** 
0.08 
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(ref. never worked)   
W’s Ever worked 0.71** 
0.31 
0.75** 
0.30 
W’s Years of work 
Experience 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.03 
Number of children < 17 -0.51*** 
0.13 
-0.38** 
0.15 
(ref. no children < 17)   
Youngest child < 6 0.24 
0.45 
0.02 
0.43 
Youngest child 6-16 -0.91** 
0.44 
1.26** 
0.53 
(ref. H’s mig. 1960-1967)   
H’s migration 1968-1970 0.93*** 
0.33 
0.93*** 
0.33 
H’s migration 1971-1973 0.77** 
0.38 
0.92** 
0.37 
Constant -4.76*** 
1.32 
-4.96*** 
1.27 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
0.2035 
353 
0.1711 
353 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 90%. 
**Significant at 95%. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Life table of duration of spouses’ separation (conditional probabilities) 
              Beg.    Cum.      Std.               Std. 
Interval     Total   Failure   Error    Hazard     Error    [95% Conf. Int.] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2     3       181    0.0276  0.0122    0.0276    0.0124    0.0090    0.0566 
3     4       176    0.0497  0.0162    0.0227    0.0114    0.0062    0.0498 
4     5       172    0.0773  0.0199    0.0291    0.0130    0.0094    0.0595 
5     6       167    0.0939  0.0217    0.0180    0.0104    0.0037    0.0433 
6     7       164    0.1602  0.0273    0.0732    0.0211    0.0378    0.1200 
7     8       152    0.1823  0.0287    0.0263    0.0132    0.0072    0.0577 
8     9       148    0.1989  0.0297    0.0203    0.0117    0.0042    0.0488 
9    10       145    0.2376  0.0316    0.0483    0.0182    0.0194    0.0901 
10   11       138    0.2928  0.0338    0.0725    0.0229    0.0347    0.1238 
11   12       128    0.3315  0.0350    0.0547    0.0207    0.0220    0.1020 
12   13       121    0.4033  0.0365    0.1074    0.0298    0.0572    0.1732 
13   14       108    0.4530  0.0370    0.0833    0.0278    0.0381    0.1460 
14   15        99    0.5304  0.0371    0.1414    0.0378    0.0773    0.2245 
15   16        85    0.5856  0.0366    0.1176    0.0372    0.0564    0.2010 
16   17        75    0.6077  0.0363    0.0533    0.0267    0.0145    0.1169 
17   18        71    0.6519  0.0354    0.1127    0.0398    0.0486    0.2031 
18   19        63    0.7072  0.0338    0.1587    0.0502    0.0761    0.2712 
19   20        53    0.7293  0.0330    0.0755    0.0377    0.0206    0.1654 
20   21        49    0.7514  0.0321    0.0816    0.0408    0.0222    0.1789 
21   22        45    0.8011  0.0297    0.2000    0.0667    0.0915    0.3503 
22   23        36    0.8287  0.0280    0.1389    0.0621    0.0451    0.2845 
23   24        31    0.8619  0.0256    0.1935    0.0790    0.0710    0.3764 
24   25        25    0.8895  0.0233    0.2000    0.0894    0.0649    0.4097 
25   26        20    0.9061  0.0217    0.1500    0.0866    0.0309    0.3612 
26   27        17    0.9337  0.0185    0.2941    0.1315    0.0955    0.6024 
27   28        12    0.9503  0.0162    0.2500    0.1443    0.0516    0.6021 
28   29         9    0.9613  0.0143    0.2222    0.1571    0.0269    0.6191 
29   30         7    0.9779  0.0109    0.4286    0.2474    0.0884    1.0321 
31   32         4    0.9890  0.0078    0.5000    0.3536    0.0606    1.3929 
36   37         2    0.9945  0.0055    0.5000    0.5000    0.0127    1.8444 
39   40         1    1.0000       .    1.0000    1.0000    0.0253    3.6889 
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Alternative codifications of the “posthalt” variable 
Variable Posthalt =1 if year==1974 
Posthalt =1 if 
year==1973 
Posthalt =1 if 
year>1973 
(ref. Turkey)    
Former Yugoslavia 0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
Greece -0.39** 
0.10 
-0.34** 
0.11 
-0.38** 
0.10 
Italy -0.18 
0.17 
-0.15 
0.17 
-0.16 
0.18 
Spain -0.25* 
0.14 
-0.21 
0.14 
-0.24* 
0.14 
Years of marriage -0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
W’s age at H’s migration -0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
H’s age at migration -0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
W’s years of education 0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
H’s years of education -0.02 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.02 
0.02 
(ref. never worked)    
W’s ever worked 0.01 
0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
Years of Work experience 0.02** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
(ref. not at work the year 
prior to H’s mig.)    
Work the year prior to H’s 
mig 
-0.41** 
0.09 
-0.40** 
0.09 
-0.41** 
0.09 
Number of children 0.04** 
0.02 
0.04** 
0.02 
0.04* 
0.02 
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(ref. no children)    
Youngest child<6 -0.12 
0.13 
-0.11 
0.12 
-0.12 
0.13 
Youngest Child 6-16 0.06 
0.11 
0.07 
0.10 
0.06 
0.10 
(ref. H’s mig. 1960-65)    
H’s mig. 1966-1970 -0.67** 
0.06 
-0.69** 
0.06 
-0.67** 
0.06 
H’s mig. 1970-1973 -0.97** 
0.08 
-0.98** 
0.08 
-0.97** 
0.08 
Rate of unemployment 0.18** 
0.01 
0.19** 
0.01 
0.18** 
0.02 
GDP country of origin 0.00* 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
(ref. year≠1974)    
Halt -0.04 
0.06   
Kindergeld -0.26** 
0.08 
-0.25** 
0.08 
-0.26** 
0.08 
(ref. year≠1973)    
Halt 
 
0.14** 
0.06  
(ref. year 1960-1973)    
Halt 
  
0.04 
0.09 
Constant 2.36** 
0.37 
2.29** 
0.36 
2.38** 
0.37 
    
ln_p 1.51** 
0.05 
1.52** 
0.05 
1.51** 
0.05 
N 
Log likelihood 
353 353 353 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Time until child’s reunification (all comparing to only for Turks) 
Variable All nationalities Only Turks 
Former Yug. (ref. Turkey) -0.06 
0.05 
 
Greece (ref. Turkey) -0.23** 
0.07 
 
Italy (ref. Turkey) -0.09 
0.06 
 
Spain (ref. Turkey) -0.09 
0.08 
 
Sex (ref. man) -0.03 
0.03 
-0.00 
0.04 
Child’s age 0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
Child’s age sq. -0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
M’s age 0.04** 
0.02 
0.12** 
0.03 
M’s age sq. -0.00 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
M’s years of education -0.07** 
0.02 
-0.08** 
0.02 
F’s years of education -0.01 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
M’s years of work exp. 0.003 
0.002 
0.00 
0.00 
Children (ref. no child) -0.01 
0.02 
-0.03* 
0.02 
Youngest sibling< 6 (ref. no sibling) 0.22** 
0.08 
0.33** 
0.12 
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Youngest sibling>= 6 (ref. no sibling) 0.04 
0.08 
0.16 
0.11 
Eldest (ref. other) -0.02 
0.05 
0.09* 
0.05 
Youngest (ref. other) 0.10** 
0.05 
0.02 
0.05 
M’s migration (ref. year≠ M’s mig) -0.55** 
0.06 
-0.39** 
0.08 
Sibling’s migration (ref. year≠ S’s mig) -0.57** 
0.06 
-0.47** 
0.06 
M’s mig* Sib’s mig 0.22** 
0.07 
0.16* 
0.09 
Parents’ Joint Mig (ref. no joint mig. of 
parents) 
-0.26** 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.07 
M’s mig* F’s mig -1.19** 
0.09 
-1.35** 
0.12 
Halt (ref. year other than 1974) -0.08 
0.06 
-0.05 
0.07 
Kindergeld (ref. year other than 1975) -0.38** 
0.07 
-0.25** 
0.07 
Rate of female unemployment 0.11** 
0.01 
0.09** 
0.01 
Constant 1.85** 
0.43 
-0.14 
0.52 
   
ln_p 1.16** 
0.04 
1.31** 
0.05 
P 
 
3.21** 
0.11 
3.70 
0.17 
N 
Log likelihood 
426 
-568 
256 
-320 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. *Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Type of migration by year of arrival (percentage) 
Year of 
Migration 
Adult Males Non-reunited 
Females 
Reunited 
Females 
Children 
1956 66.67 0 33.33 0 
1957 90 10 0 0 
1958 60 20 20 0 
1959 76.19 14.29 4.76 4.76 
1960 76.36 12.73 9.09 1.82 
1961 67.61 16.9 14.08 1.41 
1962 60 18.67 10.67 10.67 
1963 58.9 26.03 8.22 6.85 
1964 57.94 26.17 11.21 4.67 
1965 48.94 27.66 14.89 8.51 
1966 50 28.57 13.27 8.16 
1967 45.28 24.53 13.21 16.98 
1968 53.54 25.2 8.66 12.6 
1969 56.72 17.54 16.42 9.33 
1970 50.18 15.79 16.14 17.89 
1971 46.33 24.31 11.47 17.89 
1972 44.17 23.79 20.39 11.65 
1973 48 20 12.44 19.56 
1974 27.27 22.73 21.82 28.18 
1975 17.91 32.84 14.93 34.33 
1976 23.19 20.29 8.7 47.83 
1977 24.36 25.64 20.51 29.49 
1978 20.62 26.8 12.37 40.21 
1979 33.88 24.79 14.88 26.45 
1980 25.66 35.4 12.39 26.55 
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1981 29.82 36.84 10.53 22.81 
1982 27.27 33.33 15.15 24.24 
1983 29.17 41.67 8.33 20.83 
1984 23.53 47.06 5.88 23.53 
1985 22.22 51.85 7.41 18.52 
1986 37.93 48.28 13.79 0 
1987 35.29 52.94 2.94 8.82 
1988 34.48 55.17 3.45 6.9 
1989 40.43 31.91 14.89 12.77 
1990 28.57 40.82 6.12 24.49 
1991 40.74 37.04 7.41 14.81 
1992 45.45 34.85 7.58 12.12 
1993 48.08 23.08 23.08 5.77 
1994 31.25 62.5 6.25 0 
1995 37.5 37.5 18.75 6.25 
1996 50 33.33 16.67 0 
1997 42.86 42.86 0 14.29 
1998 30 40 10 20 
Source: GSOEP 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. THE PROCESS OF FAMILY 
FORMATION. MARITAL CHOICES AND 
HOUSEHOLD FORMATION 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Most immigrants who migrate as single people are likely to 
end up marrying someone and eventually having children during 
their stay abroad, as long as they do not return too soon to their 
homelands. The importance of studying the process of family 
formation among immigrants and their marital choices in 
particular derives from the crucial influence that the type of 
chosen partner is expected to have on the relations that immigrants 
maintain with the native population, their own immigrant 
community and, ultimately, also with their country of origin. As 
Nauck bluntly put it “[…] whether the marriage partner is 
selected among the members of native population, the own 
immigrant community or the group at the country of origin has 
extensive consequences for the own integration process and 
further mobility options, for the socialization and acculturation 
process of the children coming out from these unions and for the 
arrangement of the family-related social capital” (2001). 
While there are no clear clues as to how the process of family 
reunification affects the process of integration, there is widespread 
consensus around the idea that mixed marriages are the kind of 
marital choice that are more likely to favor integration. Surveys 
systematically reveal that family is the sphere where individuals 
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(immigrants or not) seek less inter-ethnic relations and, 
accordingly, bi-national couples are seen as indicating the 
maximum level of integration on behalf of the immigrant partner. 
On the other hand, endogamous marriages are likely to entail 
greater difficulties for the integration of the family members into 
the wider relationship system of the receiving society since they 
offer a “safer” context for interactions, which renders contacts 
with the outside group less necessary, and because they are also 
subjected to stronger social control from their peers. 
In principle, marriages within the own immigrant community 
and marriages with someone from the country of origin are both 
endogamous marriages.1 Therefore, one could assume that these 
two marital choices would make no difference with regard to their 
potential impact on the immigrants’ prospects for integration. 
However, there are some differences between these two variants 
of endogamous marriage that may be relevant in this respect. First 
of all, in couples made up of two co-national immigrants both 
partners would have similar knowledge about the host country, its 
language and its customs by the time they meet. In addition, their 
decisions to migrate were made independently of each other and, 
therefore, they are likely to have benefited equally from the 
intense selection process involved in migration. In contrast, in 
couples where one immigrant has imported his/her partner from 
their country of origin for the purpose of marriage and family-
formation, the importer will have a better knowledge of the 
receiving society, which may obviously affect the power balance 
within the couple and perhaps also the integration prospects not 
only of the imported partner but of the children and the entire 
family too.  
Ultimately, the question about the relation between the type of 
partner and the level of integration reached by the members of the 
                                               
1 I write “in principle” because nationality and ethnic origin do not 
necessarily coincide in the migration context. A marriage between two 
Turkish nationals in Germany might not be an endogamous marriage if, 
for instance, one of the partners is Kurd and the other is not. 
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families resulting from different kinds of marital choice is an 
empirical one. This issue has been partly addressed recently in the 
case of mixed marriages and economic assimilation (Baker and 
Benjamin, 1997; Meng and Gregory, 2005; Kantarevic, 2004). 
These studies conclude that there is a positive correlation between 
inter-ethnic marriage and economic assimilation among 
immigrants, although in some cases such an intermarriage 
premium vanishes when selection is controlled for (Kantarevic, 
2004). 
Aside from this limited evidence of earnings assimilation, 
there is no study that investigates whether immigrants who mix-
marry and their descendants perform differently in other spheres 
of social and economic life like fertility, human capital 
investments, housing, etc. Moreover, the absence of empirical 
studies is total when it comes to the potential differential impact of 
endogamous marriages depending on whether they result from the 
union of two co-national immigrants in the host country or, 
alternatively, from the importation of one partner by the one who 
resides abroad. This is particularly noteworthy when one takes 
into account that the phenomenon of the importation of spouses 
has been paid a lot of attention in the recent political debate about 
immigration in several European countries such as Netherlands, 
Denmark and UK.  
According to estimates from the Dutch Central Register for 
non-Dutch nationals, 22% of total immigration corresponded to 
family formation, versus 17% to family reunion and 6.4% to 
accompanying family members (arriving the same year as their 
relatives). In 2002, the Principles of Government Policy noted that 
75 percent of the members of two of the three biggest immigrant 
groups (Turks and Moroccans) seek spouses from their or their 
parents' country of origin. According to Netherlands Statistics, in 
the period 1995-2003 family formation migration to the 
Netherlands rose by more than eight thousand, thus making it the 
largest category of immigrants (approximately  one in four 
immigrants). On the other hand, since 1996 family reunion 
migration to the Netherlands has dwindled. Most family formation 
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immigrants (one in three in 2003) came from Turkey and Morocco 
and were women between 20 and 30 years old (Han and 
Sprangers, 2004).  
The arrival of people migrating for family formation purposes 
is seen by the Dutch public and politicians as an indication that 
integration simply has not happened; otherwise, immigrants and 
their children would find partners in the Netherlands (van Selm, 
2005). Accordingly, the general approach to family formation in 
Dutch legislation has increasingly hardened in recent years. A 
legislative reform passed in November 2004 has established that a 
Dutch national or foreign resident who brings his/her partner from 
abroad must have an income of at least 120 percent of the 
minimum salary for the Netherlands (1,319 Euros net per month, 
excluding holidays allowance) and have an employment contract 
for at least one year.2 In addition, a naturalized Dutch citizen, or 
non-EU national residing in the Netherlands, must be over 21 to 
be permitted to bring a would-be spouse into the country. The 
spouse-to-be must also be over 21. By raising the age limit the 
Minister hopes to prevent a situation in which the person forming 
the family gives up his studies, thereby hindering his integration 
into Dutch society and his ability to find employment (Goudsmit, 
2004). Furthermore, a new law approved by the lower chamber of 
parliament in April 2005 would amend the 2000 Aliens Act by 
introducing language and culture testing prior to the granting of an 
entry visa for residency purposes, which would primarily affect 
non-Dutch spouses-to-be. All the aforementioned restrictions seem 
to have been effective: the number of applicants requesting a 
temporary stay authorization for family formation or for family 
                                               
2 The Directive on the right to family reunification specifies, as an 
income requirement, that the head of family should be able to maintain 
his family members without recourse to the social assistance system, for 
which  purpose account may be taken of the level of ‘minimum national 
wage’. It is questionable whether the increase in the income requirement 
to 120% of the minimum wage is in keeping with this provision of the 
Directive. 
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reunification dropped 23 per cent in the first eight months of 2005 
compared to the same period for 2004. 
In Denmark, some studies estimate that 86% of first 
generation immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and 
Pakistan and 75% of middle and second generation had an 
imported partner in 1998 (Celikaksoy et al., 2002).3 In 2002, a 
new Aliens Act was passed aimed basically at toughening the 
legal conditions for the admission of newly married spouses. In 
fact, the reform suppressed the statutory right to reunification with 
a spouse since it was established that no reunification of spouses 
would be granted if one of the spouses is younger than 24. The 
generally more lenient access to reunification with refugee 
spouses was also abolished in all cases where the marriage was 
only entered into after the flight to Denmark. Furthermore, the 
spouses’ aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their 
aggregate ties with any other country (ties requirement), and the 
spouse living in Denmark must prove that he or she earns enough 
to be able to maintain his or her foreign spouse and, additionally, 
must provide financial security of DKK 50,000 to cover any future 
public expenses for assistance granted to the foreign spouse. 
In Belgium, Lievens’ estimates, based on the 1991 Census, 
suggested that almost 70% of Turks and more than 50% of 
Moroccans were potential importers (1999: 723). Despite these 
figures, Belgium has a fairly liberal marriage migration policy, 
which does not impose either a housing or income requirement on 
those immigrants willing to bring their marriage partners from 
origin. A reason why the Belgian legislation continues to be so 
tolerant concerning immigration for the purpose of family 
formation is because cascade family migration is forbidden and, 
therefore, middle generation immigrants cannot import their 
marriage partners from the country of origin. However, such a 
                                               
3 This author defined “middle generation” as children of 
guestworkers who were born abroad and immigrated to Denmark before 
the age of eight. Remember that I, in contrast, have defined “middle 
generation” as children born abroad and who immigrated at age between 
6 and 16.  
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prohibition becomes virtually ineffective because of the bi-lateral 
agreements still in force between Belgium and Morocco and 
Turkey, which establish that nationals from these two countries 
who are employed and have a work contract for more than one 
month are allowed to bring their partners to Belgium. 
In the UK, acceptances for settlement for marriage have 
comprised between 40-50 per cent of total acceptances or non-
asylum inflow, a figure that has not varied much since 1975. If 
one focuses on entries from the Indian sub-continent, entries for 
the purpose of marriage have largely surpassed the number of 
entries due to the reunification of spouses (Coleman, 2004: 16). In 
the context of the increasing politicization of the immigration 
debate, three of the fourteen recommendations recently put 
forward by the Kirkhope Commission, leaded by the head of the 
conservatives in the EU Parliament, are aimed at curbing the 
inflow of immigrant spouses. More precisely, the Commission 
recommended imposing an effective income requirement for those 
wishing to bring their spouses from abroad or, alternatively, to 
require them to be a British citizen in order to be allowed to 
import his/her partner. In addition, it was also recommended to 
raise to 21 years old the minimum age for any sponsor to be 
authorized to bring in his/her spouse (“Building a Fair 
Immigration System for the UK, Sept. 2004). 
In contrast to what has been said so far with regard to other 
European countries, Germany tackled the phenomenon of newly 
married partners imported by foreign residents who were 
previously established in the federal territory very early. In 
Chapter 2 I thoroughly described the decree approved in 1981 in 
this respect. However, such an early reaction has not been 
accompanied by a systematic analysis of this particular type of 
immigration linked to the process of family formation of single 
immigrants as they reach marriageable age. As Nauck (2001) has 
emphasized in his extensive review of the literature on families 
and immigration, the number of studies devoted to the issue of 
marriage choices among immigrants in Germany is still very 
limited. On the one hand, most of the studies currently available 
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have focused on bi-national marriages and are exclusively based 
on the time series of registered mix-national marriage ceremonies 
celebrated in Germany and, therefore, counted by the German 
registers. As he warned, these are only aggregated figures that 
result from various overlapping processes over time and cannot be 
taken as an indication of social distance or, alternatively, 
assimilation. On the other hand, as he also pointed out, empirical 
analyses concerning the structure of international marriage 
markets and how they affect immigrants’ marital choices are 
completely absent both in and out of Germany (see Lievens, 1999 
for the only exception). 
This chapter intends to shed some light on these issues. In 
particular, I examine the process of family formation among 
immigrants in Germany and, further, the factors underlying the 
marital choices of immigrants who marry during their stay in 
Germany. 
 
 
5.2. Theoretical explanations for mixed marriages and the 
importation of spouses 
 
In his review of the literature concerned with the factors 
underlying intermarriage and homogamy, Kalmijn (1998) 
identified three types of factors that shape individuals’ partner 
choices: 1) the preferences of the individuals for certain 
characteristics in a spouse, 2) the influence of the social group of 
which they are members and, 3) the potential constraints imposed 
by the structure of the marriage market where they are searching 
for a spouse. 
In the context of immigration, individual preferences (the first 
set of factors) have been the focus of the analyses inspired by the 
assimilationist approach, which predicts higher rates of 
intermarriage for the second and subsequent generations and for 
more educated individuals within the immigrant group. When they 
reach marriageable age, second generation immigrants have spent 
their whole lives in the host country, are fluent in its language and 
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have only attended its school system. Furthermore, some of them 
may have even acquired its nationality. All these circumstances, 
which imply partial or total socialization within the culture of the 
host country, increase their chances of establishing “normalized” 
contacts with members of the native population and will probably 
favor the development of personal values that soften prejudices 
and stereotypes about their “ideal” partner. 
On the other hand, the acquisition of country-specific 
education by second generation immigrants, in particular of high 
level degrees, is also expected to increase their opportunities of 
meeting native potential partners. This is especially applicable in 
countries like Germany where the strong link between the 
vocational training system and the labor market produces strong 
job segmentation between Germans and minority ethnic groups 
(Granato and Kalter, 2000; Müller et al., 1998; Blossfeld & 
Mayer, 1988). In addition, higher education is also believed to 
weaken attachments with the group of origin and, consequently, to 
blur the cultural barriers against marriage out of their own group 
(Hwang et al., 1995, cited in Kalmiijn, 1998: 401). 
Along with individual characteristics that indicate more or less 
assimilation into the host society, the structure of the marriage 
market has also been identified emphasized as a key factor in 
explaining the marital behavior of minority groups like 
immigrants (the third set of variables in the Kalmijn’s scheme). 
The “opportunity theory” formulated by Blau (1977) emphasized, 
among others, the constraints for individuals’ marital choices that 
derive from sex imbalances within the (partial) marriage market 
where individuals search for a partner, and the size of the own 
group within the local marriage market. The larger the size of the 
own group, the more the (statistical) chances of endogamous 
contacts, and greater the sources of social control as well. 
Accordingly, a negative relationship between the own group’s size 
and propensity to mix-marry is expected. On the contrary, sex 
imbalances within the own group are likely to increase 
intermarriage rates for the minority sex at least, since the less 
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marriageable women (men) within the same group the more likely 
they will be to marry a woman (man) from outside. 
The empirical evidence available so far has widely confirmed 
the predictions made by both the “assimilationist” and the 
“structuralist” approaches with respect to the propensity to mix-
marry among immigrants, both in the US  (Lieberson & Waters, 
1985, 1988; Alba & Golden, 1986; Pagnini & Morgan, 1990; Lee 
& Yamanaka, 1990; Kalmijn, 1993; Rosenfeld, 2002; Kulczycki 
& Lobo, 2002) and in Europe (Kane & Stephen, 1988; Lievens, 
1998; Klein, 2001; Botelho and Aagaard-Hansen, 2002). 
Compared to mixed marriages, the practice of importing 
partners from the country of origin is generally seen as the type of 
marital choice that indicates the lowest level of assimilation 
among immigrants. Individuals who import their partner reveal an 
intense preference for marrying a particular type of partner within 
their own ethnic group: one who still lives in the origin country 
and, therefore, has no contact with the host country. Although sex 
imbalances within immigrant populations are, at least, partially 
responsible for male immigrants importing their partners, the few 
studies available to date on this issue have rather stressed the role 
of traditional values and the wish for “unspoiled” wives in 
explaining the practice of importing brides, especially among 
Turks (Lievens, 1999; Celikaksoy et al., 2003).4 
The preference for imported partners among immigrant 
women, though, cannot be interpreted as the logical response to 
the shortages of marriageable men within the own immigrant 
group since the numerical predominance of males remains in the 
middle generation and, sometimes, even in the second generation 
as well. The existing literature has typically referred to what 
Kalmijn calls “the influence of the social group of reference” and, 
                                               
4 For a complete review of the issue of bi-national marriages and 
marriage migration among immigrants in Germany see Nauck (2001). 
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more precisely, to the pressures exerted by the woman’s family as 
the most decisive factor in these cases.5 
The survival of substantial migratory pressure and the practice 
of arranged marriages within the own kinship group in some 
sending countries have made migrant’s single daughters a valuable 
asset for their parents. By arranging a marriage of this type, the 
bride’s parents often obtain higher bride “prices” from the 
groom’s family in exchange for the possibility of legal admittance 
to Western Europe. In addition, the bride’s parents may also 
express a sense of loyalty to their own origins, especially if the 
groom comes from the own family at origin. In fact, several 
authors have highlighted the numerical importance of 
consanguineous marriages within some immigrant groups in 
Western European countries (Reiners, 1998, Haugh, 2002). 
Apart from these potential benefits for the bride’s family, to 
import a partner may secure the importer woman a better position 
- in terms of bargaining power- within the couple because she is 
the one who already knows the country where the couple will 
settle. In his analysis of the marital choices of Turkish and 
Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, Lievens (1999) emphasized 
this aspect of marriage migration involving female importers and 
concluded that “women may marry an imported partner in order to 
satisfy modern goals” (717). However, similar studies carried out 
for Turkish and other Muslim immigrant communities in the 
Netherlands and Denmark do not find support for such an 
hypothesis (Hooghiemstra, 2001; Celikaksoy et al., 2003).  
 
 
 
                                               
5 Note that while among men the choice of an imported bride is seen 
as a voluntary decision motivated by traditionalist considerations, 
women’s decision to import are often considered as decisions imposed 
by others. In the assimilationist rationale, the logical preference for 
middle and second generation immigrant women would be co-national 
immigrants or native partners, rather than imported ones. 
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5.3. Marital behavior of immigrants in Germany 
 
5.3.1. Mixed marriages and importation of spouses in German 
Official Statistics 
 
According to the Federal Statistics Office, the annual 
percentage of mixed marriages celebrated over the total number of 
marriages in Germany was 17.5% in 2000 and 18.5% in 2001. 
Approximately 35% were between German women and foreign 
men, 49% between German men and foreign women, and 16% 
between both non-German nationals. In other words, every sixth 
marriage involved at least one foreign partner in 2001. This 
percentage would become much larger if marriages celebrated 
abroad by foreigners who usually reside in Germany were also 
counted, since it is known that a large proportion of foreigners 
residing in Germany still return to their (or their parent’s) country 
of origin in order to celebrate their marriage ceremonies. 
Unfortunately, this type of marriage is not statistically collected in 
Germany unless they were celebrated in the German consulate 
abroad, which is not often the case. 
As Klein (2001) pointed out, the German official statistics 
have several serious shortcomings for the analysis of marriages in 
which at least one of the partners is a foreigner (apart from the 
above mentioned undercounting of marriages involving foreigners 
living in Germany but who get married abroad). First of all, there 
is no official counting of cohabitation, despite the fact that this 
form of living arrangement has become more and more common 
in Germany (Kopp, 1994). 
Secondly, German statistics only consider the current 
nationality of the partners at the time the survey is conducted; they 
do not include information on foreign origin or parents’ country of 
birth, which implies a growing risk of undercounting in cases 
where at least one partner is a middle or second generation 
immigrant. Nauck (2001) has also stressed this aspect and its 
implications for the analysis of the marital behavioral patterns of 
foreigners. As he stated, naturalizations of foreigners living in 
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Germany will lead to national and ethnic dimensions to fall 
increasingly apart, which implies that an increase of German-
Turkish ceremonies, for instance, does not necessarily have to be 
an indication of increasing contact between the Turkish minority 
and the German majority population. On the contrary, it might be 
the case that naturalization has caused partners of the same ethnic 
origin to have different passports or, the other way around, 
partners of different ethnic origin to have the same nationality.6 
Finally, the fact that official statistics do not allow any sort of 
socio-demographic characterization of the marriages involving 
foreigners constitutes a major drawback to utilize official statistics 
to analyze these issues. 
When the focus is on the proportion that bi-national couples 
represent over the total number of married couples living in 
Germany –instead of the number of marriages celebrated each 
year-, mixed couples represented 11 percent of the total in 2002. 
Out of these, 6 percent were foreign-foreign married couples (1.2 
million), and 5 percent (864,000) were German-foreign couples. 
Out of 1.2 million foreign-foreign married couples living in 
Germany, 76% were marriages between non-EU nationals, 
whereas 24% were marriages in which at least one partner had a 
passport from one of the other EU states. Among 864,000 
German-foreign married couples, 33% of foreign spouses were 
nationals of one of the EU states, whereas 44% of foreign spouses 
were nationals of a European non-EU state. The women of foreign 
nationality married to German men originated predominantly from 
Thailand (14 percent), Poland (11 percent) and Turkey (9 percent). 
As for foreign men married to German women, they were most 
often nationals of Turkey (15 percent) and Italy (13 percent), the 
                                               
6 Nauck’s proposal is to describe as “internal marriages” those 
marriages that are made up of two partners of the same nationality and 
“endogamous marriages” those where partners share the same ethnic 
origin; marriages between partners with different nationalities or 
different ethnic origin would be denominated external and exogamous, 
respectively. 
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third position is share by men from Austria and America with 7 
percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003).  
Over time, the number of male foreigners marrying German 
females has experienced severe variations whereas the number of 
foreign women marrying German men has gradually increased. 
However, there are notable variations in this pattern depending on 
the nationality under analysis. The number of marriages between 
Turkish men and German women increased in the late seventies 
but dropped abruptly in the early eighties, maybe due to the 
increasing numbers of single Turkish men who returned to their 
homeland in the light of worsening economic conditions in 
Germany. On the other hand, the number of marriages between 
German men and Philippine and, above all, Thai women steadily 
increased during the eighties and the nineties, respectively.7 In 
fact, the high numbers of bi-national marriages involving a 
German man and either a Polish or Thai woman underlies the 
pattern observed in Figure 5.1 since 1986 (compare dark grey and 
light grey lines). 
For the reason previously mentioned, German official statistics 
do not allow an adequate measurement of marriages involving 
imported spouses. Marriages between two foreign people that take 
place in the home country of the individuals or at their consulate 
in Germany remain uncounted. This means that the transnational 
dimension involved in a large share of immigrants’ marriages is 
totally absent from official registers (Strassburger, 2000, 2001). 
The extent to which this flaw in official figures affects marriages 
between two foreigners that reside both in Germany, and 
marriages between a German and foreign citizen remains 
unknown. According to Strassburger (2001), only 3.2% of the 
total number of weddings involving at least one Turkish partner 
was celebrated in German registry offices in 1996. This author 
also reported that in 1996 German Consulates in Turkey issued 
                                               
7 See Klein (2001) for a detailed description of the historical 
variations by nationality. 
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Figure 5.1. Number of bi-national marriages in Germany since 1955 
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17,662 visas to Turkish citizens in Turkey to join their non- 
German spouse in Germany. This figure amounted to 
approximately 61% of total weddings involving at least one 
Turkish citizen residing in Germany in 1996. Unfortunately we do 
not know how many of these marriages are of proper second-
generation immigrants (children born in Germany to immigrant 
parents). Taking into account the date of marriage (1996), it is 
likely that most of the marriages reported in these figures 
belonged to the middle generation (children born to immigrant 
parents and that migrated to Germany younger than 16). 
Furthermore, naturalized foreigners in these statistics are counted 
as German citizens, as the classification criterion is nationality 
instead of (parents’) country of birth. Thus, the usefulness of 
official statistics on marriages is even smaller when attempting to 
study the marriage patterns of the immigrants’ descendants. In any 
case, what becomes evident from these figures –even though they 
are flawed- is that the importation of spouses by foreigners (or 
people of foreign origin) also has substantial importance within 
the German context. 
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5.3.2. Previous studies 
 
Despite the relatively large size of the foreign population in 
Germany and the substantial proportion of married couples living 
in Germany where at least one partner is of foreign nationality, 
empirical studies on the marital behavior of immigrants are still 
few and most of them restrict themselves to the analysis of mixed 
marriages between German citizens and foreigners (Kane and 
Stephen, 1988; Klein, 2001; Weick, 2001). These studies found a 
similar pattern over time: a high rate of mix-marriage in the 
earliest stages of the migration process (between 1959 and 1967, 
approximately), which then decreases during the seventies, and 
later increases slightly during the eighties.8 Such a U-shaped 
pattern can be explained by the forces of the marriage market in 
the first phase of the immigration process and the increasing 
cultural convergence and integration later on. 
On the other hand, Klein analyzed in detail how differences in 
the rate of mix-marrying across nationalities are largely due to 
differences in group size and sex ratio imbalances rather than 
persistent cultural distance. In particular, after controlling for 
group size and sex ratio, the propensity to marry a German partner 
only differs for Yugoslavs (more likely) and for Greeks (less 
likely) to marry Germans than for the other foreign guest-workers 
groups. In contrast, initial differences in the rate of mixed 
marriages between Italians, Spaniards, Turks and Portuguese 
vanished after neutralizing differences in the structure of their 
respective marriage markets. 
 
                                               
8 This pattern, however, is not totally stable. In the late eighties, for 
instance, an abrupt drop in the proportion of Turkish mixed marriages 
can be observed. Such a sudden decrease is explained by the authors as 
reflecting data shortcomings related to the non-registration of marriages 
celebrated in the Turkish Consulates in Germany since 1987, which 
made the proportion of mixed marriages between Turkish and Germans 
over the total number of marriages involving a Turkish citizen to appear 
more numerous than they actually were. 
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Figure 5.2. Proportion of bi-national marriages by nationality 
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Source: Mikrozensus, 1996 (Graph 1 in Weick, 2001). 
 
 
Finally, some attention has also been recently paid also to the 
individual determinants of mix-marrying behavior among 
immigrants in Germany. In particular, the effect of partners’ 
education and spousal age differential has been examined by Klein 
(2001) and Weick (2001). The former demonstrated, using data 
from the Familiensurvey (1988), that the proportion of bi-national 
marriages is particularly high when the beginning of the 
partnership took place when individuals were still studying. 
Besides, he showed that German people who marry foreigners 
mostly marry up, especially when the German partner is a woman. 
Weick (2001), using data from the Mikrozensus 1996, confirmed 
that educational homogamy was particularly high among bi-
national couples where the German citizen is the woman. 
According to his results, Italian men with a school diploma and 
with secondary education are 57% and 79%, respectively, more 
likely to marry a German woman than Italian men without 
diploma. The positive effect of education on the mix-marrying 
propensity of foreign men is even stronger for Turkish men (42% 
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more likely with school diploma and 193% with secondary 
education). In the case of mixed couples, where the foreigner is 
the wife, education seems to play a minor role while spousal age 
differences appear substantially larger (9 years versus 3 on 
average in the Federal Republic of Germany). Moreover, 
marriages between German men and foreign women often occur 
later in the life-course, which may indicate second marriages for 
German men, for instance. In any case, these differences by 
gender might suggest that the exchange hypothesis commonly 
utilized for explaining marital choices works differently or at least 
on different attributes by gender. 
In contrast to the recent interest in researching mix-marrying 
behavior, the analysis of internal marriages (i.e. marriages 
between people of the same nationality) and endogamous 
marriages (i.e. marriages between people of the same ethnic 
origin), following Nauck’s terminology (2001), remains an issue 
largely overlooked in the specialized literature. As I mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter, this is particularly striking when 
one takes into account that the importation of spouses by members 
of the middle and second immigrants generations and increasing 
trends to ethnic closure has been identified as one the most 
challenging issues in contemporary multicultural  democracies. 
According to the data collected in the Integration Survey of the 
Federal Institute for Population Research (Bundesinstitut für 
Bevölkerungsforschung– BiB), which also includes individuals of 
foreign origin regardless of their current nationality, immigrants in 
Germany ascribed the arrangement of marriage and mediation of 
family members and networks of friends as having a relatively 
high importance in their marriage decisions (Haug 2002: 419). 
Besides, 19% of married Turkish women and 16% of married 
Turkish men were kindred (!). Gaby Strassburger (2001) 
interviewed 11 men and 17 women about their partner choices and 
the reasons underlying them. She concluded that the decision to 
bring a partner from the country of origin is often a second rather 
than a first marital option, and that many immigrants end up 
deciding to do so after having had unsuccessful relationships with 
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members of their own community in Germany, or even with 
Germans. 
 
 
5.4. The sample of single immigrants and their partners in 
GSOEP. A brief description 
 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, migratory flows to 
Germany were initially dominated by males. According to the 
GSOEP data, about 2/3 of these adult male inflows were married 
men, of whom roughly a half brought their wives to Germany 
within a very short time of their arrival. In Chapter 4 I have 
analyzed the patterns followed by these married male immigrants 
in reunifying with their spouses and children in Germany. 
However, the process of family formation (i.e. marriage and 
childbirth) of those immigrants who got married during their stay 
in Germany remains to be researched. 
I have reconstructed the partner choices of individuals of 
foreign origin who have married during their stay in Germany. 
The final working sample is made up of 1,097 individuals.9 It 
includes three immigrant generations: first (individuals who 
immigrated at 16 or older), middle (immigrated at between 6 and 
15, both included) and second generation (immigrated younger 
than 6 or were born in Germany to immigrant parents10). First 
generation represents half of the total sample and middle 
generation a third, while second generation represents the the 
                                               
9 91% of them belong to Sample B. The remaining 9% of individuals 
are Turkish, Yugoslav, Italian, Greek and Spanish individuals surveyed 
in the other five samples (Samples A, C, D, E and F) launched since 
1984. By including foreign individuals in newer GSOEP samples, 
however, I only achieved a very limited update of the original 
“foreigners’ sample”, which has narrowed over time due to general panel 
attrition and considerable return migration. 
10 Individuals born in Germany to immigrant parents were assigned 
their mother’s country of origin, since GSOEP provides no information 
on ethnic origin for individuals born in Germany. 
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remaining 17% (see Table 5.1). The small number of individuals 
of second generation in the sample (189, of which only 89 were 
born in Germany) calls for caution when interpreting the results 
from this group. In fact, only 20% of the immigrants’ children 
born in Germany were already married by 2002, indicating that 
our second-generation sub-sample might be over-representing 
individuals who marry at younger ages. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Sample Descriptives 
Variable Mean S. D. Min Max 
First Generation 0.50    
Middle Generation 0.33    
Second Generation 0.17    
Sex (1=female) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Years of Education 9.6 1.9 7 18 
Sex ratio 0.45 0.19 0 0.92 
Group size 737 440 3 1,484 
Date of marriage 1982 9.5 1957 2001 
N 1,097    
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. 
 
 
The average number of “years of education prior to marriage” 
in the sample is rather low (9.6 over a minimum of 7), which 
reflects both the non-qualified profile of immigrant labor from the 
sixties and seventies, and the wide educational gap between native 
and immigrant youth in Germany (Granato and Kalter, 2001; 
Riphahn, 2002).11 39% of the sample are individuals of Turkish 
                                               
11 This variable measures, respectively, the number of years of 
education completed the year before marriage for those who married 
after entering GSOEP (46%), and the number of years in education 
reported in the first interview by those who had married earlier than 
GSOEP’s inception. 
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origin, 25% are Italians, 12% Spaniards, 12% Greeks and another 
12% from the former Yugoslavia.  
“Group size” refers to the size of each individual’s national 
group in Germany the year before his/her marriage, and “sex 
ratio” measures the number of single men (women) older than 15 
over the number of single women (men) older than 15 for each 
individual’s nationality and year before her (his) marriage.12 The 
five immigrant groups under consideration experienced strong sex 
imbalances during the observation period (1960-2002), as Figure 
5.3 shows. With the exception of the Greeks in the early nineties, 
males always out-numbered females. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Sex Ratio by nationality, 1960-2000 
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Source: GSOEP 2002, own elaboration. 
 
                                               
12 These two variables, sex ratio and group size, had to be 
constructed from GSOEP information due to the absence of complete 
official register figures for the whole period under study here. 
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The dependent variable “type of partner” is coded 0 if the 
partner chosen is a native German, 1 if the partner is another co-
national immigrant living in Germany at the time of marriage, and 
2 if the partner is someone imported from the immigrant’s country 
of origin. Native Germans have been identified by combining the 
information about place of birth and nationality prior to marriage; 
imported partners are defined as immigrants who do not live in 
Germany at the time of their marriage and marry someone who 
has lived in Germany at least 2 years prior to marriage. 
Table 5.2 reveals that the dominant strategy in couple 
formation, especially for immigrant women, is marrying other co-
national immigrant (71.19% of women and 47.16% of men choose 
this option). Immigrant women marry natives less than their male 
counterparts (9.6% versus 15.97%). They also import fewer 
partners from their countries of origin than their male counterparts 
(19.2% versus 36.87%). By origin, importing partners is typical of 
Turks but also important for male immigrants from the former 
Yugoslavia.13 Mixed marriages, on the other hand, are more 
common among immigrants from the former Yugoslavia than for 
any other group. 
 
 
                                               
13 Arranged marriages may still be widespread (67.8% of marriages 
were arranged in 1993). In March 1997, Istanbul Bilgi University 
announced the results of a study involving a sample group of 6,440 
married or divorced women in 25 provinces that found 41% to have 
entered into arranged marriages (Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2. Type of partner by sex and country of origin 
 Turkish Ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish Total 
 M W M W M W M W M W M W 
Native 6.72 1.84 22.06 28.07 17.95 5.36 24.44 11.34 21.05 14.81 15.97 9.60 
 (18) (3) (15) (16) (14) (3) (44) (11) (16) (8) (107) (41) 
Co-national 42.16 64.42 39.71 57.89 60.26 75.00 50.00 83.51 51.32 79.63 47.16 71.19 
immigrant (113) (105) (27) (33) (47) (42) (90) (81) (39) (43) (316) (304) 
Imported 51.12 33.74 38.24 14.04 21.79 19.64 25.56 5.15 27.63 5.56 36.87 19.20 
 (137) (55) (26) (8) (17) (11) (46) (5) (21) (3) (247) (82) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 (268) (163) (68) (57) (78) (56) (180) (97) (76) (54) (670) (427) 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. Unweighted data. 
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5.5. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 5.3 shows the estimated coefficients of a logistic 
multinomial regression that examines the effects of the covariates 
previously described (both individuals’ characteristics and 
structural constraints within the marriage market) on the 
probability of marrying a native partner versus marrying a co-
national immigrant (upper part), and on the probability of 
importing a partner versus marrying a co-national immigrant in 
Germany (bottom part of the table). Analytically, the multinomial 
logit model can be considered as two simultaneously logit models 
in which two possible outcomes are compared against a third 
category of reference (Long, 1997: 151). Accordingly, I will 
comment on the obtained results separately for the outcome 
“marrying a native” versus marrying a co-national, and for the 
outcome “importing a partner” versus marrying a co-national. In 
addition, it is important to remember here that in non-linear 
regression models such as multinomial logit, no single approach to 
interpretation can fully describe the relationship between a 
variable and the outcome probability, since such effect always 
depends on the value of the remaining covariates (Long, 1997: 
61). In order to ease the reading, I will plot the predicted 
probabilities of each outcome for specific values of the covariates 
included in the model (see below). 
The results showed in the upper part of Table 5.3 widely 
support the predictions of both the ‘assimilationist’ and the 
‘structuralist’ approaches concerning intermarriage behavior 
among immigrant individuals in Germany. When only individual 
characteristics are considered (Model 1), the propensity to marry 
native partners appears to have increased over generations; first 
generation immigrants are less likely to marry a native partner 
than members of the middle generation, and second-generation 
individuals are more likely to mix-marry than their middle 
generation counterparts (the reference category). On the other 
hand, a positive effect of education on intermarriage behavior is 
also detected (ß = 0.23, in Model 1). Results are not affected by 
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the inclusion of a set of three dummy educational variables that 
indicate low (less than 9), medium (between 9 and 11) and high 
(11 and more), instead of the continuous variable “years of 
education” reported in previous tables (results available upon 
request). However, given the difficulties for establishing skills and 
degree equivalences across educational systems, and the small 
variation in this variable, I prefer to keep the continuous variable 
to control for the effects of education in further estimations. 
The propensity to marry native partners versus co-national 
immigrants varies greatly by country of origin. All ethnic groups 
in my sample are more likely to marry a German partner than 
Turks (the reference category). People from the former Yugoslavia 
appear to be the most likely to become part of mixed couple 
relationship and Greeks the least so, only slightly more than 
Turks. Differences in propensities to mix-marry are also found 
between men and women. In line with some previous results, 
immigrant women are substantially less likely to marry German 
partners than men (ß = - 1.17, see Model 1).  
However, some of these differences across origin and gender 
disappear after controlling for structural constraints in the 
respective marriage market. The effect of the variables “sex ratio” 
and “group size” also confirm the predictions of the structural 
opportunity theory (Blau, 1994). The more marriageable people of 
the opposite sex are within the own community in the host 
country, the more likely it is to marry another co-national 
immigrant instead of a German partner. In fact, the effect of the 
sex ratio indicator is particular large and significant at 95% (ß = - 
4.57, see Model 2). This effect holds even after controlling for the 
size of the group which is also inversely related to the propensity 
to mix-marry (ß = -0.003, see Model 3). The most remarkable 
finding of Models 2 and 3 is the modification of the previously 
found differences between sexes and ethnic groups in their 
propensity to marry a native versus a co-national immigrant. First 
of all, controlling for sex imbalances eliminates the women’s 
smaller propensity to mix-marry (see the coefficient for “sex” in 
Model 2, which is not significant).  
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Table 5.3. Multinomial logit coefficients for type of partner (ref. co-
national immigrant) 
Native (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Only Men Only Women 
(ref. middle)        
1st gen. -0.59** 
(0.24) 
-0.74** 
(0.25) 
-1.06** 
(0.27) 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
-0.33 
(0.29) 
-0.59* 
(0.35) 
0.61 
(0.54) 
2nd  gen.  0.82** 
(0.27) 
0.83** 
(0.27) 
0.75** 
(0.28) 
0.59* 
(0.31) 
0.59* 
(0.31) 
0.53 
(0.40) 
1.37** 
(0.57) 
(ref. men)        
Sex  -1.16 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.37) 
-0.06 
(0.37) 
0.18 
(0.37) 
0.56 
(1.15) 
  
Educ. 0.23** 
(0.05) 
0.24** 
(0.05) 
0.23** 
(0.05) 
0.20** 
(0.05) 
0.20** 
(0.06) 
0.20** 
(0.06) 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
(ref. Turkey)        
Former 
Yug. 
2.20** 
(0.35) 
2.36** 
(0.36) 
0.80 
(0.49) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
0.82 
(0.72) 
1.40 
(1.13) 
Greece 0.89** 
(0.37) 
0.88** 
(0.38) 
-0.91 
(0.54) 
-1.97** 
(0.61) 
-1.93** 
(0.61) 
-0.89 
(0.74) 
-1.52 
(1.39) 
Italy 1.53** 
(0.30) 
1.45** 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.78 
(0.48) 
-0.78 
(0.48) 
-0.43 
(0.56) 
-0.91 
(1.04) 
Spain 1.50** 
(0.35) 
1.61** 
(0.36) 
-0.31 
(0.55) 
-1.09* 
(0.62) 
-1.09* 
(0.62) 
-0.47 
(0.76) 
-0.81 
(1.32) 
Sex Ratio  -4.57** 
(1.04) 
-3.76** 
(1.01) 
-4.95** 
(1.08) 
-4.90** 
(1.07) 
-8.48** 
(1.83) 
1.98 
(2.93) 
Group Size   -0.002** 
(0.0000) 
-0.004** 
(0.0006) 
-0.004** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
(ref. 1960-
74) 
       
1974-80    1.13** 
(0.42) 
1.14** 
(0.42) 
0.84* 
(0.49) 
2.55** 
(0.97) 
1981-90    2.31** 
(0.43) 
2.33** 
(0.43) 
2.38** 
(0.55) 
3.73** 
(0.99) 
1991-02    1.82** 
(0.42) 
1.85** 
(0.42) 
1.98** 
(0.57) 
3.07** 
(0.92) 
Sex*Edu     -0.034 
(0.11) 
  
Constant -4.38** 
(0.56) 
-3.01** 
(0.63) 
-0.29 
(0.88) 
0.07 
(0.88) 
0.005 
(0.95) 
0.64 
(1.06) 
-5.66* 
(3.01) 
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(Table continues) 
Imported (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Only Men Only Women 
(ref. middle)        
1st  gen. 0.09 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.19) 
-0.42** 
(0.21) 
-0.39* 
(0.21) 
-0.22 
(0.26) 
-0.97** 
(0.38) 
2nd gen. -0.21 
(0.23) 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.24 
(0.23) 
-0.21 
(0.25) 
-0.23 
(0.25) 
-0.04 
(0.34) 
-0.56 
(0.39) 
(ref. men)        
Sex -1.11** 
(0.16) 
0.39 
(0.31) 
0.31 
(0.31) 
0.33 
(0.33) 
-2.31** 
(0.90) 
  
Years in 
Educ. 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.14** 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
(ref. Turkey)        
Former 
Yug. 
-0.40 
(0.25) 
-0.29 
(0.25) 
-0.81** 
(0.36) 
-0.25 
(0.39) 
-0.22 
(0.39) 
0.75 
(0.61) 
-0.77 
(0.76) 
Greece -1.09** 
(0.25) 
-1.09** 
(0.26) 
-1.72** 
(0.40) 
-1.02** 
(0.43) 
-1.04** 
(0.44) 
-0.88 
(0.58) 
-0.60 
(0.83) 
Italy -1.25** 
(0.20) 
-1.41** 
(0.22) 
-1.91** 
(0.32) 
-1.29** 
(0.36) 
-1.36** 
(0.36) 
-1.12** 
(0.44) 
-1.66** 
(0.73) 
Spain -1.19** 
(0.27) 
-1.08** 
(0.27) 
-1.74** 
(0.42) 
-1.17** 
(0.44) 
-1.20** 
(0.44) 
-0.41 
(0.62) 
-1.98** 
(0.93) 
Sex Ratio  -4.62** 
(0.83) 
-4.41** 
(0.85) 
-4.35** 
(0.89) 
-4.34** 
(0.90) 
-6.59** 
(1.74) 
-3.17* 
(1.78) 
Group Size   -0.0008**
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
(ref. 1960-74)        
1974-80     -1.24** 
(0.28) 
-1.27** 
(0.28) 
-1.20** 
(0.33) 
-1.67** 
(0.61) 
1981-90    -1.18** 
(0.31) 
-1.17** 
(0.32) 
-1.06** 
(0.40) 
-1.28** 
(0.64) 
1991-2002    -1.28** 
(0.34) 
-1.24** 
(0.34) 
-1.40** 
(0.45) 
-0.98 
(0.65) 
Sex*Educ     0.28** 
(0.09) 
  
Constant 0.91** 
(0.42) 
2.35** 
(0.51) 
3.31** 
(0.68) 
2.86** 
(0.69) 
3.70** 
(0.76) 
3.62** 
(0.84) 
1.12 
(1.88) 
Log-lik. 
N 
-919 
1,097 
-898 
1,097 
-888 
1,097 
-853 
1,097 
-848 
1,097 
-566 
670 
-260 
427 
Source: GSOEP, Unweighted Data.*Significant at 10%.**Significant at 
5%. 
The process of family formation / 219 
 
 
Secondly, when the group’s size control is also added in 
Model 3, differences between ethnic groups change substantially. 
Now, it is the Greeks who appear to be the least likely to marry a 
German partner (significant at 90% level), while the former 
Yugoslavians, Italians and Spaniards become undistinguishable 
from Turks (the reference category) in their propensity to engage 
in mixed marriages (i.e. the coefficients become much smaller in 
size and not significant at all in Model 3). However, the positive 
effect of education and the growing tendency to engage in mixed 
couples over generations remain. 
Finally, Model 4 adds a set of dummy variables distinguishing 
between four marriage cohorts: 1960-1974 (the reference 
category), 1974-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2002. This is clearly a 
rough way of measuring potential changes in the patterns of 
partner’s choices over time. However, taking into account the long 
period of time under analysis (40 years), I considered it necessary 
to include a control for changes across time. The results show an 
increasing tendency to mix-marry compared to the marriage 
cohort “1960-1974” (omitted category). In order to find out 
whether the differences between the three other categories aside 
from the omitted one were significant or not, I refitted the model 
after changing the reference category, and confirmed that the 
increasing trend to mix-marry among immigrants seems to have 
stopped and almost reversed in the nineties (the sign for the 
marriage cohort “1990-2002” is negative and almost significant 
when compared against “1981-1990”). 
The effects of the individual and structural covariates on the 
choice for an imported partner versus a co-national immigrant are 
shown in the bottom part of Table 5.3. Results in Model 1 suggest 
that the practice of importing partners from the country of origin 
among people of foreign origin in Germany does not match the 
predictions of the assimilationist approach. First of all, no 
significant differences emerge between the first and the second 
generation compared to the middle one (the reference category), 
although the sign of the coefficients points in the right direction if 
the importation of spouses is basically conceived as an expression 
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of traditional behavior. The sign of “years of education” is 
negative in line with the assimilationist expectation, but is does 
not reach statistical significance. 
The coefficients in Model 1 also suggest that the practice of 
importing spouses is more common among men and particularly 
prevalent in some ethnic groups, especially Turks. Women are 
much less likely to import than their male counterparts (ß = -1.11, 
see Model 1) and Turks (the omitted category) are considerably 
more likely to import than immigrants from Italy, Greece and 
Spain. Individuals from the former Yugoslavia, however, are not 
significantly different from Turks in their propensity to import 
(coefficient ß = -0.4 is not significant). The absence of significant 
differences between Turks and Ex-Yugoslavians in their 
propensity to import their spouses from origin may be due to two 
different factors. On the one hand, a considerable number of 
immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are Muslims for whom 
the practice of arranged marriages is relatively common. On the 
other, Turks and Yugoslavs were the groups that more severely 
suffered the consequences of the increasingly stringent controls on 
immigration imposed from the mid-seventies onwards because 
substantial emigration pressures persisted in these countries during 
the eighties and nineties, due to several factors. Accordingly, 
marriage migration among people from these countries has often 
been argued to be a strategy developed by individuals to 
circumvent immigration restrictions. 
When the statistical chances of finding a partner within an 
individual’s own ethnic group in Germany is controlled for (by 
inclusion of sex ratio in Model 2), women’s lower propensity to 
import vanishes, which confirms that sex imbalances are partially 
responsible for the practice of importing partners among men. The 
propensity to import also drops as the size of the respective 
immigrant community in Germany increases. 
Results in Model 4 show that marriages involving an imported 
partner were much more likely for the “1960-1974 cohort” (the 
reference category) than for the more recent ones, which would 
reject the idea that marriage migration developed mainly after the 
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halt on labor recruitment in 1973 as a mean to circumvent the 
increasing controls on further immigration from non-EC countries 
to Germany. Moreover, no significant differences in the 
propensity to import (versus marrying a co-national) emerge 
between the “1974-80”, “1981-1990” and “1991-2002” marriage 
cohorts (I checked this by changing successively the reference 
category and refitting the model). However, these results are not in 
contradiction with the statement previously made about marriage 
migration being today one of the most important sources of adult 
migration to Germany. New entries of foreigners due to the 
importation of spouses by residents of immigrant origin have 
effectively intensified over time but only in relative terms,  that is, 
in comparison to other forms of migration such as single adult 
migration and reunification of wives left behind at the time of 
husband’s migration. Along the same line of reasoning, it is not 
surprising that the coefficient for the first generation becomes 
negative and significant at 95% level once the aforementioned 
differences between the successive marriage cohorts are controlled 
for (ß = - 0.42, see Model 4). 
Finally, Model 5 adds the interaction term “sex*years of 
education”, in order to analyze whether the practice of importing 
spouses may entail different meanings for men and women. 
Effectively, the results reported for Model 5 show that the 
interaction term is positive, which suggest that the impact of 
education on women’s and men’s propensity to import differ 
significantly (see “sex*eduyrs” ß = 0.28 in Model 5, bottom part 
of Table 5.3). Furthermore, after introducing the interaction term, 
the negative effect of being a woman (compared to being a man) 
becomes larger and strongly significant (see “sex” coefficient ß = - 
2.31, Model 5). The same occurs with the main effect of “years of 
education”, which now captures the effect of “years of education” 
for men; it also becomes larger, negative and significant (see 
“eduyrs” coefficient ß = -0.14, Model 5). 
In Figures 5.4 and 5.5 I have plotted the cumulated predicted 
probabilities of marrying a native, a co-national immigrant and an 
imported partner for different values of the “years of education” 
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variable for Turkish middle generation immigrants who married in 
the nineties, in order to illustrate more clearly how marital choices 
vary depending on the years of education prior to marriage. These 
probabilities were computed considering all the controls included 
in Model 5.14 
Figure 5.4 shows that for middle generation Turkish men with 
less than 11 years of education marrying a co-national immigrant 
is the most likely choice (around 50%) and marrying a German 
woman the least likely one (between 10% ad 15%). For those with 
11 years of education, marrying a co-national continues being the 
most common choice versus importing and mix-marrying, which 
are approximately equally likely. But when years of education are 
above 11, the chances of importing a woman from Turkey reduces 
substantially (less than 15%), while marrying a German woman 
becomes the most preferred choice, especially for the most 
educated men (almost 60%). 
Partner choices made by middle generation Turkish women 
are very similar to those of men’s at the lowest level of education 
(7 years): marrying a co-national immigrant is the most likely 
choice (about 50%), importing a man from Turkey is the second 
preferred choice (less than 40%) and marrying a German man the 
least likely option (around 10%). However, for highly educated 
women, the most likely choice is not a German partner, as it is for 
                                               
14 For computing the predicted probabilities, the coefficients 
estimated in Model 5 were applied to the following covariates’ values: 
“first generation”, “second generation”, “Ex-Yugoslav”, “Greek”, 
“Italian” and “Spanish” were all set to 0; the dummy variables that 
indicate the marriage cohort of individuals were all set to 0 except the 
one indicating “1991-2002”. Finally, “sex” was set to 0 for computing 
probabilities in Figure 5.4 (men), and to 1 in Figure 5.5 (women). The 
value of “years of education” varies from 7 to 9, 11, 15 and 18 (see the 
horizontal axis) and, consequently, the value of the interaction term is 
always 0 in Figure 5.4 (because sex =0 and, thus, “sex* eduyrs” is 
necessarily 0), and it varies from 7 to 9, 11, 15 and 18 in Figure 5.5 that 
draws the predicted probabilities for women (i.s. “sex*eduyrs” = (1* 
eduyrs) = eduyrs). 
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men, but to import a Turkish man from the country of origin 
(between 42% and 51%). It seems that women face much stronger 
barriers for marrying outside the own group than men. If German 
partners are barely considered for middle generation Turkish 
women, their decision reduces to choosing between a co-national 
immigrant and an imported partner. However, the reasons why do 
they mostly prefer an imported partner is something that remains 
unexplained. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Effect of Years of Education on Partner Type for middle 
generation Turkish males who married in the 90’s 
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Figure 5.5. Effect of Years of Education on Partner Type for first 
generation Turkish females who married in the 90’s 
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The patterns shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 clearly 
illustrate that the effect of education differs significantly between 
sexes. In fact, this is precisely what the interaction term in Model 
5 implies: that the difference between the effect of “years of 
education” when sex is 0 (man) and when sex is 1 (woman) is 
positive and significant at 95% (-0.14 + 0.28 = 0.14). In other 
words, that the effect of years of education on the propensity to 
import a partner is more positive for women than for men, which 
does not imply necessarily that the effect of years of education is 
positive for women themselves. 
In order to estimate the effect of years of education on partner 
choices of men and women the best strategy would be to run two 
separated models for each sex. This is what I have done in the last 
columns of Table 5.3. For men, the positive effect of education on 
marrying a German woman and the negative one on importing a 
partner are both confirmed (note, for instance, that the coefficient 
of “years of education” in Model 5 and in the model fitted only for 
men is practically the same, ß = -0.14 in Model 5 and ß = -0.13 in 
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the new model). For women, the positive effect of years of 
education on mix-marrying remains stable. The effect of education 
on women’s propensity to import keeps the expected sign although 
it does not reach the significance level. 
These results imply we cannot affirm that education increases 
the probability of an immigrant woman to import her partner from 
the country of origin but only that, while the practice of importing 
spouses among men is clearly related to low educational levels, 
this is not necessarily the case for women. Although apparently 
surprising, this result can be understood in the light of the different 
incentives that immigrant parents face when intervening in the 
marital choices of their daughters and sons, respectively. I have 
already mentioned that most single people willing to migrate in 
sending countries like Turkey are men. For many of them, 
marrying a single Turkish woman who already resides in Germany 
constitutes nowadays the best way to get legal admittance to the 
German labor market. As a result, immigrant parents with single 
daughters in Germany often receive high bride-price offers from 
more than one male next of kin at origin (Böcker, 1994). Single 
sons, on the contrary, are not so sought after by female prospective 
immigrants at origin. Bearing in mind the different set of 
incentives faced by immigrant parents depending on the sex of 
their children, it does not come as a surprise that education has a 
stronger freeing effect on the marital decisions of men than on 
those of women. 
On the other hand, years of education prior to marriage are 
directly related to the age of entering into first marriage. Single 
daughters may be allowed by their parents to stay in school until 
their “arranged” partner is ready for marriage and migration, or 
until they fulfill the requirements established by the German law 
to permit their future husband to join them in Germany. These 
requirements consist basically of having resided in Germany for 
an uninterrupted period of eight years, which is the period of 
residency established for issuing a residence permit. Such legal 
conditions may delay marriage for couples involved in importeing 
a partner compared to couples made up of two middle generation 
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immigrants who already reside in Germany at the time of their 
marriage. If this is the case, the women’s decision to import a 
partner might have been made prior to the decision to stay longer 
in school and, therefore, the association between the two variables 
would not imply a causal relation from education to imported 
partners but rather the other way around.15 
 
 
5.6. Alternative explanations for the importation of spouses. 
Family influences and post-marriage living arrangements 
 
Certainly there are other possible explanations for the 
differential effect of education on the propensity to import for men 
and women. In his interpretation of the positive association 
between educational level and propensity to import for Turkish 
women in Belgium, Lievens suggested that by importing their 
husbands, immigrant women may assume an extra-power within 
the relationship and increase their chances of living independently 
of their in-laws -who stayed at origin- and of their own relatives 
living in the immigration country, because it is not commonly 
accepted for a man to live with his in-laws. However, Lievens 
never tested whether his explanation was empirically supported or 
not. 
To do so, I have identified in GSOEP which of the immigrant 
couples in my sample lived with other relatives, aside fromo their 
spouse immediately after marriage, and which did not. Then I 
investigated, first, whether those who import their partner are 
more likely to live in extended households than others, which 
would confirm the view that the practice of importing spouses is 
linked to more traditional forms of living. Second, I will focus on 
a more specific group on which the Lievens’ argument should 
apply, and analyze whether highly educated Turkish women are 
                                               
15 In fact, in my sample, Turkish women from the middle generation 
who have imported their partners marry, on average, three years later 
than those who marry co-national immigrants. 
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effectively more likely to live without other relatives at home than 
women with non-imported partners, as Lievens hypothesized. 
The information for the dependent variable was missing for 64 
couples, so the sample size is now reduced to 1,033 individuals. In 
addition, the information about the kinship relation to the head of 
the household was collected only from GSOEP’s inception in 
1984, which implies a certain measurement error for couples that 
married prior to this date.16 This is the reason why I estimated the 
model first for the whole sample (Column 1) and, then, for the 
sub-sample of immigrants who married after 1982 (Column 2). 
Sample in Column 3 is restricted to Turks (men and women) and 
Column 4 to Turkish women. 
The results in Table 5.4 strongly support the idea that the 
practice of importing spouses is related to a more traditional 
understanding of “family life”. After controlling for country of 
origin, age at migration, age at marriage, years of education, 
having worked before marriage and gender, the effect of having an 
imported spouse substantially lowers the probability that the 
couple lives on its own after marriage (see Column 1 and 3). In 
addition, this is the case not only for Turks, who are the group 
most prone to import, but also for other immigrant groups (see 
Column 3). Therefore, it seems that the proposition that the 
practices of importing spouses and living in extended households 
are related is empirically borne out by the data regardless of ethnic 
particularities. 
The expected lower propensity of the second generation 
immigrants to live in extended households –from an assimilation 
stand point- only arises when the sample is restricted to people 
who married after 1982, which eliminates most first generation 
immigrants from the comparison group and leave mostly middle 
generation immigrants. 
                                               
16 However, it is difficult to anticipate the direction of error. Newly 
married couples might be more likely to live with some other relatives at 
the beginning of their joint lives if they cannot afford their own housing, 
but couples who live on their own may incorporate new members, like 
grandparents, as they get older and more vulnerable. 
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Table 5.4. Logit estimates of living in extended household after marriage 
 All Married 
after 
1982 
Non-
Turk 
Turk 
Men 
Turk 
Men 
Turk 
Women 
Educated 
Turk 
Women 
(ref. Spanish  
& Italians) 
       
Turkish 2.03** 
-0.33 
1.73** 
-0.42 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
Ex-Yugoslav 0.80* 
-0.43 
1.25** 
-0.54 
1.11** 
-0.53 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
Greek 1.25** 
-0.42 
1.47** 
-0.55 
1.28** 
-0.52 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
(ref. first & 
middle gen.) 
       
2nd gen. 0.24 
-0.22 
-0.47** 
-0.23 
-0.28 
-0.45 
-0.56* 
-0.29 
-0.001 
-0.41 
-1.08** 
-0.45 
-2.28** 
-1.1 
Age at 
Marriage 
-0.24** 
-0.03 
-0.25** 
-0.05 
-0.31** 
-0.08 
-0.21** 
-0.06 
-0.30** 
-0.08 
-0.14 
-0.08 
-0.03 
-0.14 
Years of 
Education 
-0.03 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.06 
-0.18 
-0.11 
-0.16* 
-0.09 
-0.12 
-0.12 
-0.31** 
-0.15 
----- 
Work before 
marriage 
0.24 
-0.21 
0.51* 
-0.27 
-0.04 
-0.5 
0.63** 
-0.51 
0.92** 
-0.44 
0.5 
-0.46 
-1.90** 
-0.97 
(ref. men)        
Sex -0.38* 
-0.17 
-0.42** 
-0.21 
-0.74 
-0.48 
-0.41 
-0.25 
----- ----- ----- 
(ref. non-
imported) 
       
Imported 
Partner 
1.03** 
-0.22 
1.86** 
-0.27 
2.53** 
-0.51 
1.68** 
-0.32 
1.80** 
-0.38 
1.54** 
-0.5 
1.05 
-0.83 
Constant 2.04** 
-0.85 
3.53** 
-1.1 
2.93 
-1.84 
5.62** 
-1.32 
5.80** 
-1.65 
5.32** 
-1.86 
1.49 
-3.24 
Log likelihood
N 
-396 
1,033 
-244 
549 
-77 
263 
-162 
286 
-91 
169 
-68 
117 
-19 
40 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted Data. ** Significant at 95%; * 
Significant at 90%. 
 
 
Moreover, it seems that the change in post-marriage living 
arrangements between the middle (immigrated at age between 6 
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and 16) and the second generation (immigrated younger than 6 or 
were born in Germany) has occurred only for Turkish women but 
not for men. However, gender differences within the Turkish 
group are not limited to the intensity of the intergenerational 
change in living arrangements after marriage. Comparing results 
in column 5 (Turkish men) and column 6 (Turkish women), it can 
be noted that education has no significant effect on the males’ 
probability of living with other adult relatives asides from their 
wife, whereas it significantly reduces the women’s probability of 
sharing their household with someone else different from their 
husband. In addition, having worked prior to marriage increases 
the probability of living in an extended household for Turkish men 
but not for women. 
Finally, among Turkish women with more than 9 years of 
education (Column 7), being a second generation immigrant and 
having worked before marriage strongly reduces the probability of 
living in an extended household after getting married. Although 
the effect of having an imported partner for this select group of 
women remains positive, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, and notwithstanding the data limitation 
problems, the Lievens’ hypothesis that the more educated Turkish 
women may import their husband as a mean of freeing themselves 
from living with other relatives, aside from their husband, does not 
seem to be supported by our data. 
 
 
5.7. Does the supply-side matter? Status exchange and status 
homogamy theories 
 
In this chapter I have examined the partner’s choices made by 
single immigrants by focusing on their own characteristics and the 
conditions in their respective marriage market by the time of their 
marriage. However, so far, I have overlooked the effect that the 
characteristics of the potential partners may have on the marital 
choices made by single immigrants. Marriage is a two-sided 
decision, which is assumed to provide some gains for both 
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partners, even if bargaining power is asymmetrical. Following 
Becker, “… since marriage is practically voluntary, either by the 
persons marrying or their parents, the theory of preferences can 
be readily applied, and persons marrying (or their parents) can be 
assumed to expect to raise their utility level above what it would 
be were they to remain single.” (1974: 814) Some of these utility 
gains are difficult to identify, though. Physical attraction, for 
instance, is one of the partner’s characteristics that doubtless enter 
the individuals’ utility functions but it remains unobservable for 
the researcher.  
The status-exchange theory, which was originally built upon 
the cast system of India and applied to inter-racial marriages in the 
US by Merton (1941), predicts that US blacks with low socio-
economic status would hardly ever marry whites with high socio-
economic status, but blacks with high socio-economic status might 
sometimes marry whites with low socio-economic status. 
According to Merton, marriage between high-status blacks and 
lower-status whites would represent a kind of informal exchange; 
that is, the higher socio-economic status of the black spouse would 
directly compensate the white spouse for the loss of social 
standing that the white spouse would experience for having 
“thrown their lot in” with black society.  
The status-caste exchange arguments of Merton (1941) 
contradict the fundamental finding of the mate selection research, 
which is based upon micro-economic models of individual 
behavior according to which individuals sort themselves by 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary assets, trying to maximize future 
output (Becker, 1973, 1974). This body of research basically 
concludes that people find mates who are similar to themselves in 
status, class, education and religion (Kalmijn, 1991, 1993, 1998), 
as well as race (Lieberson and Waters, 1988). In sum, that married 
partners tend to be the same on every dimension except gender. 
By contrast, the ‘exchange’ theory of Merton (1941) required 
marriage partners to be different in at least two key dimensions 
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(other than gender); without differences, the “exchange” cannot 
take place.17 
In the case of mixed marriages, the status exchange theory 
would predict the immigrant partners to have a higher education 
and/or social status than their native partners. On the contrary, 
according to the status homogamy theory, spouses in mixed 
marriages would have similar levels of education and/or socio-
economic status. In ‘pure’ immigrant couples (i.e. made up of two 
immigrant partners), status homogamy is expected to dominate 
since there is not a clear trait to be exchanged. By contrast, in 
imported couples, the opposite thing occurs because the potential 
importer differs in one crucial aspect: the right of residence in the 
country of immigration. However, the terms of the exchange are 
likely to vary by gender of the importer. 
Bearing these two different theories in mind, I explored a little 
further the characteristics of the couples in my sample. My goal 
was not to actually model marriage as a bilateral decision but just 
to find out whether patterns of status-exchange or status-
homogamy can be traced back in each type of marital choice [(1) 
immigrant with German, (2) immigrant with immigrant, (3) 
immigrant with imported partner]. I examined differences in the 
(mean) age at marriage across couples, spousal age differential, 
spousal educational differential and differences in the education of 
the father of the spouses.  
The results, however, did not offer clear-cut differences across 
type of couples. ‘Pure’ immigrant couples are found to be made up 
of the most similar partners in the four dimensions previously 
mentioned. By contrast, partners in mixed marriages are the most 
different ones to each other. In the case of imported couples, 
strong differences by gender emerged. Male importers tended to 
choose women younger and less educated than single immigrant 
women already in Germany; in contrast, female importers tended 
to marry younger and more educated women their potential 
                                               
17 See Rosenfeld (2005) for a thorough review and critique of the 
status-exchange theory. 
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partners within their own group in Germany. Moreover, the results 
of the means comparisons varied depending on the immigrant 
generation we focused on. 
 
 
5.8. Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis carried out in this chapter confirms the 
importance of both individual characteristics and structural factors 
on immigrants’ decisions over their type of partner. Marrying a 
native and importing a partner from the country of origin emerge 
as alternatives clearly differentiated from one another, on the one 
hand, and from the most common choice of marrying another 
immigrant, on the other. 
The results obtained generally confirm previous findings in the 
literature on intermarriage behavior: second generation 
immigrants and the more educated ones are more likely to marry a 
native both for men and women. However, the analysis does not 
support the widespread idea that women are less prone to inter-
marrying than men. In fact, the differential propensity to mix-
marry between men and women disappears when sex imbalances 
within the marriageable population of the own ethnic group are 
controlled for. Moreover, accounting for the structure of the 
respective ethnic marriage market drastically modifies the 
differences between national groups. After controlling for sex ratio 
imbalances, group size differences and marriage cohort, the initial 
predisposition of Italians, Greeks and Spaniards to marry Germans 
is completely reversed, and the differences between Turks and 
immigrants from the former Yugoslavs vanish. 
The choice between importing a partner from origin and 
marrying a co-national immigrant already in Germany is a little 
more complex. The main tenets from the assimilationist approach 
are not so clearly confirmed in this case. Middle generation and 
second generation are more likely to import their partners than 
their parents’ generation. However, differences between the 
middle and second generation are not significant. The more 
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balanced the sex composition of the own ethnic group in 
Germany, the less likely for single immigrants to import their 
partners from origin. However, the propensity to import instead of 
marrying other co-national immigrants increases with the size of 
the own community in Germany. Over time, the tendency to 
import spouses seems to have declined for marriage cohorts 
compared to those immigrants who married prior to 1974, which 
implies that the idea that marriage migration intensified after the 
halt on recruitment as a means to circumvent restrictive measures 
at the border must be rejected. 
Finally, the differential impact of education on the propensity 
to import partners depending on whether the immigrant is a man 
or a woman is one of the most puzzling findings of the chapter. 
While male importers seem to be the least educated within their 
own group, women who import are not necessarily the least 
educated ones. The explanation for this result is far from clear. I 
explored the hypothesis suggested by Lievens that immigrant 
women, especially the most assimilated ones, may use a traditional 
form of marriage such as importation of spouses as a strategy for 
achieving modern goals like living independently from other 
relatives after marriage. Yet, the results obtained do not confirm 
this hypothesis. On the contrary, for both men and women, 
importing partners and living in extended households after 
marriage appear to be two facts that are strongly related to each 
other. 
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Appendix A. Education as categorical variable 
 
In order to test the robustness of my results with regard to the 
differential effect of education, I tried also the possibility of 
measuring education as a dummy variable that distinguishes 
between low, medium and high level of education; after re-
running the regressions with this alternative codification of 
education, I obtained basically the same results (see below). 
However, I preferred the continuous variable “years of education” 
because it does not requires making assumptions about the 
comparability of educational system across countries. It is 
extremely difficult to establish a table of equivalences between 
degrees obtained in different educational systems. This type of 
comparisons remains difficult and risky among developed 
countries but is even more “dangerous” when we intend to 
compare degrees obtained in developed and developing countries. 
Note that I have to deal with education credentials from 6 different 
countries: Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Germany (note that immigrants who arrived younger than 16 had 
to attend the German school system for a while, at least). 
In addition, as it can be noted in the table below, there is little 
variability in the variable “years of education”, which makes even 
more difficult to define three levels of education (low, medium 
and high) that would actually correspond to truly distinct degrees 
in reality. 
 
 
Frequencies of the variable “years of education” 
 All   Men    Women 
Years of 
Education Freq Percent 
Cum. 
Percent Freq Percent Cum Freq Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
7 208 18.9 18.9 118 17.6 17.6 90 21.1 21.1 
8.5 16 1.4 20.4 11 1.6 19.2 5 1.2 22.2 
9 412 37.5 57.9 234 34.9 54.2 178 41.7 63.9 
10 62 5.6 63.6 36 5.4 59.5 26 6.1 70.0 
10.5 121 11.0 74.6 88 13.1 72.7 33 7.7 77.7 
11 133 12.1 86.8 96 14.3 87.0 37 8.7 86.4 
11.5 31 2.8 89.6 17 2.5 89.5 14 3.3 89.7 
12 50 4.5 94.2 28 4.2 93.7 22 5.1 94.8 
13 12 1.1 95.3 8 1.2 94.9 4 0.9 95.8 
13.5 8 0.7 96.0 7 1.0 96.0 1 0.2 96.0 
14 3 0.3 96.3 2 0.3 96.3 1 0.2 96.2 
14.5 3 0.3 96.5 1 0.1 96.4 2 0.5 96.7 
15 28 2.5 99.1 18 2.7 99.1 10 2.3 99.1 
16 4 0.4 99.4 2 0.3 99.4 2 0.5 99.5 
17 1 0.1 99.5 1 0.1 99.5 0 0 99.5 
18 5 0.5 100 3 0.4 100 2 0.47 100 
Total 1,097 100  670 100  427 100  
              Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. 
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Despite of all the aforementioned limitations, I tried a dummy 
variable for education in which I took into consideration the 
typical average number of years required to achieve a particular 
degree or certificate in Germany (according to the GSOEP 
technical documentation, see Desktop Companion to the GSOEP, 
2001: 60 ff.), but also the number of observations in my sample at 
each educational level. Immigrants with less than 9 years of 
education were considered to have low level of education; those 
people who had between 9 (included) and 11 (not included) years 
of education were classified as having “medium education level”, 
and those with 11 or more as having “high level of education”. 
The table below shows the number of observation and percentages 
within each of these three educational categories, by sex. 
 
 
Recodification of the variable “years of education” into 3 levels 
 Total Men Women 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Low level  
(Less than 9 years) 224 20.42 129 19.25 95 22.25 
Medium Level 
[9 to 11) 595 54.24 358 53.43 237 55.5 
High Level 
[11 and more] 278 25.34 183 27.31 95 22.25 
Total 1,097 100 670 100 427 100 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. 
 
 
Then, I run a logit regression with only two possible outcomes 
(1= imported partner and 0= non-imported partner), which 
includes education as a set of dummy variables. Model 1 includes 
only the main effect of education. Model 2 adds to the baseline 
model two interaction terms between sex, on the one hand, and 
medium and high level of education, on the other. 
In Model 1, no significant differences emerge between people 
with different level of education. Although medium and high 
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education coefficients are negative (reference category is low 
education), which indicates that education reduces the propensity 
to import a partner, none of the two coefficients is significant at 
95%. “Sex” is not significant either. 
In Model 2, the introduction of the two interaction terms 
between “sex” and “medium education” and “high education” are 
positive and significant, while the main effect of medium and high 
educational level, which indicate the effect of having medium and 
high (versus having low education, ref. cat.), become significant 
and negative.  
Therefore, the results with regard to the effect of education on 
the propensity to import are basically the same, no matter whether 
I measure education as a continuous variable (“years in 
education”) or as a dummy variable (low, medium and high 
educational level). There is, however, one exception: the variable 
“sex” in the model specification which utilizes the dummy 
variable for education is not significant, whereas it was negative 
and significant when education is measured as a continuous 
variable. 
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Logit coefficients of importing a partner (ref.  non-imported partner) 
Variable M1 M2 
First Generation (Ref. 
Middle) 
-0.38* 
0.20 
-0.35* 
0.21 
(Ref. Middle)   
Second Generation -0.31 
0.25 
-0.33 
0.25 
Sex (Ref. Men) 0.24 
0.32 
-0.46 
0.45 
(Ref. Low education)    
Medium Education -0.26 
0.19 
-0.51** 
0.24 
(Ref. Low Education)   
High Education -0.20 
0.22 
-0.62** 
0.27 
(Ref. Turkish)   
Former Yugoslavia -0.15 
0.37 
-0.12 
0.37 
Greece -0.55 
0.41 
-0.56 
0.41 
Italy -1.01** 
0.34 
-1.06** 
0.34 
Spain -0.83** 
0.42 
-0.85** 
0.42 
Sex Ratio -3.60** 
0.85 
-3.62** 
0.85 
Group size 0.001** 
0.0004 
0.001** 
0.0004 
(Ref. 1960-1973)   
Marriage Cohort 1974-1980 -1.53** 
0.27 
-1.51** 
0.27 
Marriage Cohort 1981-1990 -1.61** 
0.30 
-1.58** 
0.30 
Marriage Cohort 1991-2002 -1.68** 
0.33 
-1.66** 
0.33 
(Ref. Low education) 
Women*Medium Education 
 0.73* 
0.41 
(Ref. Low Education) 
Women*High Education 
 1.29** 
0.48 
Constant 1.55** 
0.52 
1.77** 
0.53 
Log likelihood 
N 
-571 
1097 
-567 
1097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. LINKING PROCESSES: 
MIGRATION, FAMILY AND WORK (I). 
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST ENTRY INTO 
THE GERMAN LABOR FORCE 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters I presented a detailed portray of the 
female international migration from the five largest sending 
countries to Germany during the postwar period. First, I analyzed 
the patterns of family reunification followed by female married 
immigrants and showed that more than half of the “reunited 
wives” who resided in Germany in 1984 had joined their husbands 
in a very short time after he left. Moreover, I found that the bulk 
of wives’ reunification took place before the halt on recruitment, 
contrary to what is usually stated: only 15% of reunited wives 
whose husbands migrated prior to 1974 did join their husbands 
after the halt. Next, I examined the process of family formation 
among immigrants who were single at arrival and married 
someone during their stay in Germany. This analysis allowed me 
to illustrate that a large proportion of the flow of adult female 
immigrants who entered Germany after the halt on recruitment 
were not “reunited wives”, as commonly assumed, but imported 
brides. The main characteristics that distinguish these two groups 
of married migrant women relate to the different stage of the 
family life cycle at which they migrated, the characteristics of 
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their husbands and distinct period at which most of them arrived to 
Germany. 
Bearing all these results in mind, in the present chapter I will 
examine the labor behavior of immigrant women and how it 
relates to different patterns of family migration and differences in 
the context of reception. As far as female migration into Germany 
has been largely assumed to be exclusively linked to family 
reasons, immigrant women are generally considered passive 
dependant migrants who moved to Germany because of their 
husbands’ economic prospects. As a result, their labor behavior 
has been rarely analyzed with the exception of a couple of 
empirical studies carried out by economists who have generally 
focused on wage assimilation rather than on participation issues. 
By contrast, the main purpose of the analyses carried out in this 
and the following chapters is, precisely, to analyze the 
employment cycles of first generation immigrant women in the 
German labor market. First I will only examine the first entry into 
the German labor force, which appears to be the most crucial labor 
decision in order to classify immigrant women as house or career-
oriented. Then, I will complement the analysis of the first entry 
with that of exits and subsequent re-entries, making some 
important distinctions between full-time and part-time 
employment, on the one hand, and between inactivity and 
unemployment, on the other. 
 
 
6.2. What we already know about the labor performance of 
female immigrants 
 
6.2.1. Internal Migration and the concept of tied-mover wife 
 
Much of the empirical research concerned with the impact of 
family migration on the labor performance of women has focused 
on internal migration (i.e. moves across counties, provinces, states 
or metropolitan areas within the same country). Most of these 
studies are based upon the human capital theory -extended from 
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the individual to the family- and suggest that families migrate 
when the expected long-term economic returns derived from 
migration benefit the family as a collective, even if it is 
detrimental to the wage gains of one of the family members 
(Sandell, 1977). Due to their usually discontinuous attachment to 
the labor force, the returns (or looses) to migration that immigrant 
women experience tend to be smaller than those of their husbands. 
This would make wives more likely to be tied-movers in family 
migration decisions (Mincer, 1978).1 This is not to say that 
migration is involuntary for wives, neither the economic 
consequences of migration for them are disregarded in migration 
decisions within the family; but rather the opposite. In fact, one of 
the main predictions of the model of family migration formulated 
by Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) is that families where the 
two spouses are employed are expected to be less geographically 
mobile than other families. The reason underlying this expectation 
is precisely that the potential reduction in the wife’s earnings as a 
consequence of migration will be considered a cost of the 
husband’s geographical job change, which would constraint his 
search behavior and, ultimately, actual family migration. 
On the other hand, the family migration models inspired in the 
human capital theory predicts wives to suffer from higher 
unemployment and lower participation rates immediately after 
migration because of “the higher value that the family attaches to 
her market time in order to set up the new household at 
destination”. In other words, it is argued that reservation wages of 
migrant wives rises immediately after arrival at destination.  
Most empirical research has supported, up to date, this 
disruption hypothesis as regarding the effects of family migration 
on the labor market performance of wives (for the US see, among 
others, Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978; Lichter, 1983; Jenssen, 1990; 
                                               
1 Tied-movers participate in moves that result in a loss for 
themselves, but their loss is exceeded by the family gain. Tied-stayers 
forgo moves that would result in positive net returns for the individual, 
but would be exceeded by the expected losses of other family members. 
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Polachek and Horvath, 1977; Morrison and Lichter, 1988, 
Jacobsen and Levin, 1997; LeClere and McLaughlin, 1997; for 
Europe see Smits 1999; Kalter 1998; Nilsson 2001; Smits, Mulder 
and Hooimeijer, 2004). However, some of the most recent studies 
in the area have concluded that internal migration has a positive 
effect on the probability of employment for immigrant women 
compared to non-migrant women; although such a positive effect 
remains insufficient to overcome differences in participation 
between men and women (Cooke and Bailey, 1996). Moreover, 
these authors also concluded that migration has not a positive 
effect on men’s employment for men, which is probably related to 
men’s reason for migration -career advancement, instead of 
unemployment at origin. This is an important distinction to made 
since the effects of family migration on women’s employment is 
very likely to vary depending on whether their husbands migrate 
to escape from unemployment in the area of origin or as a result of 
upward job mobility (Cooke and Bailey, 1996; Cooke, 2001; Clark 
and Withers, 2002). In addition, it is very likely that the 
employment outcomes of tied-mover wives change over time. 
However, the studies previously cited do not make any distinction 
between short and long-term effects. 
 
 
6.2.2. International Migration: from the assimilation hypothesis to 
the family investment model 
 
The employment-related consequences of migration for 
women have been far less explored in the context of international 
migration. The assumption that women’s migration is linked to 
family rather than economic motives has probably favored this 
omission in the specialized literature. However, the main reason 
for such gap in the literature may be related to the inherent 
difficulties in studying female labor behavior (career interruptions, 
family-life cycle factors, occupational sex-segregation, etc.), as 
well as to the scarcity of adequate datasets. On the other hand, in 
the case of international migration, studies concerned with the 
Linking processes: migration, family and work (I) / 245  
 
impact of migration on the labor outcomes of women have based 
upon the previous research on earnings assimilation for immigrant 
men. As a result, wages instead of participation have been the 
primary focus of interest up to date in the few studies that analyze 
the labor market performance of immigrant women. 
In his seminal work “Americanization and the earnings of 
foreign-born men” (1978), Chiswick investigated the earnings 
adjustment of immigrant men in the US in comparison to their 
native counterparts. The author added the variable “years since 
migration” to standard earnings regressions and interpreted that a 
large positive coefficient on this variable indicates a rapid 
convergence of immigrants’ wages to those of the natives’ ones. 
His explanation for this result builds upon the human capital 
theory and the difficulties for international transferability of skills. 
Differences across countries with regard to the content of 
educational credentials and labor market structure are argued to 
explain why immigrant workers tend to obtain low economic 
rewards during the first years after arrival. However, additional 
time of residence in the host country entails the opportunity to 
acquire host country-specific knowledge, which would improve 
the immigrants’ position in the labor market and, therefore, also 
their wages. 
With the purpose of providing additional support to his 
explanatory framework of the immigrants’ performance in the US 
labor market, Chiswick (1980) replicated his analysis for 
immigrant women. But the obtained results suggested 
disassimilation, rather than convergence, between the wages of 
immigrant and native female workers. Upon arrival immigrant 
women are better paid than their native counterparts but their 
wage level declines as their time of residence in the host country 
increases. There seems to be, thus, a negative assimilation in 
earnings between immigrant and native women.  
The interpretation given by Chiswick to these unexpected 
results was that “[…] employers are discouraged from financing 
firm-specific training for male immigrants because they are likely 
to have less information about the productivity and background of 
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recent immigrants. Consequently, wives in immigrant families that 
have recently entered the US may have to work to help finance 
their husbands’ initial investments in schooling or job skills 
required in the US labor markets.” In other words, Chiswick 
argued that immigrant wives would display higher participation 
rates in the labor force during their first years in the host country 
in order to finance their husbands’ investments in country-specific 
human capital. However, their wage contribution to the family 
budget becomes less needed as their husbands get better paid job s 
and, accordingly, they progressively reduce their market time and 
relocate it to homework. Even when they decide to remain active 
in the labor market, the type of jobs they initially had taken up – 
short-end jobs with low earnings and limited chances for 
promotion- often do not permit substantial earnings gains and this 
fact explains that no assimilation with native women’s wages 
occurs (see also Long, 1980).  
The previous reasoning constitutes the core idea of the 
“Family Investment Model” formulated by Long (1980) to explain 
the labor performance of immigrant women in their host country. 
In their recent revision of the empirical evidence available 
regarding the “Family Investment Model”, Duleep and Regets 
(2002) identify three main predictions of the model: 
1. A positive relationship between husbands’ investments in 
host-country specific skills and their wives’ work, in terms of both 
participation and hours. 
2. A declining propensity to work among wives with time of 
residence as their husbands bring to an end their investment 
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activities,2 consolidate their labor position and experience 
earnings’ gains.3 
3. A flatter wage profile among immigrant women than 
otherwise would be the case, as a consequence of their first 
occupational choices aimed at maximizing their salaries during the 
initial years following migration. Jobs with high entry earnings 
help financing the household consumption during their husbands’ 
investment period but they offer less career prospects, which 
severely hampers women’s wage assimilation in the next future. 
The evidence available up to date remains contradictory. Most 
of the empirical studies aimed at testing the validity of the “Family 
                                               
2 Available evidence indicates that post-migration human capital 
investment (education, job search, etc.) increases with pre-migration skill 
level, permanency intentions and language difficulties; on the contrary, it 
decreases with age, years since migration and transferability of skills. 
The relationship between post-migration investments and other variables 
like sex or migrant status remains unclear (Coob-Clark, 2001a). 
3 Note here that the Model of Family Migration formulated by 
Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) for internal migration predicted lower 
participation of migrants wives immediately after the move, whereas the 
“Family Investment Model” predicts exactly the opposite for 
international female migrants –higher participation rates at arrival that 
decline over time. The difficulties experienced by (male) foreign 
immigrants for transferring their pre-migration skills to the host country, 
along with their financial constraints for financing these investments, 
appear as the main reason underlying such a different prediction for 
otherwise similar situations. However, the problem of skills 
transferability is not exclusive of foreign migrants but it may affect also 
internal migrants. In fact, skills transferability varies with educational 
level, occupation and reasons for migration (Friedberg, 1991). When 
push factors were more important than pull factors in explaining 
migration, pre-migration skills are expected to be less readily 
transferable. On the contrary, when pull factors dominate –i.e. a work 
contract was already arranged in advance- a better match between the 
migrant’s skills and the job at the destination is expected (see Jenssen, 
1997). 
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Investment Model” conclude that previous analyses 
underestimated the assimilation effect in the immigrant women’s 
labor participation because of the omission of the variable 
“husband’s years since migration” in the estimations. According to 
with their results, the husband’s and the wife’s time of residence 
in the host country have countervailing effects on the wife’s labor 
force participation (Duleep and Sanders, 1993; Beach and 
Worswick, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Although some 
authors rather suggest the opposite: 1) that wages assimilation is 
steeper for immigrant women than for immigrant men (Worswick, 
1996), 2) that inter-group differences in worked hours persist over 
time and, 3) that the earnings profile of the immigrant women 
married to men with better earnings prospects are steeper, instead 
of flatter, than those married to men with worse earnings profiles 
(Duleep, 1998; Duleep, Regets and Sanders, 1999).  
The diverging nature of these results, however, is largely due 
to data limitations. An adequate formal test of the three cited 
predictions would require individual longitudinal data that follow 
the two partners in immigrant couples since their arrival. Yet, 
most of the aforementioned studies have utilized either cross-
sectional or synthetic-cohort analyses (see Duleep & Dowhan, 
2002; Coob-Clark et al. 1999, 2001, for exceptions).4 
                                               
4 The lack of longitudinal data frequently implies that assimilation, 
cohort and period effects cannot be separately identified, which 
constitutes a major limitation for the study of women’s participation. The 
distinction of these three separated effects has attracted much of the 
researchers’ efforts in the field of immigrants’ economic assimilation 
since Borjas published his first work on the issue in 1985. As Borjas 
argued, because of changes in country composition of immigration flows 
and changes in the self-selection mechanisms operating within the pool 
of immigrants from a particular country, immigrants are not drawn from 
the same population over time. Therefore, the reason why an earlier 
cohort may perform better may be that the members of this cohort have 
had more time to integrate into the labor market, but also that they 
arrived to the host country with better observable (or unobservable) skills 
than more recent cohorts or in a period of better employment 
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The principal merit of the “Family Investment Model” is to 
“familiarize” the analysis of immigrants’ labor performance, by 
bringing couples to the forefront and connecting women’s 
earnings with their participation behavior. However, the “Family 
Investment Model” entails also two serious limitations. First of all, 
it is applicable only to one specific type of immigrant couples 
(those where the two partners arrive to the host country together or 
almost) to explain only the labor behavior of immigrant wives 
during the first years after their arrival. Note that the predictions of 
the model are not helpful to explain either the labor decisions of 
adult migrant women who were single at arrival, or that of 
immigrant wives who arrived to the host country a couple of years 
after their husbands. Yet, many of the previous studies have 
overlooked these limitations in their empirical test.5 
Secondly, the “Family Investment Model” is clearly US-
biased and, as a result, earnings instead of employment and 
participation remain its primary subject of concern. The 
assumption that wages are the best indicator of productivity, 
because human capital acquisition is also assumed to be accessible 
for everyone, leaves no room for labor market segmentation in the 
explanation of the obtained results. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                
opportunities. Differences in labor performance of immigrants due to 
their different period of arrival are commonly called “cohort effects”, 
whereas differences related to the additional time spent in the receiving 
country are commonly called “assimilation effects”. When these two 
effects are separated, the earnings assimilation rate often appears to be 
much smaller and slower than initially thought (Borjas, 1985, 1987, 
1991, 1995). 
5 Duleep & Dowhan (2002), for instance, did not even restrict their 
sample to married women, but took married and single women 
altogether. 
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6.2.3. The labor market performance of immigrant women in 
regulated and segmented labor Markets 
 
In countries with flexible labor markets and low minimum 
wages, immigrants are likely to find employment without major 
difficulties, especially under good macro-economic conditions, 
since they can compensate their initial disadvantage in terms of 
host country-specific human capital by offering labor at lower 
prices than the native-born. In this type of context, the question 
about how well do immigrants adjust to the new labor market can 
be adequately addressed by analyzing their earnings profile over 
time. 
However, in labor markets with high minimum wages and 
unemployment insurance such as Australia and most Western 
European countries, empirical studies have usually rejected the 
assimilation hypothesis (for Germany see Dustmann, 1993; 
Pischke, 1992; Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt, 1994; Litch and Steiner, 
1994; Constant, 1998; Constant and Massey, 2005).6 In this type 
of labor markets, immigrants often suffer higher unemployment 
rates than natives, which may imply that human capital is not 
automatically accumulated by spending a given number of years in 
the host country. If the immigrant has not been able to get a firm 
attachment to the labor market and hence acquire host country-
specific labor experience, additional years of residence in the 
receiving country might reduce their earnings capacity, instead of 
enhancing it.  
These circumstances make earnings to lose their capacity to 
faithfully reflect the overall labor market performance of 
immigrants in regulated labor markets, where the described 
process of wage assimilation is rather transformed into a process 
of employment assimilation. In Scandinavian countries, several 
                                               
6 For the UK, see Chiswick (1980), Bell (1993), Shields & Wheatley 
(1998), Blackaby et al. (2002). For Sweden, see Ekberg (1994), Aguilar 
& Gustafsson (1994); Edin, Lalonde & Åslund (2000); le Grand & 
Szulkin (2002); Österberg (2000). For the Netherlands, see Kee (1993). 
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studies have shown that the wage gap between immigrants and 
natives practically disappears when the effects of the gap in 
employment levels between these two groups are neutralized 
(Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001; Arai & Vilhemsson, 2001; Husted 
et al., 2001; Blackaby et al., 2002). 
This is partially generated by the segmentation of the labor 
market and the concentration of immigrant workers in the 
secondary segment, where “bad jobs” with low chances of upward 
mobility dominate (Piore, 1979). In Germany in particular, the 
existence of a well-established system of vocational training 
controlled by the state in collaboration with the chambers of 
industry, commerce and trade, has favored the division of the 
labor market into craft-specific labor markets where each 
occupation requires specific qualifications acquired in the German 
educational system. Empirical studies have confirmed the 
importance of qualifications in determining the chances of entry 
into the various segments of the West German labor market, not 
only for the initial entry into the employment system but also for 
subsequent occupational careers (Blossfeld and Mayer, 1988). 
According to the predictions of the theses of the labor market 
segmentation, mobility within the secondary segment can be 
attributed to the mechanism of statistical discrimination, while in 
the primary sector both qualifications and tenure (i.e. job-specific 
experience) are found to be the main predictors of mobility.  
These circumstances affect the labor performance of women 
even more strongly than men, since female labor decisions are 
known to be heavily influenced by the institutional arrangements 
of their respective labor markets. Despite of the general trend of 
increasing female participation in paid employment over time in 
developed countries, it is a well established finding that women’s 
attachment to the labor force widely varies across countries. These 
cross-national differences are strongly linked to the different 
levels of equalization of the educational opportunities between 
men and women, and to the dominant family ideology underlying 
the organization of welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
1999). In particular, the impact that child-bearing has on mothers’ 
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work has been found to widely vary depending on the structure of 
labor markets and the availability of child-care services. Women 
with children tend to participate in the labor force less and fewer 
hours than childless women (Dekker, Muffels and Stancanelli, 
2000: Drobnic, 1999; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun, 2001; 
Lippe, 2001). However, this ‘child penalty’ is not equally strong in 
Western industrialized countries: in the United Kingdom women 
whose youngest child is under age 5 work on average 24 hours 
fewer than women without young children, while in Denmark this 
difference is only 5 hours (Lippe, 2001). 
The labor behavior of immigrant women and their labor 
participation in particular is also affected by the structure of the 
host labor market and the family policy in their receiving 
countries. However, such effects may differ from those on the 
labor behavior of native women, due to intervening effects of the 
migration experience, group-specific factors such as transferability 
of their skills and gender ideologies, and immigration policies 
among others. In the following pages, I will revise the evidence 
available concerning the labor performance of immigrant women 
in the German case, with especial emphasis on those results that 
contradict the previous evidence found in the US. 
 
German Evidence 
 
Seifert (1996), Dustmann (1997), Constant (1998, 1999) and 
Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) are some of the few authors who 
have studied the labor market performance of immigrant women 
in Germany. Although their main focus of interest was on wages, 
their results systematically pointed to differences in participation 
as the main factor explaining the differential wage profile of 
immigrant and native women. However, a comprehensive analysis 
of the employment cycles of immigrant women in Germany is still 
lacked. 
Constant (1998, 1999) has found some earnings assimilation 
for immigrant women during the period 1984-1993. However, she 
stated that this assimilation “is rather illusionary and related to the 
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poor labor market performance of the reference group, German 
women” (1998: 78). In fact, in the light of her results, she 
concluded that human capital theory fails to explain why 
immigrant women, despite of their lower endowments, obtain 
higher wages than native German women. In the view of these 
results, she concludes that theories of segmentation and 
discrimination constitute a more adequate framework for 
explaining the economic fate of female migrants in Germany. 
Departing from this conclusion, she has recently attempted to 
weight the separate value of human capital and segmented labor 
market theories in explaining both the process of occupational 
allocation and earnings attainment Constant and Massey, 2005). In 
this study, the authors confirmed the existence of a high degree of 
initial occupational segmentation and very low rates of 
occupational mobility. Despite of these disadvantaged conditions, 
they experienced considerable earnings mobility within 
occupations. The explanation of these results seems to lie on the 
longer work experience and higher number of hours worked of 
immigrants compared to natives, rather than to returns to 
education. In fact, they also found that foreigners achieved lower 
returns to technical or vocational training than natives. 
One of the most striking results in this study is that “foreign 
males hold (initial) jobs that were of significantly lower status 
compared with foreign females, a gender differential that did not 
exist among natives”. In other words, Constant and Massey’s 
results would indicate that foreign females have experienced 
larger occupation mobility than their male counterparts. They also 
state that the occupational gap is wider between natives and 
children of immigrants born in Germany than between natives and 
first generation immigrants. Unfortunately additional tests of 
potential interaction effects between gender and generation are 
lacked and, consequently, no explanation is offered for such an 
odd finding. 
In 1997, Dustmann was one of the first authors that have 
utilized GSOEP to explore differences in the labor force 
participation of immigrant women. The focus of his research in 
254 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
this article was on the differential effect that return intentions had 
on the labor participation of immigrant women from different 
countries of origin. Contrary to what Duleep and Sanders (1993) 
had argued to explain the labor participation of immigrant women 
in the US,7 Dustmann argued that temporary migrants who 
anticipate earnings loses back home could choose to shift demand 
for leisure (not working) from the present to the future, which 
reduces their reservation wage and increases their labor force 
participation at present. His findings supported this hypothesis 
with regard to the labor behavior of female migrants in Germany.8 
More recently, Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) have deepened 
the previous analyses concerned with the labor performance of 
immigrant women in Germany. Namely, they have investigated 
also the reasons that may explain the wage advantage of 
immigrant women compared to natives, which was found by 
Constant (1998, 1999).  
One of the most remarkable contributions in this study is the 
inclusion of the husbands’ characteristics (e.g. husband’s year of 
arrival, the husband’s return plans and other household income, 
which mainly account for the husband’s wages) as explanatory 
variable of the labor performance of immigrant women. Regarding 
the potential effect of the variable that measures the husband’s 
                                               
7 These authors concluded that “permanent” female immigrants in 
the US tend to assimilate in their labor participation behavior to that of 
native women (note that in the US, immigrant women usually have lower 
rates of labor participation than native women and, therefore, 
convergence with natives means to participate more). Although they 
lacked direct information on permanency/return intentions, the authors 
assumed that women married to foreign-born men who had acquired US 
citizenship were permanent settlers, and carried out their analyses only 
for this selected sample. 
8 The impact of “return intentions” variable on the baseline model is 
significantly positive, although it should be noted that the effect of the 
other variables included in the model (education, experience, children, 
other income and nationality) remained stable and the overall model 
fitness only changed slightly. 
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years since migration (i.e. the husband’s length of residence in 
Germany), the authors correctly acknowledge that “conditional on 
wife’s years since migration, husband’s years since migration only 
picks up the difference in years since migration between the 
couple’s members”. Therefore, the inclusion of these two 
variables in their estimations is aimed at detecting potential 
differences in the participation and wage performance of reunited 
wives compared to others type of female immigrants. In fact, they 
found that the labor participation of immigrant women increases 
with their own years since migration but decreases with their 
husbands’ length of residence. They do not interpret this finding, 
however, as supporting the idea that women work to finance their 
husbands’ investment in host country-specific human capital as 
the “Family Investment Model” proposes. On the contrary, they 
interpreted this result as a confirmation of what “it is typical for 
labor migration”: that the husband arrives earlier, and the female 
partner follows after a stable job is found by the initial migrant. 
They exactly say: 
 
“One explanation we gave for this finding is that if the wife arrives 
later, the husband may have accumulated sufficient resources; this 
allows the migrant family unit to adopt a more traditional pattern of 
labor market behavior, with the wife abstaining from labor force 
participation. This may also affect the human capital accumulation of 
the wife in the labor market: if participating, these women may have 
lower incentives to invest in human capital.” (26) 
 
With regard to the negative effect that additional years of 
residence in the host country has been found to display on the 
wages of immigrant women, Dustmann and Schmidt argued that 
the solution of this puzzle may lie in the way the underlying 
participation process is taking into account and, in particular, in 
the distinction between part-time and full-time jobs. In fact, when 
they estimate the effect of “years since migration” separately on 
the wages of full-time and part-time workers, they found that the 
results change dramatically. While the effect on part-time workers 
is significant and negative (approximately 2 percent per year of 
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residence), the effect for full-time workers is positive and 
significant (nearly 0.5 percent per year). Therefore, they conclude 
that a large fraction of the wage advantage previously found for 
immigrant women compared to native women is due to the fact 
that immigrant women are systematically more likely to work full-
time than native women. 
Doubtless, the two main merits of the paper by Dustmann and 
Schmidt are, first of all, to study the labor performance of 
immigrant women within the household context and, secondly, to 
depart from the human capital framework and the rationale of the 
“Family Investment Model” –which strongly US biased, as I said 
before-, and introduce into the analysis the particularities of 
regulated labor markets like the German one. However, the study 
also has some important weak points that I would like to mention 
briefly. First of all, the selection of the sample; only married 
women of age 24 or older are included in the analysis. This 
implies that the impact of the initial stages of the family formation 
process (i.e. marriage and first childbirth) are completely missed 
from the study since most immigrant women still marry 
substantially younger than their native counterparts.  
Secondly, age at migration is not included in the estimations, 
neither as a continuous independent variable nor in the form of 
“dummy generations”. This implies that no distinction is made 
between women who arrived in Germany at young age and 
attended the German educational system, and women who were 
adult at arrival.9 The importance of this omission must be 
highlighted in the light of the results obtained in the previous 
chapters of this dissertation, which have demonstrated that the 
migratory experience of first and middle generation, as well as 
their marital choices and household formation process have been 
marked by very distinct circumstances. In addition, the potential 
                                               
9 This sort of women might amount about 20% of the sample (my 
own calculations). Age at immigration is used to capture the effect of 
local education on employment probabilities as well as important 
language and cultural skills that may more readily and proficiently be 
acquired if immigration occurs at a young age. 
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implications of not distinguishing between first, middle and 
second generation immigrants are making bigger because the 
authors do not distinguish between education acquired in the home 
country and education acquired in Germany, and because they do 
not take into consideration the effect of previous work experience 
on participation.10 
Thirdly, reunited and imported wives are not distinguished 
and, consequently, all the results obtained for women who arrived 
to Germany after their husbands are assumed to reflect the widely 
assumed negative selection of reunited wives with regard to their 
labor characteristics. 
Finally, no distinction is made between different immigrant 
cohorts according to their date of arrival to Germany, neither 
between different nationalities, despite of the great importance that 
the context of reception and national origin is likely to have on the 
labor performance of immigrant women. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 The selection equation (i.e. the equations aimed at detecting the 
main determinants of working or not, and working part-time or full-time) 
includes age as an explanatory variable but not experience. Although the 
authors say “when we add additional variables to the wage equation, we 
add the same regressors to the participation equation”, the effect of 
previous work experience is commented nowhere. Taking into account 
the well-known endogeneity between previous work history and labor 
force participation for women, this omission represents a major 
drawback, especially for women who were single at migration and 
worked in Germany as single workers for some time about a third of the 
sample). Note that for these women the mechanism underlying the 
negative effect of the husband’s earlier arrival is not clear at all since 
they are not reunited wives. 
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6.3. Dynamic analysis of immigrant women’s career over the 
life-course 
 
As it has been repeatedly stated, cross-sectional data are 
unable to explain adequately changes in the aggregated rates of 
women’s labor participation. In order to determine whether 
increases in the aggregate rate of female labor participation within 
the same country over time are either the result of less women 
interrupting their careers because of marriage and child-care or, 
alternatively, the result of a trend to return faster to employment 
after interruptions, longitudinal data are needed. Moreover, cross-
sectional data do not allow us to understand how changes over the 
life-course cycle relate to women’s labor behavior, that is, for 
instance, whether women who abandon their jobs at child-birth are 
likely to re-enter later and, if so, when and how. 
Although some of the studies previously cited for the case of 
Germany have made use of the longitudinal dimension of the 
GSOEP data, none of them has examined in detail the employment 
cycles of immigrant women. In the following pages, I will carry 
out this type of analysis by applying event history analysis as 
described in Chapter 3. In particular, I will analyze the first entry 
in the German labor force by first generation immigrant women 
(i.e. women who immigrated at 16 or older to Germany), their 
exits from labor activity and their re-entries into the labor force. 
By restricting my analysis to first generation immigrant 
women, I will avoid some of the drawbacks in the article by 
Dustmann and Schmidt (2001). In addition, I will be able to study 
the potential impact that differences in the timing of migration 
within couples have on the labor behavior of women, as well as 
distinguish these effects from the potential impact of changes in 
the context of reception found by different cohorts of immigrant 
women. 
Studies of women’s labor activity have generally limited their 
analyses to married (and cohabitating) women because the 
primary research interest lays on the effects of the family structure 
and the husband’s characteristics on women’s labor decisions. 
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Family constraints are almost negligible for most single women 
(with the exception of lone mothers). The most common strategy 
is to begin the empirical analysis of labor transitions at the 
moment of the first marriage. However, some authors like 
Bernasco (1994) and Bernardi (1999) started their analyses one 
year prior to first marriage in order to obtain a full view of the 
effect that the process of family formation has on the employment 
outcomes of women.11 
In the following analyses of the labor transitions of immigrant 
women in Germany, I have followed the same strategy, i.e. to start 
the analysis at the time of first marriage, in order to neutralize the 
impact that marriage is likely to have on women’s labor decisions. 
However, the inclusion of a time-constant covariate that indicates 
whether the woman was married or unmarried at migration, will 
allow me to separate the potential effect of “marriage” from the 
effect of “marital status at migration”. Note that this definition of 
the analysis time implies that women married prior to migration 
will enter the analysis from the very first moment of their arrival 
in Germany, while women who migrated unmarried will not enter 
the analysis until they marry someone in the host country.12 
On the other hand, I have decided to separate the analysis of 
the first and subsequent entries into the Germany labor force 
because the first entry is likely to be affected by many factors 
whose effect will attenuate or even disappear over time. Bearing in 
mind the well-established endogeneity between women’s present 
and past labor behavior, the decision to enter the German labor 
                                               
11 For an exception see Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rowher (1999). 
These authors examine married and unmarried women altogether but 
included a time-varying covariate for marital status that allows to 
identify the effect of marriage itself on different employment transitions. 
12 Duleep and Sanders (1993) adopted a similar strategy to analyze 
the labor participation of Asian immigrant women in the US. In contrast, 
in their study of the participation and wages of immigrant women in 
Germany, Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) selected only married women 
of 24 and older but neglected the potential differences derived from 
marital status at migration. 
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force for the first time will strongly depend on factors like the age 
at migration, the timing of migration within the couple and, 
especially, pre-migration labor experience. But the influence of 
these pre-migration factors is expected to decline over time; after 
the first episode of employment in Germany, immigrants’ 
performance in the German labor market will hinge on post-
migration factors rather than on their pre-migration characteristics 
and the characteristics of the migration process. Thus, if the main 
interest lays on determining how different migration trajectories 
influence the labor decisions of women upon arrival, it seems 
much more adequate to focus on the first decision to enter the paid 
labor force.  
Additionally, the high job stability in Germany reinforces the 
previous reasoning. In contrast to the US where the average 
number of jobs a worker holds over his work life-time is about 10, 
in Germany the corresponding figure is only four jobs 
(Wilkelmann, 1997). Moreover, job mobility in Germany, instead 
of increasing as a result of the adjustment pressures, seems to have 
decreased between 1974 and 1994 (Winkelmann and Zimermann, 
1998). As Blossfelfd and Rohwer (1999) stated, the smaller 
number of jobs over the life time makes each job change and each 
transition in and out of the labor force particularly meaningful 
(Blossfeld and Rowher, 1002; Yamaguchi, 1990). 
However, the down-side of this decision relates to the small 
number of employment episodes which can be used to study labor 
participation as a multi-episode (i.e. the smaller the number of 
transitions, the more likely is to obtain coefficient statistically 
insignificant). Moreover, in the case of immigrant women in 
Germany, Constant and Massey (2002) found that a weak 
attachment to employment –defined by the authors as marginal 
employment, unemployment or non-involvement in the labor 
force- doubles the odds of return migration. Therefore, the risk of 
loosing observations after the first exit from the labor force is 
especially high in our immigrant sample and the extent to which 
the remaining group of women who stayed in Germany a 
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relatively long time after leaving their fist job might not be 
representative of the whole original sample. 
 
 
6.4. Sample’s description 
 
Table 6.1 describes the main characteristics of first generation 
immigrant women who arrived in Germany in the period 1960-
2000, which constitute the focus of the following empirical 
analyses. The average profile of first generation immigrant women 
(i.e. who arrived at 16 or older) in Germany indicates a low 
educational level and less pre-migration work experience 
(approximately 2/3 of the sample had not worked in their country 
of origin). Most of them (60%) arrived in Germany prior to the 
halt on recruitment, and were already married at that time (80%) 
with husbands more educated than them. 
Reunited wives and imported brides make the largest part of 
the sample. However, these two groups are widely dissimilar in 
many of their characteristics. Reunited wives are, on average, the 
group of immigrant women who immigrated at older ages, with 
more children and less years of education. In contrast, imported 
brides are more educated, have arrived recently and were childless 
at arrival. In addition the distribution by origin is not homogenous 
across these two groups. While Turks are clearly over-represented 
within the group of imported brides, reunited wives are more 
evenly distributed across nationalities (compare the distribution by 
origin for the whole sample and across categories). Yugoslav 
women are largely over-represented in the group of first-movers 
(i.e. wives who preceded their husbands in migration) and under-
represented among imported brides. Spaniards and Italians are 
over-represented in the group of single migrants, and Greeks both 
within single migrants and first-mover wives. 
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Table 6.1. Descriptives of the sample for the analysis of employment 
cycles 
Married at migration  All Unmarried 
at 
migration First-
mover 
Wives 
Reunited 
Wives 
Imported 
Brides 
Age at 
migration 
26.1 
(7.9) 
20.2 
(4.1) 
28.2 
(5.8) 
31.2 
(7.6) 
21.9 
(5.0) 
Years in 
Germany (at 
last interview) 
20.9 
(9.3) 
23.1 
(9.7) 
24.3 
(9.2) 
21.8 
(8.6) 
17.7 
(9.3) 
Year of 
immigration 
1975 
(9.0) 
1973 
(9.0) 
1972 
(7.1) 
1973 
(7.4) 
1980 
(9.6) 
Arrived before 
the halt 
60 % 66 % 80 % 70.5 % 38 % 
Years of 
Education 
8.7 
(1.9) 
9.3 
(2.0) 
9.3 
(2.1) 
8.2 
(1.7) 
9.1 
(1.8) 
No pre-
migration work 
exp. 
62.6 
% 
55 % 40 % 59.7 % 75.9 % 
Number of kids 
(at arrival in 
Germany) 
1.3 
(1.7) 
0.5 
(0.9) 
1.3 
(1.0) 
2.3 
(1.8) 
0.35 
(0.9) 
H’s age at 
migration 
25.6 
(8.9) 
21.1 
(7.4) 
32 
(6.4) 
31.2 
(6.2) 
18.2 
(6.7) 
H’s years of 
education 
9.65 
(2.1) 
9.9 
(2.3) 
9.7 
(2.0) 
9.3 
(2.1) 
9.9 
(1.9) 
Turkey 39 % 23 % 34 % 38 % 52 % 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
22 % 25 % 37 % 25 % 14 % 
Greece 13 % 17 % 14 % 15 % 7 % 
Italy 16 % 20 % 9 % 13 % 18 % 
Spain 10 % 15 % 6 % 9 % 9 % 
N 
 
851 169 
(19.8 %) 
35 
(4.1 %) 
390 
(45.7 %) 
257 
(30.4 %) 
Source: GSOEP, 1984-2002. 
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The effect of migration on women’s work 
 
With some exceptions, international migration is associated 
less strongly with work among women than among men. 
However, it usually occurs also that the labor force participation of 
immigrant women in their host countries is significantly higher 
than that of their non-migrant counterparts in their respective 
countries of origin during the same periods. In Table 6.2 I have 
compared the labor force status of immigrant women immediately 
before and after migration to Germany. This comparison gives us 
an idea about how important job opportunities might have been in 
promoting women’s migration, although it still remains difficult to 
determine when work was the primary motivation for women to 
migrate and when it “just happened” after migration. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Labor participation of adult immigrants before and after 
migration 
 All  Single First Reunited Imported Pre-
halt 
Post-
halt 
Leave  
their job 
3.3% 3.4% 0% 2.6% 4.6% 2.1% 4.9% 
Entry into 
a new job 
13.5% 18.8% 14.3% 14.6% 8.1% 19.1% 5.2% 
Continue 
in empl. 
27.2% 43.7% 45.7% 24.9% 17.0% 36.3% 13.8% 
Continue 
out of 
employm. 
56.0% 34.1% 40% 57.9% 70.2% 42.3% 76.1% 
N 860 176 35 390 259 512 348 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. 
 
 
The percentages in the previous table indicate that 
approximately 40% (13.5% + 27.2%) first generation immigrant 
women worked in Germany from the very first moment since their 
264 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
arrival. This can be read as an indication of work being an 
important factor in motivating migration. In particular, the 13.5% 
women who were out of the labor force in the months prior to 
migration and entered the paid labor force in Germany right after 
arrival, it seems undeniable that economic reasons played an 
important role their migration decision. On the contrary, migration 
had a disruptive effect on women’s work just for a tiny proportion 
of adult women (3.3% of total were employed before migration 
but were not upon arrival). When the marital status at migration 
and the period of arrival are taken into account, noticeable 
differences across groups emerge. Although continuity, either in 
employment or out-of-employment, is the dominant pattern, 
migration appears to be particularly connected to the intention of 
working in the host country among women who were unmarried at 
migration (18 % of them moved from non-employment in the 
country of origin to employment immediately upon arrival). It is 
important to test whether this initial difference holds in the 
medium and long run or, by contrast, it disappears when 
unmarried migrants marry someone in Germany. 
On the other hand, the weakest link between migration and 
work does not emerge among reunited wives but imported brides. 
While 14% of the reunited wives in the sample entered into the 
labor force after migration, only 8.5% of the imported brides 
experienced this type of transition. Moreover, imported brides are 
also the group most likely to abandon their economic activity after 
migration, and the most likely to have been out from the economic 
activity both before and after moving to Germany. 
In the last two columns, I have explored to what extent the 
described differences between women unmarried at migration, 
imported by their new partners and reunited with their husbands 
do reflect differences intrinsic differences across these three 
groups of immigrant women or, on the contrary, they are the result 
of the differences in their time of arrival to Germany. While 20% 
of the pre-halt female immigrants moved from non-employment to 
employment short after migration, only 5% of post-halt 
immigrants experienced the same transition. In addition, the 
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percentage of women who were out of employment before 
migrating to Germany was much larger within the group of post-
halt female immigrants than in the earlier cohort.  
In order to determine the separated effects of period of arrival, 
marital status at migration and country of origin, among others, it 
is necessary to carry out a multivariate regression analysis.  
 
 
6.5. Hypotheses 
 
Duration dependence 
 
In general, the longer time a woman stays out of the labor 
force, the less likely it is for her to (re-)enter employment. The 
reasoning underlying such statement has to do with the main 
tenets of the human capital theory: employment is the only way of 
accumulating work experience and other resources that increase 
career prospects, strengthen the attachment to the labor market 
and, ultimately, increase the opportunity costs of leaving jobs. For 
women, in particular, time spent at work implies not only a lost 
opportunity to acquire additional human capital but also a likely 
depreciation of their previous skills (Mincer and Ofek, 1982). 
Accordingly, the prediction is that the longer time a woman stays 
out of employment, the worse become her prospects of getting a 
(good) job. Does this reasoning apply to the labor behavior of 
immigrant women as well? In principle, it should do. However, 
the process leading to entry the labor force at the destination 
country for the first time might not adjust to this pattern due to the 
aforementioned difficulties for the international transferability of 
skills, which may require a transitory period of adaptation to the 
new environment. 
 
Country of origin 
 
National or ethnic origin is commonly considered a key factor 
underlying inter-groups differences in the labor participation of 
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immigrant women. In fact, the country of origin is often utilized a 
proxy variable for gender ideologies and family values, which 
widely vary across cultures. In the German experience, Turkish 
women have the lowest rate of participation compared to both EU-
immigrants and immigrants for the former Yugoslavia, where the 
socialist regime has been assumed to favor high levels of labor 
participation among women. 
A considerable number of ethnographic studies have tried to 
discredit the male-biased culturalist approach that traditionally 
dominated immigration research in Germany (see Lutz, 1991; Lutz 
and Huth-Hildebrant, 1998; Erdem and Mattes, 2003 for a critical 
review). These qualitative studies have often exclusively focused 
on Turkish women, especially Turkish women who were 
unmarried at migration and who entered Germany during the 
recruitment period (Inowlocki and Lutz, 2000; Munscher, 1984). 
Precisely because of the type of women chosen, the conclusions 
obtained in these studies are usually difficult to generalize to the 
bulk of the female immigrant population from other sending 
countries and even from Turkey. A notable exception in this 
regard is the study carried out by Goodman (1984, 1987) among 
Spanish immigrant women in Germany in the early eighties. In 
this study, the author paid especially attention to the effect that the 
restrictive measures approved by the German government to 
protect native (female) workers from immigrants’ competition in 
the mid-seventies had on the labor performance of Spanish 
migrant women (see more below). Morokvasic (1975, 1984) also 
provided abundant information on the migration experience of 
Yugoslav women in Germany and other Western European 
countries like France and Sweden. However, the migration of 
women to Germany from Italy and Greece has received much less 
attention in the specialized literature. 
In relation to the potential effect of the country of origin in 
explaining inter-group differences in the labor behavior of 
immigrant women, it is important to remind here that the 
migration flows from each of the five largest recruitment countries 
have follow quite different developments over time. If such 
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differences are not explicitly taken into account, their effects are 
very likely to be interpreted as the effect of “cultural 
differences”.13 
 
Human capital 
 
The existence of a strong positive relationship between 
women’s education and vocational participation, on the one hand, 
and employment and occupational attainment on the other is a 
well established fact. However, women have been traditionally 
unable to translate their education into the same financial and 
status benefits that are available to men. The explanation for such 
gender differences in the labor and economic returns to human 
capital has to do with the greater sensitivity of women 
interferences derived from variations in the conditions of labor 
demand (Brinton, Lee and Parish, 1995; Cotter, Hermsen and 
Vanneman, 2001), the structure of the labor market (Blossfeld, 
1987), and their husbands’ characteristics (Bernasco, 1994; 
Bernardi, 1999). In Germany, high sex-occupational segregation 
and the predominance of part-time work for women have been 
found to distort the expected relation between education and 
experience and female employment (Drobnic et al., 1999). 
In the case of immigrants, the difficulties for the transfer of 
educational skills acquired abroad add to the aforementioned 
particularities concerning the link between education and 
                                               
13 The separated effects of these two dimensions of the migration 
experience might be assessed by limiting the analysis to unmarried 
migrants. Women who are single and adult at the time of migration are 
expected to be a very selective group within their group of reference, 
much less subjected to the dominant gender ideologies in their respective 
countries of origin and mainly economic motivated in their migration 
decision –in fact, their own migration can be interpreted as a sign of this 
“selectivity”. Therefore, potential differences between single female 
migrants from different countries of origin in their propensity to work 
after migration are likely to be due to differences in the overall migratory 
pattern from each of those countries rather than to “cultural differences”. 
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employment among women. In fact, various studies have 
suggested that primary education is most portable, which might 
result in higher levels of employment among the least educated 
immigrants (Friedberg, 2000; Cobb-Clark et al., 2001). On the 
other hand, difficulties in the international transferability of skills 
also affect the potential effect of previous work experience on the 
employability of immigrant women in the host country. While 
host country-specific work experience is likely to enhance the 
employment prospects of immigrant women at destination, the 
effect of pre-migration experience is expected to affect positively 
the first entry into the host labor market, as far as previous work 
experience reveals tastes for work. However, its potential positive 
effect will probably vanish progressively over time (Duleep and 
Sanders, 1993). 
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that returns to 
education usually change depending on the macro-economic 
conditions in the host country. In Germany, for instance, during 
the recruitment period foreign workers were generally hired to 
work in low-skilled manual jobs. Although the recruitment offices 
set up in the sending countries valued skills and experience in the 
candidates’ selection procedure, it is well documented that the 
urgency for filling vacancies often prevailed over a perfect 
matching between the employer’s request and the worker’s 
characteristics (see more in Chapter 2). Therefore, education is not 
expected to be a great predictor of employment for immigrant 
women who arrived before the halt on recruitment. But this 
situation substantially modified in the mid-seventies. Increasing 
unemployment rates coincided with the progressive incorporation 
of the youths that benefited from the educational expansion into 
the German labor force (Blossfeld and Jaenichen, 1992). In this 
context of growing and more qualified labor supply, the German 
employers began to reward more and more education credentials.14 
                                               
14 When unemployment is on the rise, the queue of people searching 
for jobs gets bigger and competition between workers intensifies. In this 
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On the other hand, since the late seventies the structure of labor 
demand in Germany began to shift progressively from industrial to 
the so-called post-industrial services economy, a transformation 
that intensified over the eighties and nineties. Labor demand has 
been shifting not only from the industrial to the service sector but 
firms have also increased their qualification requirements when 
hiring employees (Berthold and Fehn, 2003; Annesley, 2004). All 
these changes are likely to have made more difficult the entry into 
employment for immigrants with low-skill level since the mid-
seventies (Klopp, 2002). 
 
Family-life Cycle and Reasons to Migrate 
 
Marital Status at Migration 
 
The effect of marital status at migration on the post-migration 
labor behavior of immigrant women has been scarcely analyzed 
and, to date, all the available studies that have paid attention to 
this issue have focused on the US immigration experience. 
Chiswick (1980) found that women unmarried at arrival were 
more likely to work than the rest of female immigrants. He 
interpreted this result within the human capital framework, 
according to which women who migrate single are more likely to 
have skills more easily transferable to the destination labor 
market. Duleep and Regets (1993) in their study of the labor 
participation of Asian immigrant women in the US confirmed this 
result but only for some national groups such as Filipino, Chinese 
and Japanese. More recently, Cerruti and Massey (2001) have also 
found that among Mexican wives who began migrating prior to 
marriage, two out of three participated in the US labor market on 
their last trip, while the participation rate was only 50% among 
those who began migrating after their husbands (195). These 
authors, however, interpret these results as an indication of 
                                                                                                
situation, employers can demand higher qualifications than usual even 
for jobs that do not require many skills. 
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different reasons for migration between the two groups, rather 
than as a sign of higher transferability of the skills of single 
migrants. In fact, women who migrate from developing countries 
prior to marriage - especially if they did it two or three decades 
ago, as it is the case of part of the women studied in this chapter-, 
are very likely to constitute a selective group within their own 
groups of reference in their countries of origin, less subject to the 
dominant gender and family ideologies there. In addition, if adult 
women who are single at migration are more likely to work upon 
arrival, they are also more likely to acquire host country-specific 
experience, which would enhance also their employment prospects 
in the long run, even if they marry. 
 
First-mover Wives, Reunited Wives and Imported Brides 
 
Following the typology I constructed in Chapter 2 (see Section 
3.5.3), in the following empirical analyses I will examine the 
potential effect that different timing of migration within the couple 
has on the labor behavior of immigrant women. 
As I explained in the previous chapters, imported brides are 
women brought to Germany to live with their newly married 
husbands, who are generally men who migrated much earlier than 
them, in many cases as children of previous immigrants. In fact, 
previous research has demonstrated that the importation of 
spouses is often linked to the practice of family- arranged 
marriages in some countries of origin and, therefore, it is relatively 
common that the partners have not met each other until a few days 
or months before the wedding. This circumstance has favored the 
image of “imported brides” as a group of female immigrants likely 
to be particularly dependent on their husbands upon arrival and 
strongly oriented to the family. In Chapter 5, I additionally 
demonstrated that male importers are not a random group within 
the larger pool of single male immigrants in Germany; on the 
contrary, low educated single men from Turkey and the former 
Yugoslavia are the most likely group to import their wives from 
their countries of origin, instead of marrying a co-national 
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immigrant or a native partner. Moreover, I also found evidence 
that the post-marital living arrangements of couples where the 
wife had been imported to Germany by her husband tend to be 
more traditional (i.e. extended household) than among other 
couples, which adds support to the idea of stronger 
“traditionalism” involved in the practice of importing wives.15 
In line with these results I expect imported wives to be the 
group of immigrant women least likely to work in Germany. On 
the contrary, first-mover wives (i.e. wives who preceded their 
husbands in migration) and women who were single at migration 
are expected to be the most likely to participate in the host labor 
market.  
According to the most common view, the labor behavior of 
reunited wives would be expected to be very similar to that of 
imported wives as long as they are also married women who 
migrate to join their husbands in the immigration country and, 
therefore, traditionally assumed to have migrated because of 
                                               
15 A caveat is in order regarding the category of “imported brides”. 
Wagner and Mulder (1993) demonstrated that the larger propensity to 
migrate usually found among unmarried people compared to married 
ones, considerably reduces if one separates the in-between category of 
“marrying migrants” (i.e. women who marry and migrate within the 
same time interval) from the other two groups (married and unmarried 
women). Most imported brides are also “marrying migrants”, although 
they are not only that. As I have showed in previous chapters, imported 
brides also tend to marry less educated men, tend to be from specific 
countries of origin and tend to live in extend households. In order to 
separate the two potentially distinct effects of being a “marrying 
migrant” and being an “imported wife”, I will add to one of the model 
specifications both variables at once (see below). Moreover, in my 
sample 10% of reunited wives and 15% of first-movers married their 
husbands the same year they migrated to Germany. Therefore, they must 
be considered marrying migrants as well. Conversely, there are some 
imported wives that did not join their husbands the same year they 
married but a long time after. These figures clearly illustrate that the 
concept of marrying migrants and the one of imported bride define to 
different phenomena. 
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family reasons. To my knowledge, these two groups of married 
migrant women have been never separated in earlier studies aimed 
at examining the labor performance of immigrant women. In fact, 
the previously cited paper by Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) did 
not distinguish these two groups of women. Consequently, the 
authors interpreted the results obtained for the group of women 
who arrived to Germany later than their husbands as supporting 
the idea that in labor migration, the husband typically arrives 
earlier, and the female partner follows when he found a stable job 
and the budgetary constraints are less binding, which “allows the 
migrant family unit to adopt a more traditional pattern of labor 
market behavior, with the wife abstaining from labor force 
participation” (26).16 
However, in the two previous chapters I have demonstrated 
than more than half of the “reunited wives” in GSOEP dataset 
arrived to Germany the same or the following year as their 
husbands, and that the large majority of women who arrived in 
Germany later than their husbands were “imported brides” instead 
of “reunited wives”. In accordance with these results, I 
hypothesized that reunited wives are a group of female migrants 
that probably combine economic and family reasons to migrate 
and, therefore, I expect for them to have a higher propensity to 
work in Germany than imported brides. 
 
                                               
16 This problem is actually a little more complex in the paper by 
Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) since they did not take into consideration 
the date of marriage in the construction of their typology. This implies 
that women who were unmarried at migration and married a male 
immigrant who had arrived to Germany earlier than them, are merged 
together with “reunited wives” and “imported wives”. In other words, 
their dummy variables (migration earlier, later or at the same time as the 
husband) capture at the same time the effect of the timing of migration 
within the couple and the effect of marital status at migration, in a way 
that is not possible to anticipate. 
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Children 
 
Children are known to be a major constraint for women’s 
employment decisions because are women in general who assume 
the primary responsibility for child-care, even in dual-earner 
couples. Pre-school children are found to display a strong 
depressing effect on mother’s participation in absolute terms and 
also in terms of worked hours. However, the effect of children and 
household size on the labor participation of immigrant women has 
appeared a little puzzling in previous studies on the issue.  A 
considerable number of studies for different immigrant groups in 
different countries have found that the negative effect of young 
children on the labor participation of immigrant women is 
significantly smaller than for native women (Stier and Tienda, 
1992; Long 1980; Beach and Worswick 1993; Baker and 
Benjamin 1996; Dustmann 2000). Most of the authors have argued 
that such an unexpected result probably relate to the availability of 
more flexible household arrangements for helping women in 
child-care activities:  in extended households, the presence of non-
working adult members is argued to help immigrant women in 
combining family and work in ways which are not accessible to 
most native women, who in two-earner nuclear households much 
more frequently than their immigrant counterparts. Unfortunately, 
this hypothesis has not been adequately tested to date. In addition, 
there is also the possibility that a substantial number of fist 
generation women either left their young children behind for 
several years until bringing them to the host country, or did not 
migrate until their children are of school age. In these two cases, 
the reason for the absence of a negative effect of young children 
on immigrant mother’s work would be different to the one 
commonly proposed. In fact, some of the results found in Chapter 
4 pointed in this direction (e.g. joint couple migration is much 
more likely for childless women and mothers who only have 
children of school age, than for mothers with young children). 
Unfortunately, I have not complete information on the date of 
immigration of every child for all the women in my sample, as I 
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already noted in the analysis of children’s reunification. I have run 
some analyses utilizing only the sample of women for which I had 
at least partial information on this aspect, and the results appeared 
to support my hypothesis. 
 
Context of reception: macro-economic conditions and 
discriminatory labor market policies 
 
In his article of 1989, entitled “Contemporary immigration: 
theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes of 
incorporation”, Portes and Börocz defined the “context of 
reception” as the conditions jointly defined by the interaction 
between governmental policy, public opinion, labor demand and 
pre-existing ethnic communities, that channel individuals of 
similar endowments into very different paths (618-620). The 
authors stated: 
 
“[…] although it is possible and useful for analytical purposes to 
separate the economic, political, legal and other aspects of contexts 
of reception, in reality these conditions tend to form more or less 
coherent patterns organizing the life chances of newcomers. The 
stance of host governments, employers, the surrounding native 
population and the characteristics of the pre-existing ethnic 
community, if any, are important aspects of the situation confronting 
new immigrants. Newcomers face these realities as a fait accompli 
which alters their aspirations and plans and can channel individuals 
of similar background into widely different directions.” (618) 
 
In Chapter 2, I have described the main transformations in 
German immigration policy during the period 1960-2000, and 
given special attention to the halt on recruitment and the 
accompanying measures approved in the mid-seventies and early 
eighties, which were aimed at limiting family-linked migration. 
Among those measures, the “key date” regulations, which were 
enforced during four years (November 1974-April 1979), are 
expected to have severely reduced the labor participation of 
immigrant women, especially of those who arrived during those 
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years and who were not Italian nationals (excluded from the 
application of these measures due to their EC membership).  
On the other hand, during the recruitment period, prospective 
female migrants had the possibility of arranging a work contract in 
advance with a German employer; however, after the halt, this 
possibility vanished. Moreover, the macro-economic conditions 
faced by these two cohorts of immigrant women during their stay 
in Germany widely diverged: while the recruitment period was 
characterized by high rates of economic growth and low rates of 
female unemployment (with the only exception of the short 
economic recession in 1966/7), the rate of female unemployment 
jumped to 3% in 1973, hovered around 6% until 1982 and 
increased again during the recession in the mid-eighties. Since 
then, unemployment has maintained at high levels, especially after 
the reunification took place in 1990. 
Therefore, it can be said that the context of reception 
dramatically worsened in the mid-seventies. In fact, this change 
could be characterized as a transition from the most favorable 
ideal-type described by Portes and Borocz (1989), in which 
foreigners receive active legal as well as material assistance from 
the host governments and meet with a favorable public reception, 
to the most unfavorable one, in which the governmental apparatus 
take a dim view of the inflow and attempt to reduce or suppress it 
altogether. In this unfavorable context -continued the authors-, 
immigrants are negatively typified by employers, either as 
unsuitable labor or suitable only for menial jobs, and a general 
negative prejudice about immigrant spread out in the native 
population. However, newcomers still come because of the 
availability of some economic opportunities under the sponsorship 
of kinship networks. 
The previous description leads one to expect that women who 
arrived after 1973 would be less likely to enter the labor force in 
Germany, take longer time to obtain a first job after arrival and 
also, perhaps, to have a weaker attachment to the German labor 
force during their entire stay in Germany. In any case, it is 
important to note that my expectation of lower participation rates 
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among post-halt immigrant women is not based on the idea that 
women who arrived after the ban on recruitment were mainly 
reunited wives who migrated for family reasons, but rather on the 
effect of the much tougher context of reception that this cohort of 
women encountered upon arrival. 
 
Survival Functions 
 
To have a first idea about the relationship between some of the 
key independent variables identified in the hypotheses formulated 
above, and the dependent variable of the analysis (i.e. first entry 
into the German labor force), I have included below some graphs 
of the survival function. The survival function is the cumulative 
proportion of cases surviving up to the respective time interval. 
Since the probabilities of survival are assumed to be independent 
across the intervals, this probability is computed by multiplying 
out the probabilities of survival across all previous intervals. 
In the graphical representation of the survival function, the 
vertical axis measures the proportion of individuals who have not 
experienced the event (i.e. entry into the labor force) yet, and the 
horizontal axis measures the analysis time. In this case, the time of 
analysis starts at the date of arrival and ends either at the time the 
woman enters the labor force or at the time she leaves the 
survey.17 Obviously, the survival function only gives us 
information about the timing of the process but not about the 
factors explaining why individuals in the sample experience the 
event at a particular point in time. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, approximately 85% of women in 
my sample ended up entering the German labor force at some 
point during their stay in Germany. Moreover, a large fraction of 
                                               
17 Note that women who were unmarried at migration do not enter 
the analysis until the date of their marriage since, as I said before, the 
analysis restrict to married first generation immigrant women. 
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them (about 35%) entered the labor force right after arriving (see 
the severe drop in the first month of analysis).18 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force 
for first generation women 
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In Figure 6.2, I compare the survival functions corresponding 
to women who were unmarried and married at migration, 
respectively. In Figure 24, I compare the survival functions 
corresponding to women who entered Germany before and after 
the halt on recruitment. These two graphs offer a preliminary 
insight about the proportion of women within each group who 
                                               
18 Given that many women started to work in Germany immediately 
upon arrival, I have many ties (i.e. many events occurring within the 
same time interval) in the first time interval when I focus exclusively on 
the first entry to the labor force, as can be seen in the Life Table 1 
included in the Appendix A. This problem, however, disappears when 
both the first and subsequent re-entries into the labor force are analyzed 
all together (see Life Table 2 in the Appendix A) and when only re-
entries are considered. 
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entered the German labor market at some point, and about the 
moment at which they did. 
Figure 6.2 shows that almost ¾ of women who were 
unmarried at their arrival in Germany, entered the labor force the 
same month they arrived. On the contrary, the corresponding 
proportion within the group of married migrants was only 35%, 
approximately. The participation differential between the two 
groups of female immigrants progressively narrowed over time 
(note that the two lines get closer to each other as time passes). 
However, after spending twenty years (240 months) in the host 
country, women who migrated unmarried still had a higher rate of 
participation in the German labor market. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force, 
by marital status at migration 
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Something similar happens in Figure 6.3, which shows the 
survival function corresponding to the pre-halt and post-halt 
female immigrant cohorts. Approximately half women who 
entered Germany prior to 1974 entered the labor force the same 
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month they arrived, against only 25% of women who arrived in 
Germany after that date. In addition, this difference has not 
disappeared twenty years later. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force, 
by period of arrival 
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However, these differences across these two cohorts of women 
are not equal for women from all countries. In fact, as I suggested 
in the previous section, Italian women (who were exempted from 
the application of the restrictions imposed in the mid-seventies on 
the access to employment of immigrant women) do not experience 
such a difference, as Figure 6.4 illustrates. The two survival 
functions overlap over the entire time of analysis. Approximately 
half of both pre-halt and post-halt Italian women entered the 
German labor force in the first month after arriving in Germany. 
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Figure 6.4. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of 
Italian women, by period of arrival 
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This is clearly not the case for Turk women and, especially, 
women from the former Yugoslavia, as Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show 
(see below). 
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Figure 6.5. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of 
Turk women, by period of arrival 
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Figure 6.6. Survival function of first entry into the German labor force of 
Yugoslavian women, by period of arrival 
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In the following section, I will examine whether the described 
differences across cohorts, country of origin and marital status 
remain when observed differences in these and other 
characteristics are controlled for. 
 
 
6.6. Results and discussion 
 
No assimilation into employment 
 
The baseline model (Model 1) estimates the effect of time 
spent out-of-employment in Germany on the likelihood of entering 
the labor force for the first time, controlling only for age at 
migration and age at marriage. The dummy variables to measure 
the effect of time indicate that the hazard follows a declining 
pattern, which means that women who do not enter the labor force 
in the first 18 months after their arrival in Germany (reference 
category) become more and more unlikely to work. In other 
words, there is no assimilation into employment for adult first 
generation immigrant women,19 and the human capital approach 
that predicts that immigrants will behave similarly to comparable 
natives after an initial period of adaptation is not supported by 
these results. Moreover, as can be seen, this declining pattern of 
employability over time holds not matter which controls are added 
to the model (see coefficients for the dummy variables indicating 
the time spent out of employment in Model 1 to Model 10).  
The control variables “age at migration” and “age at marriage” 
show the expected signs. The chances of working in Germany 
                                               
19 Note that the variable “duration spent out-of-employment since 
arrival’ in the model equals to years since migration for all women in the 
sample but women who arrived single, who were in Germany some time 
prior to their date of marriage (i.e the starting time analysis for them). 
The declining shape of the hazard rate, however, remains even after 
excluding women unmarried at migration from my sample (see Appendix 
B). 
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decrease the older the woman was at arrival and increase the older 
she married. 
 
Country of Origin 
 
Results obtained in Model 2 indicate that first generation 
women from all nationalities, in particular Greeks and Spaniards, 
are more likely to work in Germany than Turks (reference 
category). If we take into account here the results obtained in 
Chapter 4, which indicated that Greek women were the most likely 
to migrate jointly with their husbands and to leave their children 
behind for a while, it seems that Greek women were the most 
strongly work oriented among female immigrants from the five 
recruitment countries. However, these results might change once 
additional variables that are known to widely vary across national 
groups are added to the model.  
 
Human Capital 
 
Results in Model 3 indicate that, contrary to what the human 
capital theory would predict, the propensity of immigrant women 
to work in Germany does not increase with education, which 
reinforces the previous finding that employability does not 
increase either with time of residence in the country of 
immigration. The well-established ethnic and sex-segmentation 
within the German occupational structure may be important in 
explaining these two results.  
On the contrary, years of previous work experience 
substantially increase the likelihood of participating in the German 
labor force for immigrant women (see the positive coefficient of 
this variable in Model 4, as well as the improvement in the overall 
fit of the model).20 The inclusion of this variable, in addition, 
                                               
20 It is important to remark that this variable measures actual 
experience, instead of potential work experience, which was the variable 
utilized by Dustman and Schmidt (2000) in their analysis of wage 
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reduces the size of the differences across national groups, which 
suggest that the higher propensity to work among Greek and 
Spanish women (compared to Turks) is partially due to the fact 
that they had more work experience at arrival. 
A caveat is in order with regard to the variable “years of 
previous work experience”. Although for most women in the 
sample it measures exclusively pre-migration work experience, for 
the group of women who were unmarried at migration this 
variable measures jointly “years of pre-migration experience” plus 
“pre-marital work experience acquired in Germany”, since they 
enter into the analysis at the date of their marriage. However, the 
strong effect of “previous experience” does not disappear when I 
ran the model only for women married at migration, nor when I 
include only pre-migration experience (see Appendix B). 
                                                                                                
performance. This entails a noticeable advantage since potential work 
experience is known to be a very bad approximation for women, who 
often have careers with several and relatively prolonged interruptions. In 
fact, when I ran the models with potential experience, instead of actual 
experience, the variable was not even significant. 
 
 
Table 6.3. First entry into the German labor market since the date of marriage 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
           
18-35 
months 
-2.35** 
0.14 
-2.30** 
0.14 
-2.30** 
0.14 
-2.25** 
0.14 
-2.24** 
0.14 
-2.21** 
0.14 
-2.21** 
0.14 
-2.14** 
0.14 
-2.15** 
0.14 
-2.13** 
0.14 
           
36-72 
months 
-2.64** 
0.17 
-2.59** 
0.17 
-2.59** 
0.17 
-2.56** 
0.17 
-2.56** 
0.17 
-2.52** 
0.17 
-2.57** 
0.18 
-2.43** 
0.18 
-2.48** 
0.18 
-2.42** 
0.18 
           
73-120 
months 
-2.65** 
0.16 
-2.61** 
0.17 
-2.61** 
0.17 
-2.56** 
0.17 
-2.57** 
0.17 
-2.54** 
0.17 
-2.64** 
0.18 
-2.46** 
0.19 
-2.55** 
0.19 
-2.48** 
0.19 
           
121 + 
months 
-2.85** 
0.13 
-2.81** 
0.12 
-2.81** 
0.13 
-2.78** 
0.14 
-2.79** 
0.14 
-2.77** 
0.14 
-3.13** 
0.17 
-2.76** 
0.19 
-2.98** 
0.21 
-2.87** 
0.21 
           
Age at 
Migr. 
-0.04** 
0.01 
-0.04** 
0.01 
-0.04** 
0.01 
-0.07** 
0.01 
-0.05** 
0.01 
-0.07** 
0.01 
-0.09** 
0.01 
-0.10** 
0.01 
-0.09** 
0.01 
-0.10** 
0.01 
           
Age at 
Marr. 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
           
Former 
Yug. 
 0.76** 
0.12 
0.77** 
0.13 
0.72** 
0.14 
0.67** 
0.15 
0.56** 
0.15 
0.55** 
0.16 
0.45** 
0.16 
0.43** 
0.16 
0.45** 
0.16 
           
Greece   1.23** 
0.17 
1.23** 
0.17 
0.77** 
0.21 
0.73** 
0.22 
0.69** 
0.22 
0.70** 
0.21 
0.45** 
0.21 
0.46** 
0.21 
0.45** 
0.21 
           
Italy   0.75** 
0.14 
0.74** 
0.14 
0.78** 
0.16 
0.72** 
0.17 
0.71** 
0.17 
0.69** 
0.17 
0.41** 
0.18 
0.41** 
0.18 
0.35* 
0.18 
           
Spain   0.91** 
0.19 
0.91** 
0.19 
0.82** 
0.23 
0.77** 
0.23 
0.78** 
0.23 
0.75** 
0.22 
0.36 
0.23 
0.33 
0.23 
0.32 
0.23 
           
Years of 
Educ. 
  -0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.05 
 
 
Work Exp.    0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
           
Single 
At mig. 
    0.70** 
0.19 
0.28 
0.23 
0.28 
0.23 
0.50** 
0.24 
0.52** 
0.24 
0.55** 
0.24 
           
First-
Mover 
     0.60** 
0.28 
0.57** 
0.29 
0.49 
0.3 
0.48 
0.3 
0.47 
0.3 
           
Imported 
Bride 
     -0.58** 
0.15 
-0.53** 
0.16 
-0.32** 
0.16 
-0.29* 
0.16 
-0.28* 
0.16 
           
Pregnancy       -0.82** 
0.19 
-0.92** 
0.19 
-0.93** 
0.19 
-0.94** 
0.19 
           
Number of 
Kids 
      0.01 
0.05 
0.08 
0.05 
0.07 
0.05 
0.07 
0.05 
           
Youngest 
is under 6 
      -0.11 
0.15 
-0.2 
0.15 
-0.2 
0.15 
-0.25 
0.15 
           
Youngest 
is 6-16 
      0.58** 
0.18 
0.58** 
0.19 
0.58** 
0.18 
0.54** 
0.18 
           
Female 
Unemp. 
Rate 
       -0.10** 
0.02 
-0.07** 
0.03 
-0.08** 
0.03 
           
Post-halt 
Arrival 
        -0.36* 
0.22 
-1.71** 
0.61 
           
Post-
halt*Years 
in Educ. 
         0.16** 
0.07 
           
Constant -2.89** 
0.25 
-2.90** 
0.28 
-2.85** 
0.37 
-1.68** 
0.45 
-1.80** 
0.44 
-1.37** 
0.46 
-1.04** 
0.45 
-0.81* 
0.48 
-0.78 
0.48 
-0.16 
0.56 
Log-likel. 
Events 
-2,953 
649 
-2,894 
649 
-2,894 
649 
-2,779 
649 
-2,762 
649 
-2,745 
649 
-2,713 
649 
-2,682 
649 
-2,679 
649 
-2,674 
649 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. ** Significant at 95%. * Significant at 90%. 
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Family-Life Cycle 
 
Marital status at migration and the timing of migration within the 
couple 
 
Model 5 shows that the coefficient for the variable “unmarried 
at migration” is positive (ß= 0.70) and significant, which confirm 
the idea that adult women who migrated unmarried are more likely 
to work in the country of immigration than their married 
counterparts, even after getting married themselves.21 Note that the 
introduction of the variable “unmarried”, however, does not 
eliminate differences across nationalities (only the positive 
coefficients of Yugoslav and Spanish women reduce slightly). 
In Model 6, first-mover wives, imported brides and reunited 
wives (reference category) are separated, in order to examine 
whether the timing of migration within the couple can be taken as 
an indicator revealing different preferences for work and, 
ultimately, different reasons for migration. My expectations in this 
regard are confirmed. The coefficient of “first-mover” is positive 
and significant (ß=0.60), which implies that women who preceded 
their husbands in migration are more likely to work in Germany 
than reunited wives (reference category). By contrast, imported 
brides appeared to be the least prone to participate in the German 
labor force (ß=-0.58), even when they are compared to reunited 
wives which are the omitted group in this model. Note that, after 
controlling for these differences in the timing of migration within 
the women’s couples, the higher propensity to work of the 
Yugoslavian women compared to the Turks reduce a little, 
indicating that part of the previous differences were due to both 
the larger number of imported wives among Turks and the larger 
number of first-movers among Yugoslavian women. 
                                               
21 On this point, it is important to remind that the sample is restricted 
to women who arrived in Germany at working age (i.e. first adult 
generation), which assures that the coefficient for “marital status at 
arrival” is uncontaminated by other effects like being of middle or 
second generation. 
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However, the differences found across the four groups of 
women identified (i.e. unmarried at migration, first-mover wives, 
reunited wives and imported brides) and, especially, between 
imported and reunited wives may have to do with the differences 
in the number of children they had and their ages. In fact, in the 
previous chapters I have showed that women in these two groups 
migrated, on average, at different stages of their family life cycle. 
Most reunited wives had married long before migration and 
usually had children at the time their husband left. In contrast, 
most imported brides arrived in Germany as newly married 
childless women. Therefore, while most reunited wives only had 
children of school age by the time they arrived to Germany, most 
imported wives were newly married and began to have children 
immediately after. 
In order to test this possibility, in Model 7 I have added four 
time-varying variables that indicate whether the woman is 
pregnant or not, the total number of kids, and whether the 
youngest child is under 6 or between 6 and 16. Pregnancy has a 
strong negative impact on work propensity (ß=-0.82). In addition, 
women who only have children of school age are significantly 
more likely to work than childless women (reference category, see 
ß=0.58). The absence of effect of the total number of children and, 
above all, of having at least one child of pre-school age on the 
propensity to work of immigrant women is in line with the 
previous findings in the literature, which suggested that children 
usually constitute a smaller obstacle for immigrant women than 
for native women (Stier and Tienda, 1992; Long 1980; Beach and 
Worswick, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1996; Dustmann, 2000). In 
fact, the available studies of the employment cycles of German 
women’s usually conclude that both pre-school children have a 
severe negative effect on their mother’s entry into employment, 
regardless of it is part or full-time (Blossfeld, Drobnic and 
Rowher, 2001: 69-70; Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rowher, 1999: 
140). However, the reason for such a differential effect of children 
for immigrant and native women remains unclear. The hypotheses 
that immigrant women have at disposal more flexible child-care 
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arrangements, thanks to the help provided by other adult members 
of the family cannot be tested since the entire composition of the 
households included in GSOEP can be reconstructed only since 
1984, but not for the entire period under analysis here (1960-
2002). Something similar happens with regard to my idea that first 
generation immigrant women often left their pre-school children 
behind if they intended to work in Germany. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the positive effect of 
being a woman wife who preceded her husband in migration, as 
well as the negative effect of being an imported bride do not 
disappear –actually, hardly reduce- after controlling by children 
responsibilities. Therefore, even after controlling for differences in 
their length of residence in Germany, age at migration, age at 
marriage, country of origin, education, previous experience and 
children responsibilities, imported wives are significantly less 
likely to work in the host country than reunited wives (reference 
category). On the contrary, once differences in the birth biography 
and child-bearing are taken into account, differences between first-
mover wives and reunited ones in their propensity to work vanish. 
In the light of these results, the idea that the timing of 
migration within the couple may be helpful in predicting women’s 
preferences with regard to labor participation in the host labor 
market and, more generally, their reasons for migration seems 
justified. It remains to see, however, if these results are robust to 
the introduction of one last set of controls that capture the 
differences in the context of reception that each of these group of 
women had found in the host country. 
 
Changes in the context of reception: macro-economic 
conditions, immigration policy and their differential impact by 
nationality 
 
In order to explore the effect that the changing conditions in 
the context of reception have had on the labor participation of 
immigrant women in Germany, Models 8, 9 and 10 add to the 
previous specifications two variables. First of all, Model 8 
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includes a continuous time-varying covariate that measures the 
annual female unemployment rate. The effect is clearly negative 
and significant as expected (ß= -0.10), which indicates that a 
higher rate of female unemployment in Germany reduces the 
likelihood of entering the German labor force for immigrant 
women.  
Moreover, note that these differences in the macro-economic 
context are partially responsible for the differential work 
propensity previously found between our four types of immigrant 
women (unmarried at migration, first-movers, reunited and 
imported). First of all, the higher propensity to work of the first-
mover wives compared to the reunited ones, vanish after 
controlling for variations in the rate of female unemployment 
during the period these women were “searching” their first job in 
Germany. Secondly, the lower propensity of imported wives to 
participate in the German labor force compared to their reunited 
counterparts substantially reduces when the different macro-
economic context that each of these two groups of women 
encountered are taken into account (from ß= -0.53 in Model 7 to 
ß= - 0.32 in Model 8). 
These results do not imply that the timing of migration within 
the couple cannot be taken as a proxy for reasons to migrate but 
rather the opposite. In fact, first-mover wives probably migrated in 
larger numbers in years when their chances of getting a job in 
Germany were high, precisely because their main reason to 
migrate was economic. On the other hand, imported brides 
continued migrating in years of recession and despite of high 
levels of female unemployment because their primary motivation 
for migration was not work but marriage and family formation. 
As I said earlier, a bad macroeconomic context was probably 
not the only cause of the lower participation rate of women who 
arrived in the mid-seventies and after. The restrictive immigration 
policy implemented since the first oil shock in 1973, especially 
measures aimed at limiting the number of new foreign workers 
that entered the German labor forces as a mean to protect 
employment and wages of native workers, are likely to have 
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played an important role in explaining the poor performance of 
post-halt immigrant women. The ban on access to the “regular” 
labor market imposed by the “key date” regulations to foreigners 
admitted on the basis of family reunification provisions between 
1974 and 1979 are the paramount example of this. However, even 
after the “key date” rule was lifted in April 1979, long waiting 
periods (of up to four years after arrival) remained for issuing a 
work permit to spouses of foreign residents. 
I have investigated the effect of these restrictive measures on 
the access of immigrant women to the German labor market by 
means of two different variables:  “keydate2” and “posthalt”. The 
first variable (“keydate2”) identifies those women who arrived in 
Germany during the time the “key date” regulations were 
enforced, and compare them to the rest of women. The second 
variable (“posthalt”) separates the cohort of women who arrived 
during the recruitment period from the cohort who arrived after 
the end of recruitment. The results obtained for these two different 
operationalizations of the effect of the described restrictive 
policies are very similar. Therefore, in Table 6.3 I have included 
only the results for the second of them. However, the results 
obtained with the variable “keydate2” can be found in Appendix 
C, at the end of this chapter. 
Model 9 shows that women who arrived after the halt on 
recruitment (“posthalt”) are less likely to enter the German labor 
force than their pre-halt counterparts (see ß= - 0.36), although the 
coefficient is significant only at 90%. 
In addition, in Model 10, I added an interaction term between 
the variable “post-halt” and the variable “years of education” to 
examine if, as I hypothesized, the structural change occurred in the 
German economy did actually modified the conditions governing 
the employability of immigrant women. I expect for education to 
be better rewarded in terms of access to employment and wages 
after the halt on recruitment than earlier. The reason for such 
expectation is straightforward: during the fifties and the sixties, 
foreign labor was needed to alleviate the labor shortages in low-
skilled jobs at the manufacturing industries. In contrast, the oil 
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shock and the ensuing transformation of the world economy 
implied a necessary rationalization of the production system 
through the industrial upgrading and the elimination of 
redundancies. Employers became much more selective in their 
hiring behavior, especially taking into account that they had at 
their disposal a growing cohort of German young workers who 
had benefit from the recent educational expansion. 
The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and 
significant, which means that education did improve the 
employability of post-halt women (see ß=0.16, significant at 
95%). On the contrary, education did not affect the labor 
participation of immigrant women who arrived during the 
recruitment period (see coefficient for the variable “years of 
education” in Model 10), which is absolutely consistent with the 
type of jobs foreign workers were recruited for. Finally, after 
adding the interaction term, the main effect of “post-halt” (i.e. 
arrival to Germany after 1973) becomes much larger and robust 
than before, which confirm my expectation that the restrictive 
measures imposed by the German authorities on the labor 
integration of immigrants (and of female immigrants in particular) 
had a strong negative impact on their labor performance.22 
These results contradicts the conclusions achieved by 
Goodman (1984, 1987), in her study of the labor performance of 
Spanish and Turkish women in Germany. Based on their 17 in-
depth interviews with Spanish immigrant women living in a 
medium-size German town, she concluded that the main effect of 
the restrictive measures was not to lower the participation rate of 
immigrant women but rather to confine them to the “irregular” 
labor market. Unfortunately, the author did not explain the 
strategy followed to select these 17 immigrant women, although 
she explicitly admitted that the survey “clearly is not to be 
considered representative of all Spanish women in the FGR” (34). 
                                               
22 The results do not vary if I utilize the variable “keydate2”, as can 
be seen in Appendix C. 
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Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain how many of the women who 
reported to be working in my sample, did it illegally.23 
In order to better understand the changes occurred in the 
participation behavior of immigrant women before and after the 
halt on recruitment, I decided to run separate regressions for each 
of these two groups of women. The results are showed in Table 
6.4. 
As it can be seen, there are substantial differences in the way 
that several factors such as “time spent out of employment”, 
“country of origin”, “number of children”, “imported bride” status 
and “unemployment rate at arrival”, have affected the entry into 
the German labor force for these two cohorts of immigrant 
women. These separated regression models reveal that women 
who entered Germany after the halt on recruitment were not only 
substantially less likely to work than their pre-halt counterparts 
but, in addition, those who ultimately worked took much longer to 
find a job. It is interesting to note that although time spent out of 
employment did reduce the likelihood of entering the labor force 
for women who migrated to Germany during the recruitment 
period, it did increase the employability of post-halt women 
(compare the coefficients of the four dummy variables measuring 
time out of employment since arrival in Germany in Model 4 for 
each group of women). More exactly, the rate of entry into the 
labor force for post-halt immigrant women increases over time 
(smaller negative coefficients), and it falls only for women who 
have been out of employment for more than 10 years without 
interruption. 
These results suggest that human-capital arguments that 
predict a decreasing entry rate into employment as time out of it 
                                               
23 There is no specific question about this dimension of the 
immigration experience in the GSOEP questionnaire. However, the 
retrospective nature of the data collection for this period of time may 
have helped in this regard: women who worked illegally during those 
years might be more prone to admit they did work (without having to say 
explicitly whether it was legal or illegal job) when they were asked about 
7 or 10 years later. 
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extends do not apply female immigrants who arrived during the 
recruitment phase but they do to their post-halt counterparts. In 
fact, the validity of the human capital approach to explain the fate 
of post-halt women in the German labor market gains grounds 
when one looks at the differential effect of education across these 
two cohorts. The level of education was irrelevant in predicting 
differences in first entry into the German labor force among pre-
halt immigrant women, whereas its effect was positive and 
significant for the employment chances of the post-halt immigrant 
cohort. 
Secondly, I would like to highlight the fact that the set of 
variables that measure the effect of marital status at migration and 
the timing of migration within the couple do not have a significant 
effect in predicting the likelihood of labor participation of post-
halt women. Therefore, the lower rate of activity of the post-halt 
cohort compared to their pre-halt counterparts is not related to the 
larger number of reunited and imported wives that arrived in 
Germany since the mid-seventies. 
Finally, one of the most remarkable findings achieved by 
running these two separated regression models is the differential 
propensity to work across nationalities and how it changed across 
the two cohorts. Within the pre-halt cohort, Yugoslav and Greek 
women were significantly more likely to work than Turks 
(reference category). On the contrary, within the post-halt cohort, 
Italian women are by far the most likely to work; in fact, 
differences between the other four groups are not significant. This 
result bluntly illustrates the discriminatory effect that the ban on 
recruitment and its accompanying measures, which were not 
applied to Italians because of their EC-membership, had on the 
integration of immigrant women into the German labor market.24 
                                               
24 In Appendix D, I re-ran the model after restricting the sample to 
those women who arrived to Germany between 1975 and 1980 (the 
period when the key date regulations were strictly enforced). In this case, 
Italians also remain the only group more likely to work than Turks. 
 
 
 Table 6.4. First entry into the German labor force by period of arrival 
 WOMEN WHO ARRIVED EARLIER 
THAN 1974 
WOMEN WHO ARRIVED IN 1974 OR 
LATER 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
18-35 months -2.55** 
0.17 
-2.49** 
0.17 
-2.37** 
0.18 
-2.39** 
0.18 
-1.77** 
0.23 
-1.73** 
0.23 
-1.62** 
0.24 
-1.61** 
0.23 
         
36-72 months -3.08** 
0.24 
-3.01** 
0.24 
-2.89** 
0.25 
-3.04** 
0.25 
-1.79** 
0.26 
-1.72** 
0.26 
-1.58** 
0.27 
-1.57** 
0.28 
         
73-120 months -3.77** 
0.3 
-3.71** 
0.31 
-3.58** 
0.33 
-3.89** 
0.34 
-1.33** 
0.21 
-1.23** 
0.22 
-1.12** 
0.24 
-1.09** 
0.25 
         
121 + months -3.52** 
0.16 
-3.41** 
0.17 
-3.30** 
0.26 
-4.01** 
0.33 
-1.64** 
0.23 
-1.49** 
0.22 
-1.65** 
0.27 
-1.61** 
0.29 
         
Age at Migration -0.05** 
0.01 
-0.05** 
0.01 
-0.08** 
0.02 
-0.12** 
0.02 
-0.04** 
0.01 
-0.05** 
0.01 
-0.06** 
0.02 
-0.06** 
0.02 
         
Age at Marriage 0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
         
Former Yug.  0.79** 
0.2 
0.62** 
0.2 
0.57** 
0.2 
 0.21 
0.23 
0.17 
0.25 
0.17 
0.25 
         
Greece  1.10** 
0.27 
0.65** 
0.27 
0.61** 
0.26 
 0.01 
0.42 
0.06 
0.39 
0.04 
0.4 
         
Italy  0.3 
0.22 
0.25 
0.24 
0.18 
0.23 
 1.17** 
0.24 
1.08** 
0.26 
1.06** 
0.26 
         
Spain  0.59** 
0.26 
0.46* 
0.26 
0.33 
0.25 
 1.11** 
0.53 
0.91 
0.61 
0.89 
0.61 
         
 
 
Years of 
Education 
 -0.04 
0.05 
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.05 
 0.13** 
0.05 
0.12** 
0.05 
0.12** 
0.05 
         
Work Experience  0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
 0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
         
Unmarried 
At Migration 
  0.53* 
0.31 
0.57* 
0.31 
  0.38 
0.4 
0.39 
0.4 
         
First-Mover Wife   0.38 
0.35 
0.36 
0.35 
  0.28 
0.63 
0.29 
0.64 
         
Imported Bride   -0.37* 
0.21 
-0.38* 
0.21 
  -0.29 
0.29 
-0.27 
0.29 
         
Pregnancy   -1.07** 
0.24 
-1.07** 
0.24 
  -0.82** 
0.34 
-0.83** 
0.34 
         
Number of Kids   0.11 
0.07 
0.14* 
0.07 
  -0.04 
0.08 
-0.04 
0.08 
         
Youngest is 
under 6 
  -0.24 
0.2 
-0.28 
0.2 
  -0.38 
0.24 
-0.39 
0.24 
         
Youngest is 6-16   0.67** 
0.22 
0.66** 
0.23 
  0.49* 
0.28 
0.48* 
0.28 
         
Female Unemp. 
Rate 
   -0.07 
0.04 
   -0.02 
0.04 
         
Constant -1.89** 
0.35 
-1.77** 
0.65 
0.08 
0.66 
0.57 
0.66 
-4.02** 
0.4 
-4.53** 
0.53 
-3.75** 
0.61 
-3.66** 
0.63 
Log-likelihood 
Events 
-1778 
453 
-1659 
453 
-1605 
453 
-1603 
453 
-1065 
196 
-1022 
196 
-1003 
196 
-1003 
196 
 Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%. 
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In Appendix E, I re-ran the same models for each cohort but 
excluding women who were single at migration, in order to 
eliminate possible distortions derived from the selective nature of 
this type of female migration. Most results remain unchanged, 
with the only two exceptions: 1) the negative effect of being an 
imported wife (compared to reunited wife) within the pre-halt 
cohort becomes larger and more robust and, 2) pre-halt Italian 
women were slightly more likely to work than Turks, which 
underlies the highly selective nature of single female Turkish 
immigrants. 
 
Husband’s characteristics 
 
The inclusion of two variables that measure the husband’s 
years of education and his length of residence in Germany did not 
modify the results commented so far. In fact, none of these two 
variables is significant. However, it is important to remind that in 
this chapter I have analyzed only first entry into the labor force. 
There is a possibility that these variables do affect exits from the 
labor force and/or re-entries. I will test this possibility in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
In the present chapter I have analyzed the main determinants 
of the first entry into the German labor force among first 
generation immigrant women (i.e. women who immigrated at 16 
or older). In other words, I have examined the reasons why some 
immigrant women have worked in Germany, whereas others have 
never entered the German labor force. The obtained results 
suggest there is a main underlying the differences in the labor 
behavior of immigrant women: the context of reception they 
encountered at their arrival in Germany. In fact, a higher level of 
female unemployment in the host economy and having arrived 
during the post-halt period were two of the factors that most 
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negatively affected the labor participation of women who were of 
working age at their arrival in Germany. Conversely, the idea that 
women who arrived after the halt on recruitment were less likely 
to work in Germany because they mostly were women who 
followed their husbands in migration and, therefore, migrated for 
family instead of economic reasons, do  not receive support from 
the data. In fact, the negative effect of having entered in Germany 
after the halt on recruitment remain even after neutralizing the 
differences in the marital status and the timing of migration within 
the couple between the two cohorts of women. Moreover, within 
the pre-halt cohort, women who were single at migration did 
participate more than reunited wives. However, in the post-halt 
period there is no significant difference in the likelihood of 
participating between unmarried migrants, women who preceded 
their husbands in migration, imported brides and reunited wives. 
In sum, the analyses carried out in this chapter have 
demonstrated that the halt on recruitment and its accompanying 
measures, along with the differences in the economic situation in 
Germany, implied a genuine structural change in the context of 
reception that immigrants encountered at their arrival to Germany. 
And that this change had, at least in the case of adult women, a 
long-lasting impact in the life of immigrants. 
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Life Table 1. First entry into the German labor force (since the date of 
marriage) 
                 Beg.     Cum.     Std.                Std. 
   Interval     Total   Failure   Error    Hazard     Error    [95% Conf. Int.] 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    1     2       850    0.4141  0.0169    0.4141    0.0221    0.3720    0.4585 
    2     3       498    0.4165  0.0169    0.0040    0.0028    0.0005    0.0112 
    3     4       496    0.4176  0.0169    0.0020    0.0020    0.0001    0.0074 
    4     5       495    0.4200  0.0169    0.0040    0.0029    0.0005    0.0113 
    5     6       493    0.4224  0.0169    0.0041    0.0029    0.0005    0.0113 
    7     8       491    0.4282  0.0170    0.0102    0.0046    0.0033    0.0209 
    9    10       486    0.4306  0.0170    0.0041    0.0029    0.0005    0.0115 
   12    13       484    0.4859  0.0171    0.0971    0.0142    0.0714    0.1268 
   13    14       436    0.4871  0.0171    0.0023    0.0023    0.0001    0.0085 
   15    16       435    0.4882  0.0171    0.0023    0.0023    0.0001    0.0085 
   16    17       434    0.4906  0.0171    0.0046    0.0033    0.0006    0.0128 
   17    18       432    0.4918  0.0171    0.0023    0.0023    0.0001    0.0085 
   18    19       431    0.4930  0.0171    0.0023    0.0023    0.0001    0.0086 
   19    20       430    0.4953  0.0171    0.0047    0.0033    0.0006    0.0130 
   20    21       427    0.4965  0.0172    0.0023    0.0023    0.0001    0.0086 
   24    25       426    0.5249  0.0171    0.0563    0.0115    0.0361    0.0810 
   25    26       394    0.5273  0.0171    0.0051    0.0036    0.0006    0.0141 
   27    28       392    0.5297  0.0171    0.0051    0.0036    0.0006    0.0142 
   28    29       390    0.5309  0.0171    0.0026    0.0026    0.0001    0.0095 
   30    31       389    0.5309  0.0171    0.0000         .         .         . 
   31    32       388    0.5321  0.0171    0.0026    0.0026    0.0001    0.0095 
   32    33       385    0.5333  0.0171    0.0026    0.0026    0.0001    0.0096 
   34    35       384    0.5345  0.0171    0.0026    0.0026    0.0001    0.0096 
   36    37       383    0.5637  0.0171    0.0627    0.0128    0.0401    0.0901 
   42    43       329    0.5664  0.0171    0.0061    0.0043    0.0007    0.0169 
   43    44       327    0.5690  0.0171    0.0061    0.0043    0.0007    0.0170 
   44    45       324    0.5703  0.0171    0.0031    0.0031    0.0001    0.0114 
   46    47       323    0.5717  0.0170    0.0031    0.0031    0.0001    0.0114 
   48    49       322    0.5863  0.0170    0.0342    0.0103    0.0171    0.0571 
   55    56       307    0.5890  0.0170    0.0065    0.0046    0.0008    0.0181 
   57    58       304    0.5903  0.0170    0.0033    0.0033    0.0001    0.0121 
   58    59       303    0.5917  0.0170    0.0033    0.0033    0.0001    0.0122 
   59    60       302    0.5944  0.0170    0.0066    0.0047    0.0008    0.0184 
   60    61       300    0.6133  0.0170    0.0467    0.0125    0.0255    0.0741 
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 . 
 . 
 . 
  136   137       167    0.7108  0.0165    0.0060    0.0060    0.0002    0.0221 
  140   141       166    0.7125  0.0165    0.0060    0.0060    0.0002    0.0222 
  141   142       165    0.7142  0.0165    0.0061    0.0061    0.0002    0.0224 
  142   143       164    0.7195  0.0164    0.0183    0.0106    0.0038    0.0441 
  144   145       161    0.7282  0.0164    0.0311    0.0139    0.0101    0.0636 
  148   149       152    0.7300  0.0164    0.0066    0.0066    0.0002    0.0243 
  151   152       151    0.7300  0.0164    0.0000         .         .         . 
  155   156       150    0.7336  0.0164    0.0133    0.0094    0.0016    0.0371 
  156   157       148    0.7390  0.0163    0.0203    0.0117    0.0042    0.0488 
  157   158       141    0.7408  0.0163    0.0071    0.0071    0.0002    0.0262 
  158   159       140    0.7427  0.0163    0.0071    0.0071    0.0002    0.0263 
  159   160       139    0.7445  0.0163    0.0072    0.0072    0.0002    0.0265 
  160   161       138    0.7464  0.0163    0.0072    0.0072    0.0002    0.0267 
  163   164       137    0.7482  0.0163    0.0073    0.0073    0.0002    0.0269 
  165   166       136    0.7519  0.0162    0.0147    0.0104    0.0018    0.0410 
  168   169       134    0.7575  0.0162    0.0224    0.0129    0.0046    0.0539 
  171   172       121    0.7595  0.0162    0.0083    0.0083    0.0002    0.0305 
  173   174       120    0.7615  0.0162    0.0083    0.0083    0.0002    0.0307 
  175   176       119    0.7635  0.0161    0.0084    0.0084    0.0002    0.0310 
  180   181       117    0.7675  0.0161    0.0171    0.0121    0.0021    0.0476 
  187   188       106    0.7719  0.0161    0.0189    0.0133    0.0023    0.0526 
  190   191       104    0.7741  0.0161    0.0096    0.0096    0.0002    0.0355 
  192   193       103    0.7763  0.0161    0.0097    0.0097    0.0002    0.0358 
  199   200        96    0.7833  0.0161    0.0313    0.0180    0.0064    0.0753 
  200   201        92    0.7857  0.0161    0.0109    0.0109    0.0003    0.0401 
  204   205        91    0.7951  0.0161    0.0440    0.0220    0.0120    0.0963 
  206   207        85    0.7975  0.0160    0.0118    0.0118    0.0003    0.0434 
  208   209        84    0.7999  0.0160    0.0119    0.0119    0.0003    0.0439 
  212   213        83    0.8023  0.0160    0.0120    0.0120    0.0003    0.0444 
  216   217        82    0.8047  0.0160    0.0122    0.0122    0.0003    0.0450 
  218   219        76    0.8073  0.0160    0.0132    0.0132    0.0003    0.0485 
  219   220        75    0.8099  0.0160    0.0133    0.0133    0.0003    0.0492 
  223   224        74    0.8124  0.0160    0.0135    0.0135    0.0003    0.0498 
  225   226        73    0.8150  0.0160    0.0137    0.0137    0.0003    0.0505 
  226   227        72    0.8176  0.0160    0.0139    0.0139    0.0004    0.0512 
  228   229        71    0.8176  0.0160    0.0000         .         .         . 
  230   231        65    0.8204  0.0160    0.0154    0.0154    0.0004    0.0568 
  231   232        64    0.8232  0.0159    0.0156    0.0156    0.0004    0.0576 
  232   233        63    0.8288  0.0159    0.0317    0.0224    0.0038    0.0884 
  235   236        61    0.8288  0.0159    0.0000         .         .         . 
  240   241        60    0.8316  0.0159    0.0167    0.0167    0.0004    0.0615 
  244   245        56    0.8347  0.0159    0.0179    0.0179    0.0005    0.0659 
  247   248        55    0.8347  0.0159    0.0000         .         .         . 
  252   253        54    0.8377  0.0159    0.0185    0.0185    0.0005    0.0683 
  255   256        50    0.8410  0.0159    0.0200    0.0200    0.0005    0.0738 
  259   260        49    0.8442  0.0159    0.0204    0.0204    0.0005    0.0753 
  264   265        47    0.8442  0.0159    0.0000         .         .         . 
  276   277        43    0.8442  0.0159    0.0000         .         .         . 
  288   289        37    0.8442  0.0159    0.0000         .         .         . 
  299   300        33    0.8489  0.0161    0.0303    0.0303    0.0008    0.1118 
  300   301        32    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  312   313        27    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  324   325        26    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  336   337        25    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  348   349        21    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  360   361        17    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  372   373        11    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  384   385        10    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  396   397         8    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  403   404         4    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  408   409         3    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
  456   457         1    0.8489  0.0161    0.0000         .         .         . 
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Life Table 2. All entries into the German labor force (since the date of 
marriage) 
                 Beg.     Cum.     Std.                Std. 
   Interval     Total   Failure   Error    Hazard     Error    [95% Conf. Int.] 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    1     2       853    0.0950  0.0100    0.0950    0.0106    0.0754    0.1167 
    2     3       772    0.0961  0.0101    0.0013    0.0013    0.0000    0.0048 
    3     4       771    0.0996  0.0103    0.0039    0.0022    0.0008    0.0094 
    4     5       768    0.1008  0.0103    0.0013    0.0013    0.0000    0.0048 
    5     6       767    0.1043  0.0105    0.0039    0.0023    0.0008    0.0094 
    6     7       763    0.1079  0.0106    0.0039    0.0023    0.0008    0.0095 
    7     8       759    0.1137  0.0109    0.0066    0.0029    0.0021    0.0135 
    8     9       753    0.1149  0.0109    0.0013    0.0013    0.0000    0.0049 
    9    10       752    0.1208  0.0112    0.0066    0.0030    0.0022    0.0136 
   11    12       746    0.1208  0.0112    0.0000         .         .         . 
   12    13       744    0.1669  0.0128    0.0524    0.0084    0.0373    0.0701 
   13    14       700    0.1716  0.0129    0.0057    0.0029    0.0016    0.0125 
   14    15       696    0.1728  0.0130    0.0014    0.0014    0.0000    0.0053 
   15    16       695    0.1740  0.0130    0.0014    0.0014    0.0000    0.0053 
   16    17       693    0.1764  0.0131    0.0029    0.0020    0.0003    0.0080 
   17    18       690    0.1800  0.0132    0.0043    0.0025    0.0009    0.0105 
   18    19       685    0.1824  0.0133    0.0029    0.0021    0.0004    0.0081 
   19    20       683    0.1848  0.0133    0.0029    0.0021    0.0004    0.0082 
   20    21       680    0.1872  0.0134    0.0029    0.0021    0.0004    0.0082 
   22    23       676    0.1872  0.0134    0.0000         .         .         . 
   23    24       672    0.1872  0.0134    0.0000         .         .         . 
   24    25       671    0.2029  0.0138    0.0194    0.0054    0.0103    0.0312 
   25    26       646    0.2054  0.0139    0.0031    0.0022    0.0004    0.0086 
 . 
 . 
 . 
   51    52       523    0.2805  0.0157    0.0038    0.0027    0.0005    0.0107 
   52    53       521    0.2805  0.0157    0.0000         .         .         . 
   53    54       520    0.2832  0.0158    0.0038    0.0027    0.0005    0.0107 
   54    55       517    0.2860  0.0158    0.0039    0.0027    0.0005    0.0108 
   55    56       514    0.2888  0.0159    0.0039    0.0028    0.0005    0.0108 
   56    57       510    0.2930  0.0160    0.0059    0.0034    0.0012    0.0142 
   57    58       507    0.2944  0.0160    0.0020    0.0020    0.0000    0.0073 
   58    59       503    0.2958  0.0160    0.0020    0.0020    0.0001    0.0073 
   59    60       501    0.2986  0.0161    0.0040    0.0028    0.0005    0.0111 
   60    61       498    0.3239  0.0166    0.0361    0.0085    0.0214    0.0547 
   62    63       461    0.3269  0.0166    0.0043    0.0031    0.0005    0.0121 
 . 
 . 
   77    78       415    0.3672  0.0174    0.0024    0.0024    0.0001    0.0089 
   78    79       413    0.3703  0.0174    0.0048    0.0034    0.0006    0.0135 
   79    80       411    0.3703  0.0174    0.0000         .         .         . 
   80    81       410    0.3734  0.0175    0.0049    0.0034    0.0006    0.0136 
   81    82       405    0.3749  0.0175    0.0025    0.0025    0.0001    0.0091 
   82    83       402    0.3765  0.0175    0.0025    0.0025    0.0001    0.0092 
   84    85       401    0.3967  0.0178    0.0324    0.0090    0.0173    0.0523 
   85    86       372    0.3983  0.0178    0.0027    0.0027    0.0001    0.0099 
   86    87       371    0.3983  0.0178    0.0000         .         .         . 
   87    88       369    0.3999  0.0179    0.0027    0.0027    0.0001    0.0100 
   89    90       367    0.3999  0.0179    0.0000         .         .         . 
   90    91       365    0.4032  0.0179    0.0055    0.0039    0.0007    0.0153 
   91    92       362    0.4032  0.0179    0.0000         .         .         . 
   92    93       360    0.4065  0.0180    0.0056    0.0039    0.0007    0.0155 
   93    94       358    0.4099  0.0180    0.0056    0.0040    0.0007    0.0156 
   94    95       356    0.4099  0.0180    0.0000         .         .         . 
   95    96       355    0.4099  0.0180    0.0000         .         .         . 
   96    97       354    0.4232  0.0182    0.0226    0.0080    0.0098    0.0407 
 . 
 . 
 . 
 . 
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  220   221        94    0.6607  0.0217    0.0000         .         .         . 
  223   224        92    0.6680  0.0219    0.0217    0.0154    0.0026    0.0606 
  225   226        90    0.6717  0.0219    0.0111    0.0111    0.0003    0.0410 
  226   227        89    0.6754  0.0220    0.0112    0.0112    0.0003    0.0414 
  228   229        88    0.6754  0.0220    0.0000         .         .         . 
  229   230        81    0.6794  0.0221    0.0123    0.0123    0.0003    0.0455 
  230   231        80    0.6834  0.0222    0.0125    0.0125    0.0003    0.0461 
  231   232        79    0.6874  0.0223    0.0127    0.0127    0.0003    0.0467 
 
  311   312        34    0.7386  0.0242    0.0294    0.0294    0.0007    0.1085 
  312   313        33    0.7386  0.0242    0.0000         .         .         . 
  324   325        30    0.7386  0.0242    0.0000         .         .         . 
  336   337        29    0.7477  0.0250    0.0345    0.0345    0.0009    0.1272 
  348   349        23    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  360   361        19    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  372   373        13    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  384   385        11    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  396   397         9    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  403   404         5    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  408   409         4    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
  456   457         1    0.7477  0.0250    0.0000         .         .         . 
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 First entry WITHOUT WOMEN UNMARRIED AT MIGRATION 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
(ref. less than 18 
months) 
       
18-35 months -2.02** 
0.15 
-1.99** 
0.15 
-1.97** 
0.15 
-1.97** 
0.15 
-1.98** 
0.15 
-1.92** 
0.15 
-1.95** 
0.15 
36-72 months -2.43** 
0.19 
-2.39** 
0.19 
-2.39** 
0.19 
-2.37** 
0.19 
-2.40** 
0.19 
-2.24** 
0.2 
-2.31** 
0.21 
73-120 months -2.43** 
0.19 
-2.38** 
0.19 
-2.43** 
0.19 
-2.41** 
0.19 
-2.44** 
0.19 
-2.19** 
0.21 
-2.23** 
0.21 
121 + months -2.82** 
0.17 
-2.77** 
0.16 
-2.94** 
0.17 
-2.92** 
0.17 
-2.96** 
0.17 
-2.42** 
0.26 
-2.43** 
0.27 
Age at migration -0.07** 
0.01 
-0.08** 
0.01 
-0.08** 
0.01 
-0.08** 
0.01 
-0.08** 
0.01 
-0.09** 
0.01 
-0.09** 
0.01 
(ref. Turkey)        
Ex-Yugoslav 0.68** 
0.16 
0.58** 
0.17 
0.53** 
0.17 
0.54** 
0.17 
0.50** 
0.17 
0.52** 
0.17 
0.49** 
0.17 
Greek 0.92** 
0.23 
0.86** 
0.23 
0.74** 
0.23 
0.75** 
0.23 
0.67** 
0.22 
0.62** 
0.22 
0.60** 
0.23 
Italian 0.80** 
0.16 
0.80** 
0.17 
0.66** 
0.18 
0.63** 
0.18 
0.57** 
0.18 
0.56** 
0.18 
0.57** 
0.18 
 
 
 
Spanish 0.70** 
0.25 
0.74** 
0.25 
0.50* 
0.26 
0.52** 
0.26 
0.48* 
0.25 
0.44* 
0.25 
0.37 
0.25 
Years of Education 0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0 
0.05 
-0.01 
0.05 
0 
0.05 
0 
0.05 
Previous Work 
Experience (in years) 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
Pregnancy -0.55** 
0.19 
-0.49** 
0.19 
-0.52** 
0.19 
-0.53** 
0.19 
-0.55** 
0.19 
-0.56** 
0.19 
-0.57** 
0.2 
Number of children -0.02 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
0.05 
0.01 
0.05 
0.01 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
(ref, no children)        
Youngest Child 0-5 0.18 
0.16 
0.18 
0.16 
0.11 
0.16 
0.09 
0.16 
0.11 
0.16 
0.06 
0.17 
0.09 
0.17 
Youngest Child 6-16 0.82** 
0.18 
0.80** 
0.18 
0.79** 
0.18 
0.77** 
0.18 
0.79** 
0.18 
0.78** 
0.19 
0.82** 
0.19 
Marrying at migration -0.28* 
0.15 
0 
0.16 
     
(ref. reunited)        
First-Mover  0.63** 
0.28 
0.58** 
0.29 
0.56* 
0.29 
0.53* 
0.29 
0.52* 
0.29 
0.51 
0.31 
Imported  -0.53** 
0.16 
-0.37** 
0.16 
-0.38** 
0.16 
-0.31** 
0.16 
-0.31** 
0.16 
-0.34** 
0.16 
(ref. Pre-halt)        
Post-halt arrival   -0.62** 
0.13 
-1.59** 
0.6 
-1.40** 
0.6 
-1.48** 
0.6 
-1.56** 
0.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Posthalt*Years of 
Education 
   0.11 
0.07 
0.17** 
0.07 
0.17** 
0.07 
0.17** 
0.08 
Female Unemp. Rate at 
arrival 
    -0.12** 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.06 
-0.01 
0.06 
Female Unemp. Rate      -0.09** 
0.04 
-0.09** 
0.04 
H’s Years of Education       0.01 
0.04 
Constant -1.86** 
0.45 
-1.57** 
0.47 
-1.41** 
0.48 
-1.02* 
0.57 
-0.8 
0.58 
-0.71 
0.58 
-0.83 
0.62 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%. 
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Replication of the regression in Table 24 including “keydate” instead of “post-halt” 
 Model 1 Model 2 
18-35 months -2.13** 
0.14 
-2.12** 
0.14 
36-72 months -2.42** 
0.18 
-2.41** 
0.18 
73-120 months -2.46** 
0.19 
-2.45** 
0.19 
121 + months -2.81** 
0.19 
-2.80** 
0.19 
Age at Migration -0.10** 
0.01 
-0.10** 
0.01 
Age at Marriage 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Former Yug. 0.47** 
0.15 
0.47** 
0.15 
Greece 0.47** 
0.21 
0.48** 
0.21 
Italy 0.41** 
0.18 
0.38** 
0.18 
Spain 0.34 
0.23 
0.33 
0.23 
Years of Education 0.03 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
 
 
Work Experience 0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
Unmarried 
At Migration 
0.50** 
0.24 
0.54** 
0.23 
First-Mover Wife 0.49 
0.31 
0.50* 
0.30 
Imported Bride -0.32** 
0.16 
-0.31* 
0.16 
Pregnancy -0.92** 
0.19 
-0.92** 
0.19 
Number of Kids 0.09* 
0.05 
0.10** 
0.05 
Youngest is under 6 -0.23 
0.15 
-0.24 
0.15 
Youngest is 6-16 0.56** 
0.18 
0.56** 
0.18 
Female Unemp. Rate -0.10** 
0.02 
-0.10** 
0.02 
Keydate -0.41** 
0.19 
-2.32** 
0.90 
Keydate * Eduyrs   0.22** 
0.10 
Constant -0.67 
0.48 
-0.49 
0.50 
Log-likelihood 
Events 
-2677 
649 
-2673 
649 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
First entry of women who arrived between 1974-1979 (key date 
regulations) 
Variable  
(ref. less than 18 months)  
18-35 months -2.74** 
0.60 
36-72 months -1.28** 
0.46 
73-120 months -0.25 
0.52 
121 + months -0.16 
0.62 
Age at migration -0.03 
0.04 
Age at first marriage 0.00 
0.01 
(ref. Turkey)  
Ex-Yugoslav -0.54 
0.48 
Greek -0.55 
0.71 
Italian 1.39** 
0.47 
Spanish 0.65 
0.92 
Years of Education 0.32** 
0.10 
Previous Work Experience (in years) 0.01** 
0.00 
Pregnancy 0.54 
0.75 
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(ref. no children)  
Number of children -0.40 
1.10 
Youngest Child 0-5 0.02 
0.49 
Youngest Child 6-16 -0.59 
0.58 
Marrying at migration -0.04 
0.13 
(ref. reunited)  
First-Mover -0.41 
0.39 
Imported 0.25 
0.45 
Rate of female unemployment -0.27** 
0.10 
Constant -4.62** 
1.26 
Log likelihood 
Events 
-365 
73 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. 
*Significant at 90%. 
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First Entry by period of arrival, EXCLUDING WOMEN UNMARRIED AT MIGRATION 
 Prehalt Posthalt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
18-35 months -2.12** 
0.18 
-2.11** 
0.18 
-2.11** 
0.18 
-1.41** 
0.27 
-1.41** 
0.27 
-1.40** 
0.27 
36-72 months -2.95** 
0.27 
-2.93** 
0.27 
-2.93** 
0.28 
-1.24** 
0.29 
-1.26** 
0.3 
-1.21** 
0.3 
73-120 months -3.61** 
0.33 
-3.59** 
0.32 
-3.59** 
0.36 
-0.69** 
0.26 
-0.71** 
0.27 
-0.59** 
0.29 
121 + months -3.58** 
0.21 
-3.57** 
0.21 
-3.57** 
0.35 
-1.20** 
0.29 
-1.24** 
0.3 
-1.07** 
0.35 
Age at migration -0.11** 
0.02 
-0.11** 
0.02 
-0.11** 
0.02 
-0.04** 
0.02 
-0.04** 
0.02 
-0.04** 
0.02 
Ex-Yugoslav 0.67** 
0.21 
0.66** 
0.21 
0.66** 
0.21 
0.09 
0.31 
0.08 
0.31 
0.09 
0.31 
Greek 0.86** 
0.28 
0.75** 
0.28 
0.75** 
0.28 
0.23 
0.38 
0.19 
0.39 
0.2 
0.38 
Italian 0.53** 
0.23 
0.45** 
0.23 
0.45** 
0.23 
1.14** 
0.27 
1.12** 
0.27 
1.10** 
0.27 
Spanish 0.46* 
0.27 
0.4 
0.27 
0.4 
0.26 
1.50** 
0.56 
1.47** 
0.56 
1.46** 
0.56 
 
 
Years of Education -0.02 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.05 
0.17** 
0.05 
0.18** 
0.06 
0.18** 
0.06 
Previous Work Experience (in years) 0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
Pregnancy -0.50** 
0.24 
-0.52** 
0.24 
-0.52** 
0.24 
-0.69* 
0.38 
-0.70* 
0.38 
-0.72* 
0.38 
Number of children 0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.1 
0.09 
-0.1 
0.09 
-0.09 
0.09 
Child 0-5 0.03 
0.21 
0.04 
0.21 
0.04 
0.21 
0.04 
0.29 
0.03 
0.29 
0 
0.29 
Child 6-16 0.86** 
0.23 
0.87** 
0.23 
0.87** 
0.23 
0.78** 
0.3 
0.77** 
0.3 
0.76** 
0.3 
First-Mover 0.46 
0.33 
0.39 
0.33 
0.39 
0.33 
0.23 
0.7 
0.23 
0.71 
0.26 
0.71 
Imported -0.41** 
0.2 
-0.37* 
0.2 
-0.37* 
0.2 
-0.3 
0.28 
-0.24 
0.29 
-0.24 
0.29 
Female Unemp. Rate at arrival  -0.27** 
0.1 
-0.27** 
0.11 
 -0.04 
0.06 
0.01 
0.07 
Female Unemp. Rate   0 
0.05 
  -0.06 
0.06 
Constant -0.18 
0.65 
0.25 
0.66 
0.25 
0.67 
-4.69** 
0.66 
-4.56** 
0.71 
-4.41** 
0.7 
Log likelihood 
Events 
-1388 
453 
-1384 
453 
-1384 
453 
-805 
196 
-805 
196 
-805 
196 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. *Significant at 90%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7. LINKING PROCESSES: 
MIGRATION, FAMILY AND WORK (II). 
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT CYCLES: 
EXITS AND RE-ENTRIES 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Employment cycles. A brief description 
 
Percentages in Table 7.1 show that approximately 2/3 of first 
generation immigrant women have either had one spell of 
employment, or none at all, during their stay in Germany; barely a 
quarter re-entered the labor market after having exited from the 
labor force once and only 14% have had more than two spells of 
employment during the observation period.  
First-mover and reunited wives are the groups most likely to 
experience one spell of employment in Germany, whereas women 
who migrated single and imported brides are the most likely to 
have experienced more than two. This might be related to the 
different stage of their family life cycle when these four groups of 
women migrated. Most women in the first two groups (unmarried 
at migration and imported brides) were young and childless when 
they arrived in Germany. In contrast, both first-mover and reunited 
wives were older and had, on average, more than one child at the 
time of their migration. These circumstances clearly favored the 
occurrence of more interruptions in the work careers of those 
women who migrated single and who were imported for the 
purpose of family formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1. Employment Cycles of Immigrant Women 
 All Unmarried First Reunited Imported Prehalt Posthalt 
Never worked  24.3 10.8 8.6 24.9 34.4 11.7 42.5 
Only one spell 
employment  
40.3 40.3 54.3 45.1 31.3 46.7 31 
Two spells of 
employment  
21.5 29.5 22.9 19.5 18.9 25.6 15.2 
More than 
two spells 
13.9 19.3 14.3 10.5 15.4 16 10.9 
N 860 175 35 390 259 512 348 
 Source: GSOEP, 2002. 
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In any case, the percentages in Table 7.1 suggest high 
employment stability and low chances of re-entering the labor 
force after an interruption. 
In the previous chapter I focused the analysis on the first entry 
into the German labor force, in order to separate out immigrant 
women who have worked in Germany from those who have never 
done it. Although this decision seemed justified both for 
substantive and methodological reasons, it is necessary to analyze 
both exits and re-entries to obtain a complete picture of the labor 
performance of immigrant women in their host country. This is the 
primary aim of the following pages. 
 
 
7.2. Re-entries into the labor force 
 
Only 485 women in my sample experienced a second entry 
into the German labor force. Therefore, the number of transitions 
utilized to estimate the coefficients reported in Table 7.2 was 
substantially lower than in the previous chapter. This may explain 
why just a few variables show statistically significant effects on 
the likelihood of re-entry into the labor force after having exiting.  
Time spent out of employment decreases the chances that the 
woman will obtain a second job, which is in line with the 
predictions of human capital theory. Women from the former 
Yugoslavia are the only group more likely to re-enter the labor 
force than Turks (reference category). Preceding the husband in 
migration also increases the likelihood of re-entering the labor 
force after an exit, while pregnancy severely reduces the 
likelihood of such a transition. Finally, the coefficient of the 
variable that measures the rate of female unemployment in 
Germany is positive and significant, which is a little surprising and 
difficult to interpret. 
In these estimations I have also introduced a new variable that 
measures the number of years a woman has been living in 
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Germany.1 Although the sign of the coefficient is positive, it does 
not reach the level of statistical significance. Therefore, there not 
exists “assimilation” into employment. Moreover, the time 
previously employed in Germany (i.e. “years of work experience 
in Germany”) does not affect the likelihood of experiencing the 
transition either. 
 
 
Table 7.2. Logit estimates of re-entering the German labor force, 
conditional on previous exit 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(ref. < =12 
months) 
       
13-36 
months 
-0.97** 
0.12 
-0.99** 
0.12 
-0.98** 
0.12 
-0.97** 
0.12 
-0.97** 
0.12 
-0.97** 
0.12 
-0.94** 
0.14 
37-60 
months 
-1.56** 
0.17 
-1.61** 
0.17 
-1.57** 
0.17 
-1.57** 
0.17 
-1.56** 
0.17 
-1.55** 
0.17 
-1.59** 
0.20 
61-96 
months 
-1.75** 
0.18 
-1.84** 
0.18 
-1.83** 
0.18 
-1.82** 
0.18 
-1.81** 
0.18 
-1.79** 
0.18 
-1.69** 
0.21 
97 or more -1.90** 
0.16 
-2.10** 
0.19 
-2.11** 
0.19 
-2.09** 
0.19 
-2.09** 
0.19 
-2.08** 
0.19 
-2.11** 
0.23 
Years since 
Migration 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.04** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
Age 0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
 
                                               
1 Note that in this new specification of the model, the dummy 
variables that measure “time spent out of employment” after exiting the 
first job in Germany do not overlap with “years since migration”, as 
occurred in the estimated models in the previous chapter. Imagine a 
woman who arrived in Germany in 1967 and started to work the same 
year of her arrival. In 1973 she quit her job to take care of her first child. 
By 1975, when she is still at home as a housewife, she has spent 2 years 
out of employment but 8 years in Germany. Therefore, both variables can 
be introduced simultaneously into the model to measure two different 
effects. In this case, the time spent in Germany without working, 
however, does not improve the likelihood of re-entering the labor force. 
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Age square -0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
(ref. 
Turkey) 
       
Former 
Yugoslavia 
0.23* 
0.12 
0.28** 
0.13 
0.26** 
0.13 
0.33** 
0.14 
0.34** 
0.14 
0.33** 
0.14 
0.32** 
0.16 
Greece -0.16 
0.15 
-0.09 
0.16 
-0.08 
0.15 
-0.02 
0.16 
-0.02 
0.16 
0.10 
0.17 
-0.05 
0.20 
Italy 0.07 
0.14 
0.11 
0.14 
0.11 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.16 
0.14 
0.22 
0.14 
0.06 
0.18 
Spain -0.29 
0.19 
-0.24 
0.20 
-0.20 
0.19 
-0.14 
0.20 
-0.13 
0.19 
-0.02 
0.20 
-0.29 
0.26 
Years of 
Education 
 0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
Work Exp. 
in Germany 
 -0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00** 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00* 
0.00 
-0.00* 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
Pregnancy   -0.98** 
0.30 
-0.97** 
0.30 
-0.97** 
0.30 
-0.93** 
0.30 
-1.03** 
0.39 
Number of 
children 
  0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
(ref. no 
child) 
       
Youngest 
child < 6 
  -0.19 
0.18 
-0.17 
0.18 
-0.23 
0.19 
-0.20 
0.18 
-0.16 
0.24 
Youngest 
child 6-16 
  0.20 
0.15 
0.21 
0.15 
0.19 
0.16 
0.19 
0.15 
0.22 
0.18 
(ref. Pre-
halt arrival) 
       
Post-halt 
arrival 
   0.23* 
0.12 
0.22* 
0.12 
-0.04 
0.15 
-0.06 
0.18 
(ref. 
unmarried 
at mig.) 
       
First-mover     0.42* 
0.25 
0.44* 
0.25 
0.62** 
0.31 
Reunited     -0.17 
0.14 
-0.16 
0.14 
0.02 
0.18 
Imported     -0.11 
0.14 
-0.11 
0.14 
 
Rate Female 
Unemp. 
     0.07** 
0.02 
0.06** 
0.03 
H’s educ. 
Years 
      -0.04 
0.04 
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H’s years 
since mig. 
      0.01 
0.01 
Constant -5.97** 
0.76 
-6.16** 
0.77 
-4.94** 
0.80 
-5.33** 
0.81 
-5.19** 
0.83 
-5.71** 
0.86 
-5.84** 
1.03 
Log 
likelihood 
Events 
-2631 
532 
-2624 
532 
-2622 
532 
-2608 
532 
-2600 
532 
-2565 
532 
-2554 
532 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. 
*Significant at 90%. 
 
 
On the other hand, the characteristics of the husband do not 
show a significant effect on their wives’ propensity to re-enter the 
labor force after the first exit. 
Previously, I found significant differences between women 
who were single at migration, first-movers, imported brides and 
reunited wives in their likelihood of entering the labor force upon 
arrival. However, these differences do not re-appear in the analysis 
of re-entries, which implies that marital status at migration and 
timing of migration within the couple can be taken as an indicator 
of the propensity to enter the labor force in the host country for the 
first time; but the subsequent decisions to participate of immigrant 
women who have already had some work experience in the host 
country, are not affected anymore by their particular mode of 
migration. 
Table 7.3 shows the estimates for all the entries together, 
without making the distinction between first entry and subsequent 
re-entries. Note that the obtained results largely reflect what I 
found in the analysis of the first employment. However, in these 
estimations the effect of additional time spent in Germany does 
increase the likelihood to work, while the length of residence of 
the husband continues to be non-significant and close to zero. In 
these estimations the negative effect of previous work experience 
in Germany re-appears.  This result may be a consequence of the 
fact that a large proportion of women who have had one long spell 
of employment never re-entered the labor force after exiting their 
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first job. On the other hand, the negative effects of belonging to 
the post-halt cohort and of unemployment remain. 
 
 
Table 7.3. Logit estimates of the likelihood of entering the German labor 
force, with all entries together 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(ref. < =12 
months) 
       
13-36 
months 
-1.61** 
0.09 
-1.61** 
0.09 
-1.55** 
0.09 
-1.54** 
0.09 
-1.52** 
0.09 
-1.52** 
0.09 
-1.47** 
0.1 
37-60 
months 
-2.10** 
0.12 
-2.11** 
0.12 
-2.01** 
0.12 
-2.01** 
0.12 
-1.98** 
0.12 
-1.97** 
0.12 
-2.01** 
0.14 
61-96 
months 
-2.19** 
0.12 
-2.21** 
0.13 
-2.14** 
0.13 
-2.14** 
0.13 
-2.11** 
0.13 
-2.10** 
0.13 
-2.04** 
0.14 
97 or more -2.24** 
0.1 
-2.31** 
0.13 
-2.31** 
0.14 
-2.36** 
0.14 
-2.33** 
0.14 
-2.32** 
0.14 
-2.34** 
0.15 
Years since 
Migration 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
0.02* 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.05** 
0.01 
Age 0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.01** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.00* 
0 
Age square -0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
(Ref. Turkey)        
Former 
Yugoslavia 
0.54** 
0.09 
0.48** 
0.09 
0.44** 
0.09 
0.34** 
0.09 
0.30** 
0.09 
0.31** 
0.1 
0.31** 
0.11 
Greece 0.61** 
0.1 
0.42** 
0.11 
0.41** 
0.11 
0.29** 
0.11 
0.22** 
0.11 
0.18 
0.11 
0.23* 
0.13 
Italy  0.45** 
0.09 
0.41** 
0.09 
0.40** 
0.09 
0.31** 
0.1 
0.29** 
0.1 
0.26** 
0.1 
0.23** 
0.11 
Spain 0.41** 
0.11 
0.32** 
0.12 
0.32** 
0.12 
0.16 
0.13 
0.09 
0.13 
0.05 
0.13 
0 
0.16 
Years of 
Education 
 0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04** 
0.02 
Years of pre-
mig work exp 
 0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
0.00** 
0 
Years work 
exp. in Germ. 
 0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
-0.00** 
0 
Pregnancy   -0.92** 
0.16 
-0.94** 
0.16 
-0.95** 
0.16 
-0.97** 
0.16 
-0.69** 
0.17 
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Number of 
Children 
  -0.03 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
(Ref. no child)        
Youngest 
child<6 
  -0.35** 
0.11 
-0.39** 
0.11 
-0.46** 
0.11 
-0.45** 
0.11 
-0.16 
0.13 
Youngest 
child 6-16 
  0.13 
0.11 
0.12 
0.11 
0.11 
0.11 
0.12 
0.11 
0.35** 
0.13 
(ref. Pre-halt)        
Post-halt 
arrival 
   -0.47** 
0.09 
-0.48** 
0.09 
-0.30** 
0.12 
-0.26** 
0.13 
(ref. single at 
migration) 
       
First-mover     0.02 
0.2 
0.02 
0.2 
 
Reunited     -0.47** 
0.11 
-0.48** 
0.11 
-0.56** 
0.2 
Imported     -0.58** 
0.11 
-0.57** 
0.11 
-0.69** 
0.22 
Rate Female 
Unemp. 
     -0.04** 
0.02 
-0.04** 
0.02 
H’s educ.       -0.03 
0.02 
H’s years 
since mig. 
      0 
0.01 
Constant -4.29** 
0.34 
-4.33** 
0.38 
-3.74** 
0.41 
-3.17** 
0.43 
-2.51** 
0.45 
-2.40** 
0.46 
-2.69** 
0.57 
Events 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
1181 
-5616 
1181 
-5582 
1181 
-5537 
1181 
-5516 
1181 
-5490 
1181 
-5487 
875 
-4165 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. ** Significant at 95%. * 
Significant at 90%. 
 
 
7.3. Exits from employment. The importance of separating 
exits to inactivity and exits to unemployment 
 
7.3.1. Exits from employment 
 
In this section I present the results for three sets of models that 
examine which are the factors that increase (or decrease) the 
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likelihood of immigrant women to exit their jobs in Germany. I 
first analyze all exits from employment; secondly, I distinguish 
between exits from employment to unemployment and exits from 
employment to housework, because these two types of transitions 
out of employment for women have been found to be affected in 
different ways by human capital and family-related factors (see 
Bernardi, 1999). 
The covariates utilized in the following models are the same 
that I used in the previous chapter and, thus, a detailed description 
of the meaning of each variable can be found there. There is only 
one new variable (“part-time”), which takes value 1 when the 
woman is in part-time employment and 0 when she is in full-time 
employment. In addition, these models add the variable “age” in a 
quadratic form and the variable “years since migration”, as well as 
information concerning the husband’s years of education and 
length of residence (as I did in the analyses of re-entries). By 
contrast, the variable “pre-migration experience” is excluded 
because I assume that, for women who have already found their 
first job in the host country, their permanency in that job will 
depend exclusively on host country-specific human capital (i.e. 
experience acquired in Germany). Therefore, the variable 
“previous work experience” in these models measures exclusively 
work experience acquired in Germany.  
Finally I have run models for all exits together because I have 
no theoretical reason to expect that factors that explain exits from 
the first spell of employment in Germany would be different from 
those that explain exits from subsequent jobs. 
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Table 7.4. Logit estimates of the likelihood of existing from employment 
to non-employment 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(ref. < =12 
months) 
       
13-36 
months 
-0.58** 
0.10 
-0.63** 
0.10 
-0.62** 
0.10 
-0.55** 
0.10 
-0.52** 
0.10 
-0.52** 
0.10 
-0.51** 
0.10 
37-60 
months 
-1.01** 
0.13 
-1.04** 
0.13 
-1.03** 
0.13 
-0.92** 
0.13 
-0.88** 
0.13 
-0.88** 
0.13 
-0.86** 
0.13 
61-96 
months 
-1.13** 
0.12 
-1.16** 
0.12 
-1.15** 
0.12 
-1.02** 
0.12 
-1.00** 
0.12 
-1.00** 
0.12 
-0.99** 
0.12 
97 or more -1.28** 
0.11 
-1.28** 
0.11 
-1.26** 
0.11 
-1.11** 
0.11 
-1.12** 
0.11 
-1.12** 
0.12 
-1.10** 
0.12 
Years since 
Migration 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.04** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.04** 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
Age -0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
Age square 0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
Age at 
marriage 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
(ref. Turkey)        
Former 
Yugoslavia 
-0.66** 
0.10 
-0.61** 
0.11 
-0.60** 
0.11 
-0.47** 
0.11 
-0.47** 
0.10 
-0.47** 
0.10 
-0.51** 
0.11 
Greece -0.70** 
0.11 
-0.67** 
0.11 
-0.68** 
0.12 
-0.56** 
0.11 
-0.41** 
0.11 
-0.41** 
0.11 
-0.41** 
0.12 
Italy -0.23** 
0.11 
-0.20* 
0.11 
-0.22** 
0.11 
-0.18* 
0.11 
-0.12 
0.11 
-0.12 
0.11 
-0.11 
0.11 
Spain -0.65** 
0.15 
-0.61** 
0.15 
-0.65** 
0.15 
-0.50** 
0.15 
-0.39** 
0.15 
-0.39** 
0.15 
-0.40** 
0.16 
Years of 
Education 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.02 
Years work 
exp. in Germ. 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
Pregnancy  0.77** 
0.13 
0.75** 
0.13 
0.83** 
0.13 
0.91** 
0.13 
0.91** 
0.13 
0.91** 
0.14 
Num children  0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
(Ref. no child)        
Youngest 
child< 6 
 0.17 
0.12 
0.15 
0.12 
0.24** 
0.12 
0.27** 
0.12 
0.27** 
0.12 
0.24** 
0.12 
Linking processes: migration, family and work (II) / 323 
 
Youngest 
child 6-16 
 -0.06 
0.11 
-0.07 
0.11 
-0.10 
0.11 
-0.12 
0.11 
-0.12 
0.11 
-0.13 
0.11 
(ref. single at 
migration) 
       
Reunited   0.13 
0.13 
0.07 
0.13 
0.04 
0.13 
0.04 
0.13 
0.01 
0.13 
First   -0.48** 
0.19 
-0.46** 
0.21 
-0.42** 
0.20 
-0.42** 
0.20 
-0.50** 
0.22 
Imported   0.17 
0.11 
0.03 
0.11 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.01 
0.12 
(ref. pre-halt)        
Posthalt 
arrival 
   0.79** 
0.09 
0.23* 
0.12 
0.22* 
0.12 
0.22* 
0.12 
Rate Female 
Unemp. 
    0.14** 
0.02 
0.14** 
0.02 
0.14** 
0.02 
(ref. full-time)        
Part-time      0.02 
0.09 
0.04 
0.10 
H’s educ.       0.03 
0.02 
H’s years 
since 
migration 
      0.00 
0.01 
Constant -1.45** 
0.47 
-2.13** 
0.50 
-2.31** 
0.50 
-2.87** 
0.48 
-3.41** 
0.47 
-3.41** 
0.47 
-3.73** 
0.50 
Log likelihood 
Events 
-4865 
375 
-4846 
375 
-4838 
375 
-4799 
375 
-4764 
375 
-4764 
375 
-4687 
374 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. 
*Significant at 90%. 
 
 
Results in Table 7.4 indicate that duration in employment 
clearly reduces the risk of exiting from employment, in 
accordance with the predictions of the human capital approach. 
However, education and previous experience in Germany do not 
seem to reduce the risk of exiting employment, in contradiction 
with what the human capital theorists would predict.  
In contrast to the lack of effect of the human capital variables, 
factors related to the family life cycle reveal important effects in 
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explaining the transition out of employment. Pregnancy 
significantly increases the exit risk (see Model 3 to Model 8). 
Besides, women who have at least one child of pre-school age are 
more likely to experience an exit from employment than childless 
women (reference category). On the other hand, women who only 
have children over 6 do not differ in their propensity to exit 
employment compared to childless women. Note, however, that 
the positive effect of “youngest child <6” becomes significant 
only after controlling for period of arrival (“post-halt”), in Model 
4. The reason for this is that women who entered Germany after 
the halt on recruitment are more likely to have pre-school children 
during the analysis time than their pre-halt counterparts, due to the 
differences in the stage of the family life cycle at which they 
migrated. 
By origin, all women appear less likely to exit from 
employment than Turks (reference category). However, these 
differences substantially reduce in size after controlling for the 
differences in the period of arrival of women of each nationality 
(compare the “origin” coefficients in Model 3 and 4). Moreover, 
the difference between Italians and Turks, which as small, 
completely disappears after introducing the variable “posthalt 
arrival” (see Model 4 to Model 9). 
In line with the results found in the analyses of entries, women 
who belong to the post-halt cohort have a higher risk of exiting the 
labor force (see Model 4), which confirm their weaker attachment 
to the labor force, even when the comparison is restricted only to 
women who worked. Furthermore, this differences across the two 
cohorts does not disappear neither reduces in size when potential 
differences in the type of family-migration are added to the model 
(see Model 5 and 6). In fact, no significant differences in the 
propensity to exit from employment emerge across the four groups 
of women previously defined, with the only exception being the 
first-movers who again are shown to be the most strongly attached 
to employment in the host country. 
A higher rate of female unemployment logically increases the 
risk of exiting employment among immigrant women. In addition, 
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the inclusion of this variable halved the effect of having entered 
Germany in the post-halt cohort (compare the effect of “post-halt” 
in Models 6 and 7). 
Finally, neither the husband’s length of residence in Germany 
nor his level of education affects the exit patterns of immigrant 
women in a significant manner (see Model 8). 
 
 
7.3.2. Exits to Inactivity and Exits to Unemployment. An important 
distinction 
 
It seems important to distinguish these two types of transitions 
out of employment, because the decision to leave employment and 
become a housewife appears to be a voluntary decision, whereas 
exiting employment to unemployment is largely an involuntary 
decision. In principle, women with a more traditional view of their 
role as wives and mothers are expected to be more likely to leave 
their employment in periods when the demand for family time 
increases. On the other hand, work-oriented women would be 
more reluctant to abandon their jobs voluntarily. However, it is 
well established that there are many other factors -aside from 
differences in women’s own tastes for work- that also constrain 
women’s choices concerning their labor behavior. 
In Table 7.5 I present the results for the estimation of the risk 
of exiting employment (voluntarily) and becoming a housewife. In 
Table 7.6 I estimate the same model for the transition from 
employment to unemployment. The only covariate in Table 7.6 
that is excluded from the estimations in Table 7.5 is the “rate of 
female unemployment”, since there is no theoretical reason to 
expect women to be more (or less) willing to leave their 
employment voluntarily in periods of recession. If they actually 
leave their jobs voluntarily, the macro-economic conditions in the 
host country should be irrelevant in their decision to become a 
housewife. 
There are noticeable differences in the factors that influence 
each of these two transitions out of employment. While time spent 
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in employment reduces the risk of leaving the labor force 
voluntary (see the “time” coefficients in Model 1 to Model 6 in 
Table 7.5), there is not a clear pattern of change in the risk of 
becoming unemployed depending on the time previously spent in 
employment. In fact, the risk of unemployment decreases when 
the woman is able to remain employed more than one year, but it 
increases for women who have been employed more than 5 years 
and it decreases again among women who managed to remain 
continuously in employment for more than 8 years (see Model 1 to 
Model 7 in Table 7.6). Similarly, the risk of unemployment does 
not vary significantly over the life cycle (the age coefficients are 
not significant at all in Table 7.6), whereas the risk of (voluntarily) 
leaving employment decreases initially and increases later on, as 
the woman ages (see Models 1 to 6 in Table 7.5).  
 
 
Table 7.5. Exits from employment to inactivity 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
(ref. <=12 months)       
13-36 months -0.82** 
0.13 
-0.87** 
0.13 
-0.86** 
0.13 
-0.78** 
0.13 
-0.74** 
0.13 
-0.73** 
0.13 
37-60 months -1.22** 
0.18 
-1.27** 
0.18 
-1.24** 
0.18 
-1.09** 
0.18 
-0.99** 
0.18 
-0.97** 
0.18 
61-96 months -1.48** 
0.18 
-1.52** 
0.18 
-1.49** 
0.18 
-1.31** 
0.19 
-1.19** 
0.18 
-1.20** 
0.19 
97 or more -1.87** 
0.18 
-1.88** 
0.18 
-1.81** 
0.18 
-1.56** 
0.18 
-1.35** 
0.18 
-1.37** 
0.18 
Years since 
Migration 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02* 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Age -0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01* 
0.00 
-0.01** 
0.00 
-0.01* 
0.00 
Age square 0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00** 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Age at marriage 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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(ref. Turkey)       
Former Yugoslavia -0.66** 
0.16 
-0.61** 
0.17 
-0.54** 
0.17 
-0.37** 
0.16 
-0.35** 
0.16 
-0.37** 
0.16 
Greece -0.56** 
0.16 
-0.52** 
0.17 
-0.51** 
0.17 
-0.33* 
0.17 
-0.29* 
0.18 
-0.29 
0.18 
Italy -0.15 
0.15 
-0.11 
0.16 
-0.13 
0.16 
-0.06 
0.15 
-0.00 
0.15 
-0.01 
0.16 
Spain -0.35* 
0.18 
-0.30 
0.19 
-0.35* 
0.19 
-0.13 
0.19 
-0.17 
0.19 
-0.18 
0.20 
Years of Education 0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
Years of Pre- 
migration Work 
Exp. 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
Pregnancy  0.69** 
0.17 
0.65** 
0.17 
0.76** 
0.17 
0.78** 
0.17 
0.75** 
0.18 
Number of Children  0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
(Ref. no children)       
Youngest child < 6  0.18 
0.17 
0.15 
0.17 
0.25 
0.17 
0.21 
0.17 
0.15 
0.17 
Youngest child 6-16  -0.13 
0.15 
-0.14 
0.16 
-0.19 
0.16 
-0.25 
0.15 
-0.27* 
0.15 
 (ref. reunited wife)       
Single at migration   0.30 
0.22 
0.14 
0.21 
0.06 
0.21 
0.06 
0.21 
First-mover   -1.26** 
0.40 
-1.22** 
0.40 
-1.20** 
0.40 
-1.51** 
0.49 
Imported   0.41** 
0.15 
0.24 
0.16 
0.14 
0.16 
0.07 
0.17 
(ref. pre-halt)       
Post-halt arrival    0.96** 
0.13 
0.84** 
0.13 
0.80** 
0.14 
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(ref. full-time)       
Part-time     0.59** 
0.13 
0.57** 
0.13 
H’s educ.      0.02 
0.03 
H’s years since 
migration 
     0.01 
0.01 
Constant -2.51** 
0.64 
-3.19** 
0.68 
-3.61** 
0.69 
-4.18** 
0.70 
-4.15** 
0.67 
-4.24** 
0.70 
Log likelihood 
Events 
-2491 
404 
-2481 
404 
-2467 
404 
-2436 
404 
-2423 
404 
-2389 
404 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. 
*Significant at 90%. 
 
 
By nationality, women from the former Yugoslavia are the 
only group significantly less likely to abandon their employment 
to be a housewife than Turks (see Model 1 to Model 6 in Table 
7.5). However, differences found between the other nationalities in 
the women’s likelihood to experience a transition from 
employment to inactivity disappeared once differences in the 
number and ages of children and differences between arrival 
cohorts are taking into account. In particular, the initial lower risk 
of leaving employment of Spanish women compared to Turkish 
women was entirely due to differences in child-bearing 
responsibilities, while the difference between Greek and Turkish 
women substantially reduced when differences in the period of 
arrival of these two nationalities were controlled for. 
On the contrary, the risk of becoming unemployed is 
consistently higher for Turkish women than for immigrant women 
of other nationalities. In fact, these differences do not disappear 
even after controlling for differences in all the other dimensions 
considered in the analysis (see the “country of origin” coefficients 
in Model 1 to Model 7 in Table 7.6). This clearly suggests the 
existence of a stronger occupational segmentation in the case of 
Turkish female workers and, also, the possibility of 
discrimination. 
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Neither education nor experience previously acquired in 
Germany affect the risk of leaving employment, whether voluntary 
or not. Therefore, the human capital tenets are once again rejected 
for the case of female immigrants in Germany. Family-related 
factors appear important in explaining the transition from 
employment to housewife but, in contrast, they barely affect the 
transition to unemployment. The number of children and their 
ages do not have a significant effect on the risk of becoming 
unemployed. In contrast, pregnant women are substantially more 
likely than non-pregnant women to leave their employment, and 
women who only have children of school-age appear less likely to 
leave their jobs than mothers with children of pre-school age.  
These results reinforce the idea that the transition to 
unemployment is largely involuntary. In fact, differences in the 
timing of migration within couples (i.e. differences between first-
movers, reunited wives and imported wives) are irrelevant in 
predicting the risk of unemployment, as can be seen in Model 3 in 
Table 7.6. By contrast, noticeable differences across these groups 
emerge when analyzing the risk of experiencing a transition out of 
the labor force. Wives who preceded their husbands in migration 
(i.e. first-movers) are strongly less likely to abandon their jobs 
than reunited wives (reference category), which confirms the 
stronger attachment of first-mover wives to the German labor 
market. Imported brides, in contrast, are more likely to leave 
employment than reunited wives (see the “imported” coefficient in 
Model 3 in Table 7.5). This result supports the view that describes 
imported brides as a type of immigrant women who are 
particularly “difficult” to integrate. 
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Table 7.6. Exits from employment to unemployment 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
(Ref. < =12 
months) 
       
13-36 months -0.86** 
0.19 
-0.86** 
0.19 
-0.86** 
0.19 
-0.84** 
0.19 
-0.82** 
0.19 
-0.84** 
0.19 
-0.84** 
0.19 
37-60 months -1.47** 
0.24 
-1.44** 
0.25 
-1.44** 
0.25 
-1.41** 
0.25 
-1.40** 
0.24 
-1.44** 
0.25 
-1.47** 
0.25 
61-96 months -0.85** 
0.18 
-0.81** 
0.18 
-0.81** 
0.18 
-0.78** 
0.18 
-0.79** 
0.18 
-0.84** 
0.18 
-0.85** 
0.18 
97 or more -1.38** 
0.19 
-1.35** 
0.19 
-1.35** 
0.19 
-1.29** 
0.2 
-1.32** 
0.19 
-1.45** 
0.2 
-1.46** 
0.2 
Years since 
mig. 
0.04** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.02 
Age 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Age square 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Age at 
marriage 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(Ref. 
Turkey) 
       
Former 
Yugoslavia 
-0.45** 
0.15 
-0.46** 
0.15 
-0.46** 
0.16 
-0.43** 
0.16 
-0.43** 
0.15 
-0.45** 
0.16 
-0.54** 
0.16 
Greece  -0.71** 
0.17 
-0.71** 
0.17 
-0.72** 
0.18 
-0.68** 
0.18 
-0.50** 
0.18 
-0.52** 
0.19 
-0.53** 
0.19 
Italy  -0.37** 
0.18 
-0.37** 
0.19 
-0.39** 
0.19 
-0.37** 
0.19 
-0.29 
0.18 
-0.34* 
0.19 
-0.35* 
0.19 
Spain  -0.96** 
0.28 
-0.97** 
0.28 
-0.99** 
0.28 
-0.94** 
0.28 
-0.82** 
0.28 
-0.78** 
0.28 
-0.80** 
0.29 
Years of 
Education 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.04 
0.04 
-0.05 
0.04 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.04 
-0.08* 
0.04 
Work exp. in 
Germ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Pregnancy  0.39 
0.24 
0.38 
0.24 
0.41* 
0.24 
0.49** 
0.25 
0.46* 
0.24 
0.48* 
0.25 
Num 
children 
 0.03 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
0 
0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
0 
0.06 
(ref. no child)        
Youngest 
child<6 
 -0.32* 
0.19 
-0.32 
0.19 
-0.27 
0.2 
-0.22 
0.19 
-0.18 
0.19 
-0.2 
0.2 
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Youngest 
child 6-16 
 -0.23 
0.17 
-0.23 
0.17 
-0.23 
0.17 
-0.25 
0.17 
-0.2 
0.17 
-0.21 
0.17 
(ref. 
reunited) 
       
Unmarried 
at migration 
  0.02 
0.21 
-0.01 
0.21 
-0.02 
0.21 
0.03 
0.21 
-0.01 
0.22 
First   -0.4 
0.27 
-0.39 
0.27 
-0.37 
0.26 
-0.39 
0.26 
-0.47 
0.29 
Imported   0.01 
0.18 
-0.06 
0.19 
-0.11 
0.19 
-0.03 
0.19 
-0.02 
0.2 
(ref. pre-
halt) 
       
Post-halt 
Arrival 
   0.34** 
0.15 
-0.24 
0.19 
-0.15 
0.19 
-0.17 
0.2 
Rate Female 
Unemp 
    0.15** 
0.03 
0.16** 
0.03 
0.16** 
0.03 
(ref. Full-time)        
Part-time      -0.68** 
0.18 
-0.64** 
0.18 
H’s educ. 
Years 
      0.06* 
0.03 
H’s years 
since mig. 
      0 
0.01 
Constant -3.15** 
0.82 
-3.41** 
0.84 
-3.45** 
0.85 
-3.68** 
0.84 
-4.25** 
0.85 
-4.22** 
0.85 
-4.90** 
0.88 
Log 
likelihood 
Events 
-2265 
351 
-2262 
351 
-2260 
351 
-2258 
351 
-2243 
351 
-2232 
351 
-2189 
351 
Source: GSOEP 1984-2002. Unweighted data. **Significant at 95%. 
*Significant at 90% 
 
 
However, although the stronger attachment to employment 
among first-mover wives remain no matter which other factors are 
controlled for (see Models 3 to 6 in Table 7.5), the higher 
likelihood of imported brides to leave their employment compared 
to reunited wives is largely explained by differences in the context 
of reception and the types of jobs (i.e. part-time versus full-time) 
where they concentrated. As can be seen in Models 4 and 5 in 
Table 7.5, the negative coefficient of the variable “imported” 
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reduces in size and becomes non-significant when the variables 
“period of arrival” and “part-time” are added to the model 
specification,. These results suggest, first of all, that immigrant 
women are more likely to leave part-time employment than full-
time jobs. The reason for explaining this might be that the 
economic cost of quitting a part-time job is not as high for the 
immigrant family as it is to quit a full-time job, due to the 
substantial wage differences between these two segments of the 
labor market. Secondly, the results indicate that imported brides 
make up a greater proportion of part-timers compared to reunited 
wives, which explains their higher risk of exiting employment to 
inactivity. 
The variable “part-time” also shows a significant effect on the 
risk of unemployment. However, in this case the effect is negative 
(see B= -0.68 in Model 6, in Table 7.6), which indicates that full-
time employment increases the likelihood of becoming 
unemployed because most of the dismissals that took place during 
the eighties occurred in manufacturing industries, where work was 
mainly full-time. Therefore, the effect of part-time employment on 
the labor performance of immigrant women is twofold: it increases 
the likelihood of voluntary exists from the labor force but, at the 
same time, it reduces the risk of unemployment. This differential 
effect is likely to be related to differences in the type of 
occupations available in these two segments of the labor market. 
However, we lack complete information on occupation for the 
time period under study. 
Finally, it is important to note that the characteristics of the 
husband –his education and his length of residence in Germany- 
do not change the results described so far. This is consistent with 
previous evidence that denies the existence of wage assimilation 
between immigrant and native men in Germany. 
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7.4. Conclusions 
 
In this Chapter I have analyzed the determinants of the 
transition out of the labor force, as well as the factors that favor 
(or not) the transition back into employment for those immigrant 
women who experienced more than one spell of employment 
during their stay in Germany. 
The likelihood of exiting employment is found to decrease as 
the time spent in employment increases, as expected. However, 
longer time of residence in Germany does not reduce the 
likelihood of exiting if the woman was not at work during that 
time. Therefore, there is no evidence of “assimilation” into 
employment for first generation immigrant women in Germany. 
Moreover, neither (years of) education nor (years of) work 
experience in Germany reduce significantly the probability of 
experiencing a transition out of the labor force, which confirms 
previous findings that rejected human capital as the adequate 
framework to explain the labor market performance of immigrants 
in Germany. 
On the other hand, family-related factors do affect 
significantly the labor behavior of working immigrant women. 
Pregnant immigrant women and women who have children of pre-
school age are more likely to exit the labor market than the rest of 
women. In addition, pregnancy also reduces the likelihood of re-
entering the labor market after experiencing an exit. 
First-mover wives (i.e. wives who preceded their husbands in 
migration) reveal as a very selective group of women with regard 
to their labor performance. They are not only more likely to re-
enter into employment but also less likely to exit and more likely 
to re-enter, in case an exit occurs. These results clearly indicate a 
very strong attachment to the labor force in the host country 
among this group of women. 
By country of origin, women from the former Yugoslavia, 
from Greece and from Spain are found to be less likely to exit 
employment than Turks and Italians. However, these differences 
across national groups widely vary if exits to inactivity are 
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distinguished from exits to unemployment. In fact, in line with 
previous results for non-immigrant women, these two transitions 
are found to be affected in different ways by the same factors. 
While women from the former Yugoslavia are the only group 
less likely then Turks to exit the labor force “voluntary”, women 
from all the nationalities included in the analyses are less likely to 
experience unemployment than their Turk counterparts. Therefore, 
within the group of female immigrant workers, the worse 
performance of Turks in terms of employment is related to their 
higher risk of unemployment rather to their –supposedly- stronger 
family-orientation. This suggests the existence of both high 
occupational segregation and discrimination against Turkish 
women in the labor market. 
On the other hand, family-related factors do not affect 
significantly the risk of unemployment, but they affect the risk of 
exiting employment to housewife. These results confirm the 
involuntary/voluntary character of these two transitions. 
Moreover, the timing of migration within the couple is irrelevant 
also to explain the transition to unemployment but not the 
transition to inactivity. As I said before, wives who preceded their 
husbands are significantly less likely to exit the labor force 
“voluntarily” than other women. Imported brides, in contrast, 
appeared more likely to experience voluntary exists from the labor 
force than women who had reunified with their husbands in 
Germany shortly after he left. However, this result mainly 
reflected differences in the macroeconomic conditions in the host 
country as well as in the structure of the labor market. Women 
who arrived after the halt on recruitment and who are in part-time 
employment are more likely to exit the labor force, although part-
time employment reduced the risk of unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
As was stated in the Introduction, the general aim of this 
dissertation was to answer two broad and interrelated questions: 
when and why do immigrants bring their relatives to the host 
country? And, how do family ties affect immigrants’ integration 
into their host societies? The immigrant population chosen for the 
analysis of these interrelated questions has been the original 
guestworker population in Germany and their descendents over 
the period from 1960 to 2002. 
After having analyzed the structure of family-induced chain 
migration, three main conclusions can be drawn with regard to the 
first question about when and why immigrants sponsor the 
migration of their closest relatives (spouse and children) to their 
host country. First of all, family chain migration takes different 
forms over time and across generations. While family 
reunification, in strict terms, is exclusive of adult first generation 
immigrants who had constituted their own families prior to 
migration, middle and second generations may induce further 
family-chain immigration through the importation of spouses. 
These two phenomena must be neatly distinguished for the clarity 
of immigration research and the efficacy of immigration policies. 
Secondly, the reunification of spouses and older children often 
starts taking place from the very first moment the flow initiates, as 
part of a household strategy for maximizing income in the shortest 
possible time. Thirdly, immigrants and prospective migrants react 
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strategically to changes in immigration policies and are 
particularly responsive to the macro-economic situation in the 
country of destination, which often distorts the real effects of those 
policies. 
With regard to the second question concerning the relationship 
between family ties and the integration of immigrants into their 
host societies, the analyses undertaken in this dissertation suggest 
that the importation of spouses from the country of origin is a 
traditional form of marriage generally associated with more 
traditional forms of family life such as living in extended 
households. On the other hand, the idea that imported wives are 
women with more traditional family values and, therefore, less 
likely to participate in the host labor market is only partially 
confirmed. In fact, this conclusion is largely dependent upon the 
comparison group selected and the period of migration. 
Specifically, one of the main findings of this dissertation with 
regard to the integration of immigrant women into the host labor 
market is that their labor performance is strongly influenced by the 
context of reception they encountered at their arrival, as well as by 
the varying macro-economic conditions at destination. 
In the following pages I will develop each of these conclusions 
in more detail, as well as their implications for both immigration 
research and immigration policies. 
 
 
8.2. Substantive results 
 
One of the main major findings in this dissertation is that 
family reunification and, in particular, the reunification of wives 
took place for the most part prior to the halt on recruitment 
imposed in November 1973. According to the immigrant sample 
contained in GSOEP, approximately half of the total number of 
married male guest workers who arrived in Germany between 
1960 and 1973 migrated jointly with their wives. Moreover, only 
15% of the reunited wives included in GSOEP did not join their 
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husband in Germany until after 1973 despite having had the 
possibility to do so earlier. 
These results strongly challenge the widely accepted idea that 
postwar migration to Germany mainly comprised single male 
migrant workers until the early seventies and turned into family 
migration after the ban on labor migration in 1973. Obviously, the 
family migration sequence of some immigrant households fits this 
image. However, they represented a minor fraction of total guest 
workers. In fact, both joint couple migration and reunification of 
the wife in a short period are the two much more frequent 
migration patterns.  
A major concern, however, is the possibility that the selection 
bias of GSOEP’s immigrant sample is behind the previously 
described results. GSOEP started in 1984, which means that it 
only surveyed immigrants who had continued to reside in 
Germany until that time. In other words, long stayers are over-
represented in my immigrant sub-sample. If for any reason, 
individuals who migrated jointly with their spouses and who 
tended to bring their spouses to the host country shortly after they 
migrated themselves are also more likely to stay longer periods of 
time, I may have overstated the relative importance of these two 
types of family migration. Even though this possibility cannot be 
completely ruled out, there seem to be good reasons that support 
the reliability of my results. First of all, wives who took longer to 
join their husbands abroad would have arrived in Germany more 
recently and, therefore, they would be more likely to be included 
in my sample. Secondly, the common argument regarding family 
reunification in the context of traditional labor migration is that 
the husband arrives earlier and the female partner follows after a 
stable job is found by the male first-mover. If the process actually 
works like this, why should reunited wives who took longer to join 
their husbands abroad be expected to have returned earlier to their 
home countries than those who joined their husbands 
immediately? 
Notwithstanding some uncertainty about the exact scale of the 
joint couple migration phenomenon, the results of this dissertation 
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seem sufficient to at least call for a revision of the conventional 
periodization of the process of postwar migration to Germany. Not 
only did a large proportion of wives join their husbands in 
Germany long before 1973, but the majority of adult women who 
were admitted since were imported brides, rather than reunited 
wives. In other words, the greater part of adult female immigration 
to Germany since the mid-seventies were not made up of wives 
who decided to join their husbands out of fear of even longer 
periods of separation but rather newly married brides imported by 
middle-generation young males.    
The empirical distinction between these two forms of adult 
female migration is another of the key findings of this research. 
Entries due to the importation of spouses by middle and second 
generation single immigrants constitute a large proportion of total 
current immigration to Germany. This form of family-induced 
chain migration is more common among middle generation 
immigrants than it was for their parents’ generation. However, a 
middle generation single immigrant who married someone is more 
likely to import a spouse from the country of origin if he married 
during the seventies than if he married during the eighties. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that the practice of importing 
spouses is increasing over time, although its numerical magnitude 
has increased recently in relative terms due to the reduction of 
other types of migration such as single independent migration or 
migration for the purpose of family reunification. 
Data limitations do not allow us to yet ascertain whether the 
practice of importing spouses is declining or not among the second 
generation compared to the middle one. However, what clearly 
emerged from the empirical analyses carried out in the previous 
chapters is that the propensity to mix-marry has clearly increased 
for children born to immigrant parents in Germany compared to 
their first and middle generation counterparts. Similarly, one of the 
most striking results concerning immigrants’ marital choices were 
the differences found depending on gender. While the practice of 
importing spouses is clearly related to low educational levels 
among men, this is not the case among women. The reasons why 
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education does not symmetrically affect the marital choices of 
immigrant men and women remain difficult to understand. 
What is clear from my results, however, is that the practice of 
importing spouses is strongly linked to traditional family 
arrangements such as living in extended households after 
marriage: individuals who have imported their spouse from origin 
are more likely to live with other relatives apart from their spouse 
and children after marriage, compared to those who either marry a 
native or a co-national immigrant. This result may be seen as 
supporting the idea that the importation of spouses often reflects 
the practice of arranged marriages within the extended own family 
in the countries of origin. 
Finally, the analysis of the employment cycles of immigrant 
women reveals that women who preceded their husbands in 
migration are definitely the most positively selected with regard to 
their labor characteristics. In fact, they are even more likely to 
participate than women who were single at migration and have 
married during their stay in Germany.  In addition, their 
attachment to the labor force is notably stronger than that of other 
immigrant women. However, there are not clear-cut differences 
between other types of women, especially between imported 
brides and reunited wives. The apparently stronger attachment to 
the German labor market among reunited wives compared to 
imported brides disappears once differences in period of arrival 
and unemployment level in the country of immigration are 
controlled for. While reunited wives entered Germany for the most 
part during the recruitment period, most imported brides have 
arrived in Germany after 1974, and this seems to be a key factor in 
explaining their different post-migration labor performance. 
Alongside the dramatic increase in inflation rates and 
unemployment after the fist oil crisis, the labor measures adopted 
by the German government to protect native workers from 
immigrants’ competition particularly hampered adult female 
immigrants that arrived in those years. In addition, the structure of 
the female labor market profoundly changed since the early 
eighties with a huge expansion of part-time semi-skilled 
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occupations, which seems to have greatly restricted the labor 
prospects of imported wives, who had generally arrived more 
recently than reunited wives. 
Moreover, the “Family Investment Hypothesis” is not 
supported as a valid explanation of the labor behavior of first 
generation immigrant women in Germany. In fact, predictions 
based on the human capital theory are generally rejected by the 
obtained results, especially for the cohort of women who arrived 
prior to the halt on recruitment. On the contrary, the theory of 
labor market segmentation and, above all, the different context of 
reception encountered by older and more recent cohorts of 
immigrant women seem to be the main factors underlying the 
wide differences in their labor outcomes. Not only the higher 
levels of female unemployment since the mid-seventies onwards, 
but also the restrictive measures approved by the German 
government in order to protect native workers from the foreign 
competition seem to have severely damaged the economic 
prospects of more recent female immigrants to Germany. The 
“Italian exception” is paradigmatic in illustrating this point: Italian 
immigrant women who, due to their EC membership, were 
exempted from the restrictions imposed on the entry and labor 
rights of other immigrants, do not experienced any decline in their 
rate of labor participation before and after the halt, despite of 
having traditionally being one of the groups least likely to work in 
Germany. 
 
 
8.3. Methodological results 
 
Three main points must be made in relation to the 
methodological aspects of this dissertation. The first two relate to 
basic issues that must be taken into account in order to obtain a 
proper understanding of the demographic dynamics of immigrant 
populations. First of all, the fundamental need to distinguish not 
only between first and second generation but also the intermediate 
category “middle generation”, whose special experience of 
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migration also involves particularities in their demographic 
behavior, as has been shown with regard to the practice of 
importing spouses. The second recommendation suggested by the 
results consists in avoiding the confusion between category of 
admission and reasons for migration. The strategies developed by 
migrant families are commonly much more varied than reception 
policies; as a result, statistics based on official registers often 
merge within the same category migrants of a very different kind. 
The large number of “reunited spouses” that joined their husbands 
in Germany under the rubric of “recruited workers” during the 
pre-halt period constitutes a paramount example of this problem 
that often distorts the interpretation of immigration statistics in 
most countries. In fact, this limitation in official statistics has led 
us to assume that economic and family reasons for migration are 
mutually exclusive, instead of mutually reinforcing as some 
findings in this dissertation suggest. 
Finally, the main methodological contribution made by this 
dissertation has to do with the application of dynamic techniques 
of analysis to the study of the family and labor aspects of 
international immigration. The availability of longitudinal data 
over a long period of time has allowed me to examine changes in 
the demographic and labor behavior of immigrants across 
generations, and to also examine the effect that changes in the 
immigration policies and the labor market conditions have on the 
behavior of immigrants concerning marital decisions, household 
formation and labor market participation. In this regard, the 
analysis of the effect that the halt on recruitment and the reform of 
the children allowances had on the pace of the family reunification 
process would have been impossible without longitudinal data. 
The utilization of time failure accelerated models, which takes the 
duration of the process under investigation as the dependent 
variable, has permitted me to test empirically the widespread but 
controversial idea that the halt on recruitment speeded up the 
process of family reunification. Although some delayed effect of 
the halt on recruitment cannot be completely ruled out, the 
hypothesis that it was the reform of the system of child allowances 
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that truly accelerated the process of family reunification appears 
more convincing and supported by the results.  
On the other hand, the application of transition rate models to 
the analysis of employment cycles has also permitted a proper test 
of the “family investment hypothesis”, which was originally 
developed for explaining the wage and labor performance of 
immigrant women in the US context. The obtained results 
suggested no empirical support of this hypothesis for explaining 
the labor behavior of married immigrant women in Germany. The 
reason for this, however, is not that most immigrant women only 
followed their husbands once they had secured a stable job in 
Germany and, therefore, they never entered the labor force in the 
host country, as it has been argued by previous studies in the area. 
On the contrary, a large majority of first generation immigrant 
women have worked in Germany and the characteristics of the 
length of residence of their husband in Germany does not appear 
to affect them labor behavior significantly, once the period of 
arrival and the type of employment (i.e. full-time or part-time 
employment) is taking into account. 
 
 
8.4. Limitations and future lines for research 
 
One of the major limitations in this dissertation relates to the 
absence of a non-migrant sample, which would have allowed us to 
draw conclusions not only about the migration strategies of those 
who came and stayed, but also about the selection mechanisms 
underlying the migration decision. This make difficult to fully 
understand the connection between border control policies, 
selection and integration and, therefore, the possibility of 
evaluating past immigration policies as a whole.  
Alongside the lack of information about the non-migrant 
population, the utilized dataset included very little information 
about the community level in the host country. Although I tried to 
minimize the impact of this by adding some indicators at the 
national level (e.g. within-group sex imbalances), they are clearly 
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too rough to approximate some dimensions of the processes under 
examination.  
On the other hand, differences across groups of origin (e.g. the 
tendency of Greek couples to migrate together and to reunify in 
Germany faster than the rest of immigrants) remain largely 
unexplained. The lack of information about the origin 
communities and the immigrants’ own purposes constituted a 
major limitation in this regard. This omission affects particularly 
the gender dimension of the family migration process. Although I 
can discern behavioral differences between men and women and 
some of the factors related to those differences, on many occasions 
a clear interpretation of the results is not easy (e.g. the differential 
effect of education on the propensity to import partners from the 
origin country revealed). Complementary research utilizing more 
qualitative techniques could have extremely helpful with regard to 
these issues. 
Finally, the intrinsically dynamic nature of immigration and 
the changes in the immigrants’ own strategies over time are 
somehow neglected along this study. The reunification of spouses, 
for instance, is assumed to occur once and for ever and, 
consequently, the phenomenon of “transnational immigrant 
families” remains unexplored. In this regard, it is imperative in 
policy terms to clarify the link between family reunification, 
permanent settlement and remittance behavior. Additionally, the 
impact that the separation of spouses and separation of parents and 
child children have on a wide range of aspects of the children’s 
life, should definitely be investigated. 
On the other hand, with regard to the practice of importing 
spouses, its impact on the integration of the individuals involved 
must be better analyzed. This would include not only the spouses 
themselves but also their children and other members of the 
extended family who often live with in the same household. For 
instance, it would be important to analyze whether imported wives 
have higher fertility rates than other immigrant women and, if so, 
whether this is due to differences in their family life cycle at the 
time of migration or to their “more traditional” values concerning 
344 / Family and labor strategies in migration 
 
gender roles and family life. Another possibility in this area would 
be to analyze differences in the educational results of immigrant 
children depending on whether one of their parents had been 
imported or not. 
Continuing with the practice of importing spouses, the impact 
that recent restrictive measures introduced in countries like 
Denmark or the Netherlands have, not only on the overall level of 
newly admitted imported spouses, but also on the marital behavior 
of the immigrant population at marriageable age who reside in 
these countries, should be paid attention as well. In particular, it 
would be interesting to research how this practice evolves across 
generations, since evidence relating to the second generation is 
still at a very basic level. 
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